Deere & Co. v. International Harvester Co.

496 F. Supp. 397, 208 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 158, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12220
CourtDistrict Court, C.D. Illinois
DecidedJuly 10, 1980
DocketNo. RI-CIV-76-0020
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 496 F. Supp. 397 (Deere & Co. v. International Harvester Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, C.D. Illinois primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Deere & Co. v. International Harvester Co., 496 F. Supp. 397, 208 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 158, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12220 (C.D. Ill. 1980).

Opinion

[398]*398SUPPLEMENTAL FINDINGS AND ORDERS.

ROBERT D. MORGAN, Chief Judge.

This suit by Deere against International Harvester for patent infringement is now before the court pursuant to an order of remand entered by the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. The matter seems placed in sound perspective by the following chronological statement.

The cause was tried before the court without a jury. On October 18, 1978, this court filed its decision and entered its judgment holding asserted claims 1-10, inclusive, 14 and 17 of the patent in suit1 to be valid, and holding asserted claims 1-3, inclusive, and 6-9, inclusive, to be infringed by IH’s accused device. Deere & Co. v. International Harvester Co., 460 F.Supp. 523 (S.D.Ill.1978).

Nine prior art references were cited by the patent examiner upon his processing the application for the patent.2 To support its defense assertion that the combination embodied in the claims would have been obvious to persons having ordinary skill in the art to which the subject matter pertained at the time when the claimed invention was made (35 U.S.C. § 103), IH introduced in evidence some 22 prior art references, including 17 references which had not been cited by the patent examiner.3 On such defense of obviousness, this court found that the uncited prior art references were the equivalent of, and no better than, those references which had been cited by the patent examiner. The defense was rejected by the simple statement of an ultimate finding that the claimed invention would not have been obvious within the intendment of Section 103.

On an appeal from that judgment, the Court of Appeals, by an unpublished order,4 decided that the failure of this court “to articulate more adequately its rationale” for that ultimate finding of non-obviousness, “in light of the standards set forth in” Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 86 S.Ct. 684, 15 L.Ed.2d 545 (1966), precluded “proper appellate review of the issue of the validity of the Deere patent.” That order reversed the judgment and remanded the cause with specific instructions to this court “to make detailed findings of the following in conformity with Graham”:

“1. The state of the prior art with reference to each of the several old elements that were combined to constitute the invention claimed in the Deere patent.
“2. With respect to each of those elements, a comparison of the ‘equivalent’ pri- or art cited to the Examiner with prior art not cited.
“3. The level of skill in the art.
“4. The reasons why the evidence shows the patented combination of the above elements would not have been obvious to one skilled in the art.”

Thus, this court is directed to make supplemental findings of fact related to each of the above areas of inquiry, and herein undertakes to do precisely that.

This court convened an informal conference with counsel shortly after January 23, 1980, at a time before the record on remand had been returned to this court, to discuss the content and purport of the remand order. At that time it was suggested to counsel that the remand order basically required supplementation of the original decision by the framing of supplemental findings of fact. Deere was requested to prepare and submit to the court its proposals for supplemental findings responsive to the command of the remand order, with IH to submit its response to such proposals after the receipt of same. IH did suggest at that time that it contemplated the filing of other responsive material, including a motion to reopen the evidentiary record to permit IH to adduce further evidence.

[399]*399Deere s proposals were filed following the return of the trial record to this court. Thereafter, IH filed a response and, also, a supplemental brief related to the question of validity, as well as its motion to reopen the trial record to permit it to introduce “new” evidence which was asserted to relate to the issue of validity.

A hearing on that motion and a post-remand conference were held on May 16, 1980. At that time, the IH motion to reopen the trial was denied, and counsel were advised that the argumentative bases of IH’s supplemental brief were largely rejected by the court as being not consistent with the further proceedings which the remand order is deemed to require. For perspective only, a brief summary statement as to each the IH supplemental brief and motion to reopen follows.

By its supplemental brief, IH sought to disavow all of its uncited prior art references, except the Braud publications,5 the Dort patent,6 and the Schwartz patent.7 IH asserted the position that it does not contest the validity of claim 10 and its dependent claims, in view of this court’s original determination that IH’s accused device did not infringe such claims. IH further asserted that this court’s original construction of the patent claims, plus its finding that claim 10 and certain other claims were not infringed, rendered its prior art references, other than those above specifically mentioned, unnecessary to support its position.

Although adoption of that suggested course would simplify disposition, the mandate of the Court of Appeals cannot be limited to permit that course. Also, IH’s position in that regard presumes a reliance upon the original judgment, notwithstanding the fact that that judgment has been reversed and the same now has no force and effect. It seems necessary to evaluate all uncited prior art in evidence in the light of the Graham criteria for obviousness.

The motion by IH to reopen the trial record rests upon its claimed need to introduce “new” evidence which is said to have a relevant bearing upon the issue of validity. Its assertion as to “new” evidence is said to find a basis in two contexts, namely, Deere’s dealings with White Motor Company and a declaratory judgment suit filed by IH against Deere in this court while the appeal was pending in the instant cause. International Harvester Co. v. Deere & Company, 478 F.Supp. 411 (C.D.Ill.1979).

The precise contention of IH must be articulated with reference to that declaratory judgment action. IH prayed a declaration that a production model corn head being developed by it when its complaint was filed did not infringe the claims of the subject patent. In its original decision in this cause, this court construed the claims to be limited in scope to the employment of a single drive gear and a single integrated drive train for all elements of each corn head row unit. The IH production model, which was the subject of the declaratory judgment, employed four drive gears and four attendant drive trains. Because of that distinction, this court found and declared that the IH production model did not infringe the patent here in suit.8

IH recites the factual basis for that complaint as reflecting that Deere asserts a scope for its claims which is broader than the scope asserted by it in this cause in support of the validity of the patent.

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Related

Bradshaw v. Igloo Products Corp.
912 F. Supp. 1088 (N.D. Illinois, 1996)
Deere & Company v. International Harvester Company
658 F.2d 1137 (Seventh Circuit, 1981)

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Bluebook (online)
496 F. Supp. 397, 208 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 158, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12220, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/deere-co-v-international-harvester-co-ilcd-1980.