Delaney v. Lone Star Cement Corp.

75 So. 2d 538, 1954 La. App. LEXIS 892
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedNovember 8, 1954
DocketNo. 20444
StatusPublished

This text of 75 So. 2d 538 (Delaney v. Lone Star Cement Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Delaney v. Lone Star Cement Corp., 75 So. 2d 538, 1954 La. App. LEXIS 892 (La. Ct. App. 1954).

Opinion

JANVIER, Judge.

Edward Delaney claims to - have been totally and permanently disabled as the result of a physical injury accidentally sustained on July 15, 1953, while performing his duties in New Orleans as an employee of Lone Star Cement Corporation and that corporation has appealed from a judgment awarding him compensation at $30 per week for a period not in excess of 400 weeks.

Plaintiff alleges that, “while carrying a large piece of iron across a railroad boxcar, he slipped on some oil on the floor and struck a brick wall with the piece of iron which caused your petitioner to be thrown heavily to the pavement on the outside of the boxcar.”

Defendant denies that any such accident occurred and also denies that plaintiff is disabled.

It is admitted that Delaney was an employee of defendant and that his rate of pay was such as to entitle him to the maximum $30 per week if he is entitled to compensation.

The record shows that Delaney had been in the employ of defendant for about eight years and that during that time he had been a regular ánd a competent employee.

The defendant corporation in its operations received gypsum in railroad boxcars and this gypsum was removed from these boxcars and deposited in a hopper, which we understand was a grill covered opening in a platform alongside the track on which the boxcars were brought to the plant for unloading. As each boxcar was placed alongside the platform it was the duty of Delaney and other employees to open the door on that side and then to place in position, from the floor of the car to the platform, a large piece of sheet iron and to nail this iron so that it could not move during the unloading operation from the car over the sheet iron to the hopper in the adjacent platform.

It was Delaney’s duty to “shovel” away from the door of the .car a sufficient amount of gypsum to permit the unloading machine to enter the car. This unloading machine was known as a “scoopmobile” and is referred to by Delaney as a “gyp haul.” This scoopmobile was operated by another employee and when Delaney had shoveled away from the door of the car enough of the gypsum to permit its entry, it would be driven into the boxcar by this other employee; its scoop would pick up a load of gypsum and it would then be driven out to the platform over the sheet iron and would deposit its load of gypsum into the hopper.

In order to obtain more light in the boxcar, it was necessary to open the door on the opposite side of the car and, in order to prevent any of the gypsum from falling out of the door on the other side, it was necessary that there be placed across the door a barrier which consisted of a piece of iron or steel with arms which projected through the door, one against each side of the door frame. These arms prevented this piece of iron from moving.

The gypsum in each boxcar was loaded to a height of only a few feet and this [540]*540barrier, which is placed across the opposite door, was not required to be very high. Another purpose served by the barrier was to prevent the scoopmobile or gyp haul from being inadvertently driven through the opposite door. Near each end of this barrier was a “hand hold” to be used in placing it in position and in removing it after the car had been unloaded.

Delaney alleges and also testifies that after the car in which he had been working on the day in question was unloaded, he lifted the iron barrier from its position across the door on the far side of the car, and that, as he was carrying it from the car across the sheet iron which extended from the boxcar to the platform, he slipped on. oil which was on the sheet iron and fell .and sustained an injury to his back and that it is as a result of this injury that he is now totally and permanently disabled.

There can be no doubt at all that the story of the accident as told by Delaney (there was no other witness) is far from convincing. He said that no one was with him when he fell and that no one assisted him in removing the iron bar from the door. The record convinces us that it was customary that this barrier be removed by two employees. There were two hand holds for this purpose. If he fell as he says he did, as a result of slipping on the sheet iron, the sheet iron which was nailed to the floor would" have remained in. its position, and the record leaves in our mind grave doubt as to whether this iron was still in its place after the accident occurred.

But more important still is the certainty that, although Delaney spoke to several other employees and doctors later, he did not tell any one of them that he had slipped and had fallen while carrying the piece of iron. All that he said was that his back was hurting him and he asked that he be permitted to 'see á doctor. The fact that his back was hurting him could well have resulted from a condition which was not at all to be attributed to the alleged occurrence and from which he had been suffering for some time.

When plaintiff reported to the foreman of the defendant, he made no reference to a fall and stated that he had been hurt about a week previously when he was “barring” a car. It is explained that sometimes, when a freight car must be moved only a short distance, the employees of defendant will place the end of a crowbar between one of the wheels and a rail of the track and then, by exerting pressure on the other end, force the car to move a very short distance.

We see no necessity to discuss in further detail the evidence as to whether there was such an accident. We ourselves entertain very grave doubt on the subject and yet we cannot say that obviously no such accident occurred. Even the District Judge seems to have had some doubt for he said in his reasons for judgment:

“ * * * Whether Delaney was hurt a few weeks before and again on July 15th, 1953 would make no difference, as in the court’s opinion he would still come under the Workmen’s Compensation Statute. The test is: Was he injured in the course of his employment?”

We interpret this to mean that the District Judge found that there was an accident on July 15th and that even if this accident was not the initial cause of plaintiff’s disability, the condition which already existed was aggravated by that accident. In view of this finding, we feel that the record does not justify a holding that no such accident occurred'.

We find it most difficult to determine just what is plaintiff’s present condition, or what is the injury which causes disability, if there is disability.

Several doctors testified on his behalf that he is totally and permanently disabled and others placed on the stand by the defendant were of the opinion that he is suffering from no disability which was caused by an accident on July 15, 1953, and that he could return to work if he would.

Dr. Louis J. Gehbauer, who was placed on the stand by plaintiff and who first saw him on July 28th, which was 13 days after the accident and who had seen him since [541]*541on numerous occasions — “15 or 20 times”— says that he is suffering from a “lumbosa-cral sprain and lumbar muscle spasm.” He also says that he-has “hypertrophic arthro-. sis of the lumbar spine” with which however the doctor apparently believed Delaney was suffering before the occurrence. He says that trauma “would aggravate the condition of arthrosis.” He also said that Delaney “was unable to straighten up to an erect position,” and that “he was unable to actually reach down and pick his pants up from the floor.”

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75 So. 2d 538, 1954 La. App. LEXIS 892, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/delaney-v-lone-star-cement-corp-lactapp-1954.