1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
2 DISTRICT OF NEVADA
3 * * *
4 YVONNE DEJESUS, Case No. 2:25-cv-00815-CDS-EJY
5 Plaintiff, ORDER 6 v.
7 UNITED HEALTHCARE GROUP,
8 Defendant.
9 10 Pending before the Court are Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend and First Amended Complaint. 11 ECF Nos. 10, 10-1. The Court’s prior screening Order granted Plaintiff leave to amend; thus, 12 Plaintiff need not have filed a motion. ECF No. 9. Nevertheless, the Motion is granted and the First 13 Amended Complaint (“FAC”) is screened below. 14 I. Screening Standard 15 When screening a complaint, a court must identify cognizable claims and dismiss claims that 16 are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief 17 from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Dismissal for failure to 18 state a claim under § 1915(e)(2) incorporates the standard for failure to state a claim under Federal 19 Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012). To 20 survive § 1915 review, a complaint must “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state 21 a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The 22 court liberally construes pro se complaints and may only dismiss them “if it appears beyond doubt 23 that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” 24 Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). 25 In considering whether the complaint is sufficient to state a claim, all allegations of material 26 fact are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Wyler Summit P’ship 27 v. Turner Broad. Sys. Inc., 135 F.3d 658, 661 (9th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted). Although the 1 more than mere labels and conclusions. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). 2 A formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action is insufficient. Id. Unless it is clear the 3 complaint’s deficiencies could not be cured through amendment, a pro se plaintiff should be given 4 leave to amend the complaint with notice regarding the complaint’s deficiencies. Cato v. United 5 States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995). 6 II. Discussion 7 Plaintiff’s FAC asserts four claims including race discrimination, a violation of the 8 Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), and retaliation for engaging in protected activity under 9 the ADA and Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Plaintiff provides the Court with her Right-to- 10 Sue letter dated February 13, 2025. ECF No. 10-1 at 5. Plaintiff initiated this action on May 9, 11 2025, which is less than 90 days after receiving her Right-to-Sue. Thus, facially, Plaintiff’s claim 12 was timely filed. 13 A. Race Discrimination and Retaliation Under Title VII. 14 Despite not filing her Charge of Discrimination with the Court, Plaintiff alleges her Charge 15 included claims of race discrimination and retaliation based on her race discrimination complaints. 16 The Court accepts these factual allegations as true. Wyler, 135 F.3d at 661. 17 In order to proceed with her race-based claim against United Healthcare, Plaintiff must allege 18 a prima facie case of discrimination. To state a prima facie case of race discrimination Plaintiff 19 must allege: (a) she belongs to a protected class; (b) she was qualified for the job for which she was 20 hired; (c) she was subjected to an adverse employment action; and (d) similarly situated employees 21 not in her protected class received more favorable treatment. Shepard v. Marathon Staffing, Inc., 22 Case No. 2:13-cv-02261-JCM-PAL, 2014 WL 2527149, at *2 (D. Nev. June 4, 2014) (citing Moran 23 v. Selig, 447 F.3d 748, 753 (9th Cir. 2006)). To state a claim for retaliation under Title VII, Plaintiff 24 must demonstrate that: (1) she “engaged in a protected activity, (2) she suffered an adverse 25 employment action, and (3) there was a causal link between the protected activity and the adverse 26 employment decision.” Davis v. Team Elec. Co., 520 F.3d 1080, 1093-94 (9th Cir. 2008). 27 In determining whether Plaintiff states race discrimination and retaliation claims, the Court 1 complaint. United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 2003) (“A court may …, consider 2 certain materials—documents attached to the complaint, documents incorporated by reference in the 3 complaint ….”). Those attachments include Plaintiff’s identification as Afro-Latina, and an 4 allegation that she is labeled as Black in the United States. Plaintiff states she was “consistently 5 treated … differently” than coworkers who were “of other racial backgrounds.” ECF No. 10-1 at 6 23. Plaintiff says she was repeatedly assigned tasks outside her job description and that those 7 assignments “required significantly more effort and time than those given to … [her] non-Black 8 colleagues.” Id. Plaintiff also says her work was scrutinized excessively and criticized for minor 9 errors while her non-Black peers were held to lesser standards. Id. Plaintiff alleges she was excluded 10 from training opportunities and subject to racially derogatory remarks. Id. Plaintiff also alleges she 11 raised these issues with the director of her department, but her complaint resulted in increased 12 harassment and unjustified discipline that ultimately led to her termination. Id. at 24. 13 The Court finds Plaintiff’s allegations plead necessary and sufficient facts to establish prima 14 facie claims of race discrimination and retaliation under Title VII. Thus, the Court finds these claims 15 may proceed against United Healthcare. 16 B. ADA Discrimination, Retaliation, and Failure to Accommodate. 17 Plaintiff alleges she suffers from a disability (dyslexia) that affects her reading and 18 processing of information. Plaintiff, who was a remote worker, states she had significant and 19 repeated problems with her equipment that prevented her from timely logging on and kept her from 20 performing work. Plaintiff says she contacted a “department director to report the lack of [technical] 21 support and clarify … how her attendance record was being mischaracterized.” Id. at 4. 22 To state a prima facie claim of disability discrimination under the ADA, a plaintiff must 23 allege facts that plausibly show: “(1) [she] is a disabled person within the meaning of the [ADA]; 24 (2) [she] is a qualified individual with a disability; and (3) [she] suffered an adverse employment 25 action because of [her] disability.” Hutton v. Elf Atochem N. Am., Inc., 273 F.3d 884, 891 (9th Cir. 26 2001). Here, Plaintiff alleges a disability within the meaning of the ADA and offers just enough 27 facts to state, prima facie, she was qualified for her position.
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1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
2 DISTRICT OF NEVADA
3 * * *
4 YVONNE DEJESUS, Case No. 2:25-cv-00815-CDS-EJY
5 Plaintiff, ORDER 6 v.
7 UNITED HEALTHCARE GROUP,
8 Defendant.
9 10 Pending before the Court are Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend and First Amended Complaint. 11 ECF Nos. 10, 10-1. The Court’s prior screening Order granted Plaintiff leave to amend; thus, 12 Plaintiff need not have filed a motion. ECF No. 9. Nevertheless, the Motion is granted and the First 13 Amended Complaint (“FAC”) is screened below. 14 I. Screening Standard 15 When screening a complaint, a court must identify cognizable claims and dismiss claims that 16 are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief 17 from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Dismissal for failure to 18 state a claim under § 1915(e)(2) incorporates the standard for failure to state a claim under Federal 19 Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012). To 20 survive § 1915 review, a complaint must “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state 21 a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The 22 court liberally construes pro se complaints and may only dismiss them “if it appears beyond doubt 23 that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” 24 Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). 25 In considering whether the complaint is sufficient to state a claim, all allegations of material 26 fact are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Wyler Summit P’ship 27 v. Turner Broad. Sys. Inc., 135 F.3d 658, 661 (9th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted). Although the 1 more than mere labels and conclusions. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). 2 A formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action is insufficient. Id. Unless it is clear the 3 complaint’s deficiencies could not be cured through amendment, a pro se plaintiff should be given 4 leave to amend the complaint with notice regarding the complaint’s deficiencies. Cato v. United 5 States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995). 6 II. Discussion 7 Plaintiff’s FAC asserts four claims including race discrimination, a violation of the 8 Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), and retaliation for engaging in protected activity under 9 the ADA and Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Plaintiff provides the Court with her Right-to- 10 Sue letter dated February 13, 2025. ECF No. 10-1 at 5. Plaintiff initiated this action on May 9, 11 2025, which is less than 90 days after receiving her Right-to-Sue. Thus, facially, Plaintiff’s claim 12 was timely filed. 13 A. Race Discrimination and Retaliation Under Title VII. 14 Despite not filing her Charge of Discrimination with the Court, Plaintiff alleges her Charge 15 included claims of race discrimination and retaliation based on her race discrimination complaints. 16 The Court accepts these factual allegations as true. Wyler, 135 F.3d at 661. 17 In order to proceed with her race-based claim against United Healthcare, Plaintiff must allege 18 a prima facie case of discrimination. To state a prima facie case of race discrimination Plaintiff 19 must allege: (a) she belongs to a protected class; (b) she was qualified for the job for which she was 20 hired; (c) she was subjected to an adverse employment action; and (d) similarly situated employees 21 not in her protected class received more favorable treatment. Shepard v. Marathon Staffing, Inc., 22 Case No. 2:13-cv-02261-JCM-PAL, 2014 WL 2527149, at *2 (D. Nev. June 4, 2014) (citing Moran 23 v. Selig, 447 F.3d 748, 753 (9th Cir. 2006)). To state a claim for retaliation under Title VII, Plaintiff 24 must demonstrate that: (1) she “engaged in a protected activity, (2) she suffered an adverse 25 employment action, and (3) there was a causal link between the protected activity and the adverse 26 employment decision.” Davis v. Team Elec. Co., 520 F.3d 1080, 1093-94 (9th Cir. 2008). 27 In determining whether Plaintiff states race discrimination and retaliation claims, the Court 1 complaint. United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 2003) (“A court may …, consider 2 certain materials—documents attached to the complaint, documents incorporated by reference in the 3 complaint ….”). Those attachments include Plaintiff’s identification as Afro-Latina, and an 4 allegation that she is labeled as Black in the United States. Plaintiff states she was “consistently 5 treated … differently” than coworkers who were “of other racial backgrounds.” ECF No. 10-1 at 6 23. Plaintiff says she was repeatedly assigned tasks outside her job description and that those 7 assignments “required significantly more effort and time than those given to … [her] non-Black 8 colleagues.” Id. Plaintiff also says her work was scrutinized excessively and criticized for minor 9 errors while her non-Black peers were held to lesser standards. Id. Plaintiff alleges she was excluded 10 from training opportunities and subject to racially derogatory remarks. Id. Plaintiff also alleges she 11 raised these issues with the director of her department, but her complaint resulted in increased 12 harassment and unjustified discipline that ultimately led to her termination. Id. at 24. 13 The Court finds Plaintiff’s allegations plead necessary and sufficient facts to establish prima 14 facie claims of race discrimination and retaliation under Title VII. Thus, the Court finds these claims 15 may proceed against United Healthcare. 16 B. ADA Discrimination, Retaliation, and Failure to Accommodate. 17 Plaintiff alleges she suffers from a disability (dyslexia) that affects her reading and 18 processing of information. Plaintiff, who was a remote worker, states she had significant and 19 repeated problems with her equipment that prevented her from timely logging on and kept her from 20 performing work. Plaintiff says she contacted a “department director to report the lack of [technical] 21 support and clarify … how her attendance record was being mischaracterized.” Id. at 4. 22 To state a prima facie claim of disability discrimination under the ADA, a plaintiff must 23 allege facts that plausibly show: “(1) [she] is a disabled person within the meaning of the [ADA]; 24 (2) [she] is a qualified individual with a disability; and (3) [she] suffered an adverse employment 25 action because of [her] disability.” Hutton v. Elf Atochem N. Am., Inc., 273 F.3d 884, 891 (9th Cir. 26 2001). Here, Plaintiff alleges a disability within the meaning of the ADA and offers just enough 27 facts to state, prima facie, she was qualified for her position. However, Plaintiff pleads no facts 1 allegations detail (1) all of the difficulty she was having with equipment, (2) that on one occasion 2 she suffered a migraine headache, and (3) facts regarding her race and comparators (ECF No. 10-1 3 at 11-24). Nowhere in Plaintiff’s FAC does she allege any facts tying her dyslexia to suffering some 4 adverse employment action or being treated differently than others who were not disabled. Id. In 5 the absence of these key facts, Plaintiff does not state a claim of discrimination based on disability. 6 Further, while Plaintiff states in a single sentence that she “requested accommodations, but 7 no reasonable accommodations were provided” (id. at 2), this conclusory statement is insufficient to 8 state a failure to accommodate claim under the ADA. To state a plausible failure to accommodate 9 claim under the ADA, Plaintiff must allege: (1) she is disabled within the meaning of the ADA; (2) 10 she is qualified to perform the essential functions of her job with reasonable accommodation; (3) she 11 requested an accommodation; (4) defendant knew of the requested accommodation; and (5) 12 defendant failed to reasonably accommodate her disability. Allen v. Pacific Bell, 348 F.3d 1113, 13 1114 (9th Cir. 2003); Iwaniszek v. Pride Transport, Inc., Case No. 2:17-cv-02918-JCM-BNW, 2021 14 WL 634991, at *3 (D. Nev. Feb. 17, 2021). While, as stated above, Plaintiff alleges that she suffers 15 from a disability, she does not plead that she needed an accommodation to perform essential 16 functions of her job. Nor does Plaintiff plead any facts reasonably supporting the conclusion that 17 her employer knew of a request for an accommodation and failed to provide one. The single 18 conclusory sentence offered by Plaintiff is insufficient to state a failure to accommodate claim. 19 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. In fact, even construing Plaintiff’s FAC liberally, 20 she fails to allege sufficient facts to allow the Court to reasonably infer that she was denied a 21 reasonable accommodation. 22 III. Order 23 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend (ECF No. 10) is GRANTED. 24 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint must be filed on the 25 docket. The Clerk of Court must separate ECF No. 10-1 from ECF No. 10 and file the same as 26 Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint. 27 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s claims of race discrimination and retaliation 1 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court must send Plaintiff one USM-285 form, 2 which Plaintiff must complete to the best of her ability and return to the U.S. Marshal Service no 3 later than August 26, 2025, at the following address:
4 Gary G. Schofield U.S. Marshal, District of Nevada 5 Lloyd D. George Federal Courthouse 333 Las Vegas Blvd. S., Suite 2058 6 Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 7 Plaintiff is advised to review the Nevada Secretary of State Business Entity Search website for 8 the identity and address for United Healthcare Group’s registered agent upon whom service of her 9 Amended Complaint should be made. 10 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court must issue a summons for United 11 Healthcare Group and deliver the summons, together with one copy of Plaintiff’s Amended 12 Complaint and one copy of this Order to the U.S. Marshal Service for service on Defendant. 13 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the U.S. Marshal Service must attempt service no later 14 than twenty-one (21) days after receipt of the USM-285 from Plaintiff and documents from the Clerk 15 of Court. 16 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s claims of discrimination and retaliation under 17 the ADA are DISMISSED without prejudice. If Plaintiff chooses to file an additional amended 18 complaint that complaint must be titled “Second Amended Complaint.” However, Plaintiff is not 19 required to file a second amended complaint. If she chooses not to do so, her First Amended 20 Complaint will proceed against United Healthcare Group on her Title VII race discrimination and 21 retaliation claims. 22 If Plaintiff chooses to file a second amended complaint, the second amended complaint must 23 contain all claims and all facts that support her claims, including those of race discrimination and 24 retaliation based on race because her second amended complaint will completely replace her First 25 Amended Complaint. The First Amended Complaint will no longer have any role in this case and 26 the Court cannot refer back to the content of the First Amended Complaint or its attachments when 27 considering whether Plaintiff states a claim. If Plaintiff files a second amended complaint and fails 1 to include the facts and claims necessary to support a claim she will not be granted the ability to 2 proceed with those claims. 3 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that if Plaintiff chooses to file a second amended complaint, 4 thus granting her a third opportunity to state her claims, it must be filed no later than August 29, 5 2025. The Court will not recommend Plaintiff be given a fourth opportunity to plead her claims. 6 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Court’s Recommendation at ECF No. 6 is VACATED 7 as moot. 8 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s failure to timely comply with the terms of this 9 Order may result in a recommendation to dismiss this matter in its entirety. 10 Dated this 6th day of August, 2025.
12 ELAYNA J. YOUCHAH 13 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27