del Rosario v. Nashoba Regional School District

CourtDistrict Court, D. Massachusetts
DecidedDecember 5, 2019
Docket4:19-cv-40107
StatusUnknown

This text of del Rosario v. Nashoba Regional School District (del Rosario v. Nashoba Regional School District) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Massachusetts primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
del Rosario v. Nashoba Regional School District, (D. Mass. 2019).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

________________________________________________ ) MARIA del ROSARIO, on behalf of and as Guardian ) and Parent of GWENDOLYN BURKE, ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) CIVIL ACTION ) No. 19-40107-TSH ) NASHOBA REGIONAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, and ) BUREAU OF SPECIAL EDUCATION APPEALS, ) Defendants. ) ________________________________________________)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION December 5, 2019 HILLMAN, D.J.

Background

Maria del Rosario, on behalf of and as Guardian and Parent of Gwendolyn Burke (“Plaintiff”) has filed a Complaint against Nashoba Regional School District (“Nashoba”) and the Bureau of Special Education Appeals (“BSEA”): (1) appealing the BSEA’s decision as against the weight of the evidence; (2) appealing the hearing officers BSEA decision on the grounds that it was invalidated by procedural, statutory, constitutionals; (3) seeking reimbursement of attorney’s fees and costs from Nashoba; (4) asserting a claim for damages against Nashoba for discrimination in violation of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C, § 794; (5) asserting a claim for damages under the federal civil rights act, 42 U.S.C § 1983 against Nashoba for violation of Gwendolyn Burke’s due process rights; and (VI) seeking equitable relief in the form of an injunction enforcing the outstanding portion of the BSEA decision by ordering Nashoba to arrange for an immediate, independent vocational and daily

living evaluation of Gwendolyn Burke at the “LABBB Collaborative.” This Memorandum and Order addresses Plaintiff’s Motion For A Preliminary Injunction Enforcing An Order Of The Bureau Special Education Appeals Against Defendant Nashoba Regional School District (Docket No. 4). Standard of Review It is well-settled law that “[a] plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” Voice Of The Arab World, Inc. v. MDTV Medical News Now, Inc., 645 F.3d 26, 32 (1st Cir. 2011). While all four factors must be weighed, the moving party’s

likelihood of success on the merits is “the touchstone of the preliminary injunction inquiry.” Philip Morris, Inc. v. Harshbarger, 159 F.3d 670, 674 (1st Cir. 1998). “[I]f the moving party cannot demonstrate that he is likely to succeed in his quest, the remaining factors become matters of idle curiosity.” Maine Educ. Ass’n, 695 F.3d at 152 (quoting New Comm Wireless Servs., Inc. v. SprintCom, Inc., 287 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2002)) (emphasis added). The moving party bears the burden of proof for each of these four factors. Nieves- Marquez v. Puerto Rico, 353 F.3d 108, 120 (1st Cir. 2003). Where all parties agree as to the basic facts of a dispute, a court “is free to accept as true well-pleaded allegations in the complaint and uncontroverted affidavits filed in support of the motion for a preliminary injunction.” Avaya

v. Ali, Civ.Act. No. 12-10660-DJC, 2012 WL 2888474 (D.Mass. Jul. 13, 2012) (citing Rohm & Haas Elec. Materials, LLC v. Elec. Circuits Supplies, Inc., 759 F.Supp.2d 110, 114 n. 2 (D.Mass. 2010)) (internal quotations omitted). However, where there is significant dispute as to the

underlying facts, “the propriety of injunctive relief hinges on determinations of credibility.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). In support of their relative positions, the parties relied on their written submissions and examination/cross-examination of the lone witness, Mr. Kelly, affidavits, exhibits and proffer of counsel. The Legal Landscape: Nashoba’s duty to provide Gwendolyn with transition level skills, training, and vocational opportunities suited to her potential.

Plaintiff is the court-appointed guardian of Gwendolyn Maria Burke. Nashoba is a duly chartered regional school district with a principal location in Bolton, Massachusetts. The “BSEA” is part of the Massachusetts Division of Administrative Law Appeals. Gwendolyn is a highly functioning twenty-two-year-old on the autism spectrum with a documented diagnosis of learning disability. Gwendolyn is disabled as defined by one of more of the subsections of the Individuals with Disability in Education Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. §1400 et seq., in accordance with federal and state law. As a result of her disabilities and because she and Plaintiff were residents of the school district encompassed and serviced by Nashoba, for almost two decades, Gwendolyn received special education services from Nashoba pursuant to federal and state statutes and regulations. Under applicable federal and state statutes and regulations in effect, the school district where a child with a disability resides has financial and programmatic responsibility for providing that student’s special education until the child reaches the age of twenty-two. Moreover, school districts are required to provide that student with a Free Appropriate Public Education (“FAPE”) in the Least Restrictive Environment (“LRE”) with meaningful parent involvement in designing the student’s individualized education program (“IEP”)1, including placement options and other important procedural safeguards. Additionally, federal regulations

require Nashoba to provide older disabled students such as Gwendolyn with a coordinated set of services designed to be within a results-oriented process, that is focused on improving the academic and functional achievement of the child with a disability to facilitate the child’s movement from school to post-school activities, including postsecondary education, vocational education, integrated employment (including supported employment), continuing and adult education, adult services, independent living, or community participation. These mandated transition services must be based on the individual child’s needs, taking into account the child’s strengths, preferences, and interests; and includes: (i) Instruction;

(ii) Related services;

(iii) Community experiences;

(iv) The development of employment and other post-school adult living objectives; and

(v) If appropriate, acquisition of daily living skills and provision of a functional vocational evaluation. Massachusetts regulation also require Nashoba to provide programs for older students to ensure that options are available for them, particularly those eligible students of ages eighteen

1 The term FAPE means a that the handicapped child shall receive educational instruction specifically designed to meet his or her unique needs, “supported by such services as are necessary to permit the child ‘to benefit’ from the instruction.” Board of Educ. Of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 188- 89, 102 S.Ct. 3034 (1982). The term “individualized education program” or “IEP” means a written statement for each child with a disability that is developed, reviewed, and revised in accordance with IDEA.

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del Rosario v. Nashoba Regional School District, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/del-rosario-v-nashoba-regional-school-district-mad-2019.