Delaney v. Errickson

10 Neb. 492
CourtNebraska Supreme Court
DecidedJuly 15, 1880
StatusPublished
Cited by16 cases

This text of 10 Neb. 492 (Delaney v. Errickson) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Nebraska Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Delaney v. Errickson, 10 Neb. 492 (Neb. 1880).

Opinion

Oobb, J.

It cannot be denied that at common law every one was obliged at his peril to keep his domestic animals off of the lands of another, and it made no difference whether such lands were inclosed or uninclosed, cultivated or uncultivated.

The first legislature convened in the territory of Nebraska passed an act which (in substance) now constitutes chapter ten of the general laws, and is in the following words: “So much of the,common law of England as is applicable and not inconsistent with the constitution of the United States, with the organic law of this territory, or with any law passed or to be passed by the legislature of this territory, li>e and the same is adopted and declared to be law within said territory.”

[494]*494It will be necessary then to examine, first, whether that provision of the common law of England, above referred to, is applicable to the people of Nebraska in their condition at the time of the passage of said act and down to the present time; and, secondly, whether such provision and principle of the common law are consistent with the several acts of the legislature of the state and late territory bearing upon the question involved in this inquiry.

Eor a number of years following the establishing of the territorial government, the settlements were almost exclusively confined to the near vicinity of the Missouri river and the small streams emptying into it, whére timber for fencing was comparatively plentiful, sufficiently so to enable the settlers to fence such land as they desired to cultivate, and by so doing they were enabled to allow their numerous herds of cattle the free range of the almost boundless prairie at their doors. But soon the lands were commenced to be surveyed and brought into market, and, as the homestead law was not yet enacted, nor the wise policy of reserving the public lands for the use of actual settlers yet adopted, a large number of tracts of land soon became the private property of individuals, many of whom had never been, nor ever expected to be, inhabitants of the territory. Such purchasers of land took an absolute allodial estate in them. Nevertheless they took such estate subject to any and all the conditions which nature, the policy of the government, the undeveloped state of the country, and the state of society had thrown around it. Among these was the fact that it was the settled policy of the general government, which owned the surrounding lands, to throw them open to free and unrestricted pasturage. This was to the early settler and emigrant a valuable privilege, but one which they could not enjoy if each owner of stock was compelled [495]*495to stand watch over his cattle to keep them off of each tract of land which, by reason of entry at the distant land office, should become the private property of individuals. The cattle could not be taught to regard the mounds of the government surveyors, nor that invisible line which, according to Blackstone, the common law of England draws around the possessions of every landholder.

But as emigration continued and population increased, the settlements extended out upon the open prairies where timber for fencing was not to be had, and we then having no railroad communication with the pineries or the Mississippi river, had each settler been obliged to provide a fenced pasture for his stock to keep them off of the lands of others, the settlement of the territory would have been impracticable. But it being equally impossible to procure fencing to enclose the cultivated fields, there arose a necessity for a law to compel the owners of stock to employ herders for its control, to keep it off of the growing crops. The proposition to enact such a law was regarded with disfavor by the inhabitants of the timbered portion of the state, and for a time strenuously opposed. Hence the peculiar character of the earlier herd laws, and even now five of the northern counties are specifically exempted from its provisions, and a method is prescribed by which any county may at any time take itself out of such operation by a majority vote of the inhabitants. But during the entire history of the territory, as well as that of the state, down to a recent period, it had never been even suggested that neat cattle were, by virtue of any law or custom, required to be either fenced or herded off of wild, uncultivated lands. But the universal understanding, belief, and usage of the people has been to the contrary.

It is claimed, and possibly with justice, that the time [496]*496has now arrived, when, by reason of the great increase in the density of the population of the state, and the enhanced value of grazing land, the owners of such lands should be protected in its exclusive enjoyment, the same as land sown to crops. If the time has arrived for such change, the legislature and not the courts is the place where it should be inaugurated.

It therefore appears to me that the common law of England, in the respect under consideration, was not “applicable” to our state and condition at the time of the framing of our laws and institutions, even if it can be said to be so now.

Upon examining the several acts passed by the legislature — state, as well as territorial — and applying the provisions of the English common law above referred to to them, it will be found to be utterly inconsistent with both their letter and-spirit. The first legislature of the territory passed two acts, which were severally approved March 2,1855, whereby stallions, mares, and asses over the age of two years were restrained from running at large, under a penalty to their owners of five dollars for the first offense, and ten dollars for each succeeding offense, and every person finding such animals running at large was authorized to take them up as estrays. Also restraining sheep and swine from running at large, and making the owners responsible in damages for all damage to property committed by any such animals running at large contrary to the provisions of said act.

These acts seem to have stood until 1857, when on the thirteenth of February there was approved an act entitled, “An act concerning enclosures, trespassing animals, and partition fences.” By section two it was' provided that if any domestic animal break into an enclosure, the person injured thereby shall recover the amount of damage done, if it shall appear that the [497]*497fence through, which said animal broke was lawful, but not otherwise. By section four it was provided that when any domestic animal shall break into the enclosure of any person, such person, without regard to the season of the year, may take up such animal as if an estray, etc.

The above act was repealed by an act approved January 13, 1860, entitled, “ An act to regulate enclosures and partition fences.” The first seventeen sections provide what shall constitute lawful fences, etc. Section 18 provides that if any domestic animal break into any enclosure the person injured thereby shall recover the amount of damage done, if it shall appear that the fence through which said animal broke was a lawful fence. Section 20 provided that if any person sow any grain or plant any crop without enclosing the same with a sufficient fence as above provided, he shall be liable for all damages that any person or persons may sustain in consequence of such neglect to enclose the same, etc.

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Bluebook (online)
10 Neb. 492, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/delaney-v-errickson-neb-1880.