LEIBSON, Justice.
This is the first of the so-called “right to die” cases, spawned by modern medical technology, to reach this Court.1
As a result of a tragic beating inflicted upon her on February 22,1983, Martha Sue DeGrella (Sue) sustained an acute subdural hematoma causing severe brain damage for which medical treatment was of no benefit. She now languishes, slowly wasting away, in a persistent vegetative state at the Lyndon Lane Nursing Home in Jefferson County, Kentucky. She receives nourishment and water through a gastrostomy tube surgically implanted into her stomach. She breathes through a tracheotomy tube inserted into her throat. These medical devices have been in place since March 4, [701]*7011983, with no significant possibility of improvement in her condition. With artificially supplied nutrition and hydration she may linger on many years in this condition. The doctors advise there is no “serious” report of a case where such a patient has recovered.
Martha Elston, Sue’s mother, was appointed her daughter’s legal guardian by Order of Jefferson District Court in October 1991, and in February 1992, she filed the within action, naming Sue as the respondent and asking the appointment of a Guardian Ad Litem to advocate Sue’s interests. Her petition seeks a declaratory judgment acknowledging Sue’s persistent vegetative state and asking the court to declare that “Martha Elston, as mother of Sue DeGrella, is permitted by Kentucky law to substitute her judgment for that of her daughter.” Strictly speaking, Martha Elston, the petitioner, does not seek a court order to disconnect the gastrostomy tubes used to provide nourishment and water for her ward and daughter, but a court declaration that she, as Sue’s mother and Guardian, has the right to direct such discontinuation. The petition alleges, and she has now proved to the satisfaction of the trial judge by clear and convincing evidence, that “if she [Sue] could speak, she would say, ‘Let me go.’ ”
This case is not in court because there is a dispute between the family members as to the patient’s wishes, or between the physicians as to the medical evidence. The case is before our Court because Sue’s attending physician and the nursing home fear legal sanctions, administrative, civil or even criminal, should they carry out the wishes of the patient as expressed through her mother and legal guardian. Being thus concerned, they have advised the family they require court authorization before permitting or participating in the removal of the medical device which provides Sue with nourishment and water.
The Guardian Ad Litem did not file a response controverting the factual allegations of the petition, all of which now have been proved at trial. Nevertheless, the Guardian Ad Litem attended the trial, which took place over a two-day period in July 1992, appropriately tested the witnesses by cross-examination, and after the trial submitted a final report in which he recommended “that the court deny the relief sought.” He stated:
“Despite the horrendous situation in which the Elston family finds itself, your Guardian Ad Litem simply does not believe that there is anything in present Kentucky law which authorizes what the Plaintiff seeks....”
In Brief and oral argument the Guardian Ad Litem, who is now the appellant, has conceded that there is no dispute about (1) Sue’s present condition, (2) the feelings she expressed as a competent adult about the subject at issue before this devastating condition was forced upon her, and (3) her medical prognosis. The court below decided that Sue DeGrella’s mother and legal guardian,2 has the right to direct her attending physician and the nursing home where Sue resides to disconnect the feeding tube that is maintaining her existence, and let her die. The Guardian Ad Litem challenges the legality of this decision, but fully agrees the facts are fairly stated in the trial court’s Opinion.
Within the context of this case, the issues are: (1) whether there is a right to choose to die as well as a right to live; (2) whether a person who has clearly stated, as a competent adult, that she would choose to die if ever reduced to the conditions presented, retains the right to do so after a devastating injury has rendered her incompetent and left her in a persistent vegetative state; and (3) if the answers to these two questions are in the affirmative, whether the right she retains may be exercised through a surrogate, in this ease Sue’s next of kin and legal guardian.
In addressing these issues we must confront several sub-issues. If there is a right to choose to die in present circumstances: [702]*702(1) what is the impact upon such right of two statutes enacted in 1990, the Kentucky Living Will Act (KRS 311.622-644) and the Health Care Surrogate Act of Kentucky (KRS 311.970-.986); (2) do statements made by a person when competent regarding the desire to forego medical treatment in the future under certain conditions provide an evidentiary basis for surrogate decision-making when the patient is rendered incompetent; (3) do the powers of a legal guardian or next of kin ever extend to authorizing the withdrawal of life prolonging medical treatment, even with a person in Sue’s condition; and (4) to what extent, if any, should courts be authorized or required to play a role in the decision-making process?
There is one prefatory issue which we must address before embarking on this discussion lest our words be misunderstood as the first step onto a slippery slope, or misapplied by trial courts in future cases: that is the quality-of-life issue. As long as the case is confined to substitute decision-making by a surrogate in conformity with the patient’s previously expressed wishes, the case involves only the right of self-determination and not the quality of life. However, as evidence regarding the patient’s wishes weakens, the case moves from self-determination towards a quality-of-life test. At the point where the withdrawal of life-prolonging medical treatment becomes solely another person’s decision about the patient’s quality of life, the individual’s “inalienable right to life,” as so declared in the United States Declaration of Independence and protected by Section One (1) of our Kentucky Constitution, outweighs any consideration of the quality of the life, or the value of the life, at stake. Nothing in this Opinion should be construed as sanctioning or supporting euthanasia, or mercy killing. We do not approve permitting anyone to decide when another should die on any basis other than clear and convincing evidence that the patient would choose to do so. This was the decision of the trial court in this case, and it is this decision which we affirm.
The trial court’s Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment, entered September 3, 1992, comprise some 49 pages and can hardly be summarized within the confines of this Opinion. Eleven witnesses testified, including Sue’s mother, two brothers, a sister, her former husband, three doctors, the nursing home administrator, and two theologians. Irreversible brain damage has destroyed Sue’s higher brain functioning. Only her brain stem continues to function, continuing to operate her respiration and heart. With continued feeding she may live many years. However, her brain and her body will continue to wither. She reacts only at a reflexive level, meaning she will withdraw from painful stimulus, but does not experience pain by cognitive thought. Ceasing the nutrition and hydration will cause no pain, although, likewise, continuing treatment causes no pain. With the withdrawal of the feeding tube, all signs of life will expire in about ten to twelve days.
The finding of the trial court, supported by the uncontroverted medical evidence, is:
“The provision of nutrition and hydration by way of a gastrostomy tube is found to be an artificial intrusion into the body of Sue DeGrella and under the circumstances of this case is deemed by the Court to be an extraordinary measure utilized to perpetuate her life signs.” The trial court found by “clear and con-
vincing evidence” that the proof sustained the allegations of the Complaint, both as to the medical facts regarding Sue’s condition and prognosis and as to her choice as she expressed it to family members on different occasions and in different contexts; specifically, as the subject came up in conversation on various occasions, that if she were ever faced with a devastating injury or illness incapacitating her such as she is now incapacitated, she would want her treatment terminated rather than having her life prolonged by artificial means. As stated by the trial court:
“She repeatedly expressed the view that she would not want to be kept alive by artificial means. She found the plight of Karen Ann Quinlan and Quinlan’s contin[703]*703ued treatment to be abhorrent to her.3 She hated any limitations on her abilities and she feared being reduced to being dependent on others. She went so far as to protest being put on a respirator after her second automobile accident, even though no question ever existed that she would recover.”
While she never specifically stated that she did not want nutrition and hydration in the event she was in a persistent vegetative state, it would be unreasonable to require such a high degree of specificity on her part.”
The trial court found that the respondent:
“... rejected during her life time and at times when she was competent the principle that life must be maintained at any cost. To the contrary she expressed explicitly on many occasions her desire that her life not be maintained if she would come to be under conditions which would require extraordinary means to preserve her life.”
Based on this evidence the trial court held, inter alia:
“(6) The Petitioner, mother of the Respondent, as surrogate as well as next of kin, has the power to act in the stead of Sue DeGrella. In such capacity she may elect to direct the discontinuance of further life saving treatment on behalf of Sue DeGrella.”
The question raised by this case is of profound public importance: can the trial court lawfully sanction the right of the legal guardian and next of kin of an incompetent person in a persistent vegetative state to terminate artificial nutrition and hydration? Thus, when the Guardian Ad Litem appealed the trial court’s final judgment, we granted transfer.
At the outset, we note the appellant does not question the common law right of a competent person to forego medical treatment, either by refusal or withdrawal. As stated in Union Pacific Railway Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251, 11 S.Ct. 1000, 1001, 35 L.Ed. 734 (1891):
“No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common law, than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of other, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law.”
This right was expressed by Judge Benjamin Cardozo, during his tenure on the high court of New York, as follows:
“Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an operation without his patient’s consent commits an assault, for which he is liable in damages.” Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital, 211 N.Y. 125, 130, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914).
This same right was duly noted by our Court in Tabor v. Scobee, Ky., 254 S.W.2d 474 (1951), a suit against a surgeon who discovered that his patient’s Fallopian tubes were infected and diseased during an operation for appendicitis, and who removed them without first obtaining the consent of the patient’s stepmother who was nearby. Our Court held the facts stated constituted a cause of action against the surgeon even though the surgeon’s treatment “was approved by the testimony of his professional colleagues” {Id. at 475); the patient, who was a minor, through her stepmother, had the right to decide whether she wished to undergo or refuse this medical procedure unless an immediate life-threatening emergency made it impractical for the surgeon to obtain the stepmother’s consent before removing the patient’s Fallopian tubes.
Tabor v. Scobee holds that the person with parental authority was to be consulted to obtain consent on behalf of her underage stepdaughter unconscious on the operating table. From this we infer that here Martha Elston had similar authority to refuse further medical treatment on behalf of her adult incompetent child, not in all circumstances, but in appropriate circumstances [704]*704where there is no state interest in sustaining life specifically identified which is of sufficient importance to outweigh it. Certainly the facts in Tabor v. Scobee tear at the heart of the appellant’s contention that, although a competent adult has a common law right to refuse or forego medical treatment or surgical intervention, no one has authority to engage in surrogate decision-making for an incompetent, as Martha El-ston sought to do for her daughter in present circumstances.
The only other Kentucky case of which we have knowledge having any bearing on the issue presented is Strunk v. Strunk, Ky., 445 S.W.2d 145 (1969). Strunk was a petition by the mother of an adult, incompetent son, who had been appointed as his committee, asking the court to recognize her authority to authorize the transplant of this son’s healthy kidney as a donor to his brother who was suffering from a fatal kidney disease.
“The [trial] court found that the [brother’s] operation was necessary, that under the peculiar circumstances of this case it would not only be beneficial to [the do-nee] but also beneficial to [the incompetent donor] because [the donor] was greatly dependent upon [the donee], emotionally and psychologically, and that his well-being would be jeopardized more severely by the loss of his brother than by the removal of a kidney.” Id. at 146.
Our Court affirmed the trial court, recognizing “the inherent power of the equity courts with regard to incompetents.” Id. at 147. The decision engages the subject of “substitute judgment,” refuting the Guardian Ad Litem’s claim in the present case that the guardianship statutes do not specifically authorize a legal guardian to make personal decisions of this nature. In Strunk we state:
“The right to act for the incompetent in all cases has become recognized in this country as the doctrine of substituted judgment and is broad enough not only to cover property but also to cover all matters touching on the well-being of the ward.” Id. at 148.
We quote from a legal treatise:
“Where legal disability of the individual is shown, the jurisdiction of the court is plenary and potent to afford whatever relief may be necessary to protect his interests and preserve his estates.... While this is indeed a special exercise of equity jurisdiction, it is beyond question that by virtue thereof the court may pass upon purely personal rights.” Id. at 147.
The operation contemplated in Strunk had no bearing on the physical well-being of the incompetent brother. Our court was approving the guardian’s choice as to what would be “beneficial to Tommy” based on psychological and emotional considerations of the ward that outweighed physical health and mere survival. Again quoting from a treatise, the court referred for authority to an English case where the
“... Lord Chancellor permitted the allowance of an annuity out of the income of the estate of [a] lunatic earl as a retiring pension to the latter’s aged personal servant” because the court was “ ‘satisfied that the Earl of Carysfort would have approved if he had been capable of acting himself.’ ” Id. at 148.
The appellant cites us no authority to the contrary. The appellant relies solely on the failure of the Kentucky statutes related to guardianship to cover specifically the present situation. We view the statutes related to “Guardianship and Conser-vatorship for Disabled Persons,” KRS 387.-500 et seq., as remedial rather than exclusive. These statutes intend to provide services for incompetent persons not only as specifically articulated but also as reasonably inferable from the nature of the powers of a guardian, which include in KRS 387.660:
“(2) To make provision for the ward’s care, comfort and maintenance....
(3) To give any necessary consent or approval to enable the ward to receive medical or other professional care, counsel, treatment or service [with the exception of certain procedures which require court approval except in an emergency situation],
(4) To act with respect to the ward in a manner which limits the deprivation of [705]*705civil rights and restricts his personal freedom only to the extent necessary to provide needed care and services to him.”
We quote from Rasmussen by Mitchell v. Fleming, 154 Ariz. 207, 741 P.2d 674 (1987), addressing the right of a guardian to terminate nutrition and hydration for a person in a persistent vegetative state:
“A competent person clearly has the ability to exercise the right to refuse medical treatment. So, too, does an incompetent individual who has made his or her medical desires known prior to becoming incompetent. Id. at 685-86.
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The guardian ad litem argues that a guardian’s right to consent to or approve medical treatment does not include the right to refuse medical treatment....
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... ‘Just as medical intervention is, in the majority of cases, clearly in the best interests of the ward, nonintervention in some cases may be appropriate and, therefore, in the ward’s best interest.’ ” Id. 741 P.2d at 687.
First, we approve of the following quote from Rasmussen:
“The consequences of a decision to terminate medical treatment will often be irreversible. Therefore, the court in any dispute will assume that the patient wishes to continue receiving medical treatment, and the burden to prove otherwise will rest on the party or parties desiring to terminate the treatment.” Id., 741 P.2d at 691.
We view “best interest,” in present context, exclusively from the standpoint of the health and well-being of the ward and synonymous with the decision the ward would choose to make if conscious and competent to do so.
“Under the substituted judgment standard, the guardian ‘attempt[s] to reach the decision that the incapacitated person would make if he or she were able to choose.’ ... This standard best guides a guardian's decisionmaking when a patient has manifested his or her intent while competent.” Id., 741 P.2d at 688.
We do not go the next step, as the Arizona court did in the Rasmussen case, to decide that "best interest” can extend to terminating life-sustaining medical treatment where the wishes of the ward are unknown.
The position of the appellant is that “a guardian is a fiduciary and it is unthinkable that a fiduciary could properly act so as to bring about the ward’s death.” While we recognize that this argument has superficial appeal, the courts in seventeen of our sister states which have pondered the same issue presented here have not found it “unthinkable.” Indeed, every state that has considered the matter has upheld the right of patients in a persistent vegetative state, through surrogates, to elect to withdraw such medical care: some courts based their decision on common law rights and some on common law viewed as constitutionally protected. These seventeen states are Arizona, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Rhode Island, and Washington.4 Most of these cases are covered in the Opinion of the United States Supreme Court in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri [706]*706Depart. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 110 S.Ct. 2841, 111 L.Ed.2d 224 (1990). The decisions reviewed in Cruzan reason that where the wishes of the patient are plainly manifest from statements made when competent, the right of self-determination should not be lost merely because an individual is no longer able to sense a violation of such right.
In every state, when the court has been persuaded of the wishes of the incompetent patient, the court has honored those wishes. In all but two states, Missouri and New York, even when the court has been unable to precisely determine the express wishes of the patient, it has allowed the patient’s family, or the patient’s guardian, to exercise substituted judgment as to what the patient would wish. The cases from Missouri and New York, Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408 (Mo. banc 1988) and Matter of Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, 420 N.E.2d 64 (1981), recognize the common law right to refuse treatment is retained by an incompetent, but require clear and convincing evidence that the incompetent person, while competent, expressed the desire that such treatment be refused in the circumstances presented. In the present case the trial court used “clear and convincing evidence” as the standard for making its decisions, so we need not decide whether a mere preponderance of evidence would have sufficed. Clear and convincing evidence was introduced, of both the patient’s irreversible persistent vegetative state and the strength of the patient’s commitment to the termination of life in such circumstances. Once we recognize the possibility of any circumstances where the right of self-determination of terminating medical treatment can still be exercised through a surrogate, the present circumstances qualify for its application.
The appellant contends the common law right of self-determination in, and informed consent to, obtaining medical treatment has been attenuated by legislative policy expressed in the Kentucky Living Will Act, supra, and the Health Care Surrogate Act of Kentucky, supra, to the extent that it can no longer be said to apply to an incompetent person in a persistent vegetative state. But neither of these statutes specifically applies to the present situation, and when we study them looking for a policy overriding the common law right to refuse medical treatment, they send mixed messages.
For example, the Living Will Act begins with a reaffirmation of the common law right, a legislative finding “that all adults have the fundamental right to control the decisions relating to their own medical care, including the decision to have medical or surgical means or procedures calculated to prolong their lives provided, withheld, or withdrawn.” KRS 311.622(1). The statute goes on from there to specify one method by which a competent adult, through a “living will” as detailed in the Act, can “make a written declaration ... instructing the adult’s physician to withhold or withdraw life-prolonging treatment in the event such person is diagnosed as having a terminal condition.” KRS 311.622(2). But it does not purport to be exclusive, or to supersede common law rights.
KRS 311.624(5)(b) specifies that in a living will document executed pursuant to the statute “ ‘life-prolonging treatment’ shall not include the administration of medication or the performance of any medical procedure deemed necessary to alleviate pain or for nutrition or hydration.” But the argument that the limitations in the Living Will Act express a policy for situations beyond the scope of the statute is conclusively refuted by KRS 311.640, which specifies in subsection (1) that the Act “creates no presumption concerning the intention of an adult who has revoked or has not executed a declaration” using the Act, and in subsection (2) that the Act “shall not ... impair or supersede any common law or statutory right that an adult has to effect the withholding or withdrawal of medical care.”
KRS 311.636, states that “[njothing in [the Living Will Act] shall be construed to condone, authorize or approve mercy killing or euthanasia, or to permit any affirmative or deliberate act to end life other [707]*707than to permit the natural process of dying.” (Emphasis added.) “Mercy killing” and “euthanasia” or any other “affirmative or deliberate act to end life” are fundamental violations of the common law. The key phrase is the last phrase, “other than to permit the natural process of dying,” and this phrase explains, clarifies and limits what is meant by an “affirmative or deliberate act to end life.” This phrase recognizes that the advances of medical technology have made it possible to sustain existence when life has ended except for the “natural process of dying.” This is not an objective inquiry into the quality of life, but a subjective inquiry into whether the patient wishes the continuation of medical procedures to interdict “the natural process of dying.”
The withdrawal of nutrition and hydration from a person in Sue DeGrella’s state, irreversible brain damage and a prolonged period in a persistent vegetative state, is medically recognized as fitting the definition of “permit[ting] the natural process of dying” as documented by the evidence in the record before us.5 We could not reach a different definition, even if we were so inclined, except by indulging in an abstract discussion about the “meaning of life” or “quality of life” that would substitute our personal opinions for the evidence introduced at trial as expressed through the findings of the trial judge.
Likewise, we find no special meaning in the bundle of rights legislatively provided by the “Health Care Surrogate Act of Kentucky,” supra, that limits or contravenes the patient’s common law rights in the present situation. This Act grants a person “with decisional capacity” the right to “designate” others “as a surrogate or successor surrogate to make any health care decision on behalf of the grant- [708]*708or, excluding the right to withhold or withdraw artificial nutrition and hydration,” except
“[w]hen the burden of the provision of artificial nutrition and hydration itself shall outweigh its benefit, provided the determination of burden shall refer to the provision itself and not to the quality of the continued life of the person.” KRS 311.978(3)(c).
It is difficult to interpret what the statute means by the word “burden” for a person in a persistent vegetative state. We need not decide for a person like Sue DeGrella who has clearly stated, while competent, that should she ever be reduced to a condition such as she is now in, she would want treatment terminated. Sue has established that for her “the burden of the provision of artificial nutrition and hydration ... outweigh[s] its benefit.”
In any event, the Health Care Surrogate Act, just as the Living Will Act, specifies that it supplements rather than limits common law rights. In KRS 311.984(5) it states that the Act “shall not ... impair or supersede any common law or statutory right that an adult has to effect the withholding or withdrawing of medical care.”
Having determined that neither the Living Will Act nor the Health Care Surrogate Act intends or attempts to contravene or supersede Sue DeGrella’s common law rights, we need not, and do not, extend this Opinion by addressing constitutional questions which would arise if the contrary were so. Constitutional questions would arise only if these Acts were interpreted as a legislative effort to impair rights of self-determination or personal autonomy which the constitution protects. Several of the decisions from our sister states have recognized constitutional protection for the right of the incompetent individual in Sue De-Grella’s circumstances to have nutrition and hydration withdrawn through the process of surrogate decision-making, usually based on protection of a constitutional right of privacy. That question is moot in this case because, as we interpret the acts of the General Assembly, they leave common law rights intact.
Now we turn our attention to the evidence question. As previously stated, the Guardian Ad Litem questions how Sue’s prior statements against being maintained on an artificial life-support system, no matter how credibly attested to by other persons, may constitute a legal basis for a surrogate decision-maker (“whether a guardian, a family member or a judge”) to later decide to terminate life-prolonging medical treatment. He presents no authority in point. Instead he argues: (1) an analogy to statutes which, in some instances require written proof of an action taken before it can be given effect, statutes such as KRS 394.040, the requisites of a valid will; and (2) the possibility the now incompetent person may have experienced an unknown change of heart after having voiced the choices her family is now trying to effectuate.
The analogy to the formalities required in the making of a will is unsound because the right to refuse or terminate medical treatment, unlike the power to devise property by will, does not come from the state. It inheres in a person’s right of self-determination in the choice of medical treatment, and as yet the state has not attempted to interfere in its exercise.
As to the more difficult question, the evidentiary value of past statements of preferences to govern subsequent treatment decisions, these comments made by Justice William Brennan fairly frame the issue:
“When a person tells family or close friends that she does not want her life sustained artificially, she is ‘expressing] her wishes in the only terms familiar to . her, and ... as clearly as a lay person should be asked to express them. To require more is unrealistic, and for all practical purposes, it precludes the rights of patients to forego life-sustaining treatment.” 497 U.S. at 324, 110 S.Ct. at 2875.
We recognize that previous oral statements cannot be considered conclusive in nature. The oral directives the patient gives to a family member, friend or health care provider are of significant value as a [709]*709relevant evidentiary consideration, but there are other evidentiary matters which may outweigh such statements, such as written directives to the contrary, reactions the patient voiced regarding particular types of medical treatment, religious beliefs and the tenets of that religion, or the patient’s consistent pattern of conduct with respect to prior decisions about his own medical care. These considerations are discussed in In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 361, 486 A.2d 1209, 1229-30 (1985). But the fact that other evidentiary considerations, where available, may outweigh oral statements does not rule them out as reliable evidence to guide surrogate decision-making, where such statements have been made as in the present case.
On the contrary, such evidence falls within the parameters of the exception to the hearsay rule now codified in the Kentucky Rules of Evidence, KRE 803(3), recognizing the admissibility of a “statement of the declarant’s then existing state of mind, emotion, sensation, or physical condition” where relevant to the issue at hand. For instance, in L.K.M. v. Dept. for Human Resources, Ky.App., 621 S.W.2d 38 (1981), a termination of parental rights case depending upon proof by clear and convincing evidence (the same standard used in the present case), the court said it was proper to use previous out-of-court statements of children offered to prove “intense fear” of their parents, even though the pertinent state of mind was at the time of trial. Likewise, in Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Hewlett, 307 Ky. 171, 210 S.W.2d 352 (1948), an action to recover the life insurance proceeds on a person who had disappeared, our Court permitted the beneficiary to prove that the insured had previously expressed intentions to commit suicide. And in Wilson v. Commonwealth, Ky., 551 S.W.2d 569 (1977), our Court ruled that statements showing the deceased’s previously expressed intention to kill the appellant should have been admitted as proof that the victim was the initial aggressor.
As stated in Lawson’s treatise, The Kentucky Evidence Law Handbook, 3rd Ed., Sec. 8.50, p. 435 (1993):
“It is well-settled that relevancy of expressions of states of mind can exist without a concurrence in point of time between the making of the statements and states of mind required to be proved.”
Sue DeGrella’s statements of choice made before she became incompetent, while not dispositive of the question at hand, are competent evidence upon which a surrogate decision-maker could exercise substitute judgment in the circumstances presented.
We conclude the right to withdrawal of further medical treatment for a person in a persistent vegetative state exists within the framework of the individual’s common law rights of self-determination and informed consent in obtaining medical treatment. In this Opinion we have recognized these rights can be exercised by an incompetent person through the process of surrogate decision-making so long as the wishes of the patient are known. The right to terminate medical treatment is not a power belonging to the judiciary to grant or withhold. The purpose of a declaratory judgment action is to judicially define the rights the parties already have, not to create new rights where none exist, or to withhold them. This case came to the trial court because the attending physician and nursing home would not recognize the patient’s right to choose to refuse treatment through her surrogate, not because there is any law requiring the court’s prior consent to the exercise of the patient’s right. Courts are, and must be, open to decide cases where a controversy exists, including a controversy in a case of this nature. Controversy exists only when someone challenges the existence of a right or the facts to support its exercise. Here, the lawfulness of the act of withholding further treatment depends on the existence of the underlying facts that established the patient’s condition, her wishes in such condition, and the irreversible nature of the condition.
The appellant does not challenge these facts; the appellant challenges the existence of the right even though the facts [710]*710exist, and we affirm the existence of such right. The subject matter of this action is not judicial power to terminate treatment, but Sue DeGrella’s right to terminate treatment, a choice she made before she was reduced to her present state, and retained when this tragedy befell her. Thus, though the courts are open for such cases, if no one challenges the existence of the underlying facts, legal action is not essential to the exercise of the patient’s right.
The question to be decided is a factual one, not a legal one. If the attending physician, the hospital or nursing home ethics committee where the patient resides, and the legal guardian or next of kin, all agree and document the patient’s wishes and the patient’s condition, and if no one disputes their decision, no court order is required to proceed to carry out the patient’s wishes. Future criminal sanctions or civil liability turn not on the existence or absence of a court order, but on the facts of the case. Judicial intervention into private decision-making of this sort is expensive and intrusive. No liability attaches to a decision to refuse or withdraw treatment in a case of this nature once the necessary facts are. established and carefully documented by the parties involved. On the other hand the court cannot absolve the parties from liability where the facts do not exist to support the action taken. A false or fraudulent, and collusive, decision is beyond the power of a court to approve before or after the termination of life-sustaining medical treatment.
Because of the advances in modern medical technology, the time has come for people to give serious consideration to their choices if a tragedy of this nature should befall them, to decide what they would want done in such circumstances, and to make their wishes known so that family and health care providers can respect their decision.
For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
STEPHENS, C.J., and COMBS and SPAIN, JJ., concur.
LAMBERT, J., concurs by separate opinion.
WINTERSHEIMER, J., dissents by separate opinion in which REYNOLDS, J., joins.