Deforrest, E. v. Deforrest, K.

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: March 14, 2025
• Docket: 1002 EDA 2024
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

J-S32013-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

ERIKA DEFORREST : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : KURT DEFORREST : : Appellant : No. 1002 EDA 2024

Appeal from the Order Entered March 15, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County Civil Division at No(s): 2020-18964

BEFORE: LAZARUS, P.J., STABILE, J., and KING, J.

MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, P.J.: FILED MARCH 14, 2025

Kurt Deforrest (Husband) appeals from the order, entered in the Court

of Common Pleas of Montgomery County, finding him in civil contempt for

violating a provision of a marital settlement agreement (MSA) that required

him to provide health insurance to one of his children. After careful review,

we affirm in part and reverse in part.

Husband and Ericka DeForrest (Wife) (collectively, the parties), married

on March 3, 2005. They have two children born of the marriage: S.D. (born

June 2005) and A.D. (born November 2007). On August 12, 2021, Husband

and Wife entered into a MSA. See MSA, 8/12/21, at 2. Their divorce was

finalized by divorce decree on September 1, 2021. Paragraph 12 of the MSA

reads, in relevant part, as follows:

12. INSURANCE J-S32013-24

Health Insurance: Husband and Wife specifically agree that each party will be responsible for their own health insurance following the entry of the [d]ivorce [d]ecree. The parties agree that Husband will maintain the minor children on his health insurance until they have legally emancipated. This is with the understanding that[,] if legally permitted and financially feasible, Husband will maintain the children on his health insurance until they reach the age of 26 or obtain health insurance coverage through their own employment or otherwise[.]

Id. at 21.

On December 5, 2023, Husband texted S.D. informing her that she

would be removed from his health insurance plan at the end of the year. See

Exhibit F-1, 3/1/24, at 1. On January 1, 2024, Husband removed S.D. from

his health insurance coverage. On January 3, 2024, Wife filed a petition for

civil contempt, alleging Husband violated paragraph 12 of the MSA. Husband

filed an answer to the petition on January 18, 2024.

On March 1, 2024, Husband and Wife appeared, pro se, for a hearing

on Wife’s petition. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court entered an

order granting Wife’s petition for civil contempt, finding Husband had violated

paragraph 12 of the MSA. Additionally, the court ordered Husband to provide

health insurance for S.D. until she is 29 years old.

Husband filed a timely notice of appeal, and both Husband and the trial

court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). On appeal, Husband raises the

following issues for our review:

1. Whether the trial court erred, as a matter of law, in determining that [Husband] has an obligation to cover the parties’ adult child[, S.D.,] until she is 29 years old when there is no obligation under Pennsylvania law and the [MSA] referred to in

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the [c]ourt’s [o]rder of March 14, 2024[,] requires [Husband] to cover the child up to the year she turns age 26.

2. Whether the trial court erred, as a matter of law, in its interpretation of paragraph 12 of the [MSA], in failing to read the paragraph in its entirety. The Agreement clearly indicates the parties intended for [Husband] to only cover the children until they were emancipated, but no later than [the] age of 26, which infers a reasonable interpretation to be once the child had an opportunity to obtain employment, [Husband] would no longer be obligated to pay for health insurance for the adult child [S.D.].

3. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in permitting [Wife] to pursue her claim for a [c]ontempt [p]etition when she gave no indication the third-party beneficiary adult child [S.D.] had authorized [Wife] to pursue the contempt against [Husband].

Brief of Appellant, at 5-6.

Our standard of review for appeals from contempt orders “is limited to

a determination of whether the trial court abused its discretion.” B.A.W. v.

T.L.W., 230 A.3d 402, 406 (Pa. Super. 2020). “If a trial court, in reaching its

conclusion, overrides or misapplies the law or exercises judgment which is

manifestly unreasonable, or reaches a conclusion that is the result of

partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill will as shown by the evidence of record, then

discretion is abused.” Thompson v. Thompson, 187 A.3d 259, 263 (Pa.

Super. 2018).

In his first issue, Husband argues that he has no legal obligation to

continue providing S.D. with health insurance until she turns 29 years old.

See Brief of Appellant, at 14. He argues that the statute on which the trial

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court relied, 40 P.S. § 752.1(a)(1)-(4), applies to insurers, not parents. Id.

at 15. The statute states:

(a) An insurer that issues, delivers, executes, or renews group health care insurance in this Commonwealth under which coverage of a child would otherwise terminate at a specified age shall, at the option of the policyholder, provide coverage to a child of an insured employee beyond that specified age, up through and including the age of 29, at the insured employe[e]’s expense, and provided that the child meet[s] all of the following requirements:

(1) Is not married.

(2) Has no dependents.

(3) Is a resident of this Commonwealth or is enrolled as a full-time student at an institution of higher education.

(4) Is not provided coverage as a named subscriber, insured, enrollee or covered person under any other group or individual health insurance policy or enrolled in or entitled to benefits under any government health care benefits program, including benefits under Title XVIII of the Social Security Act.

40 P.S. § 752.1(a)(1)-(4) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).

Under Chapter 40, an insurer is defined as “[a] foreign or domestic

insurance company, association or exchange, health maintenance

organization, hospital plan corporation, professional health services plan

corporation, fraternal benefit society[,] or risk-assuming preferred provider

organization[.]” 40 P.S. § 908-13(a).

In concluding that Husband was obligated to pay for S.D.’s health

insurance until she turned 29, the trial court first noted that paragraph 12 of

the MSA provides that, “if legally permitted and financially feasible, Husband

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will maintain the children on his health insurance until they reach the age of

26 or obtain health insurance coverage through their own employment or

otherwise.” Trial Court Opinion, 5/17/24, at 5 (quoting MSA, 8/12/21, at 21).

The trial court observed that section 752.1(a) “permits a child to be covered

until age 29 provided that the child” satisfies the four enumerated conditions.

Trial Court Opinion, 5/17/24, at 6. The trial court found that S.D. was, at the

relevant time, “18 years old, unmarried, has no dependents, [] is a

Pennsylvania resident attending college on a full-time basis[,] is employed at

Walmart as a part-time employee[,] and she does not receive medical benefits

from Walmart.” Id. Consequently, S.D. met “the criteria set forth in [section]

752.1(a)[(1)-(4)] for continuation of health coverage on [Husband’s]

employer-sponsored health insurance plan.” Id.

Upon review, we agree with Husband that the trial court’s application of

section 752.1(a) was erroneous. The statute specifically applies to

“insurer[s] that deliver[], execute[], or renew[] group health care insurance

in” Pennsylvania. 40 P.S. § 752.1(a) (emphasis added). Section 752.1

mandates that such insurers, at the option of the policyholder, extend

coverage to an insured’s employee child through the child’s 29th year, at the

insured’s expense, provided the child continues to satisfy the four

requirements contained in the statute. Id. The statute does not, however,

impose obligations on non-insurers to provide health insurance until that age.

Here, Husband is not an insurer as defined by Chapter 40. See 40 P.S. § 908-

13(a) (applying to “foreign or domestic insurance company[ies],

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association[s] or exchange[s], health maintenance organization[s], hospital

plan corporation[s], professional health services plan corporation[s], fraternal

benefit societ[ies] or risk-assuming preferred provider organization[s].”).

Consequently, we conclude that the trial court erred in its application of

section 752.1(a) to Husband. See Thompson, supra. Accordingly, we agree

with Husband’s argument that he has no legal obligation under section

752.1(a) to provide S.D. with health insurance until she reaches the age of

29.

In his second issue, Husband argues that the trial court’s interpretation

of paragraph 12 of the MSA was erroneous. See Brief of Appellant, at 24.

Husband argues that paragraph 12 “infers a reasonable interpretation [that]

once [S.D.] had an opportunity to obtain employment, [Husband] would no

longer be obligated to pay for health insurance for the adult child.” Brief of

Appellant, at 5-6.

The trial court noted “that during his testimony at the March 1, 2024[,]

hearing in this matter, [Husband] argued [the] ambiguity of paragraph 12[,]

. . . however, [Husband] dropped this argument.” Trial Court Opinion,

5/17/2024, at 8.1 Instead of addressing K.D.’s “reasonable interpretation” ____________________________________________

1 Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(a) provides that:

[U]pon receipt of the notice of appeal, the judge who entered the order giving rise to the notice of appeal, if the reasons for the order do not already appear of record, shall within the period set forth in Pa.R.A.P. 1931(a)(1) file of record at least a brief opinion (Footnote Continued Next Page)

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argument, the trial court focused on paragraph 12’s “legally permitted and

financially feasible” language. First, the court found that the MSA obligates

Husband to provide health insurance until S.D. is 26 years old. See id. at 7.

Further, the court found that section 752.1(a) obligates Husband to extend

health coverage to S.D. until she is 29 years old. See id. at 8. Additionally,

the trial court found that the financial feasibility prong was “not an issue”

because Husband “testified that he is employed full-time as a police officer

earning an annual salary of nearly $100,000.00, has never filed for

bankruptcy, owns his own home, which is not in foreclosure, has never had

his vehicle repossessed, and has a two-income household.” 2 Id. at 6 (citing

____________________________________________

of the reasons for the order, or for the rulings or other errors complained of, or shall specify in writing the place in the record where such reasons may be found.

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a).

Rule 1925(a) “facilitate[s] appellate review of a particular trial court order. Additionally, however, the rule fulfills an important policy consideration by providing to disputing parties, as well as to the public at large, the legal basis for a judicial decision.” Commonwealth v. DeJesus, 868 A.2d 379, 383 (Pa. 2005) (quoting Commonwealth v. Williams, 732 A.2d 1167, 1192 (Pa. 1999) (Castille, J. concurring)). If a trial court fails to address an issue raised in an appellant’s Rule 1925(b) statement, ordinarily “the remedy is a remand to the trial court with directions that an opinion be prepared and returned to the appellate court.” Scampone v. Grane Healthcare Co., 11 A.3d 967, 973 (Pa. Super. 2010) (quotations omitted). However, a remand “is unnecessary as long as the lack of an opinion does not impact upon our ability to conduct appellate review.” Id. Here, although the trial court failed to address Husband’s “reasonable interpretation” argument, our ability to conduct appellate review is not impeded. See Scampone, supra.

2Husband appears to have remarried sometime after the parties divorced. See N.T., Contempt Hearing, 3/1/24, at 35.

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N.T., Plaintiff’s Petition for Contempt in Divorce, 3/1/2024, at 35). The trial

court then cited Wife’s testimony stating that Husband, as a police officer,

pays lower health insurance premiums than people who work in the private

sector. Id. at 7. The trial court also noted that Husband testified that it would

“merely cost [him] fifteen (15) percent out-of-pocket (approximately $167.00

additional monthly cost) to continue to insure S.D. on his employer-sponsored

health insurance.” Id. (citing N.T., Contempt Hearing, 3/1/24, at 28).

The “interpretation of a contract is a question of law.” CM Goat, LLC

v. Valdez, 318 A.3d 392, 397 (Pa. Super. 2024). This Court’s standard of

review is de novo, and our scope of review is plenary. Vinvulum, Inc. v.

Goli Techs., LLC, 310 A.3d 231 (Pa. 2024). “In interpreting a contract, the

ultimate goal is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the parties as

reasonably manifested by the language of their written agreement.”

Humberston v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 75 A.3d 504, 510 (Pa. Super. 2013).

A marital settlement agreement is governed by the law of contracts unless the

agreement states otherwise, and “[t]he terms of a marital settlement

agreement cannot be modified by a court in the absence of a specific provision

in the agreement providing for judicial modification.” Rosiecki v. Rosiecki,

231 A.3d 928, 932-33 (Pa. Super. 2020). When a contract’s terms are clear

and unambiguous, “the Court need only examine the writing itself to give

effect to the parties['] understanding.” Habjan v. Habjan, 73 A.3d 630, 640

(Pa. Super. 2013).

The relevant portion of paragraph 12 reads as follows:

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The parties agree that [Husband] will maintain the minor children on his health insurance until they have legally emancipated. This is with the understanding that if legally permitted and financially feasible, [Husband] will maintain the children on his health insurance until they reach the age of 26 or obtain health insurance coverage through their own employment or otherwise[.]

MSA, 8/12/21, at 21.

Husband proffers that, under paragraph 12, “[n]ot only must the

insurance be financially feasible to [Husband][,] but it must be proven that

the child cannot obtain health insurance coverage through their own

employment or otherwise.” Brief of Appellant, at 29. Husband argues that

paragraph 12 “infers a reasonable interpretation [that] once [S.D.] had an

opportunity to obtain employment, [Husband] would no longer be obligated

to pay for health insurance for the adult child.” Id. at 5-6. We disagree.

The plain language of paragraph 12 obligates Husband to provide health

insurance to his children until they are legally emancipated. Whether a child

is legally emancipated is a question of fact determined by the totality of the

circumstances. See Castaldi v. Castaldi-Veloric, 993 A.2d 903, 911 (Pa.

Super. 2010). This Court, however, need not determine whether S.D. is

legally emancipated. The parties agreed to the emancipation clause obligation

“with the understanding” that Husband’s obligation, if legally permissible and

financially feasible, would extend until the children reach the age of 26 or

obtain their own health insurance through employment or some other means.

See Habjan, supra.

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Paragraph 12 makes no reference to the children’s “opportunity” to

obtain employment or health insurance. Rather, Paragraph 12 clearly states

that Husband’s obligation ends only when the children reach age 26 or obtain

their own health insurance, or if providing health insurance is no longer legally

permissible and financially feasible. Reading Husband’s “opportunity”

argument into paragraph 12 would require our Court to modify the plain

language of the MSA. See Rosiecki, supra. Because paragraph 12 is clear

that Husband is obligated to provide health insurance at least until his

children are legally emancipated, and until they reach 26 years old or obtain

their own health insurance, we hold that paragraph 12 obligates Husband to

provide S.D. health insurance until S.D. is 26 years old or obtains her own

health insurance. See Blumenstock, supra.

In his third issue, Husband argues that the trial court abused its

discretion by permitting Wife to pursue a contempt petition against Husband

without first receiving authorization from S.D., a third-party beneficiary to the

MSA. See Brief of Appellant, at 19-20, 22-23. This claim is waived.

“Issues not raised in the trial court are waived and cannot be raised for

the first time on appeal.” Pa.R.A.P. 302(a). A party must make a specific

objection at the appropriate time before the trial court in order to preserve an

issue for appeal. In re S.C.B., 990 A.2d 762, 767 (Pa. Super. 2010). Our

Court “will not consider a claim which was not called to the trial court’s

attention at a time when any error committed could have been corrected.”

Interest of L.V., 209 A.3d 399, 418 (Pa. Super. 2019).

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Here, Husband did not raise the issue in his answer to Wife’s contempt

petition or raise the issue during the contempt hearing. See generally, N.T.

Contempt Hearing, 3/1/24; see also In re S.C.B., supra. Rather, Husband

first raised the issue in his Rule 1925(b) statement, which was insufficient to

preserve it for appellate review. See Cabot Oil and Gas Corp. v. Speer,

241 A.3d 1191, 1196 (Pa. Super. 2020) (recognizing issue cannot be raised

for first time in Rule 1925(b) statement). Because Husband did not raise this

issue below, at the first opportunity to do so, it is waived. See Pa.R.A.P.

302(a); Interest of L.V., supra.

Order affirmed in part and reversed in part. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Date: 3/14/2025

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