FILED COUT-ZT OF APVEALS DIV I STATE OF WASHINGTON
20I1NOV 13 AM 10:51
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DEBRA TALLEY, a single woman; ) No. 76452-7-1 and AMY J. LAWSON,a single woman,) ) Appellants, ) ) DIVISION ONE v. ) ) LANPHERE ENTERPRISES OF ) WASHINGTON, INC., a Washington ) corporation d/b/a RENTON HONDA ) JACOB B. NEARY, personally and as ) agent and/or employee of LANPHERE ) ENTERPRISES OF WASHINGTON ) INC.; ROBERT D. LANPHERE, JR., as ) President of LANPHERE ) ENTERPRISES OF WASHINGTON ) INC,; and JOHN DOES I-V, as agents ) And/or employees of LANPHERE ) ENTERPRISES OF WASHINGTON, ) INC., ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION ) Respondents. ) FILED: November 13, 2017 )
MANN, J. — Debra Talley and Amy Lawson sued Lanphere Enterprises of
Washington, Inc., d/b/a Renton Honda (Renton Honda)for negligence. Renton Honda
admitted that it was negligent but it disputed that its negligence caused Talley and
Lawson's injuries. The jury agreed with Renton Honda and found no proximate cause. No. 76452-7-1/2
Talley and Lawson moved the court for a new trial under CR 59(a) because the jury
failed to award damages. The court denied their motions. They appealed, but we find
no abuse of discretion. We do, however, find that Talley and Lawson's appeal is
frivolous. Accordingly, we award Renton Honda its attorney fees and costs on appeal.
FACTS
On March 2, 2008, Talley and Lawson were passengers in a car that crashed.
An employee of Renton Honda was driving the car at the time of the crash.
On March 1, 2011, Talley and Lawson sued Renton Honda and its associated
entities for negligence. The case went to trial, but the court ultimately declared a
mistrial after the plaintiffs moved to sever Talley's claims from Lawson's. (The court
ultimately ordered R.E. Bodkin, Talley and Lawson's counsel to'pay for some of the
costs associated with the second trial.)
On October 24, 2016, a new trial began. Renton Honda admitted that it was
negligent but disputed that its negligence was the proximate cause of the plaintiffs'
claimed injuries. The jury found for Renton Honda. On a special verdict form, the jury
found that Renton Honda's actions were not the proximate cause of Talley and
Lawson's injuries. Since the jury found no proximate cause, it did not reach the issue of
damages.
Talley and Lawson moved for a new trial under CR 59(a). The court denied the
motion. Talley and Lawson appealed.
ANALYSIS
Talley and Lawson do not challenge the jury's verdict finding that Renton
Honda's negligence was not the proximate cause of their claimed injuries. Talley and
-2- No. 76452-7-1/3
Lawson also do not challenge the jury instructions telling the jury that if they did not find
proximate cause that they should not reach damages. Instead, Talley and Lawson
assert that the trial court abused its discretion in denying their CR 59(a) motion for a
new trial. We disagree.
We review a trial court's denial of a CR 59 motion for abuse of discretion.
Worden v. Smith, 178 Wn. App. 309, 322-23, 314 P.3d 1125(2013). A trial court
abuses its discretion when its decision is manifestly unreasonable, or exercised on
untenable grounds or for untenable reasons. A court abuses its discretion if it bases its
ruling on an incorrect interpretation of the law. We review alleged errors of law de novo.
Smith, 178 Wn. App. at 323.
Talley and Lawson moved for a new trial under CR 59(a)(5),(7), and (9). We
address each claim in turn.
CR 59(a)(5) allows the trial court to grant a new trial if damages were so
inadequate that they unmistakably indicate that the verdict was the result of prejudice.
Here, the trial court correctly concluded that damages were not inadequate because the
jury found no proximate cause. The jury was instructed not to award damages if it
found no proximate cause. Talley and Lawson did not challenge this instruction. The
trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Talley and Lawson's motion under CR
59(a)(5).
CR 59(a)(7) allows the trial court to grant a new trial after a jury returned a verdict
where "there is no evidence or reasonable inference from the evidence to justify the
verdict." When a proponent of a new trial argues that the jury's verdict was not based
on the evidence, we look to the record to determine whether there was sufficient
-3- No. 76452-7-1/4
evidence to support the verdict. Palmer v. Jensen, 132 Wn.2d 193, 197, 937 P.2d 597
(1997). We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.
Hojem v. Kelly, 93 Wn.2d 143, 145, 606 P.2d 275 (1980). The verdict must be
supported by substantial evidence, "evidence of a character which would convince an
unprejudiced, thinking mind of the truth of the fact to which the evidence is directed."
Kelly, 93 Wn.2d at 145. "A jury verdict finding that a defendant is negligent but that the
negligence was not a proximate cause of the plaintiffs injuries is not inconsistent if there
is evidence in the record to support a finding of negligence but also evidence to support
a finding that the resulting injury would have occurred regardless of the defendant's
actions." Estate of Stalkup v. Vancouver Clinic, Inc., P.S., 145 Wn. App. 572, 586, 187
P.3d 291 (2008).
Here, substantial evidence supports the jury's verdict that Renton Honda's
negligence was not the proximate cause of Talley and Lawson's injuries. The extent of
the plaintiffs' claimed injuries was vigorously disputed at trial. Renton Honda put on
evidence that Talley and Lawson exaggerated their injuries caused by the accident. For
example, Renton Honda admitted a video showing Talley working out in a gym and
appearing to be in much better physical condition than she presented to the jury. An
expert medical witness (neuropsychologist) who reviewed the plaintiffs' medical records
testified that Talley suffered no "bona fide impairment" from the accident. That same
expert also testified that Lawson did not suffer any cognitive disorders as a result of the
accident. Lawson herself testified that she had fallen numerous times since the
accident. Substantial evidence supports the jury verdict.
-4- No. 76452-7-1/5
Talley and Lawson argue that because Renton Honda admitted "liability for the
collision and that it caused some injury to each plaintiff' in jury instruction 2, damages
are required. But Talley and Lawson overlook the instruction that specifically addresses
the impact of Renton Honda's admission of liability. Instruction 4 advised the jury that
each plaintiff has the burden of proving "that the March 2, 2008 automobile collision was
a proximate cause of the injury to the plaintiff." The jury was clearly instructed that it
had to determine whether the plaintiffs' alleged injuries were proximately caused by the
collision. Talley and Lawson also argue in passing that instruction 15, which instructed
the jury on the measure of damages in the event that it found proximate cause, required
the jury to award damages after Renton Honda admitted negligence and "some injury"
to each plaintiff.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
FILED COUT-ZT OF APVEALS DIV I STATE OF WASHINGTON
20I1NOV 13 AM 10:51
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DEBRA TALLEY, a single woman; ) No. 76452-7-1 and AMY J. LAWSON,a single woman,) ) Appellants, ) ) DIVISION ONE v. ) ) LANPHERE ENTERPRISES OF ) WASHINGTON, INC., a Washington ) corporation d/b/a RENTON HONDA ) JACOB B. NEARY, personally and as ) agent and/or employee of LANPHERE ) ENTERPRISES OF WASHINGTON ) INC.; ROBERT D. LANPHERE, JR., as ) President of LANPHERE ) ENTERPRISES OF WASHINGTON ) INC,; and JOHN DOES I-V, as agents ) And/or employees of LANPHERE ) ENTERPRISES OF WASHINGTON, ) INC., ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION ) Respondents. ) FILED: November 13, 2017 )
MANN, J. — Debra Talley and Amy Lawson sued Lanphere Enterprises of
Washington, Inc., d/b/a Renton Honda (Renton Honda)for negligence. Renton Honda
admitted that it was negligent but it disputed that its negligence caused Talley and
Lawson's injuries. The jury agreed with Renton Honda and found no proximate cause. No. 76452-7-1/2
Talley and Lawson moved the court for a new trial under CR 59(a) because the jury
failed to award damages. The court denied their motions. They appealed, but we find
no abuse of discretion. We do, however, find that Talley and Lawson's appeal is
frivolous. Accordingly, we award Renton Honda its attorney fees and costs on appeal.
FACTS
On March 2, 2008, Talley and Lawson were passengers in a car that crashed.
An employee of Renton Honda was driving the car at the time of the crash.
On March 1, 2011, Talley and Lawson sued Renton Honda and its associated
entities for negligence. The case went to trial, but the court ultimately declared a
mistrial after the plaintiffs moved to sever Talley's claims from Lawson's. (The court
ultimately ordered R.E. Bodkin, Talley and Lawson's counsel to'pay for some of the
costs associated with the second trial.)
On October 24, 2016, a new trial began. Renton Honda admitted that it was
negligent but disputed that its negligence was the proximate cause of the plaintiffs'
claimed injuries. The jury found for Renton Honda. On a special verdict form, the jury
found that Renton Honda's actions were not the proximate cause of Talley and
Lawson's injuries. Since the jury found no proximate cause, it did not reach the issue of
damages.
Talley and Lawson moved for a new trial under CR 59(a). The court denied the
motion. Talley and Lawson appealed.
ANALYSIS
Talley and Lawson do not challenge the jury's verdict finding that Renton
Honda's negligence was not the proximate cause of their claimed injuries. Talley and
-2- No. 76452-7-1/3
Lawson also do not challenge the jury instructions telling the jury that if they did not find
proximate cause that they should not reach damages. Instead, Talley and Lawson
assert that the trial court abused its discretion in denying their CR 59(a) motion for a
new trial. We disagree.
We review a trial court's denial of a CR 59 motion for abuse of discretion.
Worden v. Smith, 178 Wn. App. 309, 322-23, 314 P.3d 1125(2013). A trial court
abuses its discretion when its decision is manifestly unreasonable, or exercised on
untenable grounds or for untenable reasons. A court abuses its discretion if it bases its
ruling on an incorrect interpretation of the law. We review alleged errors of law de novo.
Smith, 178 Wn. App. at 323.
Talley and Lawson moved for a new trial under CR 59(a)(5),(7), and (9). We
address each claim in turn.
CR 59(a)(5) allows the trial court to grant a new trial if damages were so
inadequate that they unmistakably indicate that the verdict was the result of prejudice.
Here, the trial court correctly concluded that damages were not inadequate because the
jury found no proximate cause. The jury was instructed not to award damages if it
found no proximate cause. Talley and Lawson did not challenge this instruction. The
trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Talley and Lawson's motion under CR
59(a)(5).
CR 59(a)(7) allows the trial court to grant a new trial after a jury returned a verdict
where "there is no evidence or reasonable inference from the evidence to justify the
verdict." When a proponent of a new trial argues that the jury's verdict was not based
on the evidence, we look to the record to determine whether there was sufficient
-3- No. 76452-7-1/4
evidence to support the verdict. Palmer v. Jensen, 132 Wn.2d 193, 197, 937 P.2d 597
(1997). We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.
Hojem v. Kelly, 93 Wn.2d 143, 145, 606 P.2d 275 (1980). The verdict must be
supported by substantial evidence, "evidence of a character which would convince an
unprejudiced, thinking mind of the truth of the fact to which the evidence is directed."
Kelly, 93 Wn.2d at 145. "A jury verdict finding that a defendant is negligent but that the
negligence was not a proximate cause of the plaintiffs injuries is not inconsistent if there
is evidence in the record to support a finding of negligence but also evidence to support
a finding that the resulting injury would have occurred regardless of the defendant's
actions." Estate of Stalkup v. Vancouver Clinic, Inc., P.S., 145 Wn. App. 572, 586, 187
P.3d 291 (2008).
Here, substantial evidence supports the jury's verdict that Renton Honda's
negligence was not the proximate cause of Talley and Lawson's injuries. The extent of
the plaintiffs' claimed injuries was vigorously disputed at trial. Renton Honda put on
evidence that Talley and Lawson exaggerated their injuries caused by the accident. For
example, Renton Honda admitted a video showing Talley working out in a gym and
appearing to be in much better physical condition than she presented to the jury. An
expert medical witness (neuropsychologist) who reviewed the plaintiffs' medical records
testified that Talley suffered no "bona fide impairment" from the accident. That same
expert also testified that Lawson did not suffer any cognitive disorders as a result of the
accident. Lawson herself testified that she had fallen numerous times since the
accident. Substantial evidence supports the jury verdict.
-4- No. 76452-7-1/5
Talley and Lawson argue that because Renton Honda admitted "liability for the
collision and that it caused some injury to each plaintiff' in jury instruction 2, damages
are required. But Talley and Lawson overlook the instruction that specifically addresses
the impact of Renton Honda's admission of liability. Instruction 4 advised the jury that
each plaintiff has the burden of proving "that the March 2, 2008 automobile collision was
a proximate cause of the injury to the plaintiff." The jury was clearly instructed that it
had to determine whether the plaintiffs' alleged injuries were proximately caused by the
collision. Talley and Lawson also argue in passing that instruction 15, which instructed
the jury on the measure of damages in the event that it found proximate cause, required
the jury to award damages after Renton Honda admitted negligence and "some injury"
to each plaintiff. But instruction 15 only applies "[i]f you[]find that defendants
proximately caused injury to a plaintiff." Here, the jury found no'proximate cause. In
addition, Talley and Lawson cite numerous cases where appellate courts have reversed
jury verdicts for inadequate damages, but they cite no case that says that a jury
awarded inadequate damages when the jury did not find proximate cause. The trial
court did not abuse its discretion by denying Talley and Lawson's motion under CR
59(a)(7).
CR 59(a)(9) allows a trial court to grant a new trial when "substantial justice has
not been done." Talley and Lawson offer no persuasive argument about why
substantial justice was not done. The trial court properly rejected this argument:
Finally, there is no merit to Plaintiffs' claim that substantial justice has not been done. This was a hard-fought case. Plaintiffs called 25 witnesses and had almost 90 exhibits admitted into evidence. They had every opportunity to present their claims to fourteen conscientious jurors who took seriously their responsibilities as officers of the court. Other than
-5- No. 76452-7-1/6
their personal disappointment in the verdict, Plaintiffs offer no persuasive argument that justice has not been done.
Again, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Talley and Lawson's
motion under CR 59(a)(9).
Attorney Fees
Renton Honda contends that this appeal is frivolous under RAP 18.9(a). RAP
18.9(a) allows us to order a party to pay terms and compensatory damages if we deem
the appeal frivolous. "[A]n appeal is frivolous if there are no debatable issues upon
which reasonable minds might differ, and it is so totally devoid of merit that there was no
reasonable possibility of reversal." Streater v. White, 26 Wn. App. 430, 435,613 P.2d
187(1980).
Renton Honda argues that the appeal is frivolous because it raises no debatable
issues of merit. We agree. There is no reasonable possibility of reversal here: Talley
and Lawson ask us to find that a trial court abused its discretion by denying a motion for
a new trial on damages when the jury found no proximate cause and did not reach
damages. This appeal is devoid of merit. Accordingly, we hold that the appeal is
frivolous. Renton Honda may recover its attorney fees and costs on appeal, subject to
compliance with RAP 18.1(d).
Affirmed.
-6-