Delatour v. Prudence Realization Corp.

167 F.2d 621, 1948 U.S. App. LEXIS 3079
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Second Circuit
DecidedApril 5, 1948
DocketNo. 5, Docket 20434
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 167 F.2d 621 (Delatour v. Prudence Realization Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Delatour v. Prudence Realization Corp., 167 F.2d 621, 1948 U.S. App. LEXIS 3079 (2d Cir. 1948).

Opinion

CHASE, Circuit Judge.

The appeal is from an order entered in the proceedings, commenced on March 20, 1944, for the reorganization under Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C.A. § 501 et seq., of Espade Realty Corporation. The sole issue is whether certain holders of defaulted certificates of participation in a single mortgage on real estate of the debtor are entitled to interest at 6%, which is both the rate the mortgage bore and the legal rate of interest on debts overdue in New York, or only to interest at 5j/£%, the rate'provided for in the certificates.

[623]*623The only asset of the debtor at the time the petition for reorganization was filed was a parcel of real estate in Mount Vernon, N. Y., on which there was an apartment building. It had acquired this property in 1936 subject to an outstanding mortgage to secure a bond on which the principal sum of $577,500 was then unpaid. The mortgage had been executed in 1927 by the then owner of the property to secure a debt of $700,000, which was payable, in accordance with the terms of the bond and mortgage, with interest at 6%. In 1927, the mortgage was assigned to Prudence-Bonds Corporation. It issued certificates of participation bearing interest at 5^%. These were guaranteed by the Prudence Company, Inc., as to the payment both of interest when due and of principal when due or within a reserved grace period during which the mortgagor’s default might be cured. Both the assignee and the guarantor have been reorganized in separate proceedings in the district court and, to those who are familiar with the various appeals which have been decided by this court in those proceedings, the fact that Prudence Company, Inc., completely dominated Prudence-Bonds Corporation will be well known. The appellant, Prudence Realization Corporation, is the successor of The Prudence Company, Inc. as the result of the latter’s reorganization and for present purposes has all and only the interest of its predecessor.

The participation certificates were issued in accordance with an agreement of deposit made with the Chatham-Phoenix National Bank to which the mortgage was assigned as depositary.1 The Prudence Company, Inc. then sold the certificates to the public and credited the proceeds upon the debt of Prudence-Bonds Corporation to it on account of the guaranty. Each certificate in terms assigned to the purchaser an undivided share or part of the bond and mortgage equal to the face amount of the certificate and bore interest at 5%%, payable semi-annually. Prudence-Bonds Corporation assumed no liability on the certificates2 but it and the guarantor were, inter alia, each “authorized to collect all moneys payable under the terms of said mortgage; * * * [and] account to the holder of this certificate for his share of the principal and for interest at the rate of 5}4% per annum thereon, payable under the terms of this certificate and to retain any balance of moneys collected * * * ” Each certificate bore the endorsement of The Prudence Company, Inc., which so far as is now material read as follows: “The Prudence Company, Inc. hereby certifies to the holder of the within certificate, that by the guarantee therein mentioned and now in the possession of the depositary named in the Deposit Agreement referred to in said certificate, it has guaranteed payment of the interest on said certificate when due, and the payment of principal thereof when due, or within eighteen months thereafter, together with interest thereon after maturity at the rate specified in said certificate, until payment is effected or offered, as provided in said certificate.”

On October 1, 1932, the mortgagor defaulted in the payment of an interest installment and the mortgage by its terms then became due. None of the principal was ever paid until after the present proceedings were begpm. Interest was paid to the holders of the certificates by the guarantor, however, until April 1, 1933, when it defaulted on its guaranty. On September 21, 1932, the Prudence Company, Inc. had taken an assignment of the rents and thereafter it and its successor, the appellant, collected and accounted for them until the property was sold, the net proceeds from the rents being distributed to the certificate holders to apply on the overdue interest.

Before January 30, 1933, The Prudence Company, Inc. had acquired either by direct purchase from the public holders, or otherwise, certificates in the amount of $189,713.97. During its own reorganization proceedings and those of Prudence-Bonds Corporation, its trustees also acquired all of the interest of Prudence-Bonds Corporation in any of the issues of the latter’s certificates which The Prudence Company, Inc. had guaranteed, as well as [624]*624in an uncertificated portion of the mortgage, to the amount of $7,700, which had been retained by Prudence-Bonds Corporation. The remaining certificates, aggregating $380,086.03, are held by the public.

On December 4, 1945, the appellant consented to the subordination of its claim against the debtor, based on the repurchased certificates, to the claims based upon the other certificates, doing so in recognition of the effect of the decision of this court in In re 1934 Realty Corporation, 2 Cir., 150 F.2d 477, certiorari denied, Prudence Realization Corp. v. Hurd Committee, 326 U.S. 734, 66 S.Ct. 43, 90 L.Ed. 437. As a result of subordination, the publicly owned certificates became entitled to priority in payment over the certificates now held by appellant.

During the reorganization proceedings of this debtor, the property covered by the mortgage was sold and the net proceeds of the sale are more than sufficient to pay all the public certificate holders in full whether interest is allowed at 6% or at 5[4%. There are seven and one-half years of interest arrearages. Interest at 6% was allowed in the order below.

The appellant claims that the purchasers of the certificates acquired an undivided share in the mortgage itself with interest at 51/2%, to be paid as provided in the certificates, and that to the extent of the difference between the interest rate of the mortgage and that of the certificates the Prudence-Bonds Corporation remained a part owner of the mortgage. In this view it, and therefore the appellant, would be entitled to the satisfaction of its claim out of the proceeds of the mortgage in the right of a partial owner thereof. This would be true regardless of any default of the guarantor, since the claim is not based upon any theory of compensation for the so-called servicing of the mortgage or for making the guaranty.

The contention of the appellees is that the certificate holders, as the owners of undivided shares in the mortgage, which in the aggregate equalled its principal certificated amount, owned that portion of the mortgage as tenants in common and are entitled to interest at 6% either under the mortgage terms or, that being the New York legal rate, as damages for the delay in payment after maturity of the certificates. It was held below that they were entitled on both theories to the interest they claimed.

We think, however, that the order was right on the first theory and accordingly put our decision on that alone. These certificates did not assign a participating' interest in a pool of mortgages, subject to withdrawal and replacement provided the pool was not depleted, as was the case in People v.

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Bluebook (online)
167 F.2d 621, 1948 U.S. App. LEXIS 3079, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/delatour-v-prudence-realization-corp-ca2-1948.