Dehnoushi v. Islamic Republic of Iran

• Court: District Court, District of Columbia
• Decided: June 22, 2026
• Docket: Civil Action No. 2025-2109
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

STELLA DEHNOUSHI, et al.,

Plaintiffs, Civil Action No. 25-2109 (RDM) v.

ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiffs bring this case against the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Islamic Revolutionary

Guard Corps (“IRGC”), and the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security (“MOIS”) pursuant

to the terrorism exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”), 28 U.S.C.

§ 1605A(a)(1).1 See generally Dkt. 1 (Compl.). Plaintiffs previously requested that the Court

authorize alternative service on the IRGC and the MOIS by email as “agencies and

instrumentalities” of Iran under 28 U.S.C. § 1608(b)(3)(C). See Dkt. 9. The Court denied that

motion without prejudice, explaining that the Court has previously held that the IRGC and the

MOIS “were considered ‘the foreign state itself’ for the purpose of service, rather than an agency

or instrumentality of the state, and that, therefore, service of those entities must proceed under 28

U.S.C. § 1608(a)” instead of Section 1608(b). Min. Order (Feb. 18, 2026) (quoting Holladay v.

Islamic Republic of Iran, 406 F. Supp. 3d 55, 59 (D.D.C. 2019)). The Court invited Plaintiffs to

renew their motion but directed that they “include an explanation of why they believe this

1 Plaintiffs also name twenty unidentified individuals who “were officials, employees, agents, or operatives of Iran, the IRGC, or [the] MOIS” as Defendants. Dkt. 1 at 4 (Compl. ¶ 14). Court’s decision in Holladay to be mistaken.” Id. Plaintiffs have now filed a renewed motion

for alternative service. See Dkt. 11.

As the Court previously explained in Holladay, “Section 1608 governs service of process

under the FSIA and provides separate paths that plaintiffs must follow depending on the nature

of the entity being served.” 406 F. Supp. 3d at 59 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1608). The first set of

options, under Section 1608(a), applies “[i]f plaintiffs seek to serve a ‘foreign state,’” while the

second set of options, under Section 1608(b), applies “if they seek to serve an ‘agency or

instrumentality of a foreign state.’” Id. In the pending motion, Plaintiffs ask the Court to

authorize service on the IRGC and the MOIS by email under Section 1608(b)(3)(C), which

permits service upon an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state “as directed by order of the

court consistent with the law of the place where service is to be made.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 1608(b)(3)(C); see Dkt. 11 at 13. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ request must be denied if the IRGC

and the MOIS are properly classified as “a foreign state or political subdivision of a foreign

state” rather than an agency or instrumentality, such that service must be effected under Section

1608(a) rather than Section 1608(b). 28 U.S.C. § 1608(a).

“The D.C. Circuit has offered the following guidance for determining which path applies:

‘if the core functions of the entity are governmental, it is considered the foreign state itself; if

commercial, the entity is an agency or instrumentality of the foreign state.’” Holladay, 406 F.

Supp. 3d at 59 (quoting Roeder v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 333 F.3d 228, 234 (D.C. Cir. 2003));

see also Transaero, Inc. v. La Fuerza Aerea Boliviana, 30 F.3d 148, 151–53 (D.C. Cir. 1994).

Here, Plaintiffs do not contend that the “core functions” of either the IRGC or the MOIS are

commercial rather than, as the Court held in Holladay, governmental. 406 F. Supp. 3d at 59; see

generally Dkt. 11. Indeed, in their complaint Plaintiffs acknowledged that “[p]ursuant to the test

2 established by the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, the [IRGC] and [the]

MOIS must be treated as the State of Iran itself as that term is used in [Section 1608].” Dkt. 1 at

4 (Compl. ¶ 13).

Nothing in Plaintiffs’ latest motion supports a different result. Plaintiffs first argue that

the D.C. Circuit misinterpreted the text of the FSIA in holding that Section 1608(b)’s

applicability turned on whether a defendant entity’s core functions were governmental or

commercial. Dkt. 11 at 4–6; see Transaero, Inc., 30 F.3d at 151. This Court, however, remains

bound by the D.C. Circuit’s reading of the statute unless and until the Circuit elects to revisit it.

Plaintiffs next argue that the U.S. government’s designation of the IRGC and the MOIS as

terrorist entities under separate statutory authorities demonstrates that both entities are “distinct

entities separate from the Iranian state.” Dkt. 11 at 7. Those designations, however, do not alter

the D.C. Circuit’s holding in Transaero, Inc. or this Court’s prior holding that the IRGC and the

MOIS engage in governmental activities and are therefore covered by Section 1608(a). See

Holladay, 406 F. Supp. 3d at 59.

Finally, Plaintiffs emphasize that they have been unable, through no fault of their own, to

effect service in accordance with Section 1608(a). Iran (along with the IRGC and the MOIS) is

not a party to any international convention regarding service; it lacks any other special

arrangement for service; it has refused to accept service by certified mail; and, at least for the

time being, it cannot be served via the Swiss Embassy in Iran (as the U.S. Department of State

has done in other FSIA cases against Iranian entities) owing to the ongoing armed conflict in the

region. Dkt. 11 at 9–11, see also Dkt. 12-1 at 2 (an email from the Department of State reporting

that the Swiss Embassy “is temporarily closed until further notice.”). The Court appreciates that

Plaintiffs have endeavored in good faith to effect service on the Iranian Defendants and that their

3 failure to do so in accordance with Section 1608(a) is not attributable to any lack of diligence on

their part. But that does not authorize the Court to reclassify the IRGC or the MOIS as agencies

or instrumentalities of Iran in defiance of binding precedent or to authorize alternative service on

a foreign state beyond the methods prescribed by Congress in Section 1608(a).

The Court will therefore DENY without prejudice Plaintiffs’ renewed motion for

alternative service, Dkt. 11. Plaintiffs are free to renew the motion if they have additional

arguments that the IRGC and the MOIS are subject to service under Section 1608(b), or that

Plaintiffs should be considered to have successfully effected service under Section 1608(a).

They are also free to renew their efforts to effect service through the U.S. Department of State

and the Swiss Embassy, if and when the Swiss Embassy reopens in Iran. On the present record,

however, Plaintiffs have not demonstrated they have served Defendants in “strict adherence to

the terms of [Section] 1608(a)” as Congress has required. Transaero, Inc., 30 F.3d at 154.

SO ORDERED.

/s/ Randolph D. Moss RANDOLPH D. MOSS United States District Judge

Date: June 22, 2026