Delco Electronics, Div., General Motors Corp. v. United States

11 Ct. Int'l Trade 661
CourtUnited States Court of International Trade
DecidedSeptember 25, 1987
DocketCourt No. 85-10-01462
StatusPublished

This text of 11 Ct. Int'l Trade 661 (Delco Electronics, Div., General Motors Corp. v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of International Trade primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Delco Electronics, Div., General Motors Corp. v. United States, 11 Ct. Int'l Trade 661 (cit 1987).

Opinion

Opinion

Restani, Judge:

This action concerns the proper classification for tariff purposes of circuit boards assembled in Singapore and imported into the United States during the years 1978 through 1983, which were then incorporated into car radios and tape players. Depending on the type of board, the United States Customs Service (Customs) classified the boards as either car radio receivers or amplifiers. Plaintiff disputes the classifications and asserts that the boards classified as car radio receivers were parts of radio reception apparatus. It further asserts that the amplifiers were not "stand alone” amplifiers and could not be classified under the provision for amplifiers, but must be classified as machines and parts thereof.1

Amplifiers

At the conclusion of plaintiffs case defendant moved for judgment in its favor. The motion was granted as to the boards classified as amplifiers and the reasons for the ruling were fully set forth at that time. The main reasons will be repeated here. The case of General Electric Co. v. The United States, 2 CIT 84, 90-91, 525 F. Supp. 1244, 1249 (1981), aff’d 69 CCPA 166, 681 F.2d 785 (1982)2 held that the amplifier portions of other articles (phonographs) were audio amplifiers, classifiable under item 684.70, Tariff Schedules of the United States (TSUS), the classification asserted by Customs here. Such classification seems consistent with the plain language of item 684.70 which merely lists, among other items, "audio-frequency electric amplifiers.”

Plaintiff argues that the Brussels Nomenclature (1955),3 which may be utilized as legislative history of TSUS, if the applicable language of TSUS is similar,4 indicates that the relevant portion of item 684.70 should be construed to cover stand alone amplifiers only. The court in General Electric did not address the Brussels Nomenclature and it is likely that it was not addressed by the parties. This does not appear to be a sufficient reason not to follow the holding of the Court of Appeals.

[663]*663For the sake of argument, the court considered plaintiffs legislative history argument.5 Although the language of the Brussels Nomenclature tends to support plaintiffs view, it is written in exemplary rather than definitional terms. The use of words such as "generally” and "commonly” provides no clear indication that of all the articles commonly called "amplifiers,” only stand alone amplifiers are to be classified under the broadly worded TSUS item. Accordingly, the court would not reject the plain language of TSUS on the basis of the inconclusive legislative history cited here. Customs’ classification of the circuit boards which contain the audio amplifiers is correct.

Receivers

A much more troublesome question is the proper classification of the circuit boards that contained many of the components of a receiver. Plaintiff asserts that the boards are merely parts of a receiver and thus must be classified under item 685.29, TSUS, which reads:

Radiotelegraphic and Radiotelephonic transmission and reception apparatus; radio-broadcasting and television transmission and reception apparatus and parts thereof:
if:
Other:
$ ^ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡
Other.

Customs’ classification, item 685.21, includes the same superior heading and the immediately inferior "other,” but specifically covers:

Solid-state (tubeless) radio receivers:
Designed exclusively for motor vehicle installation.

The question before the court, therefore, is whether the boards per se are substantially complete car radio receivers or whether they are parts of the same. See General Headnote 10(h), TSUS; Daisy-Heddon, Div. Victor Comptometer Corp. v. United States, 66 CCPA 97, 600 F.2d 799 (1979).

[664]*664There is no dispute that plaintiff intended the circuit boards to be assembled with other components into articles which were to be installed in motor vehicles. The testimony at trial also revealed that the imported apparatus contained some parts of a type normally seen in car radios and generally not in radios for other purposes. The boards, in their condition as imported, however, were not designed to be installed in motor vehicles as car radio receivers.

Defendant argues that one first must decide whether the circuit boards are unfinished radio receivers before one addresses the "designed for” qualifying provision, citing General Headnote 10(c)Cii), TSUS. Plaintiff argues that one should consider suitability for motor vehicle installation in deciding whether the circuit boards are substantially complete articles rather than parts. General Headnote 10(c)(ii) states:

(c) an imported article which is described in two or more provisions of the schedules is classifiable in the provision which most specifically describes it; but, in applying this rule of interpretation, the following considerations shall govern:
(ii) comparison are to be made only between provisions of coordinate or equal status, i.e. between the primary or main superior headings of the schedules or between coordinate inferior headings which are subordinate to the same superior heading.

The case at hand does not involve the issue of relative specificity, but deals with mutually exclusive provisions. Thus, Rule 10(c)(ii) would not appear to apply directly. Applying Rule 10(c)(ii) to bar the court from considering the entire tariff provision under which the imports were classified could prevent the court from properly effectuating legislative intent. In deciding whether the subject merchandise is properly dutiable under item 685.21, the court must consider whether it is a substantially complete receiver for motor vehicle installation, not whether it is a substantially complete receiver in an abstract sense or for some other unknown purpose. The court has no way of determining if an article is substantially complete without reference to its intended function.

No cases in this court or its predecessor have been discovered that address the question of what constitutes a car radio receiver. Thus, the court must analyze the generally applicable principles that determine whether a device is a substantially complete article or a part of the same.

The factors that come into play in deciding whether an article is substantially complete when it is missing some parts include:

* * * (1) Comparison of the number of omitted parts with the number of included parts; (2) comparison of the time and effort required to complete the article with the time and effort required to place it in its imported condition; (3) comparison of [665]

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Related

Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. v. United States
585 F. Supp. 649 (Court of International Trade, 1984)
Channel Master, Div. of Avnet Inc. v. United States
648 F. Supp. 10 (Court of International Trade, 1986)
General Electric Co. v. United States
525 F. Supp. 1244 (Court of International Trade, 1981)
Daisy-Heddon v. United States
600 F.2d 799 (Customs and Patent Appeals, 1979)
General Electric Co. v. United States
681 F.2d 785 (Customs and Patent Appeals, 1982)
Symphonic Electronics Corp. v. United States
77 Cust. Ct. 147 (U.S. Customs Court, 1976)

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11 Ct. Int'l Trade 661, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/delco-electronics-div-general-motors-corp-v-united-states-cit-1987.