Deering v. Lockheed Martin Corporation

CourtDistrict Court, D. Minnesota
DecidedApril 16, 2021
Docket0:20-cv-01534
StatusUnknown

This text of Deering v. Lockheed Martin Corporation (Deering v. Lockheed Martin Corporation) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Minnesota primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Deering v. Lockheed Martin Corporation, (mnd 2021).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA

Daniel’la Deering, Civ. No. 20-1534 (DSD/BRT)

Plaintiff, v. ORDER

Lockheed Martin Corporation, a Maryland corporation; Maryanne Lavan, an individual; and Kenneth Bastian, an individual,

Defendants.

Heidi J.K. Fessler, Esq., Innova Law Group, PLLC; William J. Egan, Esq., Avisen Legal, P.A., counsel for Plaintiff.

Allyson J. Petersen, Esq., Donald M. Lewis, Esq., Joseph G. Schmitt, Esq., Nilan Johnson Lewis PA; Krissy A. Katzenstein, Esq., Baker & McKenzie LLP; and Michael S. Burkhardt, Esq., Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP, counsel for Defendants.

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Production of Documents. (Doc. No. 37.) This motion relates to several discovery requests served by Plaintiff on Defendants. A hearing was held on the motion on April 12, 2021. (Doc. No. 44.) Plaintiff’s counsel clarified at the hearing which discovery requests remain at issue and for which they seek rulings from the Court. This Order addresses only those discovery requests argued in Plaintiff’s motion that remain at issue. Any other requests referenced in Plaintiff’s motion papers are considered not at issue before the Court. Guiding the Court’s rulings are the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure regarding discovery in a civil case. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 governs discovery in federal court. Discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, however, is not without bounds even if relevance is shown. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(2)(C) provides: On motion or on its own, the court must limit the frequency or extent of discovery otherwise allowed by these rules or by local rule if it determines that:

(i) the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or can be obtained from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive;

(ii) the party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity to obtain the information by discovery in the action; or

(iii) the proposed discovery is outside the scope permitted by Rule 26(b)(1).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1) provides: Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case, considering the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties’ relative access to relevant information, the parties’ resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.

Therefore, Rule 26(b) imposes a proportionality requirement on the scope of discovery, which must be considered when ruling on discovery disputes. See Provident Savings Bank, F.S.B. v. Focus Bank, No. 1:19-CV-151 RLW, 2020 WL 6196132, at *2 (E.D. Mo. Oct. 22, 2020) (“The parties and the court have a collective responsibility to consider the proportionality of all discovery and consider it in resolving discovery disputes.” (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee’s notes to 2015 amendment)). The discovery at issue in Plaintiff’s motion to compel pertains to requests for documents. Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b) provides that document requests must “describe with reasonable particularity” the documents sought. The Court also considers that this is an employment discrimination case. While the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply to employment discrimination cases, “the discovery of information pertaining to other

employees must be limited to those employees who are similarly situated.” Quinonez- Castellanos v. Performance Contractors, Inc., No. 16-cv-4097-LTS, 2017 WL 3430511, at *3 (N.D. Iowa Aug. 9, 2017). “The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has clearly stated that ‘a plaintiff in a wrongful termination case is not entitled to company-wide discovery absent a showing of a particular need for the requested information.’” Id. (quoting Semple v. Fed. Express Corp., 566 F.3d 788, 794 (8th Cir. 2009)).

In addition, “the time period concerning the requested discovery must be ‘reasonable.’” Id. (citing Sallis v. Univ. of Minn., 408 F.3d 470, 478 (8th Cir. 2005)). However, the statute of limitations is not a cut-off. Regarding temporal scope, while a statute of limitations can be a helpful point of reference, discovery of information both before and after the liability period may be relevant and proportional. See Johnson v.

Charps Welding & Fabricating, Inc., No. 14-CV-2081 (RHK/LIB), 2015 WL 13883903, at *6 (D. Minn. May 14, 2015) (“At the discovery stage, it is sufficient to note that the mere fact that information pertains to a time period beyond a possibly applicable limitations period does not render it undiscoverable, so long as the request for such information is reasonable.”). The Court has reviewed the briefs and all the papers supporting the pending motion and the response filed. The Court has considered the arguments made, has reviewed each discovery request at issue, and considered both the relevance and

proportionality of the discovery sought based on the information provided. Based on the Court’s consideration, the file, submissions, and proceedings herein, the Court grants in part and denies in part Plaintiff’s motion as explained further below. ORDER

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Production of Documents (Doc. No. 37) is granted in part and denied in part as follows:

a. Regarding RFP No. 2, the motion is granted.

b. Regarding RFP No. 3, the motion is denied as moot because Defendants have agreed that they will produce non-privileged documents relating to Plaintiff’s claims in this case.

c. Regarding RFP No. 4, Defendants state that they have produced non-privileged documents responsive to subparts (a), (c), (e), and (i), and that Defendants will produce non-privileged documents responsive to subparts (d), (f), (g), and (h) to the extent that they exist. The Court agrees with Defendants that Plaintiff has not shown that policies referenced in subpart (b) are sufficiently relevant and proportional to the needs of the case. Defendants must produce the agreed-upon subpart policies dating back to January 1, 2014. Plaintiff’s request to produce policies dating back to January 1, 2012 is denied as overly broad and not proportional.

d. Regarding RFP No. 6, the motion is denied because the request as drafted is overly broad and not proportional. The Court, however, observes that if Plaintiff seeks discovery to identify the occasions when in-house attorneys in the RMS Division have engaged outside trial counsel—who are not on the Preferred Provider lists at the time of engagement—in a case that has been litigated through trial since 2015, an interrogatory may be the better discovery vehicle.

e. Regarding RFP No.

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Related

James H. Sallis v. University of Minnesota
408 F.3d 470 (Eighth Circuit, 2005)
Semple v. Federal Express Corp.
566 F.3d 788 (Eighth Circuit, 2009)

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Deering v. Lockheed Martin Corporation, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/deering-v-lockheed-martin-corporation-mnd-2021.