Delano Artise Nailey v. City of Tucson, et al.

D. Arizona

Delano Artise Nailey v. City of Tucson, et al.

DecidedDecember 22, 2025

Docket4:25-cv-00685

StatusUnknown

This text of Delano Artise Nailey v. City of Tucson, et al. (Delano Artise Nailey v. City of Tucson, et al.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Arizona primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Delano Artise Nailey v. City of Tucson, et al., (D. Ariz. 2025).

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1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 Delano Artise Nailey, No. CV-25-00685-TUC-AMM

10 Plaintiff, ORDER

11 v.

12 City of Tucson, et al.,

13 Defendants. 14 15 Pending before the Court is pro se Plaintiff Delano Artise Nailey’s Complaint 16 (Doc. 1) and Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Doc. 2). For the following 17 reasons, the Court will grant the Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis and dismiss 18 the Complaint. 19 I. IFP Application 20 A party who files an action in federal district court must pay a filing fee. 28 U.S.C. 21 § 1914(a). However, indigent plaintiffs may apply for a fee waiver. 28 U.S.C. § 1915. 22 The Court must determine whether the litigant is unable to pay the filing fee before 23 granting leave to proceed in forma pauperis. See id. § 1915(a)(1). 24 Plaintiff Nailey’s IFP Application is sparse. (Doc. 2.) However, he indicates that 25 he has no sources of income other than unspecified gifts or inheritances. (Id. at 1–2.) The 26 Court will grant the IFP Application based on this limited information. 27 /// 28 /// 1 II. Statutory Screening of Pro Se Complaints 2 A district court must screen and dismiss a complaint, or any portion of a 3 complaint, filed in forma pauperis that “is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim 4 upon which relief may be granted; or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is 5 immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1)–(2). The district court applies the 6 same standard as a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). 7 Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012). Thus, the complaint must 8 contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to 9 relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The pleading standard does not demand “‘detailed factual 10 allegations,’ but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed- 11 me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. 12 Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). 13 To meet this standard, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, 14 accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting 15 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). A claim to relief is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads 16 factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is 17 liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. Therefore, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of 18 a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. 19 The Ninth Circuit has instructed district courts to “continue to construe pro se 20 filings liberally.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010); see also Watison, 21 668 F.3d at 1112. A “complaint [filed by a pro se litigant] ‘must be held to less stringent 22 standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Hebbe, 627 F.3d at 342 (quoting 23 Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)). 24 III. Complaint 25 On December 10, 2025, Plaintiff Nailey brought this action on behalf of Green 26 Clouded Pyramids, LLC against the City of Tucson, Tucson Police Department, and 27 several named officers alleging that they violated the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth 28 Amendments. (Doc. 1 at 1.) Plaintiff Nailey states that he is the “Owner/Operator” of 1 Green Clouded Pyramids, LLC. (Id.) 2 As a threshold matter, the Court must dismiss this action because Plaintiff Nailey 3 may not represent Green Clouded Pyramids, LLC. Rowland v. Ca. Men’s Colony, Unit II 4 Men’s Advisory Council, 506 U.S. 194, 201–02 (1993) (“It has been the law for the better 5 part of two centuries, for example, that a corporation may appear in the federal courts 6 only through licensed counsel.”). Therefore, Plaintiff Nailey’s pro se Complaint on behalf 7 of Green Clouded Pyramids, LLC must be dismissed. 8 IV. Leave to Amend 9 A pro se litigant is entitled to an opportunity to amend a complaint before 10 dismissal of the action if the Court determines that Plaintiff might cure the complaint by 11 alleging other facts. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127–29 (9th Cir. 2000) (en 12 banc). “Leave to amend need not be given if a complaint, as amended, is subject to 13 dismissal.” Moore v. Kayport Package Express, Inc., 885 F.2d 531, 538 (9th Cir. 1989). 14 If Plaintiff Nailey seeks to pursue claims on behalf of Green Clouded Pyramids, 15 LLC, he may do so through retained legal counsel. In this case, the Court will allow 16 Plaintiff Nailey to file a pro se Amended Complaint only to the extent that he seeks to 17 assert that his constitutional rights were violated. Plaintiff Nailey may not file an 18 Amended Complaint to assert any claims on behalf of Green Clouded Pyramids, LLC 19 absent representation by legal counsel. 20 If he chooses to amend, Plaintiff Nailey must write short, plain statements telling 21 the Court for each claim: (1) law right he believes was violated; (2) the name of the 22 Defendant who violated the law; (3) exactly what that Defendant did or failed to do that 23 violated that particular law; (4) how the action or inaction of that Defendant is connected 24 to the violation; and (5) what specific injury Plaintiff suffered because of that Defendant's 25 conduct. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371–72, 377 (1976). If Plaintiff Nailey fails 26 to affirmatively link the conduct of each named Defendant with the specific injury he 27 suffered, the allegations against that Defendant will be dismissed for failure to state a 28 claim. As indicated above, mere conclusory allegations that a Defendant has violated the 1 || law are not acceptable and will be dismissed. 2 Plaintiff Nailey must clearly designate on the face of the document that it is the 3|| “Amended Complaint.” The Amended Complaint must be retyped or rewritten in its || entirety and may not incorporate any part of the original Complaint by reference. Ferdik || v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992) (an amended complaint supersedes any 6 || previous complaint, meaning that the Court will treat the original Complaint as non- || existent). 8 The Court is aware that Plaintiff Nailey is proceeding pro se. He shall familiarize 9|| himself with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Local Rules for the District of Arizona, both of which can be found on the Court’s web site at www.azd.uscourts.gov. 11 || He is also advised that a Handbook for Self-Represented Litigants is available on the 12 || Court's website at: https://publicapps.azd.uscourts.gov/prose-survey/. 13 V. Conclusion 14 For the foregoing reasons, 15 IT IS ORDERED: 16 (1) Plaintiff Nailey’s Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis is GRANTED. 17 (Doc.

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1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 Delano Artise Nailey, No. CV-25-00685-TUC-AMM

10 Plaintiff, ORDER

11 v.

12 City of Tucson, et al.,

13 Defendants. 14 15 Pending before the Court is pro se Plaintiff Delano Artise Nailey’s Complaint 16 (Doc. 1) and Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Doc. 2). For the following 17 reasons, the Court will grant the Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis and dismiss 18 the Complaint. 19 I. IFP Application 20 A party who files an action in federal district court must pay a filing fee. 28 U.S.C. 21 § 1914(a). However, indigent plaintiffs may apply for a fee waiver. 28 U.S.C. § 1915. 22 The Court must determine whether the litigant is unable to pay the filing fee before 23 granting leave to proceed in forma pauperis. See id. § 1915(a)(1). 24 Plaintiff Nailey’s IFP Application is sparse. (Doc. 2.) However, he indicates that 25 he has no sources of income other than unspecified gifts or inheritances. (Id. at 1–2.) The 26 Court will grant the IFP Application based on this limited information. 27 /// 28 /// 1 II. Statutory Screening of Pro Se Complaints 2 A district court must screen and dismiss a complaint, or any portion of a 3 complaint, filed in forma pauperis that “is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim 4 upon which relief may be granted; or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is 5 immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1)–(2). The district court applies the 6 same standard as a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). 7 Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012). Thus, the complaint must 8 contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to 9 relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The pleading standard does not demand “‘detailed factual 10 allegations,’ but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed- 11 me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. 12 Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). 13 To meet this standard, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, 14 accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting 15 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). A claim to relief is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads 16 factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is 17 liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. Therefore, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of 18 a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. 19 The Ninth Circuit has instructed district courts to “continue to construe pro se 20 filings liberally.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010); see also Watison, 21 668 F.3d at 1112. A “complaint [filed by a pro se litigant] ‘must be held to less stringent 22 standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Hebbe, 627 F.3d at 342 (quoting 23 Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)). 24 III. Complaint 25 On December 10, 2025, Plaintiff Nailey brought this action on behalf of Green 26 Clouded Pyramids, LLC against the City of Tucson, Tucson Police Department, and 27 several named officers alleging that they violated the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth 28 Amendments. (Doc. 1 at 1.) Plaintiff Nailey states that he is the “Owner/Operator” of 1 Green Clouded Pyramids, LLC. (Id.) 2 As a threshold matter, the Court must dismiss this action because Plaintiff Nailey 3 may not represent Green Clouded Pyramids, LLC. Rowland v. Ca. Men’s Colony, Unit II 4 Men’s Advisory Council, 506 U.S. 194, 201–02 (1993) (“It has been the law for the better 5 part of two centuries, for example, that a corporation may appear in the federal courts 6 only through licensed counsel.”). Therefore, Plaintiff Nailey’s pro se Complaint on behalf 7 of Green Clouded Pyramids, LLC must be dismissed. 8 IV. Leave to Amend 9 A pro se litigant is entitled to an opportunity to amend a complaint before 10 dismissal of the action if the Court determines that Plaintiff might cure the complaint by 11 alleging other facts. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127–29 (9th Cir. 2000) (en 12 banc). “Leave to amend need not be given if a complaint, as amended, is subject to 13 dismissal.” Moore v. Kayport Package Express, Inc., 885 F.2d 531, 538 (9th Cir. 1989). 14 If Plaintiff Nailey seeks to pursue claims on behalf of Green Clouded Pyramids, 15 LLC, he may do so through retained legal counsel. In this case, the Court will allow 16 Plaintiff Nailey to file a pro se Amended Complaint only to the extent that he seeks to 17 assert that his constitutional rights were violated. Plaintiff Nailey may not file an 18 Amended Complaint to assert any claims on behalf of Green Clouded Pyramids, LLC 19 absent representation by legal counsel. 20 If he chooses to amend, Plaintiff Nailey must write short, plain statements telling 21 the Court for each claim: (1) law right he believes was violated; (2) the name of the 22 Defendant who violated the law; (3) exactly what that Defendant did or failed to do that 23 violated that particular law; (4) how the action or inaction of that Defendant is connected 24 to the violation; and (5) what specific injury Plaintiff suffered because of that Defendant's 25 conduct. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371–72, 377 (1976). If Plaintiff Nailey fails 26 to affirmatively link the conduct of each named Defendant with the specific injury he 27 suffered, the allegations against that Defendant will be dismissed for failure to state a 28 claim. As indicated above, mere conclusory allegations that a Defendant has violated the 1 || law are not acceptable and will be dismissed. 2 Plaintiff Nailey must clearly designate on the face of the document that it is the 3|| “Amended Complaint.” The Amended Complaint must be retyped or rewritten in its || entirety and may not incorporate any part of the original Complaint by reference. Ferdik || v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992) (an amended complaint supersedes any 6 || previous complaint, meaning that the Court will treat the original Complaint as non- || existent). 8 The Court is aware that Plaintiff Nailey is proceeding pro se. He shall familiarize 9|| himself with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Local Rules for the District of Arizona, both of which can be found on the Court’s web site at www.azd.uscourts.gov. 11 || He is also advised that a Handbook for Self-Represented Litigants is available on the 12 || Court's website at: https://publicapps.azd.uscourts.gov/prose-survey/. 13 V. Conclusion 14 For the foregoing reasons, 15 IT IS ORDERED: 16 (1) Plaintiff Nailey’s Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis is GRANTED. 17 (Doc. 2.) 18 (2) The Complaint is DISMISSED. (Doc. 1.) 19 (3) Plaintiff Nailey may file an Amended Complaint consistent with the terms of 20 this Order no later than January 30, 2026. If Plaintiff Nailey does not file an 21 Amended Complaint by January 30, 2026, the Clerk of Court shall close this 22 case without further notice. 23 Dated this 22nd day of December, 2025. 24 25 bow uct 26 Honorable Angela M. Martinez United States District Judge 28

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