Delaware, Lackawanna & Western Railroad v. Mayor of Newark

37 A. 629, 60 N.J.L. 60, 31 Vroom 60, 1897 N.J. Sup. Ct. LEXIS 125
CourtSupreme Court of New Jersey
DecidedFebruary 15, 1897
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 37 A. 629 (Delaware, Lackawanna & Western Railroad v. Mayor of Newark) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of New Jersey primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Delaware, Lackawanna & Western Railroad v. Mayor of Newark, 37 A. 629, 60 N.J.L. 60, 31 Vroom 60, 1897 N.J. Sup. Ct. LEXIS 125 (N.J. 1897).

Opinion

[61]*61The opinion of the court was delivered by

Lippincott, J.

This is a proceeding taken under the two hundred and thirty-ninth section of the statute concerning taxes. Gen. Stat., p. 3332, § 239. It is taken upon a petition of the Delaware, Lackawanna and Western Railroad Company, alleging that certain property belonging to that company, in the city of Newark, used for railroad purposes, was, by the local assessors of that city, assessed for local taxation for the year 1895. For that year the railroad company returned the same property, with the exception of a small dwelling-house thereon, to the state board of assessors for taxation, under an act entitled “An act for the taxation of railroad and canal property,” approved April 10th, 1884, and the supplements thereto. Gen. Stat., p. 3324.

The valuation placed on these lands by the local assessors, for the purposes of local taxation, was the sum of $60,000, and the tax thereon claimed to be payablé to the city of Newark amounts to the sum of $1,168. Upon the return made by the railroad company to the state board of assessors, a valuation of $58,000 has been placed thereon. In both assessments the property, after excepting the dwelling-house, is assessed as a whole instead of being divided into different parcels. As to the house and the enclosure in which it stands, being Nos. 217 and 219 Orange street, no question whatever exists; it is conceded to be locally taxable, and is not returned by the company to the state board of assessors. As to the remaining property, some portions would appear to be taxable locally, whilst other portions can only be taxed by the state, through the board of assessors appointed for that purpose. This depends upon the use to which it was devoted during the year 1895.

The act (Gen. Stat., p. 3332, § 239) provides “that all property of any railroad or canal company not used for railroad or canal purposes shall be assessed and taxed by the same assessors, and in the same manner and at the same time as the taxable property of other owners in the same municipal division or assessing district.”

[62]*62The act also provides “ that all other property of any railroad or canal company shall be assessed and taxed as hereinafter directed.”

The subsequent direction of the act is that such last-named property shall be returned to the state board of assessors as property used for railroad and canal purposes,” and so assessed by them.

The whole question to be determined is whether the whole or any portion of this property was used for railroad purposes during the year 1895.

The whole of the property is evidently designed as a coal and freight yard, The plot contains railroad tracks, platforms, embankments, retaining walls, trestles, coal shutes, and coal pockets beneath the trestles, weighing scales and coal offices, with entrances for carts and wagons from the public street.

The character of the use of lands for railroad purposes, under the statutes, has been very clearly determined in this state. The actual uses to which it is devoted are as good tests as can be established, in order to settle the question whether it is taxable, in one direction or the other, under the statutes.

In the case of Morris Canal and Banking Co. v. Betts, 4 Zab. 555, 559, it was decided that the piers and basins of the canal company, in Jersey City, were the appendages of the canal, and were exempt from local taxation. The court held that it was of no importance that boats not navigating the canal, and merchandise not transported on it occasionally when the pier and basin were not otherwise occupied, were permitted to use them, and that a compensation for such use was charged, and laid down the rule that “ the actual purpose for which these works were constructed, the use to which they are primarily dedicated, and the necessity that exists for them, furnish the tests by which this question should be governed.”

In the case of United New Jersey Railroad Co. v. Jersey City, 26 Vroom 129, 132, the question was whether the author[63]*63ized right of way of a railroad company, on which the railroad had been constructed and in good faith operated, is used for railroad purposes within the meaning of the act of April 10th, 1884, although it may not, for the time being, be wholly occupied by tracks or other railroad appliances. The court held that it was so used, and that the part of it which awaited railroad occupation upon the demand of necessity is in use, like the curtilage of a dwelling-house or the side of a country highway. But the court, in its opinion, added: “ We are also of opinion that when any part of the lands which lie within such right of way are used or appropriated to purposes not incident to the proper construction, maintenance and management of the railroad, or to its use by the corporation as a carrier of goods and passengers, it cannot then be said to be used for railroad purposes, and will be .the subject of local tax.”

A railroad purpose was well defined by some of the earlier cases. New Jersey Railroad and Transportation Co. v. Hancock, Collector, 6 Vroom 537; S. C. v. Jersey City, 20 Id. 540.

If the property be actually used for other than railroad purposes, it is subject to local taxation. United New Jersey Railroad Co. v. Jersey City, 28 Vroom 563, and cases there cited; Camden and Atlantic Railroad Co. v. Atlantic City, 29 Id. 316.

The learned Chancellor, in the case of United New Jersey Railroad Co. v. Jersey City, 26 Vroom 129, 132, speaking of the property exempt from local taxation, said: “ It is the land which the legislature, in its wisdom, has deemed to be reasonably necessary to answer the ordinary and emergent uses of a railway and ensure the continued convenient and safe accommodation of the public. Its dimensions are limited by the law which devotes it to a special purpose.” But the exemption does not remain when it becomes actually devoted to some other purpose. The fact that property is owned by a railroad company is not at all conclusive as to the character; the test is the use or purpose for which it is held or the use to which it'is actually devoted.

[64]*64Applying these principles to the evidence táken in this proceeding, it is clear that the portion of this property shown upon the maps exhibited in this case and described in the evidence, which extends from the southerly side of Morris and Essex Kailroad avenue, at its intersection with Sheffield street, and thence along Sheffield street, about one hundred and forty-two feet, to property of private owners; thence westerly, along private property, about one hundred feet; thence along a line between the two portions of the railroad property, along what is called a fence on Exhibit D 1 in the case, and, as it is on the property, to the easterly side of a stone wall which runs along the westerly end of the coal chute .and trestle on the property; thence along and on the line of the wall to the south side of Morris and Essex Kailroad avenue, and thence along said avenue to the intersection of Sheffield street, is. neither held nor used for railroad purposes.

Most of the evidence upon both sides is devoted to the question of the use to which this portion of the property is actually devoted.

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Bluebook (online)
37 A. 629, 60 N.J.L. 60, 31 Vroom 60, 1897 N.J. Sup. Ct. LEXIS 125, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/delaware-lackawanna-western-railroad-v-mayor-of-newark-nj-1897.