Decker v. Bally's Grand Hotel
This text of 655 A.2d 73 (Decker v. Bally's Grand Hotel) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
JOSEPH B. DECKER, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT,
v.
BALLY'S GRAND HOTEL CASINO, CAESAR'S ATLANTIC CITY HOTEL CASINO, MERV GRIFFIN'S RESORTS CASINO HOTEL, SANDS HOTEL & CASINO, TROPWORLD CASINO & ENTERTAINMENT RESORT, TRUMP PLAZA HOTEL & CASINO, AND TRUMP TAJ MAHAL CASINO RESORT, DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS, AND SHOWBOAT HOTEL & CASINO, DEFENDANT.
Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division.
*218 Before Judges BROCHIN and KLEINER.
Scott E. Becker argued the cause for plaintiff-appellant.
Frederick H. Kraus argued the cause for respondent Greate Bay Hotel and Casino, Inc. t/a Sands Hotel & Casino.
Patrick Madamba argued the cause for respondents GNOC Corp., Resorts International Hotel, Inc., and Adamar of New Jersey, Inc. (Horn, Goldberg, Gorny, Daniels, Paarz, Plackter & Weiss, attorneys; Mr. Madamba, of counsel; Eileen Lindinger, on the brief).
Christine Cote argued the cause for respondents Trump Taj Mahal Casino Resort, Trump Plaza Hotel Casino, and Caesar's Atlantic City Hotel Casino (Cooper, Perskie, April, Niedelman, Wagenheim & Levenson, attorneys; Lloyd D. Levenson, of counsel and on the brief).
The opinion of the court was delivered by KLEINER, J.A.D.
Appellant Joseph B. Decker appeals from an order dismissing his complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. R. 4:6-2(e). We affirm.
On January 8, 1992, the Casino Control Commission ("the Commission") adopted amendments to N.J.A.C. 19:45-1.37 and N.J.A.C. 19:45-1.39. Prior to the adoption of these amendments, casino licensees were precluded from removing or reducing a *219 jackpot in a progressive slot machine[1] until a jackpot was won by a patron. The amendments, which became effective February 3, 1992, changed this regulatory scheme to allow casinos to establish time limits of not less than thirty days for the offering of progressive jackpots. Thus, the amended regulations permit casino licensees to remove progressive slot machines from the casino floor or to reduce the progressive jackpot after thirty days notice to the public and with prior Commission approval.
On October 23, 1992, plaintiff filed a complaint which named eight Atlantic City casino licensees as defendants. The complaint alleged breach of express and implied contract in that defendants had closed and removed progressive slot machines from their casino floors and sought an undefined amount of damages. In his complaint, plaintiff alleged that he had gambled in every Atlantic City casino since gambling was legalized in 1978. Due to the amount of his gambling losses since 1978, plaintiff decided that the only way to recoup his losses was to play progressive slot machines. He maintains that he has lost substantial amounts of money playing the progressive slot machines. Plaintiff further alleged that on or after February 1992, defendants closed and removed certain progressive slot machines with jackpot prizes totaling over $20 million. Plaintiff maintained that as a result of defendants removing the progressive slot machines, they breached an express and implied contract with the public that the progressive jackpot amount would be awarded to the winning player.
Thereafter defendant Sands Hotel & Casino ("the Sands") filed a motion to dismiss plaintiff's contract action for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. R. 4:6-2(e). This motion was joined by all other defendants except for the Showboat Hotel & Casino ("Showboat"). The Sands argued that since plaintiff did *220 not allege that he had played any particular progressive slot machine at the Sands and had won a jackpot that had been reduced, plaintiff had no colorable claim to damages. Additionally, the Sands argued that plaintiff's allegations as to damages were speculative and plaintiff cannot establish his alleged loss.
In response, plaintiff alleged that he possessed plastic account cards issued by each of the defendant casinos which are used to record information such as a customer's gambling time, amount of winnings or losses and number of visits, but he has not been able to obtain this specific information regarding his gambling record.[2] Additionally, plaintiff argued that defendant's removal of the machines eliminated the possibility that he would win a jackpot.
On December 4, 1992, the court granted the Sands' motion and ordered plaintiff's complaint dismissed as to all defendants.[3] In its memorandum of decision, the trial court found that the casino licensees had complied with the regulation's notice requirement by posting the applicable notices on all of their progressive slot machines and had received approval of all changes from the Commission in accordance with the procedures set out in the regulations. The trial court also concluded that plaintiff had no standing to sue since his complaint did not state that he had played and won the jackpot on a progressive slot machine on *221 which the amount of the progressive meter had been reduced.[4]
On appeal, plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in dismissing his complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. According to plaintiff, the complaint states a cognizable claim for breach of contract or, "at the very least, quasi-contract." We conclude that plaintiff's complaint was properly dismissed.
As we stated in Rieder v. State Dep't of Transp., 221 N.J. Super. 547, 552, 535 A.2d 512 (App.Div. 1987):
On a motion made pursuant to R. 4:6-2(e) "the inquiry is confined to a consideration of the legal sufficiency of the alleged facts apparent on the face of the challenged claim." P. & J. Auto Body v. Miller, 72 N.J. Super. 207, 211 [178 A.2d 237] (App.Div. 1962). The court may not consider anything other than whether the complaint states a cognizable cause of action. Ibid. For this purpose, "all facts alleged in the complaint and legitimate inferences drawn therefrom are deemed admitted." Smith v. City of Newark, 136 N.J. Super. 107, 112 [344 A.2d 782] (App.Div. 1975). See also Heavner v. Uniroyal, Inc., 63 N.J. 130, 133 [305 A.2d 412] (1973); Polk v. Schwartz, 166 N.J. Super. 292, 299 [399 A.2d 1001] (App.Div. 1979). A complaint should not be dismissed under this rule where a cause of action is suggested by the facts and a theory of actionability may be articulated by way of amendment. Muniz v. United Hsps. Med. Ctr. Pres. Hsp., 153 N.J. Super. 79, 82-83 [379 A.2d 57] (App.Div. 1977). However, a dismissal is mandated where the factual allegations are palpably insufficient to support a claim upon which relief can be granted.
In this instance, the factual allegations in the complaint are "palpably insufficient" to support a cause of action. Ibid. Plaintiff placed money in the progressive slot machines and received in return a chance to win a progressive jackpot. The defendants here did not take away the opportunity to win a progressive jackpot before plaintiff pulled the handle on the progressive slot machine. Since he did not win any jackpot, plaintiff has no personal stake in the outcome of the proceedings. Cf. Patrolmen's Benev. Ass'n v.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
Related
Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
655 A.2d 73, 280 N.J. Super. 217, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/decker-v-ballys-grand-hotel-njsuperctappdiv-1994.