Decker v. Schumacher

19 N.W.2d 466, 312 Mich. 6, 1945 Mich. LEXIS 289
CourtMichigan Supreme Court
DecidedJune 29, 1945
DocketDocket No. 37, Calendar No. 42,954.
StatusPublished
Cited by10 cases

This text of 19 N.W.2d 466 (Decker v. Schumacher) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Michigan Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Decker v. Schumacher, 19 N.W.2d 466, 312 Mich. 6, 1945 Mich. LEXIS 289 (Mich. 1945).

Opinion

Boyles, J.

The only question here for decision is whether the jurors were coerced by the court into rendering a verdict, as a result of which a new trial should he granted.

This is a damage suit arising out of a collision between two automobiles, As usual, the essential *8 issues of fact submitted to the jury were whether the defendant was guilty of negligence and, if so, whether plaintiff Chester A. Decker was guilty of contributory negligence. Testimony was received from witnesses for each of the parties, the conflicting testimony disclosed the usual sharp issues of fact, and the casB was submitted to the jury after lengthy instructions from the court, concerning which no complaint is made.

The case was given to the jury on a Thursday morning. Later in the same day the jury asked for and received permission to confer with the court. In court the foreman said to the judge, among other things:

“We can’t agree exactly on who contributed the negligence or whether they both did. * * * We are in general disagreement — that is about all.”

The coui$ asked how the jury stood and was told that' they (the jurors) thought the defendant was guilty of negligence but nine claimed that the plaintiff driver was guilty of contributory negligence and were for ‘ ‘ no cause for action. ’ ’ After a lengthy discussion between court and jury concerning credibility of witnesses, the discrediting of testimony, the degree of care that a prudent driver must use, and the duty of a driver in a sudden emergency, the court told the jury it could recess until 9:30 the next (Friday) morning when he would have the court stenographer read the conflicting testimony on certain questions raised. The court said: ‘

“It will take another jury if you can’t agree. It will take another jury three or four days to arrive at the same place you are at now, and I would rather you come back in the morning at 9:30 and attempt to agree upon it.”

*9 At 9: 30 Friday morning the jury came into court, parts of the testimony were read by the stenographer, and a further discussion ensued between court and jurors which concluded as follows:

“The Court: I think you should go back to the jury room and consider this testimony — and unless you are able to agree that Mr. Decker was free from negligence, then you can’t bring in a verdict for him.

“The Foreman: Nine of us feel he was guilty of contributory negligence and three members of the jury think that he was a prudent driver and done the proper thing.

“The Court: Three to nine can’t bring in a verdict you know.

“The Foreman: We understand that.

“The Court: So what are you going to do? Are you going to dispose of it? Or are you going to leave the thing hanging so that we’ll have to try it again? I think I’ll ask you to go back to the jury ' room and talk the thing over.”

At 4:30 the same afternoon the jury requested opportunity of the court to ask further questions,were brought into court, and this occurred:

“The Court: Have you agreed upon a verdict?

“The Foreman: We have agreed to disagree.

“The Court: You can’t do that. That isn’t a verdict, you know.

“The Foreman: Well, some of the members, judge, wanted to come in and ask you some more questions.

“The Court: I am here, ready and willing to answer any that I can.

“The Foreman: At present we stand five to seven in favor of no cause.

“The Court: Seven for no cause and five disagreeing with you?

*10 “The Foreman: I don’t know just liow you would say it — but we seem to be deadlocked. The seven don’t feel they should hardly change their convictions, and the five say they’ll never give up, and there you are. Just what are you going to do?

“The Court: There must be either five or seven contrary people on this jury. I hate to spend another four days on the trial of this case.”

Then, after considerable further colloquy between the court and jurors, the court said:

“Well, what are you going to do? I don’t know what to do with you. We had a jury that got started this way about a year ago. They hung on each case that they tried — couldn’t decide a case. I don’t say this jury will do that. We have got cases to be tried in this court and we don’t want anybody to hang on them and it is a bad thing to get in the habit of hanging — of thinking you don’t have to inquire into what the other party thinks about the-case. If I were on a jury and voted according to the dictates of my conscience and all the rest did. and it stood eleven to my one, that would upset me quite a little and I would wonder if I was the one that was wrong. I would consider the thing again in order to' determine whether I was wrong. You should work just as hard to see if you are occupying the wrong position as to see if you are occupying the right position. Argue it out with the other party to see where you really belong and what you can do. It takes a unanimous verdict of a jury in order to come to a verdict — a unanimous agreement of the jury.”

This was followed by further discussion during which the court continued to refer to the facts of the case, and then sent the jurors back to the jury room to “take another ballot and see if you can arrive at a verdict.” Later the jury again “reas *11 s emble d” in the courtroom (Friday afternoon) where the following occurred:

“The Court: Any progress?

“The Foreman: We haven’t made a particle of progress. We have argued this thing over and over and the minority say they will never change.

“The Court: What does the majority say?

“The Foreman: Pretty near the same thing. Neither side will change their vote.

“The Court: Everybody ought to be ready to change his vote when he is convinced.

“The Foreman: They refuse to be convinced. We have had a lot of arguments.

“The Court: I am sorry this has taken place at this time. You people have to approach the subject right in order to get a verdict. You haven’t approached it with the right disposition. You are antagonistic. How do. men and women agree on a thing? They don’t take a position and say, ‘You never can convince me.’ That sort of person can’t be fit for jury service if he says that. You have to be convinced or yon can’t agree. There isn’t a jury in the world that will' all vote the same on the first ballot — unanimous. Therefore, you have to be in position to agree when you are convinced.

“You can come back in the morning at 9:30 and try again, but this will be bad advertising to the attorneys.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
19 N.W.2d 466, 312 Mich. 6, 1945 Mich. LEXIS 289, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/decker-v-schumacher-mich-1945.