Deepak Joglekar v. Neeta Kumari.

• Court: Massachusetts Appeals Court
• Decided: April 18, 2025
• Docket: 23-P-1352
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

23-P-1352

DEEPAK JOGLEKAR

vs.

NEETA KUMARI.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

After approximately twelve years of marriage, Deepak

Joglekar (husband), filed a complaint for divorce from Neeta

Kumari (wife). Following a three-day trial, a judge of the

Probate and Family Court issued a judgment of divorce nisi

(divorce judgment) and findings of fact in August 2023. The

wife appealed, challenging portions of the divorce judgment

related to the division of the marital estate, physical custody

of the parties' two children, and child support.1 We affirm.

1The wife filed this appeal before the trial judge sua sponte entered an amended divorce judgment in March 2024 to correct an error concerning tax exemptions for the dependent children. The wife filed a motion for new trial following entry of the amended judgment, and separately appealed its denial, but the two appeals were not consolidated, thus the order denying the motion for new trial is not before us. Although the wife 1. Property division. "Our review of a judgment pursuant

to the equitable distribution statute, G. L. c. 208, § 34,

proceeds under a two-step analysis." Adams v. Adams, 459 Mass.

361, 371 (2011). "First, [w]e review the judge's findings to

determine whether [she] considered all the relevant factors

under [G. L. c. 208, § 34,] and no irrelevant factors"

(quotation and citation omitted). Connor v. Benedict, 481 Mass.

567, 578 (2019). "Second, if the judge has done so, we will not

reverse a judgment unless it is 'plainly wrong and excessive'"

(citation omitted). Id. A judge's "broad discretion" in

dividing property allows flexibility to respond to the

"different fact situations which surround divorces and arrive at

a fair financial settlement in each case." Adams, supra,

quoting Rice v. Rice, 372 Mass. 398, 401 (1977).

The judge made detailed findings reflecting thoughtful

consideration of all relevant factors under G. L. c. 208, § 34.

The judge considered the parties' occupations, employability,

and sources of income; their respective liabilities and needs;

and the present and future needs of their dependent children.

did not file an appeal of the amended judgment itself, we are exercising our discretion and reviewing the divorce judgment entered August 2023, as amended in March 2024. See generally, Roch v. Mollica, 481 Mass. 164, 165 n.2 (2019).

2 The judge also addressed the parties' economic and domestic

contributions to the family unit.

The wife maintains that the judge erred by (1) valuing the

marital home at the price stipulated by the parties on the first

day of trial; (2) awarding the marital home to the husband; (3)

excluding from the asset allocation loans from the wife's

family; and (4) ruling that "the parties shall retain any and

all personal property currently in their possession." We

address these arguments in turn.

a. Value of the marital home. The wife did not challenge

the value of the marital home at trial. Indeed, the wife

stipulated before the August 2022 trial to the valuation used by

the judge.2 This is conclusive. Issues "not raised or argued

below may not be argued for the first time on appeal" (citation

omitted). Carey v. New England Organ Bank, 446 Mass. 270, 285

(2006).

Even were we to consider this argument, it would not change

the outcome. "The determination of the appropriate valuation

date is left to the discretion of the trial judge." Connor, 481

Mass. at 576. "[T]he valuation date typically is the date of

trial" unless "warranted by the circumstances of a particular

2 The agreed property value was greater than the assessed fair market value at the time, and was the result of pretrial negotiations in which both parties made financial concessions.

3 case" (citation omitted). Id. Compare Savides v. Savides, 400

Mass. 250, 252-253 (1987) (no abuse of discretion to value

assets as of date of separation, several years before divorce,

where wife did not contribute to marital estate after that

date); Obara v. Ghoreishi, 103 Mass. App. Ct. 549, 553-554

(2023) (error to ignore credible evidence of postdivorce

increase in property value when there was seven-year delay

between divorce and property division). There was no error in

using the parties' stipulated value for the home.

b. Award of home to the husband. When she awarded the

marital home to the husband, the judge credited the wife for a

$122,000 loan advanced by her family for the downpayment. The

judge found that both parties maximized their financial

contributions to the marital estate, and the husband had been

solely responsible for the mortgage and home expenses since July

2019. She also considered "the present and future needs of the

dependent children of the marriage," G. L. c. 208, § 34,

including the fact that the children lived in the marital home

in the primary care of the husband. As evidenced by the

guardian ad litem's (GAL) report, the children had benefited

from the "stable environment" provided by the husband; awarding

him the marital home was consistent with the custody decision.

See Zatsky v. Zatsky, 36 Mass. App. Ct. 7, 14 (1994)

4 ("pragmatic" to award marital home to custodial parent);

contrast Charrier v. Charrier, 416 Mass. 105, 111 (1993)

(failure to consider present and future needs of dependent

children).

c. The wife's family loans. We also discern no error in

the judge's detailed findings regarding allocation of the wife's

claimed liabilities. "In dividing the marital estate, exact

'[m]athematical precision is not required.'" Openshaw v.

Openshaw, 493 Mass. 599, 614 (2024), quoting Ross v. Ross, 50

Mass. App. Ct. 77, 81 (2000). The findings demonstrate that the

judge carefully considered the payments from the wife's family

and, after doing so, concluded that -- other than the $122,000

loaned for the home -- they were not loans that the wife had an

obligation to repay. "[T]he reasons for [the judge's]

conclusions are 'apparent and flow rationally' from [her]

findings and rulings." Baccanti v. Morton, 434 Mass. 787, 790

(2001), quoting Williams v. Massa, 431 Mass. 619, 631 (2000).

d. Division of personal property. With respect to the

division of the remainder of the property, the judge

thoughtfully outlined the parties' assets, including their

personal property. The judge considered and rejected the wife's

valuation of furnishings and furniture, and, having considered

the wife's financial needs, her contributions to the marital

5 estate, and her income, reasonably concluded that the wife was

entitled to $242,186 from the equity in the marital home, more

than half of the equity value in the property.3 "We cannot say

that, having considered the appropriate factors, the judge was

'plainly wrong and excessive' in [her] distribution of the

parties' assets." Connor, 481 Mass. at 579.

2. Custody. We review custody determinations for an abuse

of discretion. Schechter v. Schechter, 88 Mass. App. Ct. 239,

245 (2015). "In custody matters, the touchstone inquiry [is]

. . . what is 'best for the child.'" Hunter v. Rose, 463 Mass.

488, 494 (2012), quoting Custody of Kali, 439 Mass. 834, 840

(2003). See G. L. c. 208, § 28. "The determination of which

parent will promote a child's best interests rests within the

discretion of the judge . . . [whose] findings . . . 'must stand

unless they are plainly wrong.'" Hunter, supra, quoting Custody

of Kali, supra at 845.

Here, the GAL reported, and the judge credited, that there

was an "issue of control" in the family; the husband undermined

the wife, the wife provoked the husband into drawn-out debates

that delayed parental decision making, and the "parties'

3 The judge found that, after the payment to the wife of $122,000, half of the remaining home equity would be $114,581. The sum of half of the remaining equity and the wife's $122,000 familial loan was $236,581, and the wife was awarded $5,605 more.

6 antipathy for each other is pervasive." The parents' conflict

affected the two children, upsetting their relationship with

each other and causing a rift between one of them and the wife.

The children engaged in family therapy with the wife, but

scheduling therapy contributed to conflict between the parties.

The GAL was concerned that the children complained to the

husband about the wife, but did not raise issues regarding the

wife in therapy, implying that the children were close to, and

trust, the husband.

Before trial, the wife had parenting time with the children

every other weekend, and one or two evenings per week, depending

on the weekend schedule. After trial, the judge awarded the

wife a weekly overnight stay on Thursdays. One child was to

spend the first, third, and fifth weekends of any month with the

wife. The other child was to spend the third weekend of any

month with the wife and, at her option, could join the other

child on the first and fifth weekends. Except for time

allocated for holidays and vacations, the children live with the

husband at all other times.

On appeal, the wife contends that it was error to award the

husband primary physical custody of the children and reduce her

parenting time. She primarily takes issue with the judge's

weighing of the evidence, including by contrasting her improved

7 relationship with the children with findings about the husband's

response to one child's eating disorder and his inflexibility

about parenting time and family therapy.

The judge found, among other things, that (1) most recently

the husband had been the children's primary caretaker and had

consistently provided a stable environment where the children

can succeed; (2) one of the children was more emotionally

conflicted, had disagreements with her mother, and had issues of

control within the co-parenting conflict; (3) that child's

eating disorder was not the product of either parent's specific

actions, contrary to their accusations of the other; and (4) the

husband exhibited parenting skills that were more aligned with

the children's developmental needs, and it was in the children's

best interests for the husband to remain the children's primary

caregiver.

These findings form an appropriate basis for the judge's

grant of primary physical custody to the husband and for the

adjustment in parenting time with the wife. See Charara v.

Yatim, 78 Mass. App. Ct. 325, 334-335 (2010), quoting Custody of

Kali, 439 Mass. at 842 ("it is in [the] best interests of [the]

child to preserve [the] 'current placement with a parent, if it

is a satisfactory one'; 'stability and continuity with the

8 child's primary caregiver is itself an important factor in a

child's successful upbringing'").

3. Child support. The wife claims the judge erred by

failing to retroactively adjust her child support obligation for

the period of her unemployment.4 "[T]here is no statutory

mandate that modification of support orders be given retroactive

effect; the decision whether to give retroactive effect to such

orders rests in the sound discretion of the judge." Boulter-

Hedley v. Boulter, 429 Mass. 808, 809 (1999).

While the amount of child support was an issue at trial,

the issue arose because the husband requested retroactive child

support. The wife did not request retroactive child support at

trial, nor did she make such a request in her proposed judgment

following trial. This issue, not having been raised, is waived.

See Carey, 446 Mass. at 285. Furthermore, the judge properly

considered the wife's current income, her employment changes

through the pendency of the case, and her family's financial

4 The wife also maintains that the judge erred by failing to attribute income to the husband based on the testimony of the wife's vocational expert. We disagree. "The judge was not required to accept the opinion of the expert[], and was entitled to credit all, part, or none of their testimony." Vedensky v. Vedensky, 86 Mass. App. Ct. 768, 774 (2014).

9 support, and reasonably did not award retroactive child support

to either parent. There was no error.5

Judgment dated August 24, 2023, as amended on March 5, 2024, affirmed.

By the Court (Vuono, Hershfang & Tan, JJ.6),

Clerk

Entered: April 18, 2025.

5 The husband's request for appellate attorney's fees and costs is denied.

6 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.