Deckman v. Joseph

2025 Ohio 2360

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: July 3, 2025
• Docket: 113892
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as Deckman v. Joseph, 2025-Ohio-2360.]

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

ALEC DECKMAN, :

Plaintiff-Appellant, : No. 113892 v. :

KIM JOSEPH, ET AL., :

Defendants-Appellees. :

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: July 3, 2025

Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Probate Division Case No. 2023 ADV 278409

Appearances:

Michael P. Harvey Co., L.P.A., and Michael P. Harvey, for appellant.

McDonald Hopkins LLC, Franklin C. Malemud, and David L. Drechsler, for appellees.

LISA B. FORBES, J.:

Alec Deckman (“Alec”) appeals the probate court’s judgment entry

granting Kim Joseph (“Kim”) and Michelle Silverstein’s (“Michelle”)(collectively, “Defendants”) motion to dismiss. For the following reasons, we affirm the probate

court’s decision.

I. Factual Background and Procedural History

At the center of this case is a $500,000 life insurance policy (“Policy”)

that the now-deceased William Deckman (“Decedent”) purchased from Genworth

Life and Annuity Insurance Company (“Genworth”). Decedent’s son, Alec, claims

that he is a beneficiary of the Policy; however, the proceeds of the Policy were paid

to his cousins Kim and Michelle.

On October 27, 2023, Alec filed his first amended complaint, raising

five claims. He requested compensatory damages in claims for undue influence

(Count 1) and breach of fiduciary duty (Count 2). Alec sought a declaratory

judgment (Count 3), asserting that he was the lawful beneficiary of the Policy and

that Defendants were not lawful beneficiaries. Alec asked the court to impose a

constructive trust over the Policy proceeds in his favor and to prevent Defendants

from disposing the proceeds without satisfying his interest in them (Count 4).

Lastly, Alec requested a full accounting of Decedent’s assets (Count 5).

A. Factual Allegations in the Amended Complaint

In support of these claims, Alec alleged the following. Alec claimed

that he is an individual of full age and majority. Decedent took out the Policy in

1999. The application for the Policy identifies Alec’s mother, Allison Deckman

(“Allison”), as the primary beneficiary. A copy of the application and an insurance

policy were attached to the amended complaint, though the amended complaint asserts only that a “true and accurate copy of the Decedent’s application for the

Policy is attached.”

Allison and Decedent filed for divorce in Tennessee in 2014. A

divorce decree was entered in 2016. An order including a parenting plan was

entered in 2019. Alec averred that, “[a]s a part of the divorce proceedings, Decedent

agreed to maintain a $500,000 life insurance policy while he had support

obligations related to Plaintiff and his brother, Matthew.”

Alec alleged that, according to Kim, Decedent had “significant health

problems in early 2019,” including at least one stroke and cardiovascular issues. In

addition, Decedent’s memory deteriorated. A medical-examination report prepared

“no later than February 20, 2019” declared Decedent “incompetent” and supported

appointing a conservator. Alec alleged, “At some point in early 2019, Decedent was

transported [from Tennessee] to Ohio for medical care.”

According to the amended complaint, “[o]n April 15, 2019[,] Kim

drove Decedent to an attorney’s office so he could execute a Durable General Power

of Attorney (the ‘POA’),” giving Kim the power to “among other things, change

beneficiaries on Decedent’s accounts.” Kim then made herself the beneficiary of the

Policy. Following Decedent’s death on June 27, 2022, Kim submitted a claim to

Genworth, which paid Kim the Policy proceeds of $502,202.32. Kim split the Policy

proceeds with Michelle. B. Motion to Dismiss

On November 20, 2023, Defendants moved to dismiss Alec’s first

amended complaint, arguing that the Probate Division of the Cuyahoga County

Court of Common Pleas lacked jurisdiction over this dispute, which “should be

heard by a Tennessee Court and in the alternative, Plaintiff lacks standing.”

Defendants also argued that Alec had failed to name necessary and indispensable

parties, namely Allison and Alec’s brother, Matthew. Finally, Defendants argued

that Alec’s claim for an accounting should be dismissed “by way of summary

judgment” because Defendants had already provided an accounting. Alec opposed

Defendants’ motion.

On April 18, 2024, the probate court issued a journal entry granting

the motion to dismiss. Alec appealed arguing the trial court erred as a matter of law

by dismissing his first amended complaint.

II. Law and Analysis

A. Lack of Standing – Undue Influence and Breach of Fiduciary Duty

The court did not err in dismissing Alec’s claims for undue influence

and breach of fiduciary duty for lack of standing. “A motion to dismiss for lack of

standing is treated as a motion to dismiss pursuant to Civ.R. 12. Specifically, a lack

of standing may be properly raised in a motion to dismiss premised on

Civ.R. 12(B)(6).” Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v. Rudolph, 2012-Ohio-6141, ¶ 18

(8th Dist.). The “standard of review on a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss is de

novo.” Weiler v. Technipower Inc., 2023-Ohio-465, ¶ 11 (8th Dist.), citing

NorthPoint Props. v. Petticord, 2008-Ohio-5996, ¶ 11 (8th Dist.). Accordingly,

when ruling on a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion, “we undertake an independent review of

the record and accord no deference to the trial court’s decision.” Lars St. John v.

Univ. Hosps., 2025-Ohio-653, ¶ 6 (8th Dist.), citing Hendrickson v. Haven Place,

Inc., 2014-Ohio-3726, ¶ 12 (8th Dist.).

A Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion “‘tests the sufficiency of the complaint.’”

Weiler at ¶ 11, quoting Petticord at ¶ 11. In ruling on a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion, we

“‘accept all factual allegations of the complaint as true and all reasonable inferences

must be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party.’” Id., quoting id. A court “may

grant a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted

where it appears ‘beyond doubt from the complaint that the plaintiff can prove no

set of facts entitling [him] to relief.’” Weiler at ¶ 12, quoting Grey v. Walgreen Co.,

2011-Ohio-6167, ¶ 3 (8th Dist.).

“A trial court’s review of a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss is limited

to the four corners of the complaint along with any documents properly attached to,

or incorporated within, the complaint.” Szewczyk v. Century Fed. Credit Union,

2022-Ohio-1683, ¶ 16 (8th Dist.), citing Glazer v. Chase Home Fin. L.L.C., 2013-

Ohio-5589 ¶ 38 (8th Dist.).

Civ.R. 10(C) states that a “written instrument attached to a pleading

becomes part of the pleading.” “However, ‘not every document attached to a pleading constitutes a Civ.R. 10(C) written instrument.’” Reynolds v. Kamm, 2023-

Ohio-3797, ¶ 15 (8th Dist.), quoting State ex rel. Leneghan v. Husted, 2018-Ohio-

3361, ¶ 17 (8th Dist.). “Rather, a written instrument ‘has primarily been interpreted

to include documents that evidence the parties’ rights and obligations, such as

negotiable instruments, “insurance policies, leases, deeds, promissory notes, and

contracts.”’” Id., citing id., quoting Inskeep v. Burton, 2008-Ohio-1982, ¶ 17 (2d

Dist.).

With regard to the trial court’s conclusion that Alec lacked standing

to bring his undue-influence and fiduciary-duty claims, Alec argues on appeal,

among other things, that Defendants raised matters outside the first amended

complaint in seeking dismissal, which is inappropriate in connection with a motion

under Civ.R. 12(B)(6); that he has standing because he “is complaining that all of

the monies that should have gone to him and his brother from their Dad, instead

went to his cousins”; that the trial court misapplied Civ.R. 12(B)(6); that the trial

court failed to accept contentions in the amended complaint as true; and that the

trial court engaged in “hyper-technical slicing and dicing of allegations and

contentions.” We disagree with Alec’s arguments.

“Before an Ohio court can consider the merits of a legal claim, the

person or entity seeking relief must establish standing to sue.” Ohio Pyro, Inc. v.

Ohio Dept. of Commerce, 2007-Ohio-5024, ¶ 27. Standing is “[a] party’s right to

make a legal claim or seek judicial enforcement of a duty or right.” Id., citing Black’s

Law Dictionary (8th Ed. 2004). “Standing is determined as of the commencement of the action.” Groveport Madison Local Schools Bd. Of Edn. v. Franklin Cty. Bd.

Of Revision, 2013-Ohio-4627, ¶ 26.

“‘Where the party does not rely on any specific statute authorizing

invocation of the judicial process, the question of standing depends on whether the

party has alleged . . . a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy.’” (Cleaned

up.) Fed. Home Loan Mtge. Corp. v. Schwartzwald, 2012-Ohio-5017, ¶ 21, quoting

Cleveland v. Shaker Hts., 30 Ohio St.3d 49, 51 (1987). “Traditional standing

principles require litigants to show, at a minimum, that they have suffered ‘(1) an

injury that is (2) fairly traceable to the defendant’s allegedly unlawful conduct, and

(3) likely to be redressed by the requested relief.’” ProgressOhio.org, Inc. v.

JobsOhio, 2014-Ohio-2382, ¶ 7, quoting Moore v. Middletown, 2012-Ohio-3897,

¶ 22.

Looking solely at the amended complaint and the documents

properly attached to it, such as the application for insurance, as we must in

conducting analysis under Civ.R. 12(B)(6), Alec has not alleged an injury traceable

to Defendants’ conduct. In his claim for undue influence, Alec alleged that “Kim

exerted undue influence upon Decedent to have him designate her as the sole

beneficiary of the Policy.” In his claim for breach of fiduciary duty, Alec averred that

“Kim breached her fiduciary duties to Plaintiff by making arrangements for

Decedent to designate her as the sole beneficiary related to the Policy.”

However, Alec failed to plead facts that, if proven, would demonstrate

that Alec would have had a right to benefit from the Policy had Kim not made herself its beneficiary. Alec alleged only that his father took out a life insurance policy, that

his mother was named as the primary beneficiary, that his mother and father

divorced, and that, as part of the divorce, his father agreed to maintain a $500,000

life insurance policy while he had support obligations related to Alec and his brother

Matthew. The application and the life insurance policy attached to Alec’s amended

complaint list Allison as the primary beneficiary, as Alec alleged. Alec is not listed

as a beneficiary. Alec did not allege that when his father agreed to maintain a life

insurance policy while he had support obligations to Alec and Matthew, Alec was or

was supposed to be a beneficiary under the policy.

In his appellate brief, Alec argues, “The Divorce decree mandated that

William Deckman maintain life insurance, for the benefit of his children, until his

child support obligations had been met.” This differs from the allegation in his

amended complaint that, “[a]s a part of the divorce proceedings, Decedent agreed

to maintain a $500,000 life insurance policy while he had support obligations

related to Plaintiff and his brother, Matthew.” Reviewing whether standing has been

demonstrated, we are limited to the allegations in the amended complaint.

We recognize that this court has found, where a separation agreement

required a spouse to “maintain the child of the parties as primary, irrevocable

beneficiary in [life insurance] policies,” the “child was granted a vested right” to the

policies. Thomas v. Studley, 59 Ohio App.3d 76, 79 (8th Dist. 1989). This “vested

right cannot be defeated by the [spouse’s] failure to maintain the policy as required

by the divorce decree.” Id. However, Alec does not allege that the divorce decree required Alec

to be a beneficiary of the policy. Alec does not allege the terms of his father’s support

obligations under the divorce decree. The divorce decree itself is not attached to the

amended complaint.

Notwithstanding his arguments to the contrary, Alec has not alleged

facts in the amended complaint that, if proven, would establish that Defendants’

conduct caused him injury, as required to establish standing for his undue-influence

and breach-of-fiduciary-duty claims. We affirm the court’s dismissal of Counts 1

and 2 for lack of standing.

B. Declaratory Judgment – Lack of Standing

The Ohio Supreme Court has recognized that standing “must be

demonstrated for each claim and each form of relief.” (Cleaned up.) Ohioans for

Concealed Carry, Inc. v. Columbus, 2020-Ohio-6724, ¶ 13. Addressing standing

under the Declaratory Judgment Act specifically, the Court explained, “Although a

declaratory-judgment action generally contemplates that the action is brought

before an injury-in-fact has occurred, a plaintiff must nonetheless demonstrate

‘actual present harm or a significant possibility of future harm to justify pre-

enforcement relief.’” Id. at ¶ 32, quoting Peoples Rights Org., Inc. v. Columbus, 152

F.3d 522, 527 (6th Cir. 1998). Dismissing for lack of standing, the Court explained

that the “complaint is simply devoid of any allegation on which we could conclude

the significant possibility of future injury.” Id. at ¶ 35. Dismissal of a claim for declaratory relief is appropriate without

addressing the merits of the case “‘if there is (1) neither a justiciable issue nor an

actual controversy between the parties requiring speedy relief, or (2) the declaratory

judgment will not terminate the uncertainty or controversy.’” Cool v. Frenchko,

2022-Ohio-3747, ¶ 17 (10th Dist.), quoting M6 Motors, Inc. v. Nissan of N. Olmsted,

L.L.C., ¶ 19, 2014-Ohio-2537. “Standing depends on ‘whether the plaintiffs have

alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy that they are entitled

to have a court hear their case.’” Ohioans for Concealed Carry at ¶ 37, quoting

ProgressOhio.org, Inc., 2014-Ohio-2382, at ¶ 17.

Under Count 3, Alec alleged that he “believes he is the proper and

lawful beneficiary of the Policy proceeds” and sought “an order from the Court

confirming that: (i) he is the lawful beneficiary related to the Policy. . . .” However,

as discussed above, Alec has not alleged any facts that, if proven true, support his

belief. See Lombardo v. Best W. Hotels & Resorts, 2023-Ohio-2300, ¶ 17 (“Even

Ohio’s liberal notice-pleading standard does not permit mere speculation.”);

Sacksteder v. Senney, 2012-Ohio-4452, ¶ 45 (2d Dist.) (“We have never construed

Civ.R. 12(B)(6) as permitting either speculation or complaints that are devoid of

factual allegations supporting the legal claims.”).

The test for standing in a declaratory-judgment action is “whether a

justiciable issue exists as opposed to alleging an injury.” Cool at ¶26. Based on the

facts alleged in the amended complaint, Alec has not demonstrated a justiciable

controversy. Dismissal of his claim for declaratory judgment was proper. C. Declaratory Judgment – Failure to Name Indispensable Parties

Furthermore, Alec failed to name all necessary parties. To properly

bring a claim for declaratory judgment, “all persons who have or claim any interest

that would be affected by the declaration shall be made parties to the action or

proceeding.” R.C. 2721.12(A). For purposes of R.C. 2721.12(A), a “party is ‘legally

affected’ if the party has a legal interest in rights that are the subject matter of the

cause of action.” M6 Motors, Inc., 2014-Ohio-2537, at ¶ 33 (8th Dist.), quoting

Rumpke Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. State, 2010-Ohio-6037, ¶ 14. A mere “practical

interest in the outcome of the action” is insufficient. Id. at ¶ 34.

As noted, in Count 3, Alec sought “an order from the Court confirming

that: (i) he is the lawful beneficiary related to the Policy. . . .” This order, if issued,

would make Alec the sole beneficiary of the Policy, terminating anyone else’s interest

in the Policy. However, Alec alleged in the first amended complaint that his mother

is listed as the primary beneficiary in the policy application and the documents Alec

attached to the amended complaint support that allegation. Alec did not name

Allison as a party.

To the extent Alec is trying to argue that he has an interest in the

policy because, “[a]s a part of the divorce proceedings, Decedent agreed to maintain

a $500,000 life insurance policy while he had support obligations related to Plaintiff

and his brother, Matthew,” Matthew would have the same interest. Naming Alec

the sole beneficiary of the policy would terminate Matthew’s rights, making him a

necessary party to this case. Yet, Alec failed to name Matthew as a party in his amended complaint. Moreover, as noted above, Alec did not allege facts sufficient

to demonstrate that he or his brother had a vested interest in the life insurance

policy.

Ordinarily, “Ohio courts have eschewed the harsh result of dismissing

an action because an indispensable party was not joined, electing instead to order

that the party be joined pursuant to Civ. R. 19(A) . . . .” State ex. rel. Bush, 42 Ohio

St.3d 77, 81 (1989). However, “[t]he absence of a necessary party is a jurisdictional

defect that precludes any declaratory judgment.” Cerio v. Hilroc Condo.

Unitowners Assn., 2004-Ohio-1254, ¶ 10 (8th Dist.), citing Bretton Ridge

Homeowners Club v. DeAngelis, 51 Ohio App.3d 183, 185 (8th Dist. 1988). In Cerio,

this court remanded a declaratory-judgment action that failed to name all interested

parties under R.C. 2721.12 with instructions that “the complaint should be dismissed

unless all necessary parties are joined.” Cerio at ¶ 14. Similarly, in DeAngelis, this

court found that, where a declaratory-judgment action lacked necessary parties, the

“[c]omplaint should have been dismissed.” DeAngelis at 185.

In the present case, Alec did not join Allison or Matthew, who are

necessary parties to his declaratory-judgment action. Nonetheless, in light of Alec’s

lack of standing, we decline to remand the matter.

C. Constructive Trust and Accounting

Although set forth as separate counts in Alec’s amended complaint,

the “imposition of a constructive trust and a request for an accounting are generally

considered to be remedies, not independent causes of actions.” Haddad v. Maalouf- Masek, 2024-Ohio-1983, ¶ 62 (8th Dist.) (finding that, where the trial court erred

in granting summary judgment that denied appellant’s underlying claim for

intentional interference with expectancy, appellant did “not identif[y] any basis” for

constructive trust and accounting). As we found above, the probate court properly

dismissed Alec’s unjust-enrichment and breach-of-fiduciary-duty claims and his

declaratory-judgment action. Alec has, therefore, identified no basis for the

remedies he requested.

Accordingly, Alec’s sole assignment of error is overruled.

Judgment affirmed.

It is ordered that appellees recover from appellant costs herein taxed.

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment

into execution.

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

______________________________ LISA B. FORBES, JUDGE

KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, P.J., and MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, J., CONCUR