Deerfield Holdings, LLC v. Lakewood Township Planning Board

• Court: New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division
• Decided: February 13, 2026
• Docket: A-0810-24
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-0810-24

DEERFIELD HOLDINGS, LLC and YESHIVA CHEMDAS HATORAH,

Plaintiffs-Respondents,

v.

LAKEWOOD TOWNSHIP PLANNING BOARD,

Defendant-Appellant,

and

LAKEWOOD TOWNSHIP COMMITTEE,

Defendant. __________________________

Argued September 16, 2025 – Decided February 13, 2026

Before Judges Currier and Jablonski.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Ocean County, Docket No. L-0329-24. John J. Jackson III argued the cause for appellant (John J. Jackson III & Associates, Attorneys at Law, attorneys; John J. Jackson III, of counsel and on the briefs; Jilian McLeer, on the briefs).

Donna M. Jennings argued the cause for respondents (Carluccio Leone Dimon Doyle Gutman & Petro, LLC and Wilentz, Goldman & Spitzer, PA, attorneys; John P. Doyle and Donna M. Jennings, of counsel and on the brief; Luke H. Policastro, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Defendant, Lakewood Township Planning Board (the "Board"), appeals

the trial court's decision granting summary judgment in favor of plaintiff,

Yeshiva Chemdas Hatorah ("YCH"), in this prerogative writs action. The

issue before us is narrow: Should YCH's development application be

considered "complete" under the Municipal Land Use Law ("MLUL"),

N.J.S.A. 40:55D-1 to -136, and the relevant Lakewood Township ordinance

when the applicant has satisfied all checklist requirements, but the Board

contends that additional information is needed to establish its jurisdiction to

review the substantive merits of the application? On the record presented

before us, we conclude the application was complete and affirm.

A-0810-24 2 I.

In March 2018, YCH applied for the development of a planned

educational campus ("PEC") in Lakewood Township. 1 The PEC application

(the "Campus Application") included plans to construct six dormitories, six

townhomes, a gymnasium, a yeshiva with related site improvements, and

parking.

In April, Ally Morris ("Morris"), the Board administrator, advised YCH

its request was missing certain components. Specifically, the application

lacked proof of the school's accreditation and a topographic survey. A few

weeks later, YCH provided site plans, architectural drawings, and the

topographic survey, but it did not include any accreditation information.

Nevertheless, Morris later wrote to YCH stating "[t]he revised plans

satisfactorily address the comments in my administrative review letter" and

that "[t]he subject application has been scheduled for a Plan Review Meeting

on Tuesday June 5, 2018."

In July 2018, Lakewood amended its zoning ordinance to add "Section

J" that permitted applicants who had existing "complete" PEC applications to

1 Deerfield Holdings, LLC is the owner of the property where the educational campus was planned to be constructed. It did not participate in the planning board application other than verifying its ownership of the property. A-0810-24 3 pursue residential use of a tract rather than one restricted to educational

activity:

In all Residential Zoning districts, any tract for which a complete application for a [PEC] has been filed with the Lakewood Planning Board, in compliance with Section 18-902 H 1 (g), re-approval for development of that tract shall be conditionally permitted in accordance with the provisions of the R-7.5 (Residential) Land Use District. Such re-approval shall be subject to all of the following conditions:

1. Submission and approval of a complete development application to the Lakewood Planning Board based on the provisions of the R-7.5 (Residential) Land Use District, Section 18-902 G.

2. A complete application for a [PEC] in accordance with Section 18-902 [H 1 (g)] must have been submitted prior to the adoption of this ordinance.

3. No development of any portion of the [PEC] may have been commenced at or before the time of adoption of this ordinance . . . .

[Lakewood, N.J., Ordinance 18-900J (July 12, 2018)] (the "Ordinance").

The Plan Review meeting took place on September 4, 2018. Notes from

that meeting list various next steps to be taken and other "[i]tems required to

A-0810-24 4 be considered for public hearing." The Board contends that YCH never

satisfied those next steps. YCH does not refute that claim.

For approximately a year and a half after that meeting, the Board

contends YCH made no progress to develop its project. In March 2020, and

intending to "purge unresolved applications," Morris contacted YCH and asked

it to advise the Board of its "future intentions for this application." Morris

wrote that "[i]t has been determined that your project has been [on] hold as per

your inaction since September 4, 2018, and has not yet been approved or

denied by the Board." Through counsel, YCH advised it was "addressing

those items in the . . . review letter" and would be "providing additional

submission documents in the near future." The Board never received any

additional documents from YCH, and consequently removed the Campus

Application from its active docket.

In November 2021, YCH submitted a revised plan under the Ordinance

to develop the property for residential use. This Residential Application

envisioned the development of 130 new lots for sixty-two duplex structures,

one single-family dwelling, four parking lots, and one lot for a house of

worship (the "Residential Application"). YCH sought preliminary and final

major subdivision approval .

A-0810-24 5 In July 2022, the Board's engineer reviewed the Residential Application

and advised the Board "[s]ince a complete application for this tract was

submitted prior to July 18, 2018," the site would be controlled by the standards

established in the Ordinance. A hearing on the application began on

September 6, 2022.

As a preliminary matter, the Board addressed an objection to the

Residential Application raised by Jan Meyer, Esq., counsel for a homeowner's

association organized to oppose YCH's proposal. During his remarks to the

Board, Meyer generally identified what he termed the "threshold issue" and

specifically whether YCH's original Campus Application was valid. He also

questioned whether the Campus Application was "complete."

Board members voiced concerns about whether the Residential

Application was submitted in good faith, whether it satisfied the requirements

for an educational campus, and how many similar cases like it might exist.

YCH's attorney acknowledged that, although the Campus Application never

proceeded to a public hearing before the Board, an application was submitted

and a review meeting was held. Brian Flannery, YCH's engineer and planner,

testified that the Campus Application was "deemed complete" by the Board

A-0810-24 6 secretary. Notably, Morris also confirmed that the application was "deemed

completed."

During its discussion, the Board noted its understanding that the

Ordinance was originally intended to allow conditional approval only to PEC

applications that had been approved, not merely completed, and expressed

disapproval over changes in the Ordinance's wording. The Board also voiced

concerns about the potential for the process to be "abused" to facilitate higher -

density zoning, contrary to the Ordinance's original intent. Some members

suggested that the application may have been submitted as a pretext to obtain

high-density housing in the area.

Ultimately, the Board determined that it needed additional information

regarding the history of the application, briefing from the parties as to what

constitutes a complete application, and testimony from YCH's rabbi to clarify

the project's purpose and the reasons for its apparent delay. The application

was adjourned to a future meeting.

The Board reconvened on December 6, 2022. Early in those

proceedings, the Board's attorney focused the Board on a "threshold issue that

pertains to [the Board's jurisdiction]." Counsel noted the Ordinance requires a

"reapproval for development of that tract shall be conditionally permitted in

A-0810-24 7 accordance with the provisions of [the pertinent] residential land use district."

The Board's attorney then framed the issue to be addressed as whether the

"Board can make a threshold determination of jurisdiction." Ultimately, the

Board concluded summarily it lacked jurisdiction to consider the matter based

on the "totality" of the facts presented at that meeting.

In its resolution, the Board later explained:

The Board finds that it does not have jurisdiction to hear the merits of the application and thus rejects jurisdiction of this application. The Board bases this conclusion on the fact that while the Board Administrator's correspondence dated April 19, 2018[,] indicates that all comments in her initial administrative review letter were "satisfactorily addressed[,"] it did not specifically state that the application had been deemed complete. Further, when the matter did proceed to a plan review meeting in September of 2018, there was a memorandum produced stating what was needed from the applicant in order to be deemed complete to go to a public hearing. The applicant never supplied the Board with that information documentation, and never proceeded to a public hearing. The Board finds that, based on these facts and circumstances, a completed application was never submitted to the Board prior to the adoption of the Ordinance at issue. The Board further finds that [the Campus Application] was never approved by the Board and thus is not eligible for "re-approval" under Lakewood Township Ordinance 2018-35. [Lakewood, N.J., Ordinance 2018-35 (July 12, 2018).] Therefore, the proposed use is not a conditionally permitted use in the zone, which necessitates a use variance from the Zoning Board.

A-0810-24 8 In essence, the Board declined to hear YCH's Residential Application

because it concluded that the PEC was neither complete nor could it be

considered complete because it did not include the accreditation information.

After the Board denied YCH's motion for reconsideration, plaintiff

initiated an action in lieu of prerogative writs, asserting that the Board had

incorrectly refused to consider its application on the grounds that it lacked

jurisdiction. Subsequently, plaintiff moved for summary judgment.

In a written opinion, the trial court granted plaintiff's application and

ruled its Campus Application was complete and the Ordinance only required a

complete PEC application for the Residential Application to be considered. It

further concluded defendant's action not to consider the application was

arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable. The trial judge, however, did not

grant plaintiff's additional request to approve the Residential Application

automatically under N.J.S.A. 40:55D-48(c). Consequently, the trial court

remanded the application to the Board with instructions to consider the

Residential Application substantively.

The Board appealed and argued the trial court erred when it made its

ruling because summary judgment was not the appropriate procedural

mechanism to resolve the disputed issues presented in this prerogative writs

A-0810-24 9 action. Substantively, the Board also contended that genuine issues of material

fact remain regarding whether YCH's application was "complete" for purposes

of a PEC given YCH did not obtain the necessary accreditation. The Board

also disputed the interpretation of the term "re-approval" as used in the

Ordinance. Finally, the Board maintained its decision to decline to consider

the application was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, and should

therefore be upheld.

II.

A.

Because this appeal arises from the trial court's entry of summary

judgment, our review is de novo. DeSimone v. Springpoint Senior Living,

Inc., 256 N.J. 172, 180 (2024); R. 4:46-2(c). Similarly, we review the Board's

interpretation of the Ordinance de novo and, therefore, afford no deference to

its legal conclusions. See Dunbar Homes, Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of

Franklin, 233 N.J. 546, 559 (2018).

B.

The Board initially argues that summary judgment was improperly used

to resolve the central legal question in this prerogative writs action. We

disagree.

A-0810-24 10 Summary judgment should be granted if "the pleadings, depositions,

answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if

any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and

that the moving party is entitled to a judgment or order as a matter of law." R.

4:46-2(c). A genuine issue of fact exists "only if, considering the burden of

persuasion at trial, the evidence submitted by the parties on the motion,

together with all legitimate inferences therefrom favoring the non-moving

party, would require submission of the issue to the trier of fact." Ibid.

Although the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the

non-moving party, summary judgment cannot be denied simply because the

non-movant demonstrates the existence of a disputed fact. Brill v. Guardian

Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 540-41 (1995). Denial is only proper when

the evidence is of such quality and quantity that reasonable minds could return

a finding in favor of the party opposing the motion. Id. at 540.

Since an exclusively legal issue is presented here, summary judgment is

an appropriate procedural vehicle to address it. See, e.g., D'Anastasio Corp. v.

Twp. of Pilesgrove, 387 N.J. Super. 241, 245 (App. Div. 2009) (prerogative

writ complaints presenting purely legal issues can be decided by summary

judgment); Willoughby v. Planning Bd. of Twp. of Deptford, 306 N.J. Super.

A-0810-24 11 266, 275 (App. Div. 1997) ("[W]here a prerogative writ action challenges

governmental action which is not based on an administrative record developed

in a quasi-judicial hearing or seeks performance of a ministerial duty, the usual

procedures for the disposition of civil actions, including summary judgment

practice, may be employed.").

Here, the material facts are undisputed, and the parties only disagree as

to their legal significance. Both parties acknowledge that Morris sent the April

19, 2018, letter and do not dispute its contents. Their disagreement centers on

the legal effect of this correspondence, specifically regarding whether YCH's

application was considered "complete." The Board's claim that the application

was incomplete due to YCH's failure to submit proof of accreditation presents

a legal question requiring the court to decide whether, in light of Morris's

confirmation, the application sufficiently addressed her concerns. Therefore,

we find no error in the trial court's decision to review the application under the

summary judgment standard.

C.

Next, the Board contends that there was a genuine issue of material fact

regarding whether YCH submitted a complete application for a PEC,

specifically asserting that YCH failed to obtain the necessary accreditation

A-0810-24 12 from the Office of the Secretary of Higher Education of the State of New

Jersey, as required for designation as a PEC under Lakewood, N.J. Ordinance

§ 18-200 (July 14, 2005). YCH, however, argues that the Ordinance's plain

language allows an applicant to submit a complete application to develop a

PEC before filing its Residential Application under the Ordinance. After

examining the relevant definitions and operative provisions within Lakewood's

ordinances, the trial court found YCH had submitted a complete application to

the Board. We concur with this conclusion.

The MLUL defines how and when a developer's site plan application

becomes "complete." A development application

shall be complete for purposes of commencing the applicable time period for action by a municipal agency, when so certified by the municipal agency or its authorized committee or designee. In the event that the agency, committee or designee does not certify the application to be complete within 45 days of the date of its submission, the application shall be deemed complete upon the expiration of the 45-day period for purposes of commencing the applicable time period, unless: a. the application lacks information indicated on a checklist adopted by ordinance and provided to the applicant; and b. the municipal agency or its authorized committee or designee has notified the applicant, in writing, of the deficiencies in the application within 45 days of submission of the application . . . . The municipal agency may subsequently require correction of any information found to be in error and submission of additional

A-0810-24 13 information not specified in the ordinance or any revisions in the accompanying documents, as are reasonably necessary to make an informed decision as to whether the requirements necessary for approval of the application for development have been met. The application shall not be deemed incomplete for lack of any such additional information or any revisions in the accompanying documents so required by the municipal agency.

[N.J.S.A. 40:55D-10.3 (emphasis added).]

Similarly, an application is considered "complete" according to the

Lakewood Unified Development Ordinance when all escrow deposits have

been paid and all checklist requirements have been satisfied. Lakewood, N.J.

Ordinance § 18-200 (July 14, 2005). In this case, YCH did not submit the

required certification evidencing accreditation. However, as the trial court

correctly recognized, the MLUL expressly prohibits deeming an application

incomplete due to the absence of additional information not specified on the

municipal checklist. See N.J.S.A. 40:55D-10.3. Furthermore, both parties

agree that Morris deemed the application complete without requesting proof of

accreditation.

Therefore, since the checklist requirements were met and the procedural

obligations for the application were fulfilled, the strict provisions and plain

A-0810-24 14 language of the MLUL supports the trial court's determination that the

application is complete.

We affirm the trial court's decision that the Campus Application was

complete and to remand the case to the Board to consider substantively the

Residential Application in light of that determination.

We find the parties' remaining arguments lack sufficient merit to warrant

discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

Affirmed.

A-0810-24 15