Dejane Draper, et al. v. Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department, et al.

• Court: District Court, D. Nevada
• Decided: December 3, 2025
• Docket: 2:25-cv-01119
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 3

5 Dejane Draper, et al., Case No. 2:25-cv-01119-JAD-MDC

6 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION TO Plaintiffs, DISMISS CASE 7 vs.

8 Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department, et al.,

9 Defendants.

10 11 The Court previously denied plaintiff Dejane Draper’s (“Draper”) IFP application and ordered 12 him to either pay the filing fee or file a new in forma pauperis (“IFP”) application. ECF No. 4. The 13 Court also ordered Draper to obtain counsel for his children he listed as plaintiffs if they were minor- 14 aged or clarify that his children are adults. Id. No plaintiff has filed anything, paid the filing fee, or 15 obtained counsel, and the deadline to do so has passed. It appears that plaintiffs have abandoned this 16 case. 17 The Court RECOMMENDS that this case be dismissed. 18 I. LEGAL STANDARD 19 District courts have the inherent power to control their dockets and “[i]n the exercise of that 20 power, they may impose sanctions including, where appropriate . . . dismissal” of a case. Thompson v. 21 Hous. Auth. of City of Los Angeles, 782 F.2d 829, 831 (9th Cir. 1986). A court may dismiss an action 22 based on a party’s failure to obey a court order or comply with local rules. Malone v. U.S. Postal 23 Service, 833 F.2d 128, 130 (9th Cir. 1987) (dismissal for failure to comply with court order); Henderson 24 v. Duncan, 779 F.2d 1421, 1424 (9th Cir. 1986) (dismissal for lack of prosecution and failure to comply 25 with local rules). 1 In determining whether to dismiss an action on one of these grounds, the court must consider: (1) 2 the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the court’s need to manage its docket; (3) 3 the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits; 4 and (5) the availability of less drastic alternatives. In re Phenylpropanolamine Prod. Liab. Litig., 460 5 F.3d 1217, 1226 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Malone v. U.S. Postal Serv., 833 F.2d 128, 130 (9th Cir. 6 1987)). 7 II. ANALYSIS 8 The first two factors, the public’s interest in expeditiously resolving this litigation and the court’s 9 interest in managing its docket, weigh in favor of dismissal of the plaintiff’s case. Plaintiff has chosen 10 not to comply with this Court’s Order. The third factor, risk of prejudice to defendants, also weighs in 11 favor of dismissal because a presumption of injury arises from the occurrence of unreasonable delay in 12 prosecuting an action. See Anderson v. Air West, 542 F.2d 522, 524 (9th Cir. 1976). The fourth factor— 13 the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits—is greatly outweighed by the factors 14 favoring dismissal. 15 The fifth factor requires the Court to consider whether less drastic alternatives can be used to 16 correct the party’s failure that brought about the Court’s need to consider dismissal. Yourish v. Cal. 17 Amplifier, 191 F.3d 983, 992 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining that considering less drastic alternatives before 18 the party has disobeyed a Court order does not satisfy this factor); accord Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 19 F.3d 639, 643 & n.4 (9th Cir. 2002) (explaining that “the persuasive force of” earlier Ninth Circuit cases 20 that “implicitly accepted pursuit of less drastic alternatives prior to disobedience of the Court’s Order as 21 satisfying this element[,]” i.e., like the “initial granting of leave to amend coupled with the warning of 22 dismissal for failure to comply[,]” have been “eroded” by Yourish). Courts “need not exhaust every 23 sanction short of dismissal before finally dismissing a case but must explore possible and meaningful 24 alternatives.” Henderson, 779 F.2d at 1424. 25 1 This Court cannot operate without collecting reasonable fees and litigation cannot progress 2 || without a plaintiff's compliance with Court orders. The only alternative is to enter another order setting 3 || another deadline. Issuing another order, however, will only delay the inevitable and further squander the 4 || Court’s finite resources. Setting another deadline is not a meaningful alternative given these 5 || circumstances. The fifth factor favors dismissal. 6 After weighing these dismissal factors, the Court finds that they weigh in favor of dismissal. For 7 || the reasons discussed in this Order and the Court’s earlier Order (ECF No. 4), plaintiffs’ case should be 8 || dismissed. 9 IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT this case be DISMISSED. 10 Dated: December 3, 2025. 11 LX 3 Hon, ykitilggS I). Coyvillier II Unjged States 7 e Judge 14 NOTICE 15 6 Pursuant to Local Rules IB 3-1 and IB 3-2, a party may object to orders and reports and

7 recommendations issued by the magistrate judge. Objections must be in writing and filed with the Clerk

1g || of the Court within fourteen days. LR IB 3-1, 3-2. The Supreme Court has held that the courts of appeal 19 || may determine that an appeal has been waived due to the failure to file objections within the specified 20 || time. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 142 (1985). This circuit has also held that (1) failure to file 21 || objections within the specified time and (2) failure to properly address and brief the objectionable issues 22 || waives the right to appeal the District Court's order and/or appeal factual issues from the order of the *3 |! District Court. Martinez v. Yist, 951 F.2d 1153, 1157 (Sth Cir. 1991); Britt v. Simi Valley United Sch. 24 Dist., 708 F.2d 452, 454 (9th Cir. 1983). Pursuant to LR IA 3-1, plaintiffs must immediately file written 25

notification with the court of any change of address. The notification must include proof of service upon 1 each opposing party’s attorney, or upon the opposing party if the party is unrepresented by counsel. 2 Failure to comply with this rule may result in dismissal of the action. 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25