25CA2381 Delgado v ICAO 03-19-2026
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 25CA2381 Industrial Claim Appeals Office of the State of Colorado WC No. 25657-2025
Javier Delgado,
Petitioner,
v.
Industrial Claim Appeals Office of the State of Colorado,
Respondent.
ORDER SET ASIDE AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS
Division VII Opinion by JUDGE GOMEZ Pawar and Martinez*, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced March 19, 2026
Javier Delgado, Pro Se
No Appearance for Respondent
* Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art. VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2025. ¶1 Javier Delgado appeals the denial of his unemployment
benefits claim. We set aside the Panel’s order and remand the case
for additional factual findings.
I. Background
¶2 Delgado worked as an accountant for Progressive Employer
Management Co. III (Employer) before resigning from his position.
Delgado then filed a claim for unemployment insurance benefits.
Upon review, a deputy for the Division of Unemployment Insurance
(the Division) found that Delgado was disqualified from receiving
benefits pursuant to section 8-73-108(5)(e)(II), C.R.S. 2025, which
disqualifies claimants who resign due to dissatisfaction with
reasonable supervision. Delgado appealed that determination, and
the Division set the matter for an evidentiary hearing regarding the
reasons for his job separation.1
1 Employer didn’t attend the initial hearing, and the hearing officer
found that Delgado was entitled to benefits. Employer requested, and received, a new hearing. Following that proceeding, the hearing officer issued a decision finding that Delgado was disqualified from receiving benefits. Delgado appealed that decision to the Panel, which remanded the case for further findings. In this opinion, we discuss only the second hearing and the hearing officer’s order, as revised on remand.
1 ¶3 After reviewing the evidence, the hearing officer found that,
during Delgado’s employment, Employer discussed performance
concerns with him on multiple occasions. The hearing officer
further found that, on Delgado’s final day at work, Employer
summoned him for a meeting and requested that he leave his work
computer and other work related items at his desk and bring all his
personal belongings with him. The hearing officer found that
Employer merely intended to discuss Delgado’s performance and
didn’t intend to terminate his employment unless the discussion
didn’t go well. But, the hearing officer found, Delgado preempted
the performance discussion by tendering his resignation letter.
Thus, the hearing officer found that Delgado “resigned his
employment because he believed [Employer] was going to terminate
his employment, which was not the case.” And because Delgado
“did not present any reasoning for his resignation, the hearing
officer conclude[d] that [his] resignation was for personal reasons.”
¶4 Based on these findings and conclusions, the hearing officer
determined that Delgado was disqualified from receiving benefits
pursuant to section 8-73-108(5)(e)(XXII), which relates to
2 resignation from employment for personal reasons. Delgado
appealed the hearing officer’s decision, and the Panel affirmed.
II. Standard of Review and Applicable Legal Principles
¶5 The hearing officer serves as the fact finder in unemployment
cases. See Eckart v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 775 P.2d 97, 99
(Colo. App. 1989). A claimant’s entitlement to benefits depends on
the reason they separated from their employment, which is a
factual matter for the hearing officer to resolve. Id. In resolving
that issue, the hearing officer evaluates the totality of the evidence
and determines the factors motivating a claimant’s separation. Id.
¶6 We may set aside the Panel’s decision only if (1) the Panel
acted without or in excess of its powers; (2) the decision was
procured by fraud; (3) the factual findings don’t support the Panel’s
decision; or (4) the decision is erroneous as a matter of law. § 8-74-
107(6), C.R.S. 2025. We may not disturb “administrative findings
as to the facts” if those findings are “supported by substantial
evidence.” § 8-74-107(4). Substantial evidence is evidence that is
“probative, credible, and competent, of a character which would
warrant a reasonable belief in the existence of facts supporting a
particular finding, without regard to the existence of contradictory
3 testimony or contrary inferences.” Rathburn v. Indus. Comm’n, 566
P.2d 372, 373 (Colo. App. 1977).
¶7 Under section 8-73-108(5)(e)(XXII), a claimant is disqualified
from unemployment benefits if they resign “under conditions
involving personal reasons, unless the personal reasons were
compelling pursuant to other provisions of [section 8-73-108(4)].”
¶8 The disqualifying provision of section 8-73-108(5)(e) “must be
read in light of the express legislative intent . . . to provide benefits
to those who become unemployed through ‘no fault’ of their own.”
Cole v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 964 P.2d 617, 618 (Colo. App.
1998) (quoting § 8-73-108(1)(a)). Thus, even if the hearing officer’s
findings may support a disqualification, a claimant may still be
entitled to benefits if the totality of the circumstances establishes
that their job separation occurred through no fault of their own. Id.
In this context, “fault” requires a volitional act or “the exercise of
some control or choice by the claimant in the circumstances
resulting in the separation such that the claimant can be said to be
responsible for the separation.” Id. A claimant’s responsibility or
“fault” for their job separation is an ultimate legal conclusion based
on the established findings of evidentiary fact. Id. at 618-19.
4 ¶9 Considering claimants’ volition in the context of resigning,
Colorado courts have concluded that “if an employee quits in the
reasonable belief that termination is imminent, such termination is
not voluntary.” Goddard v. E G & G Rocky Flats, Inc., 888 P.2d 369,
371 (Colo. App. 1994). Thus, a claimant who resigns under such
circumstances is entitled to receive unemployment benefits. Id.
¶ 10 Because Delgado represents himself, we construe his
arguments liberally, giving effect to their substance rather than
their form. See Arnold v. Brent, 2024 COA 104, ¶ 8.
III. Application
¶ 11 Delgado argues, among other things, that the hearing officer
erred in finding — and the Panel erred in affirming — that he
voluntarily resigned his position. He states that he didn’t want to
resign; that he “only prepared [his] resignation letter in a moment of
grief[,] as [he] was about to lose [his] job”; and that he “handed [his]
resignation letter to [Employer] in a moment of grief and duress to
try and be in control of an unfamiliar situation.” Construing
Delgado’s argument liberally, we discern that he essentially
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25CA2381 Delgado v ICAO 03-19-2026
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 25CA2381 Industrial Claim Appeals Office of the State of Colorado WC No. 25657-2025
Javier Delgado,
Petitioner,
v.
Industrial Claim Appeals Office of the State of Colorado,
Respondent.
ORDER SET ASIDE AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS
Division VII Opinion by JUDGE GOMEZ Pawar and Martinez*, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced March 19, 2026
Javier Delgado, Pro Se
No Appearance for Respondent
* Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art. VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2025. ¶1 Javier Delgado appeals the denial of his unemployment
benefits claim. We set aside the Panel’s order and remand the case
for additional factual findings.
I. Background
¶2 Delgado worked as an accountant for Progressive Employer
Management Co. III (Employer) before resigning from his position.
Delgado then filed a claim for unemployment insurance benefits.
Upon review, a deputy for the Division of Unemployment Insurance
(the Division) found that Delgado was disqualified from receiving
benefits pursuant to section 8-73-108(5)(e)(II), C.R.S. 2025, which
disqualifies claimants who resign due to dissatisfaction with
reasonable supervision. Delgado appealed that determination, and
the Division set the matter for an evidentiary hearing regarding the
reasons for his job separation.1
1 Employer didn’t attend the initial hearing, and the hearing officer
found that Delgado was entitled to benefits. Employer requested, and received, a new hearing. Following that proceeding, the hearing officer issued a decision finding that Delgado was disqualified from receiving benefits. Delgado appealed that decision to the Panel, which remanded the case for further findings. In this opinion, we discuss only the second hearing and the hearing officer’s order, as revised on remand.
1 ¶3 After reviewing the evidence, the hearing officer found that,
during Delgado’s employment, Employer discussed performance
concerns with him on multiple occasions. The hearing officer
further found that, on Delgado’s final day at work, Employer
summoned him for a meeting and requested that he leave his work
computer and other work related items at his desk and bring all his
personal belongings with him. The hearing officer found that
Employer merely intended to discuss Delgado’s performance and
didn’t intend to terminate his employment unless the discussion
didn’t go well. But, the hearing officer found, Delgado preempted
the performance discussion by tendering his resignation letter.
Thus, the hearing officer found that Delgado “resigned his
employment because he believed [Employer] was going to terminate
his employment, which was not the case.” And because Delgado
“did not present any reasoning for his resignation, the hearing
officer conclude[d] that [his] resignation was for personal reasons.”
¶4 Based on these findings and conclusions, the hearing officer
determined that Delgado was disqualified from receiving benefits
pursuant to section 8-73-108(5)(e)(XXII), which relates to
2 resignation from employment for personal reasons. Delgado
appealed the hearing officer’s decision, and the Panel affirmed.
II. Standard of Review and Applicable Legal Principles
¶5 The hearing officer serves as the fact finder in unemployment
cases. See Eckart v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 775 P.2d 97, 99
(Colo. App. 1989). A claimant’s entitlement to benefits depends on
the reason they separated from their employment, which is a
factual matter for the hearing officer to resolve. Id. In resolving
that issue, the hearing officer evaluates the totality of the evidence
and determines the factors motivating a claimant’s separation. Id.
¶6 We may set aside the Panel’s decision only if (1) the Panel
acted without or in excess of its powers; (2) the decision was
procured by fraud; (3) the factual findings don’t support the Panel’s
decision; or (4) the decision is erroneous as a matter of law. § 8-74-
107(6), C.R.S. 2025. We may not disturb “administrative findings
as to the facts” if those findings are “supported by substantial
evidence.” § 8-74-107(4). Substantial evidence is evidence that is
“probative, credible, and competent, of a character which would
warrant a reasonable belief in the existence of facts supporting a
particular finding, without regard to the existence of contradictory
3 testimony or contrary inferences.” Rathburn v. Indus. Comm’n, 566
P.2d 372, 373 (Colo. App. 1977).
¶7 Under section 8-73-108(5)(e)(XXII), a claimant is disqualified
from unemployment benefits if they resign “under conditions
involving personal reasons, unless the personal reasons were
compelling pursuant to other provisions of [section 8-73-108(4)].”
¶8 The disqualifying provision of section 8-73-108(5)(e) “must be
read in light of the express legislative intent . . . to provide benefits
to those who become unemployed through ‘no fault’ of their own.”
Cole v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 964 P.2d 617, 618 (Colo. App.
1998) (quoting § 8-73-108(1)(a)). Thus, even if the hearing officer’s
findings may support a disqualification, a claimant may still be
entitled to benefits if the totality of the circumstances establishes
that their job separation occurred through no fault of their own. Id.
In this context, “fault” requires a volitional act or “the exercise of
some control or choice by the claimant in the circumstances
resulting in the separation such that the claimant can be said to be
responsible for the separation.” Id. A claimant’s responsibility or
“fault” for their job separation is an ultimate legal conclusion based
on the established findings of evidentiary fact. Id. at 618-19.
4 ¶9 Considering claimants’ volition in the context of resigning,
Colorado courts have concluded that “if an employee quits in the
reasonable belief that termination is imminent, such termination is
not voluntary.” Goddard v. E G & G Rocky Flats, Inc., 888 P.2d 369,
371 (Colo. App. 1994). Thus, a claimant who resigns under such
circumstances is entitled to receive unemployment benefits. Id.
¶ 10 Because Delgado represents himself, we construe his
arguments liberally, giving effect to their substance rather than
their form. See Arnold v. Brent, 2024 COA 104, ¶ 8.
III. Application
¶ 11 Delgado argues, among other things, that the hearing officer
erred in finding — and the Panel erred in affirming — that he
voluntarily resigned his position. He states that he didn’t want to
resign; that he “only prepared [his] resignation letter in a moment of
grief[,] as [he] was about to lose [his] job”; and that he “handed [his]
resignation letter to [Employer] in a moment of grief and duress to
try and be in control of an unfamiliar situation.” Construing
Delgado’s argument liberally, we discern that he essentially
contends that he was constructively discharged (if not actually
discharged). We agree that the hearing officer and the Panel erred.
5 ¶ 12 As a threshold matter, we note that we cannot review whether
the factual findings support the decision, because it is unclear what
the hearing officer found caused Delgado’s employment separation.
The hearing officer’s finding that Delgado resigned because “he
believed he was going to be discharged” contradicts the finding that
Delgado “did not present any reasoning for his resignation” and
thus implicitly resigned for unspecified “personal reasons.” We
remand the case, in part, for clarification on this issue.
¶ 13 And to the extent that the hearing officer ultimately found that
Delgado “resigned his employment . . . because he believed he was
going to be discharged,” additional findings are necessary.
Although the hearing officer noted that Delgado’s belief was
“subjective” and that he hadn’t taken “proactive steps” to determine
whether his assumption was correct, the hearing officer made no
findings as to whether Delgado’s belief was subjectively reasonable.
Yet some the hearing officer’s findings — such as that Delgado was
told to come to a meeting with his personal belongings and while
leaving his work-related items behind — might support a finding
that Delgado’s belief was reasonable.
6 ¶ 14 The hearing officer’s failure to make a finding as to
reasonableness establishes a legal error, as Delgado would be
entitled to benefits if he resigned based on a reasonable — even if
incorrect — belief that termination was imminent. See Goddard,
888 P.2d at 371. The Panel then compounded the error by
misapplying the law, stating that “it is generally unnecessary to
consider whether the claimant is at ‘fault’ for the separation from
employment” when analyzing disqualification under section 8-73-
108(5)(e)(XXII). The Panel arrived at this conclusion from the false
premise that “quitting is volitional.” But as Goddard makes clear,
quitting is not always “volitional,” and the requisite fault analysis
reveals that in certain circumstances — for example, where an
employee resigns under the subjectively reasonable belief that they
will be imminently discharged — the employee is deemed to have
been constructively discharged and thus is entitled to benefits. 888
P.2d at 371.
IV. Disposition
¶ 15 We set aside the Panel’s order and remand to the Panel with
directions to remand to the hearing officer (1) for clarification
regarding the cause of Delgado’s job separation, and, if the
7 separation occurred because Delgado resigned under the belief that
Employer would imminently discharge him, then (2) for findings
regarding whether that belief was subjectively reasonable. The
Panel may, if it chooses, afford the hearing officer the discretion to
conduct another hearing session to permit the parties to present
additional evidence on these issues.
JUDGE PAWAR and JUSTICE MARTINEZ concur.