Deford v. Ballentine Realty Corp.

180 S.E. 164, 164 Va. 436, 1935 Va. LEXIS 220
CourtSupreme Court of Virginia
DecidedJune 13, 1935
StatusPublished
Cited by18 cases

This text of 180 S.E. 164 (Deford v. Ballentine Realty Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Virginia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Deford v. Ballentine Realty Corp., 180 S.E. 164, 164 Va. 436, 1935 Va. LEXIS 220 (Va. 1935).

Opinion

Hudgins, J.,

delivered the opinion of the court.

The complainant, Ballentine Realty Corporation, filed a bill against the executors, trustees and beneficiaries under the will of J. Wiley Halstead, deceased, praying that the contract of sale to the corporation of 381 lots, known as the Willoughby Bay lots, in the city of Norfolk, be rescinded, and the deed from J. Wiley Halstead to the corporation, bearing date on the 10th day of December, 1923, be set aside and declared null and void, and that the respondents be compelled to pay complainant the sum of $49,530, purchase price, with interest from date of sale.

The answer alleged that the sale of the Willoughby lots was only a part of the contract between Halstead and the corporation, which included the sale of both the Willoughby lots and some forty-four acres of land known as the Fox Hall farm. The chancellor held that the sale of the lots and the acreage constituted one transaction, and that the corporation was entitled to a rescission of the sale and a return of the purchase price, but that it would have to account for the profits, if any, made out of the development, buildings and sales of the Fox Hall tract. To ascertain the exact amount of such profits or losses, the cause was referred to a commissioner to take accounts. From that decree, the respondents sought and obtained this appeal.

The first assignment of error is to the finding of the chancellor that in consummating the sale to the corporation, J. Wiley Halstead was guilty of a breach of duty which he owed to it.

There is very little conflict in the evidence. The difficulty arises in the inferences which the parties draw from the evidence and in the application of the law thereto. It is [440]*440conceded that at the time the contract was made, Halstead was president and general manager of the Ballentine Realty Corporation, and in that transaction he did not assume to act for the corporation but for himself, and dealt with the other directors, who were acting for the corporation and were personally disinterested.

A transaction between an officer of a corporation and the corporation is similar to one between a trustee and cestui que trust. In Waddy v. Grimes, 154 Va. 615, 647, 153 S. E. 807, 817, the majority rule is stated thus: “There is a distinction to be made between transactions occurring directly between a trustee and his cestui que trust, and those transactions in which the trustee deals with himself in respect to the trust estate. The latter class of transactions are voidable by the cestui que trust at his election without giving any reason or alleging any fraud, or any advantage or inadequacy of price. But where the trustee deals directly with the cestui que trust, the transaction is not ipso facto voidable at the election of the cestui que trust; but only prima facie presumed to be invalid, which presumption may be rebutted.”

The evidence shows that in 1907 J. Wiley Halstead organized the Ballentine Realty Corporation for the purpose of acquiring, developing, subdividing and selling real property. Shortly after its organization, this corporation acquired a tract of land containing some 366 acres, situated in the eastern section of the city of Norfolk and known as the Ballentine farm. This acreage was plotted, subdivided into lots, streets and sidewalks were laid out and improved, buildings erected, and sale of the lots and buildings undertaken. This venture proved very successful.

By the latter part of 1921 or early in 1922, so much of the property had been sold that it was found inadvisable and unprofitable to maintain the large and expensive organization which the company then had. Mr. Halstead’s salary, which had been five thousand dollars annually, was reduced to $2,500, and other curtailments followed. Mr. Hal-stead and the directors realized that it was necessary either [441]*441to dissolve the corporation and dispose of its assets, or to acquire more property for development.

Mr. Halstead, in 1917, had' purchased from a substituted trustee at a forced sale, some lots in the city of Norfolk, near Ocean View, for which he paid $8,088.75. Subsequently, it was claimed that the substituted trustee had been appointed without due notice to all parties in interest, and that the title of Mr. Halstead to the lots in question was not good. In 1920, a receiver for the Jamestown Land Corporation, grantor in the deed of trust under which the substituted trustee had sold the lots, reoffered them for sale, and from him Mr. Halstead purchased 381 lots, the subject of this controversy, at the price of $15,240, receiving credit for the eight thousand and odd dollars he had previously paid to the substituted trustee.

On April 4, 1923, notice was given for a called meeting of the directors, in which notice it was stated that Mr. Hal-stead was offering to sell the lots to the corporation on certain conditions, the prices ranging from $125 to $150. The hour of the meeting was set for four, p. m., and at the bottom on the notice was this note: “The meeting was called by the president at the hour named in order to give each an opportunity to see and investigate the property before the meeting, and I will be glad to show it to you at any time.” At this meeting on April 11th, the minutes showed that Mr. Halstead requested “that the members consider the proposition strictly from a business standpoint and not consider his individual interest.” He modified his offer to convey the lots to the corporation for four hundred shares of preferred stock, and stated that if the stock was redeemed within the year he would make a reduction of ten per cent, in which case the lots would cost the corporation less than $100, each. “He then retired to give those present an opportunity to discuss the matter freely.” After the discussion, one of the members had to leave and Mr. Halstead, called back into the meeting, stated that because of his personal interest he would not vote on the question. Some of the members expressed a desire to liquidate instead of ex[442]*442panding, and some desired to purchase the lots. The meeting adjourned without any action being taken.

When the corporation declined, or rather, failed to accept his offer, Mr. Halstead offered to purchase the acreage and lots of the Ballentine property then unsold, and, with notice of a meeting called to consider his offer, furnished the directors with a statement of the acreage, the lots, and the cost price. Nine of the fifteen directors attended the meeting and adjourned for the purpose of viewing the properties. No definite action was taken, but a committee of three was appointed to confer with Mr. Halstead “in regard to the liquidation of the company, or to adopt some method by which the business would be continued,” and to meet whenever the committee was ready to report. At a meeting of the directors held on June 2d, the committee made the following report:

“First—To continue the corporation. This would make it necessary to acquire additional land. If Mr. Halstead will renew his proposition with reference to the Willoughby property, we would recommend favorable action on one or the other plan for payment contained therein provided the purchase price of this property is considered by directors to be fair and reasonable. In addition, secure more property, if possible, as it is evident that the present overhead expense is far too great for the amount of business we are doing; and unless we can secure more land, we recommend,

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
180 S.E. 164, 164 Va. 436, 1935 Va. LEXIS 220, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/deford-v-ballentine-realty-corp-va-1935.