Dejshontaye Would v. N.J. Department of Corrections, et al.

CourtDistrict Court, D. New Jersey
DecidedJanuary 21, 2026
Docket3:26-cv-00533
StatusUnknown

This text of Dejshontaye Would v. N.J. Department of Corrections, et al. (Dejshontaye Would v. N.J. Department of Corrections, et al.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. New Jersey primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Dejshontaye Would v. N.J. Department of Corrections, et al., (D.N.J. 2026).

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

DEJSHONTAYE WOULD,

Plaintiff, Civil Action No. 26-533 (ZNQ) (TJB) v. OPINION N.J. DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al.,

Defendants.

QURAISHI, District Judge

This matter comes before the Court on the Court’s sua sponte screening of Plaintiff’s complaint (ECF No. 1) and application to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 1-2) in this prisoner civil rights matter. Having reviewed Plaintiff’s application, this Court finds that leave to proceed without the prepayment of fees is authorized in this matter and Plaintiff’s application shall therefore be granted. Because Plaintiff shall be granted in forma pauperis status in this matter, this Court is required to screen his complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and dismiss any claim which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim for relief, or seeks relief from an immune defendant. For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff’s complaint shall be dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim for which relief may be granted.

I. BACKGROUND Plaintiff is a convicted state prisoner currently confined in Northern State Prison. (ECF No. 1 at 5.) In his complaint, Plaintiff asserts that his Due Process rights were violated when he was found guilty of a prison disciplinary violation without being permitted to appear for a disciplinary hearing, and was held in an unsanitary cell without recreation while awaiting the outcome of that hearing. (ECF No. 1 at 7.) Plaintiff provides no further detail in his complaint about the nature of the hearing, the discipline imposed, the allegedly unsanitary conditions of his

cell, or the like. (Id.) As Defendants, Plaintiff names the New Jersey Department of Corrections, Northern State Prison, and a number of high level prison and Department officials including Victoria Kuhn, the commissioner of the N.J. D.O.C.; Marc Sim, the administrator of Northern State Prison; as well as Anthony Gongi, Anita Berryman, Nicholas Callicchio, and Desiree Gray, all of whom are apparently assistant administrators of Northern State Prison. (Id. at 1-4.) Plaintiff pleads no facts, however, connecting any of these Defendants to the alleged harms he suffered, and instead simply asserts that each Defendant should be liable to him because a “state entity violated my rights” without further detail. (Id.)

II. LEGAL STANDARD Because Plaintiff shall be granted in forma pauperis status, this Court is required to screen his complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Pursuant to the statute, this Court must sua sponte dismiss any claim that is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id. “The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as that for dismissing a complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).” Schreane v. Seana, 506 F. App’x 120, 122 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000)). In deciding a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), a district court is required to accept as true all factual allegations in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences from those allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, see Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 228 (3d Cir. 2008), but need not accept as true legal conclusions couched as factual

allegations. Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986). A complaint need not contain “detailed factual allegations” to survive a motion to dismiss, but must contain “more than an unadorned, the- defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A complaint “that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do,’” and a complaint will not “suffice” if it provides only “’naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 557 (2007)). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). A complaint that provides facts “merely consistent with” the defendant’s liability “stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility” and will not survive review under Rule 12(b)(6). Id. (quoting Twombly, 555 U.S. at 557). While pro se pleadings are to be liberally construed in conducting such an analysis, pro se litigants must still “allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim.” Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013).

III. DISCUSSION In his complaint, Plaintiff seeks to raise unlawful conditions of confinement and Due

Process claims related to a prison disciplinary proceeding against Northern State Prison, the New Jersey Department of Corrections, and a number of prison and Department supervisory officials pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. As both prisons and state Departments are arms of the state, however, they are not proper defendants in a civil rights proceeding and are in any event entitled to Eleventh Amendment Immunity. See e.g., Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Pol., 491 U.S. 58,

70-71 (1989); Christ the King Manor, Inc. v. Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 730 F.3d 291, 318 (3d Cir. 2013); Walker v. Beard, 244 F. App’x 439, 440-41 (3d Cir. 2007); Grabow v. S. State Corr. Facility, 726 F. Supp. 537, 538-39 (D.N.J. 1989). Petitioner’s claims against the New Jersey Department of Corrections and Northern State Prison must therefore be dismissed with prejudice at this time. Plaintiff’s claims against the remaining supervisory defendants also fail to state a claim for which relief may be granted. A defendant in a civil rights proceeding brought pursuant to § 1983 cannot be held liable for the actions of his subordinates or merely because he holds a supervisory position, instead he must have personal involvement in the alleged wrong. Chavarriaga v. N.J. Dep’t of Corr., 806 F.3d 210, 222 (3d Cir. 2015); Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207-08

(3d Cir. 1988).

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Related

Papasan v. Allain
478 U.S. 265 (Supreme Court, 1986)
Will v. Michigan Department of State Police
491 U.S. 58 (Supreme Court, 1989)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Clarence Schreane v. Seana
506 F. App'x 120 (Third Circuit, 2012)
Kelley Mala v. Crown Bay Marina
704 F.3d 239 (Third Circuit, 2013)
Phillips v. County of Allegheny
515 F.3d 224 (Third Circuit, 2008)
Grabow v. Southern State Correctional Facility
726 F. Supp. 537 (D. New Jersey, 1989)
Walker v. Beard
244 F. App'x 439 (Third Circuit, 2007)
Natale v. Camden County Correctional Facility
318 F.3d 575 (Third Circuit, 2003)

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