Deisy Ordonez-Godoy v. Jefferson Sessions

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
DecidedJune 29, 2018
Docket17-71840
StatusUnpublished

This text of Deisy Ordonez-Godoy v. Jefferson Sessions (Deisy Ordonez-Godoy v. Jefferson Sessions) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Deisy Ordonez-Godoy v. Jefferson Sessions, (9th Cir. 2018).

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 29 2018 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

DEISY YAQUELIN ORDONEZ-GODOY No. 17-71840 and CALEB JOEL SAUCEDA-ORDONEZ, Agency Nos. A206-843-750 Petitioners, A206-843-751

v. MEMORANDUM* JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Argued and Submitted April 11, 2018 Pasadena, California

Before: ROGERS,** BYBEE, and WATFORD, Circuit Judges.

Deisy Ordonez-Godoy, a native and citizen of Honduras, petitions for review

of the BIA’s decision upholding the IJ’s denial of her applications for asylum,

withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The Honorable John M. Rogers, United States Circuit Judge for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation. Ordonez-Godoy also claims that the IJ and BIA denied her due process. Caleb Joel

Sauceda-Ordonez, Ordonez-Godoy’s minor son, is a derivative beneficiary of her

claims. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252.

Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s denial of Ordonez-Godoy’s

application for asylum. “In order to reverse the BIA, we must determine ‘that the

evidence not only supports [a contrary] conclusion, but compels it—and also

compels the further conclusion’ that the petitioner meets the requisite standard for

obtaining relief,” Garcia-Milian v. Holder, 755 F.3d 1026, 1031 (9th Cir. 2014)

(alteration in original) (quoting INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 n.1 (1992)),

but here the record does not compel reversal. Substantial evidence supports the

BIA’s conclusion that Ordonez-Godoy did not suffer past persecution. Ordonez-

Godoy was never physically harmed or directly threatened by the Figueroas.

Ordonez-Godoy credibly testified to threats against her husband by the Figueroas,

but during her only direct interaction with the Figueroas—when an armed group of

gang members came to her home shortly after her husband fled Honduras—a gang

member told her he was friends with her father and expressed no interest in harming

her. Ordonez-Godoy remained in the country for nearly two years following the

incident without harm.

Absent a showing of past persecution, Ordonez-Godoy cannot benefit from a

presumption of a fear of future persecution, and substantial evidence supports the

2 17-71840 BIA’s determination that Ordonez-Godoy did not establish a well-founded fear of

future persecution on account of a protected ground. First, substantial evidence

supports the BIA’s conclusion that Ordonez-Godoy is unlikely to be persecuted

based on her relationship with her husband’s politically active family. During

Ordonez-Godoy’s single direct encounter with the Figueroas they expressed no

desire to harm her even though they were aware that she was living with her

husband’s family; she lived in her husband’s family’s home for nearly two more

years without incident; and there is no evidence that anyone in Ordonez-Godoy’s

hometown has been specifically targeted because of his or her relationship with the

Sauceda-Velasquez family.

Substantial evidence also supports the BIA’s conclusion that Ordonez-Godoy

did not establish a well-founded fear of future persecution based on her political

opinion. It is true that the Figueroas have targeted her husband’s uncle and cousin,

who were political candidates for mayor, as well as her husband’s aunt and other

uncle, who served as campaign managers. But the record here does not compel the

finding that the Figueroas imputed these political beliefs to Ordonez-Godoy. Again,

Ordonez-Godoy has had a single interaction with the Figueroas and they expressed

no interest in harming her, despite knowing that she lived with her husband’s

politically active family. She lived with her husband’s family without incident

throughout the mayoral campaign, and she lived in Honduras without harm for more

3 17-71840 than a year after the assassination of her husband’s uncle. Her husband’s parents

have continued to live in Honduras since that time without harm, despite the

inclusion of her father-in-law on the Figueroas’ hit list.

Further, because Ordonez-Godoy failed to establish eligibility for asylum, she

necessarily failed to satisfy the higher standard for withholding of removal. See

Lanza v. Ashcroft, 389 F.3d 917, 933 (9th Cir. 2004).

We do not have jurisdiction to consider the merits of Ordonez-Godoy’s CAT

claim. Because Ordonez-Godoy did not appeal the IJ’s adverse CAT decision to the

BIA, she failed to exhaust her administrative remedies with respect to her CAT

claim. See Alvarado v. Holder, 759 F.3d 1121, 1127 n.5 (9th Cir. 2014).

Ordonez-Godoy was not denied due process. The transcript of Ordonez-

Godoy’s hearing does not support her assertion that the IJ demonstrated actual bias

or prejudgment. The IJ was within her authority to question Ordonez-Godoy during

the hearing. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(1); see Halaim v. INS, 358 F.3d 1128, 1137 (9th

Cir. 2004). Moreover, while the IJ at times was terse with Ordonez-Godoy and her

counsel, “a mere showing that the IJ was unfriendly, confrontational, or acted in an

adversarial manner is not enough” to demonstrate that a petitioner has been denied

due process. Rizo v. Lynch, 810 F.3d 688, 693 (9th Cir. 2016). Ordonez-Godoy also

claims that the IJ denied her due process by denying her motion to consolidate her

case with her husband’s. But the issue was not exhausted before the agency because

4 17-71840 it was not substantively raised before the BIA, and the BIA did not consider the issue

when it adopted the immigration judge’s October 18, 2016, decision. Thus, the issue

is not properly before us. See Sola v. Holder, 720 F.3d 1134, 1135 (9th Cir. 2013)

(per curiam).

Finally, the BIA’s evidentiary rulings did not deny Ordonez-Godoy due

process. Ordonez-Godoy complains that the IJ afforded diminished weight to a

report about conditions in Honduras. But IJs retain broad discretion to “weigh the

evidence’s credibility and probative force.” Vatyan v. Mukasey, 508 F.3d 1179,

1185 n.4 (9th Cir. 2007). Here the IJ’s decision was not an abuse of discretion. The

IJ observed that the report was incomplete and was not accompanied by an

appropriate English translation, even though foreign language documents offered in

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