1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 DEEPAK SHARMA (A# 203-703-707), No. 1:25-cv-1861 AC 12 Petitioner, 13 v. ORDER 14 WARDEN OF THE GOLDEN STATE ANNEX DETENTION FACILITY, et al., 15 Respondents. 16 17 Pursuant to the parties’ consent, all proceedings and entry of final judgment are assigned 18 to the magistrate judge. ECF No. 14. For the foregoing reasons, the petition for writ of habeas 19 corpus is granted in part. 20 I. Factual and Procedural Background 21 Petitioner, a national and citizen of India, entered the United States on or about July 16, 22 2019. ECF No. 11-1 (Declaration of Deportation Officer Mayra Gallenkamp (“Gallenkamp 23 Decl.”)) ¶ 5. Petitioner was detained by border patrol and issued a Notice to Appear (“NTA”), 24 charging him as inadmissible and ordering him to appear for a future removal hearing. Id. ¶¶ 5 25 and 7; ECF No. 11-3 (Notice to Appear) at 1. On September 6, 2019, petitioner was released on 26 his own recognizance. ECF No. 11-1 (Gallenkamp Decl.) ¶ 8; ECF No. 11-4 (Notice to EOIR: 27 Alien Address) (“Released from ICE custody on the following condition(s): Order of Supervision 28 or Own Recognizance (Form I-220A)”). 1 The NTA was filed with the Executive Office of Immigration Review (“EOIR”) on 2 February 13, 2020. ECF No. 11-3 (NTA) at 1. The NTA does not indicate that the notice was 3 “being issued after an asylum officer has found that the respondent has demonstrated a credible 4 fear of persecution” or that an expedited removal order under INA § 235(b)(1) was being vacated 5 in light of such finding. Id. 6 Petitioner was arrested on June 5, 2024, and January 2, 2025. ECF No. 11-1 (Gallenkamp 7 Decl.) ¶¶ 9-10; ECF No. 11-5 (RAP Sheet) at 8. On January 7, 2025, petitioner was convicted of 8 assault in violation of California Penal Code § 245. ECF No. 11-1 (Gallenkamp Decl.) ¶ 11; ECF 9 no. 11-5 (RAP Sheet) at 8. 10 On June 25, 2025, petitioner was identified as a potential immigration violator and 11 targeted for detention. ECF No. 11-6 (Form I-213, June 26, 2025) at 2. On June 26, 2025, 12 petitioner was ordered removed to India by an Immigration Judge. Id.; ECF No. 11-8 (Order of 13 Immigration Judge). Before petitioner left the immigration court, Immigration and Customs 14 Enforcement (“ICE”) detained him based on their determination that he was subject to a final 15 order of removal. ECF No. 11-6 (Form I-213, June 26, 2025) at 2. Petitioner was not afforded a 16 pre-detention hearing. ECF No. 1 at 6. 17 On July 15, 2025, petitioner appealed the removal order. ECF No. 11-10 (Filing Receipt 18 for Appeal). The appeal remains pending.1 19 On December 15, 2025, petitioner filed a habeas petition alleging violations of procedural 20 and substantive due process. ECF No. 1. In response, respondents filed a motion to dismiss or 21 alternatively an opposition to the petition for writ of habeas corpus. ECF No. 11. Petitioner has 22 filed a response to the motion to dismiss and reply to the petition. ECF No. 16. 23 II. The Petition 24 The petition alleges that respondents violated petitioner’s Fifth Amendment due process 25 rights. ECF No. 1 at 5-17. The petition seeks an order (1) declaring petitioner’s detention 26 violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment; (2) granting petitioner’s immediate 27 1 Executive Office of Immigration Review, Automated Case Information, available at 28 https://perma.cc/2B6B-KQMH (last visited April 29, 2026). 1 release or release within 30 days unless respondents schedule a bond hearing before an 2 immigration judge with certain procedural protections; (3) granting any further relief deemed just 3 and proper, and (4) awarding costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees. Id. at 17. 4 III. Legal Standard 5 The Constitution guarantees the writ of habeas corpus “to every individual detained within 6 the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S. Const., art. I, § 9, 7 cl. 2). “The essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that 8 custody, and . . . the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal custody.” 9 Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). The writ of habeas corpus extends to a prisoner 10 who “is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 11 8 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Historically, “the writ of habeas corpus has served as a means of 12 reviewing the legality of Executive detention, and it is in that context that its protections have 13 been strongest.” I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001) (citation omitted), superseded by 14 statute on other grounds, Nasrallah v. Barr, 590 U.S. 573580 (2020). “District courts retain 15 jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to consider habeas challenges to immigration detention that 16 are sufficiently independent of the merits of [a] removal order[.]” Lopez-Marroquin v. Barr, 17 955 F.3d 759 (9th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted); see also Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 688 (“We 18 conclude that § 2241 habeas corpus proceedings remain available as a forum for statutory and 19 constitutional challenges to post-removal-period detention.”). 20 IV. Discussion 21 A. Relevant Statutory Framework 22 The United States Supreme Court has acknowledged that “[i]mmigration law can be 23 complex, and . . . is a legal specialty of its own.” Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 359, 369 (2010). 24 “Where a [noncitizen] falls within this statutory scheme can affect whether his detention is 25 mandatory or discretionary, as well as the kind of review process available to him if he wishes to 26 contest the necessity of his detention.” Prieto-Romero v. Clark, 534 F.3d 1053, 1057 (9th Cir. 27 2008). Accordingly, the undersigned begins with the relevant statutory framework. 28 Title 8 U.S.C. § 1225 governs the procedures by which the government may mandatorily 1 detain “an applicant for admission.” Section 1225(a)(1) defines “an applicant for admission” as a 2 noncitizen “present in the United States who has not been admitted or who arrives in the United 3 States (whether or not at a designated port of arrival and including [a noncitizen] who is brought 4 to the United States after having been interdicted in international or United States waters).” 5 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1). “[A]pplicants for admission fall into one of two categories, those covered 6 by § 1225(b)(1) and those covered by § 1225(b)(2).” Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 287 7 (2018). Both categories are subject to mandatory detention until a certain point or until certain 8 proceedings have concluded. Id. Of relevance, § 1225(b)(2)(A) states that a noncitizen 9 “applicant for admission” who is “seeking admission” and who does not fall under 10 § 1225(b)(2)(B) exceptions or is subject to subparagraph (C) “shall be detained for a proceeding 11 under section 1229a of this title.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). Despite mandatory detention, 12 applicants for admission may be temporarily released on parole “for urgent humanitarian reasons 13 or significant public benefit” under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5). Id. at 288 (citing 8 U.S.C. 14 § 1182(d)(5), 8 C.F.R. §§ 212.5(b), 235.3 (2017)). 15 Title 8 U.S.C. § 1226 governs detention of noncitizens who are already present in the 16 United States but do not have an absolute right to remain here and are subject to full, standard 17 removal proceedings. See Jennings, 583 U.S. at 288-89 (“U.S. immigration law authorizes the 18 Government to detain certain [noncitizens] seeking admission into the country under 19 §§ 1225(b)(1) and (b)(2)” and “certain [noncitizens] already in the country pending the outcome 20 of removal proceedings under §§ 1226(a) and (c).”) (emphasis added). “Section 1226(a) sets out 21 the default rule: The Attorney General may issue a warrant for arrest and detention of an 22 [noncitizen] ‘pending a decision on whether the [noncitizen] is to be removed from the United 23 States.” Id. at 288 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)). “Except as provided in subsection (c) of this 24 section,” the Attorney General “may continue to detain” or “may release” a noncitizen detained 25 under § 1226(a) on “bond” or “conditional parole.” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). Section 1226(c) sets out 26 a statutory category of noncitizens “who may not be released under § 1226(a).” Jennings, 583 27 U.S. at 289 (emphasis in original). 28 Section 1231(a) governs detention of noncitizens who have a final order of removal and 1 mandates detention during a ninety-day “removal period.” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A). “This 2 ‘removal period’ begins on the latest of either (1) the date a noncitizen’s ‘order of removal 3 becomes administratively final,’ (2) the date of a court’s final order, if the noncitizen’s removal 4 order is judicially reviewed and [the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals] stays the noncitizen’s 5 removal, or (3) the date the noncitizen is released from criminal detention or confinement.” 6 Avilez v. Garland, 69 F.4th 525, 531 (9th Cir. 2023) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(B)(i)-(iii)). 7 An order of removal becomes “administratively final” “only upon the earlier of (i) a [Board of 8 Immigration Appeals (“BIA”)] determination affirming the order or (ii) the expiration of the 9 deadline to seek the BIA’s review of the order.” Ocampo v. Holder, 629 F.3d 923, 926 (9th Cir. 10 2010) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(47)(B)); Orellano v. Sessions, 736 Fed. Appx. 635, 638 (9th Cir. 11 2018) (Thomas, C.J., concurring) (“A removal order thus becomes administratively final only 12 upon affirmance by the BIA or the running of the appeal period.”). Section 1231(a), however, 13 “does not provide any authority before the removal period.” Prieto-Romero, 534 F.3d at 1060. 14 B. Applicable Detention Statute 15 Considering the facts in this case under the relevant statutory framework, the undersigned 16 finds that petitioner’s initial detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a) was unlawful and rejects 17 respondents’ arguments that petitioner is now subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. 18 § 1225(b)(2), rather than discretionary detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226. See ECF No. 11 at 2-5, 19 7-8.2 20 The record before the undersigned shows that petitioner entered the United States in 2019 21 and was detained for less than two months and not placed into expedited removal proceedings 22 under INA § 235(b)(1), codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1). ECF No. 11-1 (Gallenkamp Decl.) 23 ¶¶ 5, 7; ECF No. 11-3 (NTA) at 1. The record further shows petitioner was released using ICE 24 Form I-220A. ECF No. 11-3. ICE Form I-220A, labeled “Order of Release on Recognizance,” 25
26 2 Respondents also argue that mandatory detention is constitutional. ECF No. 11 at 5-6. The court declines to address this argument because, as discussed below, the undersigned finds that 27 petitioner is not subject to mandatory detention, and that even if he is subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2), such detention does not alter the outcome of petitioner’s due 28 process claim based on revocation of release. 1 states “[i]n accordance with section 236 of the Immigration and Nationality Act and the 2 applicable provisions of Title 8 of the Code of Federal Regulations, you are being released on 3 your own recognizance provided you comply with the following conditions[.]” Solano v. 4 Robbins, No. 1:25-cv-1823 EPG HC, 2025 WL 3718831, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 23, 2025); 5 S.D.O.T. v. Chestnut, No. 1:25-cv-1956 JLT SAB HC, 2026 WL 171926, at * 4 n.3 (same). In 6 Ortega Cervantes v. Gonzalez, 501 F.3d 1111, 1112, 1115 (9th Cir. 2007), the Ninth Circuit 7 found the prior version of ICE Form I-220A, INS Form I-220A, Order of Release on 8 Recognizance, refers to “conditional parole” under § 1226(a). Accordingly, the undersigned finds 9 that petitioner was released under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). 10 Courts dealing with similar facts, including this court, have concluded that when a 11 noncitizen is released under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), that section, not § 1225(b)(2), governs the 12 noncitizen’s detention. Amaya-Quinteros v. Corecivic, Inc., No. 1:25-cv-1672 AC, 2025 WL 13 3687642, at 10 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 19, 2025) (collecting cases); Orejuela Gutierrez v. Chestnut, No. 14 1:25-cv-1515 DAD AC, 2025 WL 3514495, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 8, 2025) (alternation in 15 original) (“[A]s numerous courts have observed, the initial decision to pursue petitioner’s 16 detention under § 1226(a) precludes the government from later ‘switch[ing] tracks’ to subject him 17 to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2).” (quoting Salcedo Aceros v. Kaiser, No. 25-cv-06924 18 EMC, 2025 WL 2637503, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 12, 2025))). 19 Moreover, courts, including this court, have also repeatedly and overwhelmingly 20 concluded that when a noncitizen is detained within the interior of the United States, the 21 appropriate detention statute is 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), not 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b). Amaya-Quinteros, 22 2025 WL 3687642, at *10 (finding “that the plain language of the statutes, the overall structure of 23 these statutes, the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the statutes, the intent of Congress, and the 24 long-standing practice of applying § 1226(a) prior to 2025 to noncitizens like petitioner . . . makes 25 clear that § 1226(a) is the appropriate statutory framework for noncitizens like petitioner who are 26 already in the country and not subject to § 1226(c)”) (emphasis in original); Morales-Flores v. 27 Lyons, No. 1:25-cv-1640 TLN EFB, 2025 WL 3552841, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2025) (citing 28 collected cases rejecting the Department of Homeland Security’s new policy, adopting an 1 expansive definition for “applicant for admission” under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) to include all 2 noncitizens unlawfully present in the United States); Josue I.C.A. v. Lyons, No. 1:25-cv-1542 3 SKO, 2025 WL 3496432, at *3 n.6 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 2025) (same); Aquino v. LaRose, No. 25- 4 cv-2904 RSH MMP, 2025 WL 3158676, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 12, 2025) (“the overwhelming 5 majority of courts to address the issue have agreed that Section 1226(a), rather than the 6 mandatory detention provision of Section 1225(b)(2)(A), applies to a noncitizen in Petitioner’s 7 position who has resided in the United States for many years”) (collecting cases); Alejandro v. 8 Olson, No.1:25-cv-2027-JPH-MKK, 2025 WL 2896348, at *6 (S.D. Ind. Oct. 11, 2025) 9 (collecting cases); Lepe v. Andrews, No. 1:25-cv-1163-KES-SKO (HC), __ F.Supp.3d.__, 2025 10 WL 2716910, at * (E.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2025) (collecting cases). 11 Yesterday the Second Circuit reached the same conclusion in Barbosa da Cunha v. 12 Freden, after reviewing the plain language of 8 U.S.C. § 1225 and § 1226, “the statutory context, 13 structure, history, and purpose, as well as nearly three decades of Executive Branch practice 14 enforcing the immigration laws with that understanding and the accompanying congressional 15 silence in light of that practice.” Barbosa da Cunha v. Freden, ___ F.4th ____, 2026 WL 16 1146044, at *2, 4 (2nd Cir. Apr. 28, 2026). The court found that 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) governed 17 petitioner’s detention where petitioner was arrested within the interior of the United States after 18 living here for over twenty years. Id. at *2-3. The court noted that its “holding is consistent 19 with” the preliminary conclusion in Castañon-Nava v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 161 F.4th 20 1048, 1062 (7th Cir. 2025) and “the decisions of over 370 district judges across the Nation who 21 (as of mid-February 2026) have also rejected the government’s position.” Id., at *4 (explaining 22 that “over ninety percent of district judges have sided with Petitioner” on this issue). The court 23 also explained why it disagreed with the contrary decisions in Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, 166 24 F.4th 494, 508 (5th Cir. 2026) and Avila v. Bondi, 170 F.4th 1128, 1138 (8th Cir. 2026). Id., at 25 *4, 6-7, 13-19. 26 Because the undersigned is persuaded by the thorough analysis in Barbosa da Cunha and 27 similar cases noted above, the undersigned adopts and incorporates the analysis in those cases 28 here and similarly finds petitioner, who was detained in the interior of the United States after 1 living here for six years, cannot presently be detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2). The 2 applicable detention statute in this case, pre-final order of removal, is 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). 3 The discussion, however, does not end here because the record shows petitioner received 4 an order of removal from an immigration judge and that ICE interpreted this order as a “final” 5 order of removal and re-detained petitioner in order to execute the order. See ECF No. 11-2 at 2. 6 The undersigned therefore must determine whether petitioner has a final order of removal, which 7 would change the detention authority from 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (pre-final order) to 8 U.S.C. 8 § 1231(a) (post-final order). 9 In their response to the petition, respondents take a rather odd position, claiming that the 10 immigration judge’s removal order authorized them to detain petitioner, presumably under 8 11 U.S.C. § 1231(a), and that once petitioner appealed the removal order the authority for his 12 detention reverted to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), a pre-final order of removal detention statute. 13 ECF No. 11 at 2, 5. Respondents’ position is flawed for two reasons. 14 First, because petitioner was re-detained prior to the expiration of the appeal period, and 15 the BIA has not affirmed the removal order, ICE lacked authority to detain petition under 8 16 U.S.C. § 1231(a)—based on a final order of removal—on June 26, 2025. Secondly, as discussed 17 above, because petitioner was previously released from immigration custody pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 18 § 1226(a) and was arrested within the interior of the United States, his pre-final order of removal 19 detention is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), not § 1225(b)(2)(A). 20 Accordingly, the court finds that petitioner’s current detention is governed by 8 U.S.C. 21 § 1226(a). 22 C. Fifth Amendment Due Process Claim – Revocation of Release 23 Respondents argue that petitioner’s conditional release does not change his status as an 24 “applicant for admission” within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b), and that petitioner therefore 25 does not possess a due process right to freedom from immigration detention in any form other 26 than the form provided by Congress. ECF No. 11 at 6, 9. Petitioner argues that his release on 27 conditional parole for six years created a “real and weighty liberty interest” and that because he is 28 not seeking admission but rather liberty from prolonged civil confinement without meaningful 1 due process, he is not confined to the “process authorized by Congress.” ECF No. 16 at 4-5. 2 This court in numerous cases has previously addressed petitioner’s due process claim 3 based on the revocation of his release. In doing so, 4 this court has found that the Due Process Clause requires that, in order for the government to re-detain a noncitizen who has been 5 previously released on bond or conditional parole under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), or humanitarian parole under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5), the 6 government must provide a pre-deprivation bond hearing before a neutral arbiter at which the noncitizen’s eligibility for bond must be 7 considered. 8 9 Hernandez Gonzalez v. Warden, California City Corr. Ctr., No. 1:26-cv-02630 DC AC (HC), 10 2026 WL 1069555, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 20, 2026) (emphasis added); Singh v. Noem, No. 1:26- 11 cv-1150 DC JDP (HC), 2026 WL 585512 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 2, 2026) (same); Orellana Gonzalez v. 12 Cerna, No. 1:26-cv-1344 DC JDP (HC), 2026 WL 604193 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 4, 2026) (same); see 13 also Thakur v. Chestnut, No. 1:26-cv-0038 CSK, 2026 WL 1099018 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 23, 2026); 14 Guervara v. Warden, No. 1:26-cv-2451 DC AC, 2026 WL 1068767 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 20, 2026); 15 Singh v. Warden of the Golden State Annex Det. Facility, No. 1:26-cv-00196 DC AC (HC), 2026 16 WL 785834 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 20, 2026); Mejia Parada v. Chestnut, No. 1:26-cv-1564 DAD JDP, 17 2026 WL 555479 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 27, 2026); Vilcape Garate v. Chestnut, No. 1:26-cv-1472 DAD 18 SCR, 2026 WL 524661 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 2026); Tarawally v. Chestnut, No. 1:26-cv-0619 TLN 19 CSK, 2026 WL 249611 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 30, 2026); D.L.C. v. Wofford, No. 1:25-cv-1996 DC JDP 20 (HC), 2026 WL 25511 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 5, 2026); Selis Tinoco v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1762 DC JDP 21 (HC), ___ F. Supp. 3d ____, 2025 WL 3567862 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 14, 2025); Perez v. Albarran, No. 22 1:25-cv-1540 DAD CSK, 2025 WL 3187578 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2025); O.A.C.S. v. Wofford, No. 23 1:25-cv-1652 DAD CSK, 2025 WL 3485221 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 2025); Labrador-Prato v. Noem, 24 No. 1:25-cv-1598 DC SCR (HC), ___ F. Supp. 3d ____, 2025 WL 3458802 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 25 2025); Ayala Cajina v. Wofford, No. 1:25-cv-1566 DAD AC (HC), 2025 WL 3251083 (E.D. Cal. 26 Nov. 21, 2025); Thakur v. Chestnut, No. 1:26-cv-0038 CSK, 2026 WL 1099018 (E.D. Cal. April 27 23, 2026). 28 Adopting and incorporating the reasoning from those cases, the undersigned finds that 1 petitioner’s due process rights were violated. Petitioner, who was released from immigration 2 custody in 2019 under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and re-detained on June 26, 2025, should have been 3 afforded a pre-deprivation hearing prior to his re-detention. Because he was not, respondents 4 violated his due process rights and petitioner is entitled to be released to right this wrong.3 5 Accordingly, the petition for writ of habeas corpus will be granted on petitioner’s due 6 process claim based on revocation of release and respondents’ motion to dismiss will be denied. 7 D. Motion to Strike and Dismiss Unlawfully Named Officials 8 In a footnote to their motion to dismiss, “[r]espondents move to strike and dismiss all 9 unlawfully named officials under § 2241.” ECF No. 11 at 1 n.1. Citing Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 10 U.S. 426, 430 (2004), Ortiz-Sandoval v. Gomez, 81 F.3d 891, 894 (9th Cir, 1996), and Doe v. 11 Garland, 109 F.4h 1188 (9th Cir. 2024), respondents argue that the only proper respondent in this 12 case is petitioner’s custodian—the warden of his detention facility. Id. In reply, petitioner “does 13 not oppose caption clean up if the Court prefers” and “proceed[ing] with the Warden as 14 respondent (if required).” ECF No. 16 at 6 (emphasis added). However, for the reasons 15 discussed below, the undersigned will deny respondents’ motion to strike and dismiss all 16 respondents other than the warden. 17 First, respondents’ reliance on Rumsfeld, Ortiz-Sandoval, and Doe is misplaced. Those 18 cases addressed the proper respondent in a “core” habeas case, which is a case in which release is 19 the only remedy. See Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. at 435; Ortiz-Sandoval, 81 F.3d at 894-96; Doe v. 20 Garland, 109 F.4h at 1197. Here, as discussed below, petitioner’s case presents relief in the form 21 of release and protection from future detention. None of the above cases address this issue. 22
23 3 Even if the undersigned agreed with defendants that petitioner’s detention is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)—which she does not—the outcome in this case would be the same. Singh v. 24 Warden, 2026 WL 785834, at *1 (“Moreover, the undersigned declines to resolve the statutory basis for petitioner’s current detention, as the due process analysis would be the same whether 25 petitioner was detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) or § 1226(a)”) (collecting cases); Fernández 26 López v. Wofford, No. 1:25-cv-1226 KES SKO (HC), 2025 WL 2959319, at *4-5 (E.D. Cal. 2025) (finding that petitioner released from immigration detention on parole had protected liberty 27 interest in remaining out of custody regardless of whether she was paroled under § 1226(a) or § 1182(d)(5), the parole provision for release under § 1225(b)). 28 1 Second, respondents fail to address Dunne v. Henman, 875 F.2d 244 (9th Cir. 1989), a 2 “non-core” habeas case concerning relief from future detention. There, the Ninth Circuit 3 explained that the official with control over petitioner’s future detention is a “true custodian” and 4 should be named as a respondent. Here, the warden of petitioner’s detention facility does not 5 have control over petitioner’s future detention, unless petitioner happens to end up back in the 6 same facility. In contrast, the other named defendants have control over petitioner’s future 7 detention and therefore are his “true custodians.” 8 Third, and most importantly, none of the above cases preclude naming additional 9 respondents other than petitioner’s physical custodian in a case like this, where release and 10 protection against future detention, are at stake. See Gonzalez Angulo v. Warden, California 11 City Corr. Ctr., No. 2:26-cv-1249 KES SAB, 2026 WL 967623, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 9, 2026). 12 Accordingly, the undersigned will deny respondents’ motion to strike and to dismiss respondents 13 other than the warden. See id.; Khan Atal v. Secretary of the United States Dep’t of Homeland 14 Sec., No. 1:26-cv-1945 DAD SCR, 2026 WL 1110268, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 24, 2026) (denying 15 motion to dismiss all respondents other than petitioner’s immediate custodian “because the 16 appropriate remedy here includes an injunction on the action of those who may execute any future 17 re-detention of petitioner”); Estrada v. Mullin, No. 1:26-cv-2527 KES EPG, 2026 WL 1030902, 18 at *2 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 2026) (denying motion to dismiss all respondents other than petitioner’s 19 immediate custodian because the other respondents, not the warden, are the officials “who may 20 decide to re-detain petitioner and deny him a bond hearing”). 21 CONCLUSION 22 For the reasons discussed above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 23 1. Petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus (ECF No. 1) is GRANTED on his 24 Fifth Amendment due process claim based on revocation of release as follows. 25 a. Respondent is ordered to 26 i. IMMEDIATELY RELEASE petitioner from custody under the terms 27 of supervision in place at the time of his detention. 28 ii. RETURN all of petitioner’s documents and possessions upon ] petitioner’s release. 2 ii. FILE a notice of compliance within three (3) days of this order 3 confirming petitioner’s release and the return of his documents and 4 possessions. 5 b. Respondents are PERMANENTLY ENJOINED and RESTRAINED from re- 6 detaining petitioner absent no less than seven (7) days’ notice to petitioner and 7 a pre-deprivation bond hearing before a neutral arbiter, at which petitioner’s 8 eligibility for bond must be considered. This order does not address the 9 circumstances in which respondents may detain petitioner in the event 10 petitioner becomes subject to an executable final order of removal. 11 c. Petitioner’s request for attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2412 12 id DENIED without prejudice to bringing a properly noticed and supported 13 motion. 14 2. Respondents’ motion to dismiss and to strike (ECF No. 11) is DENIED. 15 3. The Clerk of the Court is directed to enter judgment in favor of petitioner in this 16 || case, serve Golden State Annex with a copy of this Order, and CLOSE this case. 17 | DATED: April 29, 2026 ~ 18 Httven— Lhar—e_ ALLISON CLAIRE 19 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 12