Dedrick Fontenot v. Tasha Marie Lewallen

Court of Appeals of Texas·Decided December 1, 2006·No. 12-06-00094-CV·Published

Opinion

                                                NO. 12-06-00094-CV

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT

TYLER, TEXAS

DEDRICK FONTENOT,     §                      APPEAL FROM THE

APPELLANT

V.        §                      COUNTY COURT AT LAW

TASHA MARIE LEWALLEN,

APPELLEE   §                      HOUSTON COUNTY, TEXAS

MEMORANDUM OPINION

            Dedrick Fontenot appeals the trial court’s order denying his motion to reinstate following the dismissal of his suit for want of prosecution.  In three issues, Fontenot argues that the trial court failed to give him proper notice of its intent to dismiss his suit and improperly denied his motion to reinstate.  We affirm.

Background

            Fontenot filed suit against Tasha Marie Lewallen for injuries he allegedly sustained in a car accident with her.  As the trial date approached, Fontenot sought to accept a settlement offer previously made by Lewallen.  According to Fontenot’s motion to reinstate, his trial counsel orally accepted Lewallen’s settlement offer during a phone conversation he had at 11:08 p.m. on Wednesday, November 23, 2005, with an unidentified female who answered the phone at Lewallen’s attorney’s office.


            On November 30, 2005, the trial court conducted a previously scheduled pretrial conference.  Lewallen’s attorney was present; Fontenot’s attorney failed to attend.  After attempting to contact Fontenot’s attorney, the trial court granted Lewallen’s motion to dismiss.  The trial court signed its order of dismissal on December 15, 2005.

            On January 12, 2006, Fontenot filed a motion to reinstate his suit arguing that he believed the case had been settled thereby making his presence at the pretrial conference unnecessary.  Fontenot further argued that he did not receive notice of the court’s intention to dismiss or of the dismissal hearing.  Lewallen filed a response stating that her attorney’s law office was closed on November 23, 2005 for the Thanksgiving holiday and, therefore, the settlement discussions alleged by Fontenot in his motion to reinstate never occurred. 

            A hearing was conducted on Fontenot’s motion to reinstate on February 16, 2006.1  Following the hearing, the trial court denied Fontenot’s motion.  This appeal followed.

Dismissal for Want of Prosecution/Motion to Reinstate

            In his first issue, Fontenot argues that he was entitled to notice of Lewallen’s motion to dismiss.  In his second issue, Fontenot argues that he was entitled to notice of the court’s intention to dismiss when he was not informed that it was necessary to attend pretrial conferences.  In his third issue, Fontenot contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to reinstate because he demonstrated that his failure to attend the pretrial conference was the result of accident or mistake rather than conscious indifference.

            We review a judgment of dismissal under an abuse of discretion standard.  See Ellmossallamy v. Huntsman, 830 S.W.2d 299, 300 (Tex. App–Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, no writ).  To determine if there is an abuse of discretion, we must look to see if the trial court acted without reference to any guiding rules and principles.  Id.  The standard of review for a motion to reinstate is essentially the same as that for setting aside a default judgment.  See Smith v. Babcock & Wilcox Constr. Co., 913 S.W.2d 467, 468 (Tex. 1995).

            A trial court may dismiss a suit under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 165a(1) on the failure of any party seeking affirmative relief to appear for any hearing or trial of which the party had notice, or under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 165a(2) when a case is not disposed of within the time standards promulgated by the Texas Supreme Court.  See Tex. R. Civ. P. 165a; Villarreal v. San Antonio Truck & Equip., 994 S.W.2d 628, 630 (Tex. 1999).2  A trial court may not dismiss a suit without giving the plaintiff notice of its intent to dismiss.  Id.  A dismissal without notice violates Rule 165a and the party’s due process rights.  See Rohus v. Licona, 942 S.W.2d 111, 112 (Tex. App.–Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, no pet.).

Notice

            We first consider Fontenot’s first and second issues relating to lack of notice.  We initially note that the record reflects that Fontenot received notice of the November 30 pretrial conference.  As such, we focus our inquiry on whether he properly received notice of the trial court’s intention to dismiss his suit.  The hearing on a motion to reinstate is the same hearing with the same burden of proof that the plaintiff would receive before the trial court signs the order of dismissal.  See Texas Sting, Ltd. v. R.B. Foods, 82 S.W.3d 644, 648–49 (Tex. App.–San Antonio 2002, pet. denied).  Therefore, a postdismissal hearing remedies any violations to the litigant’s due process rights occurring before the dismissal.  Id.; see also Jimenez v. Transwestern Prop. Co., 999 S.W.2d 125

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Dedrick Fontenot v. Tasha Marie Lewallen, (Tex. Ct. App. 2006).

Dedrick Fontenot v. Tasha Marie Lewallen (Dedrick Fontenot v. Tasha Marie Lewallen) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related

Rohus v. Licona
942 S.W.2d 111 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1997)
Texas Sting, Ltd. v. R.B. Foods, Inc.
82 S.W.3d 644 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 2002)
Jimenez v. Transwestern Property Co.
999 S.W.2d 125 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1999)
Ellmossallamy v. Huntsman
830 S.W.2d 299 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1992)
MacGregor v. Rich
941 S.W.2d 74 (Texas Supreme Court, 1997)
Smith v. Babcock & Wilcox Construction Co.
913 S.W.2d 467 (Texas Supreme Court, 1996)
Villarreal v. San Antonio Truck & Equipment
994 S.W.2d 628 (Texas Supreme Court, 1999)
Balla v. Northeast Lincoln Mercury
717 S.W.2d 183 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1986)