DeHart v. United States (In re Metropolitan Metals, Inc.)

210 B.R. 249, 1997 Bankr. LEXIS 1568, 1997 WL 347917
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
DecidedApril 15, 1997
DocketBankruptcy No. 79-318
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 210 B.R. 249 (DeHart v. United States (In re Metropolitan Metals, Inc.)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, M.D. Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
DeHart v. United States (In re Metropolitan Metals, Inc.), 210 B.R. 249, 1997 Bankr. LEXIS 1568, 1997 WL 347917 (Pa. 1997).

Opinion

OPINION AND ORDER

JOHN J. THOMAS, Bankruptcy Judge.

This bankruptcy began under the Act of 1898 on March 29,1979.

Pending before this Court, to be addressed in this Opinion, are a Motion of Joseph F. and Caroline Enos for Leave to Intervene (Doc. # 808) in a certain litigation and a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution (Doc. # 810) to enforce execution of a judgment in that litigation.

This matter came to be heard on June 12, 1996. At that time, the parties, i.e., the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”); the Trustee, Charles DeHart, III, Esquire (“Trustee”); and Joseph F. and Caroline Enos (“Enoses”), agreed that a Stipulation of Facts filed in 1984 could be utilized by the Court as findings of fact in support of the parties’ respective positions. Rather than summarize those stipulations of fact, attached as an Appendix to this Opinion is a copy of that Stipulation of Facts filed October 3,1984 to Document # 496.

The Enoses’ Motions specifically relate to an Opinion of my predecessor, the Honorable Thomas C. Gibbons, Bankruptcy Judge, issued July 5, 1985 and reported in In re Metropolitan Metals, Inc., 50 B.R. 685 (Bankr.M.D.Pa.1985).

In that Opinion, Judge Gibbons (1) denied the Trustee’s request to compel the IRS to satisfy their tax claims against the assets of Enoses prior to making claim against the assets of the bankrupt Metropolitan Metals, Inc.; and (2) allowed the estate of Metropolitan Metals, Inc. to be subrogated to the rights of the IRS against the Enoses to the extent that Metropolitan Metals, Inc. is required to pay the IRS.

That decision was subsequently appealed to the district court and affirmed on August 4,1986.

The IRS has pursued the Enoses for the various tax liabilities asserted by it together with interest and whatever penalties may have accrued. Enoses, on the other hand, are hopeful that the bankruptcy Trustee for Metropolitan Metals, Inc. will pay the IRS so as to reduce and/or possibly eliminate the obligation that the Enoses may have to the IRS. These current Motions to intervene and execute the judgment are part of Enos-es’ ongoing effort to compel the Trustee to make this payment. The Enoses rely on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 71, which has specifically been incorporated into the Bankruptcy Rules by Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7071.

Initially, as an Act case, the current Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure may not apply. As we have previously indicated, the current Bankruptcy Rules are applicable to pending proceedings “except to the extent that in the opinion of the court their application in a pending proceeding would not be feasible or would work injustice, in which event the former procedure applies.” In re Blue Coal Corp., 166 B.R. 816, 819 (Bkrtcy.M.D.Pa.1993). Citing Order of the Supreme Court Adopting the Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, April 25,1983.

The Motion to Intervene would normally come before this Court under Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 2018(a). That Rule provides that the Court may permit any interested entity to intervene generally or with respect to any specified matter. The Rule, however, limits its application to cases “under the Code.” The Advisory Committee Note to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 1001 suggests that the “Code” refers to [251]*251Public Law 95-598 (the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978). The Committee Note distinguishes references to the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 as being made through the term “Bankraptcy Act.”

Nevertheless, Rule 71 specifically authorizes a party, in whose favor an order is entered, to enforce that order as if he were a party. I find that Judge Gibbons’ Order of July 5, 1985, as amended and affirmed, can run in favor of the Enoses and, therefore, can be enforced by the Enoses.

If the IRS is being compelled to pursue the Enoses for their tax obligation covered by the levy referred to in the Opinion of July 5, 1985, then this Court will enjoin the Trustee from attempting such compulsion. That, however, is not this Court’s understanding of what is happening. The IRS has pursued the Enoses, but not at the demand or insistence of the Trustee or pursuant to the order of any court. There is simply no evidence that they are pursuing Joseph F. and Caroline Enos for any reason other than to liquidate the tax obligation owing the United States government.

According to Rule 71, “(w)hen an order is made in favor of a person who is not a party to the action, he may enforce obedience to the order by the same process as if he were a party____” While Rule 71 allows non-parties to enforce orders made in their favor, it can not be adopted by one to enforce an order in an action in which she has no standing to sue. Lasky v. Quinlan, 558 F.2d 1133 (2nd Cir.1977). J. Moore, 7 Moore’s Federal Practice P71.03 (1979). A party has standing only if the interest she seeks to vindicate is “arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the ... constitutional guarantee in question.” Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153, 90 S.Ct. 827, 830, 25 L.Ed.2d 184, 188 (1970).
Moore v. Tangipahoa Parish School Board, 625 F.2d 33, 34 (5th Cir.1980).

While the Court has no hesitation in allowing the Enoses standing to intervene generally to enforce the rights they may have under Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7071, I simply cannot find any evidence of a failure to comply with Judge Gibbons’ Opinion and, therefore, deny as unnecessary, the Enoses Motion to enforce,

APPENDIX

STIPULATION OF FACTS

NOW COME Plaintiff, Charles J. DeHart, III, Trustee in Bankruptcy for Metropolitan Metals, Inc., and Defendant, United States of America, by respective counsel, and stipulate that the following facts shall govern the court in the rendition of a decision and judgment in the above-captioned matter:

1. On March 29, 1979, Metropolitan Metals, Inc. (Metropolitan) filed a Petition for relief under the provisions of Chapter XI of the Bankruptcy Act, former 11 U.S.C.A. 701 et seq., in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania (the Court). On June 24,1981, an Order was entered by the Court adjudicating Metropolitan a bankrupt.

2. On June 26, 1981, Charles J. DeHart, III, who was the Court appointed receiver for Metropolitan in the aforesaid Chapter XI case, was appointed Trustee for Metropolitan and subsequently qualified as Trustee. The said Charles J.

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Related

Enos v. DeHart (In re Metropolitan Metals, Inc.)
217 B.R. 457 (M.D. Pennsylvania, 1997)

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210 B.R. 249, 1997 Bankr. LEXIS 1568, 1997 WL 347917, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/dehart-v-united-states-in-re-metropolitan-metals-inc-pamb-1997.