Deion Brown v. Terry Royal, et al.

Opinion

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6 DEION BROWN, Case No.: 3:25-cv-00052-MMD-CLB

7 Petitioner, ORDER v. 8 TERRY ROYAL, et al., 9 Respondents. 10 12 This habeas matter is before the Court on Petitioner Deion Brown’s Motion to 13 Withdraw Counsel (ECF No. 17), Motion for Appointment of Counsel (ECF No. 18), and 14 Motions to Extend Time (ECF Nos. 20, 29) as well as Respondents’ Motion to Seal (ECF 15 No. 25). For the reasons discussed below, the Court denies Brown’s Motion to Withdraw 16 and Motion for Appointment of Counsel and grants Respondents’ Motion to Seal. 18 Brown challenges a state court conviction and sentence for attempted lewdness 19 with a child under the age of 14. The state district court sentenced Brown to a term of 8 20 to 20 years. Following direct appeal and postconviction proceedings, Brown filed a 21 federal habeas petition and initiated the instant proceeding. (ECF No. 1-1.) Following the 22 appointment of counsel, Brown filed his first amended petition. (ECF Nos. 14, 19.) 24 A. Motion to Withdraw and Motion to Appoint Counsel 25 The Court confirmed the appointment of the Federal Public Defender through Ron 26 Y. Sung, Esq. as counsel for Brown. (ECF No. 14.) Brown filed a pro per motion 27 requesting withdrawal of his counsel based on a conflict of interest, asserting that his 28 counsel wants Brown to dismiss his habeas petition. (ECF No. 17 at 2.) Brown also 1 requested appointment of counsel. (ECF No. 18.) 2 Courts presiding over federal habeas petitions have the discretion to appoint 3 counsel when justice so dictates. Brown has no Sixth Amendment right to represent 4 himself in this case because the right to self-representation does not apply to habeas 5 proceedings. See Martinez v. Court of Appeal of California, Fourth Appellate District, 528 6 U.S. 152 (2000). As the Supreme Court expressed in Martinez, “[t]he requirement of 7 representation of trained counsel implies no disrespect for the individuals inasmuch as it 8 tends to benefit the appellant as well as the court.” Id. at 163. 9 In addition, Rule 6(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases (the “Habeas 10 Rules”) instructs that the district court must appoint counsel “[i]f necessary for effective 11 discovery.” And under Habeas Rule 8, a district court must appoint counsel if an 12 evidentiary hearing is warranted. Although the Court makes no rulings as to whether a 13 discovery or evidentiary hearing is warranted at this point, sound case management and 14 efficient administration of justice militate in favor of appointing counsel earlier rather than 15 later in a case where either is possible, particularly where, as here, Brown’s petition likely 16 raises complex issues, including whether his claims are exhausted and/or procedurally 17 defaulted and whether he can demonstrate cause and prejudice to overcome any 18 procedural bars. 19 Brown is reminded that counsel is under no obligation to restate and reassert each 20 and every allegation that a petitioner desires to pursue. Rather, counsel is appointed to 21 exercise their independent professional judgment about which allegations, claims, and 22 arguments they believe collectively present the best chance of success. Cf. Jones v. 23 Barnes, 463 U.S. 745 (1983) (counsel is vested with the authority to determine which are 24 the strongest issues and which should be “winnow[ed] out”). The Court cautions Brown 25 that refusal to cooperate with counsel will not be deemed a conflict-of-interest worthy of 26 removing counsel. See McNeal v. Williams, 2023 WL 418643, at *1 (9th Cir. Jan. 26, 27 2023) (agreeing with the district court that the interests of justice are best served by 28 having counsel represent the petitioner in complex matters, and the district court did not 1 abuse its discretion in denying petitioner’s motion to dismiss counsel because of 2 petitioner’s disagreement with counsel’s decisions as to which claims to raise in his § 3 2254 petition). 4 The Court encourages Brown to communicate with counsel and work with them to 5 develop his case, as he has been granted a resource that many pro se litigants ask for 6 but are denied. It remains in Brown’s best interest to communicate with his counsel as 7 this district’s local rules prevent the Court from entertaining pro se filings when a party is 8 represented by counsel. Brown may pursue this matter and communicate with the Court 9 only through filings by counsel. 10 Because the Court finds that, on the current record, appointment of counsel is in 11 the interests of justice, the Motion to Withdraw Counsel is denied, and the Court is not 12 persuaded that substitution of counsel is warranted. The Court denies Brown’s Motion to 13 Appoint Counsel. 14 B. Motions to Extend 15 Brown requests an extension of time to file his amended petition. (ECF No. 20.) 16 His first amended petition, however, has been filed. (ECF No. 19.) The Court denies his 17 motion for extension of time as moot. 18 Brown seeks also an extension of time to file his opposition to Respondents’ 19 motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 29.) The Court finds that the request is made in good faith 20 and not solely for the purpose of delay, and, therefore, good cause exists to grant the 21 motion. Brown has until June 15, 2026 to file his opposition. 22 C. Motion to Seal 23 Respondents seek leave to file under seal two documents (ECF No. 25): 24 Exhibit 18, Petitioner’s psychosexual evaluation (ECF No. 26-1); and Exhibit 19, 25 Petitioner’s Presentence Investigation Report (“PSI”) (ECF No. 26-2). Under Nevada law, 26 the PSI is “confidential and must not be made a part of any public record.” NRS § 27 176.156(5). In addition, the need to protect medical privacy generally qualifies as a 28 “compelling reason” for sealing records. See, e.g., Abbey v. Hawaii Emp’rs Mut. Ins. Co. 1 || (HEMIC), 760 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1013 (D. Haw. 2010). 2 Having reviewed and considered the matter in accordance with Kamakana v. City 3 || and County of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172 (9th Cir. 2006), and its progeny, the Court finds 4 || that a compelling need to protect Petitioner’s safety, privacy, and/or personal identifying 5 || information outweighs the public interest in open access to court records. Accordingly, 6 || the Respondents’ Motion to Seal (ECF No. 25) is granted, and Exhibits 18 and 19 (ECF 7 || Nos. 26-1, 26-2) are considered properly filed under seal. 9 It is therefore ordered that Petitioner Deion Brown’s Motion to Withdraw Counsel 10 || (ECF No. 17) is denied. 11 It is further ordered that Petitioner's Motion for Appointment of Counsel (ECF No. 12 || 18) is denied. 13 It is further ordered that Petitioner's Motion to Extend Time (ECF No. 20) is denied 14 || as moot. 15 It is further ordered that Petitioner's Motion to Extend Time (ECF No. 29) is 16 || granted. Brown has until June 15, 2026 to file his opposition. 17 It is further ordered that Respondents’ Motion to Seal (ECF No. 25) is granted. 18 || Exhibits 18 and 19 (ECF Nos. 26-1, 26-2) are considered properly filed under seal. 19 DATED THIS 11" Day of May 2026.

99 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 23 24 25 26 27 28