Deion Omar Pryor v. the State of Texas

Opinion

Opinion filed August 13, 2026

In The

Eleventh Court of Appeals

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No. 11-26-00188-CR

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DEION OMAR PRYOR, Appellant V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 104th District Court Taylor County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 25380-B

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant, Deion Omar Pryor, pleaded guilty to the second-degree felony offense of engaging in organized criminal activity. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 71.02(a), (e) (West Supp. 2025). Pursuant to a negotiated plea bargain agreement between Appellant and the State, the trial court sentenced Appellant to imprisonment in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice for four years. On June 22, 2026, the Taylor County District Clerk’s Office filed a document in this court wherein Appellant, pro se, indicated a desire to appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 25.2(c)(2). We dismiss the appeal.

When this appeal was docketed, we notified Appellant that the trial court had certified that this is a plea bargain case in which Appellant has no right of appeal. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 44.02 (West 2018); TEX. R. APP. P. 25.2(a)(2). In our letter, we requested that Appellant’s court-appointed counsel respond and show grounds to continue the appeal. On June 24, however, the trial court signed an order (1) granting Appellant’s counsel’s motion to withdraw and (2) denying his counsel’s motion to substitute counsel and Appellant’s request for court-appointed appellate counsel.1 As a result, we requested that pro se Appellant respond and show grounds to continue the appeal, and we informed him that the appeal was subject to dismissal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 25.2(a)(2), (d). In his response, Appellant states that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance.

Rule 25.2(a)(2) provides that, in a plea bargain case in which the punishment imposed does not exceed the punishment agreed to by the parties, “a defendant may appeal only: (A) those matters that were raised by written motion filed and ruled on before trial, (B) after getting the trial court’s permission to appeal, or (C) where the specific appeal is expressly authorized by statute.” TEX. R. APP. P. 25.2(a)(2); see also CRIM. PROC. art. 44.02. Subsections (A), (B), and (C) are not applicable here. Moreover, a plea-bargaining defendant cannot appeal matters relating to the voluntariness of his plea or the effectiveness of his counsel unless the trial court has granted him permission to appeal. See Ex parte Castillo, 664 S.W.3d 833, 834 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022); Harper v. State, 567 S.W.3d 450, 455–56 (Tex. App.— Fort Worth 2019, no pet.) (collecting cases).

The documents on file show that Appellant entered into a plea bargain agreement, and the trial court assessed his punishment in accordance with that agreement. Further, the trial court certified that this case is a plea bargain case, and

1 In its order, the trial court confirmed that Appellant was sentenced in accordance with the plea bargain agreement between Appellant and the State.

3

Appellant has no right of appeal. The trial court’s certification was signed by Appellant, Appellant’s trial counsel, and the presiding judge. The documents on file in this court support the trial court’s certification. See Dears v. State, 154 S.W.3d 610, 613–14 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). Accordingly, we must dismiss this appeal without further action. TEX. R. APP. P. 25.2(d); Chavez v. State, 183 S.W.3d 675, 680 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).

This appeal is dismissed.

W. BRUCE WILLIAMS JUSTICE

August 13, 2026 Do not publish. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b). Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J., Trotter, J., and Williams, J.