Delkei Derrett v. the State of Texas

• Court: Texas Court of Appeals, 7th District (Amarillo)
• Decided: March 31, 2026
• Docket: 07-25-00358-CR
• Status: Published

Opinion

In The Court of Appeals Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

No. 07-25-00358-CR

DELKEI DERRETT, APPELLANT

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE

On Appeal from the Criminal District Court 3 Tarrant County, Texas1 Trial Court No. 1792992, Honorable Douglas A. Allen, Presiding

March 31, 2026 MEMORANDUM OPINION Before PARKER, C.J., and DOSS and YARBROUGH, JJ.

Pending before this Court is a motion to withdraw supported by a brief filed

pursuant to Anders v. California.2 Appellant, Delkei Derrett, was charged with sexual

assault3 and, following a jury trial, was sentenced to serve ten years of imprisonment. At

1 Because this matter was transferred from the Second Court of Appeals, we apply its precedent

when it conflicts with that of the Seventh Court of Appeals. TEX. R. APP. P. 41.3. 2 Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 18 L. Ed.2d 493 (1967).

3 See TEX. PENAL CODE § 22.011(a)(1), (b)(3), (5). the recommendation of the jury, the trial court suspended the sentence and placed

Appellant on community supervision for eight years. The court also sentenced Appellant

to serve three days of confinement in the Tarrant County jail as a condition of community

supervision.4

Appellant was charged with intentionally or knowingly causing the penetration of

C.D.’s mouth by his penis without her consent, including while she was unaware or

physically unable to resist. At trial, the evidence showed that in April 2023, Appellant

joined C.D. and her sister to celebrate C.D.’s 26th birthday, during which C.D. became

intoxicated at a bar. Appellant drove the group home in C.D.’s car, where she appeared

largely passed out, vomited multiple times, and was described as “very out of it.” Upon

arriving, C.D.’s sister went inside, while C.D.’s mother, concerned when the two remained

in the car, found Appellant standing outside the open passenger door with his pants

unbuckled. He claimed he had been urinating. C.D.’s mother described C.D. as a “limp”

and unresponsive “dead fish.” C.D. testified she experienced choking and gagging

sensations but had little memory of events, stating she was unaware of any assault, felt

out of control of her body, and was blacking out. Appellant, by contrast, testified C.D.

was responsive and initiated contact, though he denied any further conduct.5

In support of his motion to withdraw, counsel certifies he has conducted a

conscientious examination of the record, and in his opinion, it reflects no potentially

4 A trial court has discretion to require, as a condition of community supervision in a felony case, a

defendant submit to a term of confinement in a county jail not to exceed 180 days. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 42A.302. 5 During his interview with police, Appellant initially claimed there was no sexual contact. Appellant’s version of the events changed as the interview progressed.

2 plausible basis for reversal of Appellant’s conviction. Anders, 386 U.S. at 744–45; In re

Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 406 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). In counsel’s brief, he states he

believes no reversible error occurred in the underlying proceeding. Counsel frankly and

thoroughly discusses why, under the controlling authorities, the record supports that

conclusion. See High v. State, 573 S.W.2d 807, 813 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978). Counsel

has demonstrated that he has complied with the requirements of Anders and In re

Schulman by (1) providing a copy of the brief and a motion to access the appellate record

to Appellant, (2) notifying him of the right to file a pro se response if he desired to do so,

and (3) informing him of the right to file a pro se petition for discretionary review. In re

Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 408. By letter, this Court granted Appellant an opportunity to

exercise his right to file a response to counsel’s brief, should he be so inclined. Id. at 409

n.23. Appellant did not file a response or any other correspondence, and the State did

not favor us with a brief.

By the Anders brief, counsel evaluates potential issues but then candidly concedes

he is unable to find any meritorious issues to advance on appeal and concludes the

appeal is frivolous.

We too have independently examined the record to determine whether there are

any non-frivolous issues which might support this appeal. See Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S.

75, 80, 109 S. Ct. 346, 102 L. Ed. 2d 300 (1988); In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 409;

Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). We have found no such

issues. See Gainous v. State, 436 S.W.2d 137, 138 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969); Nunez v.

State, No. 02-23-00300-CR, 2025 Tex. App. LEXIS 82, at *2–3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth

Jan. 9, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). After reviewing the 3 record and counsel’s brief, we agree that there is no plausible basis for reversal of

Appellant’s conviction. See Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 826–27 (Tex. Crim. App.

2005).

We affirm the trial court’s judgment and grant counsel’s motion to withdraw.6

Alex Yarbrough Justice

Do not publish.

6 Counsel shall, within five days after the opinion is handed down, send Appellant a copy of the

opinion and judgment, along with notification of Appellant’s right to file a pro se petition for discretionary review. See TEX. R. APP. P. 48.4. This duty is an informational one, not a representational one. It is ministerial in nature, does not involve legal advice, and exists after the court of appeals has granted counsel’s motion to withdraw. In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 411 n.33.