NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-0138-23
DEBRA REUTER,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
BERKELEY TOWNSHIP, its agents, servants, employees, CARMEN F. AMATO, JR., TED MCFADDEN, DEBBI WINOGRACKI, and JOHN A. CAMERA,
Defendants-Appellants. ____________________________
Argued January 13, 2025 – Decided July 31, 2025
Before Judges Gummer, Berdote Byrne, and Jacobs.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Ocean County, Docket No. L-2806-18.
Brigit P. Zahler argued the cause for appellants (Dasti & Staiger, PC, attorneys; Christopher A. Khatami and Brigit P. Zahler, of counsel and on the briefs). William R. Stoltz argued the cause for respondent (Law Offices Rosemarie Arnold, LLP, attorneys; William R. Stoltz and Paige R. Butler, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendants Berkeley Township (the "Township"), Carmen F. Amato, Jr.,
Ted McFadden, Debbi Winogracki, and John A. Camera appeal the trial court's
August 23, 2023 order denying defendants' motion for a new trial pursuant to
Rule 4:49-1. Defendants also appeal the trial court's May 26, 2023 order for
judgment, which was entered after a jury trial, in favor of plaintiff Debra
Reuter's hostile-work-environment and retaliation claims based on disability
discrimination pursuant to the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination
("LAD"), N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to -50. Although plaintiff asserted both disability-
and religious-discrimination claims, after an eight-day trial the jury found
plaintiff had not proven religious discrimination by a preponderance of the
evidence. However, it determined the Township and defendants Amato,
Camera, and Winogracki had fostered a hostile work environment because of
plaintiff's disability and had retaliated against her in violation of the LAD.1 The
jury awarded her $500,001 in emotional-distress damages, $110,000 in
economic-loss damages, and $1,000,002 in punitive damages.
1 The jury did not find defendant McFadden liable for any wrongdoing. A-0138-23 2 Defendants argue the trial court erred in denying their motion for a new
trial on several grounds: (1) plaintiff's trial testimony materially deviated from
her pleadings and discovery; (2) the jury's verdict as to hostile-work-
environment and retaliation claims based on disability discrimination was
against the weight of the evidence; (3) the trial court gave an improper jury
charge; (4) the jury's damages award was against the weight of the evidence;
and (5) plaintiff's counsel made statements during summation capable of
confusing and misleading the jury leading to an unjust result. We note this
appeal pertains only to the jury's findings as to disability discrimination and
disability retaliation, as neither party appealed the jury's verdict in favor of
defendants on plaintiff's religious-discrimination claims or retaliation for
plaintiff’s complaints based upon religious discrimination.
We conclude the jury's verdict—finding that plaintiff was subjected to a
hostile work environment based on disability discrimination and was retaliated
against in violation of the LAD—was against the weight of the evidence and
resulted in a miscarriage of justice. Therefore, a new trial is warranted. Further,
we conclude the jury's damages award is also against the weight of the evidence
as set forth in Rule 4:49-1(a) and the trial court's review of that award in denying
a new trial conflated evidence relating to religious discrimination, which the
A-0138-23 3 jury did not find, with evidence of disability discrimination and constitutes error
pursuant to Rule 2:10-2. Finally, the court erred in its review of punitive
damages by failing to apply the requisite heightened standard. Accordingly, we
vacate the order of judgment, reverse the order denying the motion for a new
trial, and remand for a new trial with respect to defendants' potential liability
and plaintiff's damages, if any, limited to disability discrimination and
retaliation for hiring an attorney, against all defendants except McFadden. No
evidence of a hostile work environment based upon religious discrimination may
be presented to the jury on remand.
I.
In January 2002, plaintiff began her employment with the Township as an
assistant recreation supervisor.2 By 2016, plaintiff requested a promotion to
recreation supervisor, which was granted after the Township's mayor, defendant
Amato, intervened in her favor. In November 2015, defendant Camera became
the Township's business administrator, and in this role, he oversaw the
Township's departments, although he was not plaintiff's direct supervisor.
Defendant Winogracki was hired by the Township in July 2016 as a recreation
2 At the time of this appeal, plaintiff remained employed with the Township in the Recreation Department. A-0138-23 4 program manager and in February 2018, was promoted to director of recreation
for the Township. At that time, she became plaintiff's direct supervisor.
Winogracki held this position until she resigned in November 2021.
In addition to her primary role as assistant recreation supervisor, plaintiff
coordinated the Municipal Alliance Program ("MAP"), a grant-funded initiative
that provided stipends to offset costs of community programs such as senior
activities, youth programs, and other local events. She held that position from
2004 to January 2018, earning initially an additional $14,000 annually. Over
time, her compensation for this position increased to more than $23,000
annually. The stipend compensating her for this role was disbursed separately
by the Township, which was reimbursed by the county. The grant was not
guaranteed and required annual application. Plaintiff testified her total annual
income, including overtime and MAP compensation, reached approximately
$100,000 in one year, but she could not recall the specific year.
Beginning in November 2017, the Township's Chief Financial Officer
conducted an audit of the Recreation Department's financial records, including
MAP, due to general budgetary concerns and learned seventy percent of the
MAP grant monies were used to pay plaintiff's stipend. On January 2, 2018,
A-0138-23 5 defendant Camera halted the payment of grant stipends to plaintiff and another
employee based on the audit findings.
Plaintiff's claims at trial were comprised of five distinct causes of action.
She alleged hostile work environment due to instances of religious
discrimination throughout 2017. She also alleged retaliation due to complaints
she claimed she had made to her superiors of religious discrimination. Plaintiff
retained an attorney sometime in January 2018, who sent a letter on January 25,
2018, to the Township alleging a hostile work environment based on religious
discrimination. The letter made no mention of disability discrimination based
on her mental health. In February 2018, plaintiff sought leave pursuant to the
Family and Medical Leave Act 3 ("FMLA") for anxiety allegedly caused by
defendants' religious discrimination and took leave, which lasted approximately
twelve weeks.4 By the time of trial, in addition to claims of hostile work
environment for religious discrimination and retaliation based on her complaints
of religious discrimination, plaintiff also presented claims of hostile work
3 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654. 4 Plaintiff also went on FMLA leave a second time in May 2019, after the filing of her complaint and after the alleged LAD violations. A-0138-23 6 environment based on disability discrimination and retaliation for (1) hiring an
attorney; and (2) taking FMLA leave.
Prior to trial, defendants moved for summary judgment, which the trial
court denied. After plaintiff's case was presented to the jury, defendants moved
for a directed verdict pursuant to Rule 4:40-1(a), which the trial court also
denied.
At trial, plaintiff testified that when she returned from FMLA leave,
defendant Winogracki, who had since become plaintiff's direct supervisor,
commandeered plaintiff's office in her absence. Plaintiff further testified that
although her job title and salary remained the same, her responsibilities were
significantly altered; where she originally had been organizing and supervising
various recreational events within the Township, her duties were reduced to
folding t-shirts, washing the Township car, and cleaning out office closets,
including defendant Winogracki's.5 Plaintiff noted further that on "[s]everal
occasions" defendant Winogracki had "make fun of [her] for being on FMLA,
5 We note these alterations in plaintiff's responsibilities were temporary, as her testimony at the time of trial revealed she is currently "supervis[ing] programs, supervis[ing] the staff, help[ing] run different events and organiz[ing] different events for the [T]ownship." The record shows plaintiff has remained employed by the Township in the same position and salary since the inception of this action. A-0138-23 7 that [she] need[s] to be on medications" and had told plaintiff "all [she] was
good at was taking FMLA leaves." Plaintiff maintained she had reported this
behavior to defendants, but no action was taken. Plaintiff testified at trial that
defendants were not aware of her mental-health disability until she took FMLA
leave on or around February 15, 2018.
The trial court did not charge the jury on five distinct claims: (1) hostile
work environment for religious discrimination; (2) retaliation for complaints of
religious discrimination; (3) hostile work environment based upon disability
discrimination; (4) retaliation for hiring counsel; and (5) retaliation for taking
FMLA leave. Instead, the trial court charged the jury generally with the
elements of hostile work environment for discrimination and retaliation.
After an eight-day trial, the jury found plaintiff had not proven by a
preponderance of the evidence that defendants had discriminated against her or
retaliated against her for religious reasons but found in favor of plaintiff on her
claims of a hostile work environment based on disability discrimination and
disability retaliation pursuant to the LAD. Plaintiff was awarded $500,001 for
emotional distress, $110,000 for economic loss, and $1,000,002 in punitive
damages. The jury verdict did not break out damages by each individual
defendant.
A-0138-23 8 Defendants moved for a new trial pursuant to Rule 4:49-1, citing various
issues with the jury verdict and trial proceedings. The court denied the motion,
finding "[t]he verdict was not against the weight of the evidence" as "[t]here was
testimony and evidence to support the verdict." In its decision, the trial court
relied on various instances in 2017 that plaintiff claimed showed she had been
discriminated against because of her religion and plaintiff's loss of the MAP
stipend on January 2, 2018. Defendants filed a notice of appeal and a motion to
stay the judgment. The trial court granted the stay pending appeal. Plaintiff did
not file a cross-appeal challenging the jury's finding of no cause for religious
discrimination or retaliation based on religious complaints pursuant to the LAD.
II.
A trial court "shall grant" a motion for a new trial "if, having given due
regard to the opportunity of the jury to pass upon the credibility of the witnesses,
it clearly and convincingly appears that there was a miscarriage of justice under
the law." R. 4:49-1(a). "The object is to correct clear error or mistake by the
jury," but without "the judge . . . substitut[ing] his judgment for that of the jury
merely because he would have reached the opposite conclusion." Dolson v.
Anastasia, 55 N.J. 2, 6 (1969); see also R. 4:49-1(a). We do not consider an
argument on appeal claiming the jury verdict was against the weight of the
A-0138-23 9 evidence unless the defendants moved for a new trial on that ground. R. 2:10-
1; Ogborne v. Mercer Cemetery Corp., 197 N.J. 448, 462 (2009).
"The standard of review on appeal from decisions on motions for a new
trial is the same as that governing the trial judge—whether there was a
miscarriage of justice under the law." Hayes v. Delamotte, 231 N.J. 373, 386
(2018) (quoting Risko v. Thompson Muller Auto. Grp., Inc., 206 N.J. 506, 522
(2011)); see also R. 2:10-1 ("The trial court's ruling on such a motion shall not
be reversed unless it clearly appears that there was a miscarriage of justice under
the law."). "[A] 'miscarriage of justice' can arise when there is a 'manifest lack
of inherently credible evidence to support the finding,' when there has been an
'obvious overlooking or under-valuation of crucial evidence,' or when the case
culminates in 'a clearly unjust result.'" Hayes, 231 N.J. at 386 (quoting Risko,
206 N.J. at 521). In our review of the trial court's decision on a motion for a
new trial, the trial court "is not entitled to any special deference where it['s
decision] rests upon a determination as to the worth, plausibility, consistency or
other tangible considerations apparent from the face of the record with respect
to which [the trial court] is no more peculiarly situated to decide than the
appellate court." Dolson, 55 N.J. at 7.
A-0138-23 10 We conclude the jury's verdict finding plaintiff established, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that she had suffered a hostile work environment
and retaliation based on her disability is against the weight of the evidence and
warrants a new trial for liability and damages because the trial court's analysis
was based on a "'manifest lack of inherently credible evidence to support the
finding[s]'" and "culminates in 'a clearly unjust result.'" Hayes, 231 N.J. at 386
(quoting Risko, 206 N.J. at 521). We therefore vacate the order of judgment,
reverse the order denying defendants' motion for a new trial to prevent a
"miscarriage of justice," and remand for a new trial with respect to defendants'
liability, if any, focused solely on plaintiff's disability discrimination claims and
claims of retaliation based upon hiring counsel. Ibid. (quoting Risko, 206 N.J.
at 521).
III.
"Discrimination based on an employee's disability, or perceived disability,
is illegal under the LAD." Guzman v. M. Teixeira Int'l, Inc., 476 N.J. Super.
64, 70 (App. Div. 2023). The LAD prohibits "any unlawful discrimination
against any person because such person is or has been at any time disabled or
any unlawful employment practice against such person, unless the nature and
extent of the disability reasonably precludes the performance of the parti cular
A-0138-23 11 employment." N.J.S.A. 10:5-4.1. N.J.A.C. 13:13-1.3 defines "[a] person with
a disability" as (1) "[a] person who is perceived as or believed to be a person
with a disability, whether or not that individual is actually a person with a
disability" as well as (2) "[a] person who has been a person with a disability at
any time." In a LAD discrimination claim, the plaintiff bears the burden of
establishing a prima facie case. Victor v. State, 203 N.J. 383, 408 (2010).
A. Plaintiff's Hostile Work Environment Claim.
To establish a hostile work environment claim pursuant to the LAD,
plaintiff must prove "(1) that [she] is in a protected class; (2) that [she] was
subjected to conduct that would not have occurred but for that protected status;
and (3) that it was severe or pervasive enough to alter the conditions of [her]
employment." Id. at 409.
Plaintiff testified she suffered from generalized anxiety disorder, post-
traumatic stress disorder, and depression. The record shows she consulted her
general practitioner for the first time on November 11, 2017, for these
symptoms, which was concurrent with the audit of the MAP program. Our
Supreme Court has recognized that "[v]arious mental illnesses and
psychological disorders are considered disabilities under the LAD." Players
Place II Condo. Ass'n, Inc. v. K.P., 256 N.J. 472, 487 (2024). We have also
A-0138-23 12 concluded psychiatric disorders such as depression and post-traumatic stress
disorder are disabilities pursuant to the LAD. See, e.g., Domurat v. Ciba
Specialty Chems. Corp., 353 N.J. Super. 74, 89 (App. Div. 2002) (recognizing
attention deficit disorder, depression, and "other psychiatric disorders" as
disabilities pursuant to the LAD); Tynan v. Vicinage 13 of the Super. Ct., 351
N.J. Super. 385, 399 (App. Div. 2002) (concluding post-traumatic stress
disorder, depression, and anxiety panic attacks are disabilities).
We conclude the jury's finding of the first prong of a hostile work
environment claim was not against the weight of the evidence. See Hayes, 231
N.J. at 386; D.G. ex rel. J.G. v. N. Plainfield Bd. of Educ., 400 N.J. Super. 1,
26-27 (App. Div. 2008).
Regarding the second prong, plaintiff testified defendant Winogracki
regularly insulted her for taking FMLA leave upon her return, including saying
"all [plaintiff] was good at was taking FMLA leaves," and would make negative
comments about her medication use. However, plaintiff testified at trial
defendants were not aware of her disability until she took FMLA leave on
February 15, 2018. Giving "due regard" to the jury's opportunity to deem
plaintiff's testimony credible by rendering a verdict in her favor, Dolson, 55 N.J.
at 6 (quoting R. 4:49-1(a)), there exists adequate credible evidence that
A-0138-23 13 Winogracki's comments may not have occurred "but for" plaintiff's protected
status as a mentally-disabled person, see Leonard v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 318
N.J. Super. 337, 344-45 (App. Div. 1999) (finding the "but for" prong of a
hostile work environment claim based on disability discrimination satisfied
because "[i]t [was] clear that [the defendant's] conduct was directed to [the]
plaintiff's disability" when "[h]is comments . . . directly referenced [the]
plaintiff's diabetes and [the defendant's] perception that [the] plaintiff w as
looking for special treatment because of that condition"). However, because
plaintiff did not demonstrate defendants knew she was suffering from a mental
disability until, at the earliest, the January 25, 2018 letter from her attorney, the
trial court could not consider any evidence before that date in deciding whether
the jury's verdict was against the weight of the evidence in its consideration of
defendants' motion for a new trial.
Additionally, although plaintiff offered evidence of defendant
Winogracki's conduct, which may not have occurred "but for" plaintiff's
"protected status" of her mental disability, plaintiff failed to offer any evidence
of such conduct for defendants Amato and Camera, who were both sued
individually, in addition to the Township. Victor, 203 N.J. at 409. The record
before the trial court and before us is devoid of any evidence that Amato
A-0138-23 14 discriminated against plaintiff because of her disability. At trial, Amato testified
he had never "made comments that can be considered derogatory to somebody
with a disability to plaintiff," never "receive[d] a complaint from plaintiff
regarding her allegation that she was being discriminated against on the basis of
a disability," and "never made comments to plaintiff regarding her . . .
disability." He also testified that although he had received "numerous
complaints from various [T]ownship employees including plaintiff," none of
"those complaints raise[d] the issue of disability discrimination." The evidence
reflects Amato was unaware of plaintiff's disability until she filed her complaint
alleging disability discrimination. Plaintiff conceded on cross-examination she
never "told Mayor Amato that [she] thought any action was taken against [her]
because of [her] disability."
Similarly, the record is devoid of evidence supporting the jury's verdict
that Camera was liable for violating the LAD by creating a hostile work
environment. Camera testified plaintiff "never" communicated to him "in any
way . . . that she felt she was being discriminated against on the basis of any
disability," and he was "never aware that there was a disability until either the
initial letter from the attorney or the lawsuit was filed." On cross-examination,
he clarified he was unsure if he first became aware of plaintiff's disability when
A-0138-23 15 her attorney sent the January 25, 2018 representation letter, after reviewing her
FMLA file, or when she filed her Law Division complaint as he could not
remember which of these events occurred first. He also testified none of the
religious discrimination complaints he received alleged disability
discrimination. Camera conceded on cross-examination he had received a
number of emails from plaintiff with the subject line "hostile work environment"
but maintained when he spoke with plaintiff about her "issues in the workplace"
each issue dealt with religious discrimination; she never "said anything to [him]
that made [him] believe [she was] being discriminated against" because of her
disability.
Because the jury's verdict finding defendants Amato and Camera
individually and personally liable for the hostile work environment based on
plaintiff's disability was against the weight of the evidence presented at trial, we
decline to address the third prong of her hostile work environment claim and
conclude a new trial is necessary to determine any of the defendants' liability.
See Hayes, 231 N.J. at 386; D.G., 400 N.J. Super. at 26-27.
Having "given due regard to the opportunity of the jury to pass upon the
credibility of the witnesses," we nevertheless conclude the jury's verdict
regarding liability "clearly" amounts to a "miscarriage of justice under the law"
A-0138-23 16 and warrants a new trial on the issue of hostile work environment for disability
discrimination. Dolson, 55 N.J. at 6-7 (quoting R. 4:49-1(a)).
B. Plaintiff's Retaliation Claim.
The LAD forbids "any person to take reprisals against any person because
that person has opposed any practices or acts forbidden under [the LAD] or
because that person has sought legal advice regarding rights under [the LAD]."
N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(d). The LAD provides a cause of action for individuals who
have suffered retaliation in violation of N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(d), and "the elements
of the cause of action are that the employee 'engaged in a protected activity
known to the [employer,]' the employee was 'subjected to an adverse
employment decision[,]' and there is a causal link between the protected activity
and the adverse employment action." Battaglia v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 214
N.J. 518, 547 (2013) (alterations in original) (quoting Woods-Pirozzi v. Nabisco
Foods, 290 N.J. Super. 252, 274 (App. Div. 1996)). In addition to these
requirements, the "plaintiff must also demonstrate that the [protected activity]
was both reasonable and made in good faith." Ibid.
We have held "there is no bright-line rule defining adverse employment
action in the context of a LAD claim." Richter v. Oakland Bd. of Educ., 459
N.J. Super. 400, 417 (App. Div. 2019), aff'd and modified on other grounds, 246
A-0138-23 17 N.J. 507 (2021). Relevant factors include "the employee's loss of status, a
clouding of job responsibilities, diminution in authority, disadvantageous
transfers or assignments, and toleration of harassment by other employees " as
well as "assignment to different or less desirable tasks." Mancini v. Township
of Teaneck, 349 N.J. Super. 527, 564 (App. Div. 2002), aff'd and modified on
other grounds, 179 N.J. 425 (2004); see also Richter, 459 N.J. Super. at 417
("[R]etaliatory conduct must affect adversely the terms, conditions, or privileges
of the plaintiff's employment or limit, segregate or classify the plaintiff in a way
which would tend to deprive her of employment opportunities or otherwise
affect her status as an employee." (quoting Marrero v. Camden Cnty. Bd. of Soc.
Servs., 164 F. Supp. 2d 455, 473 (D.N.J. 2001))).
In addressing "how harmful an act of retaliatory discrimination must be"
to satisfy the LAD's anti-retaliation provision, our Supreme Court adopted the
standard used by the United States Supreme Court for addressing Title VII
claims, holding "a plaintiff must show that a reasonable employee would have
found the challenged action materially adverse, which in this context means it
well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a
charge of discrimination." Roa v. Roa, 200 N.J. 555, 575 (2010) (quoting
Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 61, 68 (2006)) (internal
A-0138-23 18 quotation marks omitted). Moreover, in "[e]xamining whether a retaliatory
motive existed, jurors may infer a causal connection based on the surrounding
circumstances." Est. of Roach v. TRW, Inc., 164 N.J. 598, 612 (2000).
Plaintiff claims she was retaliated against because (1) she retained legal
counsel to represent her regarding the alleged religious discrimination and
hostile work environment and (2) she took FMLA leave. We determine the trial
court erred in denying defendants' motion for a new trial because the jury verdict
finding defendants Amato and Camera individually and personally liable for
retaliation was against the weight of the evidence and because the jury's verdict
is unclear as to whether it found defendant Winogracki retaliated against her for
hiring an attorney or taking FMLA leave. Hayes, 231 N.J. at 386; D.G., 400
N.J. Super. at 26-27.
Plaintiff's counsel sent a letter to defendants on January 25, 2018,
informing defendants of her having "sustained substantial psychological and
physical damages as a result of the religious discrimination and hostile work
environment she is subjected to." On February 15, 2018, shortly after this letter
was sent, plaintiff went on FMLA leave. Upon returning, plaintiff's job
responsibilities and duties were significantly altered, and she was relegated to
A-0138-23 19 folding t-shirts, cleaning the Township car, and cleaning office closets rather
than her previous responsibilities of organizing Township recreational events.
We conclude evidence in the record supported a finding plaintiff had
engaged in a protected activity known to defendants when she retained legal
counsel regarding alleged religious discrimination pursuant to the LAD.
N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(d). Although the jury did not return a verdict finding religious
discrimination, our Supreme Court does not require discrimination be proven to
have a cognizable LAD retaliation claim, only "that the original complaint was
both reasonable and made in good faith." See Battaglia, 214 N.J. at 547-50 ("We
would ill serve those important purposes [of the LAD] were we to demand t hat
one who voices complaints . . . and who suffers retaliation as a consequence,
also prove that there is a separate, identifiable victim of actual discrimination.") .
We do not, however, agree that taking FMLA leave is a protected activity
pursuant to the LAD. In addition to prohibiting retaliation against individuals
opposing practices forbidden by the LAD or retaining counsel regarding their
LAD rights, the LAD's anti-retaliation provision expressly forbids retaliation in
the form of "coerc[ing], indimidat[ing], threaten[ing] or interfere[ing] with any
person in the exercise or enjoyment of . . . any right granted or protected by [the
LAD]." N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(d). The right to leave guaranteed by the FMLA is not
A-0138-23 20 a right "granted or protected by [the LAD]." See ibid. Rather, the FMLA has
its own anti-retaliation provision, see 29 U.S.C. § 2614(a), and plaintiff did not
seek relief by pleading FMLA retaliation.
We further conclude it was possible for the jury to find plaintiff had
suffered an adverse employment decision by having her job duties significantly
reduced after defendants were made aware of her retaining legal counsel because
such reduction in responsibilities is an outcome that would have dissuaded "a
reasonable employee from making or supporting a charge of discrimination."
See Roa, 200 N.J. at 575 (quoting Burlington, 548 U.S. at 68) (internal quotation
marks omitted). We also conclude the jury was permitted to infer a causal
connection between plaintiff's retention of legal counsel and the reduction in her
responsibilities because of their close temporal proximity. See Roach, 164 N.J.
at 612.
However, we disagree with the trial court's finding that "[t]he verdict was
not against the weight of the evidence" as "[t]here was testimony and evidence
to support the verdict" because both the testimony and evidence fails to support
the jury's finding that Amato and Camera were individually and personally liable
for plaintiff's retaliation. The record is devoid of any evidence of Amato's
retaliation against plaintiff in violation of the LAD. Plaintiff's testimony
A-0138-23 21 referenced Amato when she claimed she was being retaliated against by having
her MAP stipend audited and then cancelled, but those actions predate any
defendants’ awareness of any evidence of plaintiff's disability. She testified: "I
felt like I was being retaliated against. And, you know, just all the antisemitic
remarks from Debbi[] Winogracki, Tim McFadden, [and] Mayor Amato." This
testimony relates solely to plaintiff's allegations of religious discrimination,
which the jury failed to find. Plaintiff's alleged protected activity, retaining an
attorney, occurred after defendants' audit and cancellation of plaintiff's MAP
stipend, not before, and cannot provide the basis for a finding of liability or
damages. The record evidence also does not support the jury's finding Camera
was liable for retaliation for the same reasons.
We conclude the trial court erred in holding the jury's verdict was not
against the weight of the evidence as the record lacks evidence supporting the
jury's finding Amato and Camera liable for retaliation, and because the jury
verdict is unclear as to whether it found Winogracki retaliated against plaintiff
because she hired counsel, a protected activity, or whether Winogracki retaliated
against plaintiff for taking FMLA leave, an activity not protected by the LAD .
We reverse the trial court's denial of the motion for a new trial and remand for
a new trial to determine defendants' liability, if any.
A-0138-23 22 C. Damages Award.
"[T]he evaluation of damages is a matter uniquely reposed in the jury's good
judgment and to justify judicial interference, the verdict must be wide of the
mark and pervaded by a sense of wrongness." Ogborne, 197 N.J. at 463 (quoting
Jastram ex rel. Jastram v. Kruse, 197 N.J. 216, 229 (2008)). We conclude the
damages awarded were against the weight of the evidence and met that high
standard justifying judicial interference. When faced with a motion for a new
trial, "[t]he object is to correct clear error or mistake by the jury ." Lockley v.
Turner, 344 N.J. Super. 1, 13 (App. Div. 2001) (quoting Baxter v. Fairmont Food
Co., 74 N.J. 588, 598 (1977)), aff'd in part and modified in part, 177 N.J. 413
(2003). "This approach 'applies with equal force to awards of emotional distress
damages in LAD cases.'" Ibid. (quoting Rendine v. Pantzer, 141 N.J. 292, 312
(1995)).
As a part of plaintiff's award, the jury found defendants owed plaintiff
$110,000 in economic loss. However, the record demonstrates plaintiff's MAP
stipend, which was the sole basis for plaintiff's alleged economic loss as she was
paid the same salary at all times prior to, and after, the actions that support the
LAD disability discrimination and retaliation verdicts, was not guaranteed and
required annual reapplication. More importantly, plaintiff did not dispute the
A-0138-23 23 MAP stipend for plaintiff and another employee was terminated on January 2,
2018, as a result of an internal audit. This was several weeks before defendants
were first made aware of plaintiff's retention of legal counsel on January 25,
2018, and over a month before defendants were made aware of plaintiff's mental-
health disability when she went on FMLA leave on or about February 15, 2018.
Accordingly, it was against the weight of the evidence to award plaintiff these
economic damages because they were based on losses she purportedly incurred
before defendants knew she was disabled and prior to any alleged wrongdoing
by defendants based on her disability. Accordingly, a new trial for damages was
warranted and the trial court erred in denying defendants’ motion for a new trial.
In addition, we conclude the trial court erred in its failure to review the
jury's punitive-damages award against the Township, a public entity, with the
necessary heightened review. A trial court is required to apply a heightened
standard when it reviews a punitive-damages award against public entities. See
Pritchett v. State, 248 N.J. 85, 110 (2021); Lockley v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 177
N.J. 413, 433 (2003) ("[T]he court's responsibility to review awards of punitive
damages for reasonableness is heightened when such damages are awarded
against a public entity."). After a jury's award of punitive damages "in the
ordinary case," the trial court "acts as a check on the jury's calculation of
A-0138-23 24 punitive damages"; however, "in the case of a governmental entity, when public
monies are the source of the award, the judge must scrutinize with great care the
amount of the award to determine whether it is proportionate to the harm
suffered by the plaintiff." Lockley, 177 N.J. at 433. Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:15-
5.14(a), a trial court must undergo this review to "ascertain that the award is
reasonable in its amount and justified in the circumstances of the case" before it
"enter[s] judgment for an award of punitive damages."
Here, the trial court did not apply the heightened standard or review the
punitive-damages award on the record after the jury awarded plaintiff
$1,000,002 in punitive damages. Nor did the trial court review the punitive-
damages award in the May 26, 2023 order which entered the punitive-damages
award against the Township. Addressing the punitive-damages award, the order
stated only "judgment be and is hereby entered in favor of [p]laintiff, Debra
Reuter, against [d]efendant, Berkeley Township, for punitive damages in the
amount of $1,000,002." No further analysis, review, or explanation was
provided. In its consideration of the punitive-damages award entered against
the Township, the trial court failed to recognize "that public funds were at stake"
and failed to act with the "special responsibility" imposed by our Supreme Court
"to review for reasonableness an award of publicly funded monies for punitive
A-0138-23 25 purposes." Pritchett, 248 N.J. at 110; see also Lockley, 177 N.J. at 432-33;
Green v. Jersey City Bd. of Educ., 177 N.J. 434, 444 (2003) ("We trust that our
courts will be vigilant in their review of [punitive-damages] awards [against
public entities] . . . .").
The trial court also erred in its analysis of the validity of the jury's
emotional and punitive-damages awards in its consideration of the motion for a
new trial. The trial court's opinion incorrectly conflates plaintiff's religious-
discrimination claims with disability-discrimination claims: "while the [j]ury
may not have found in favor of religious discrimination, that does not mean that
comments/issues related to religious discrimination are irrelevant insofar as they
relate to causation of [p]laintiff's psychiatric (and therefore disability) issues."
The court then went on to discuss various incidents in 2017, all pre-dating
defendants' knowledge of plaintiff's mental-health condition or the attorney
letter that provided the basis for her retaliation claim, to support the emotional-
distress and punitive-damages awards. Plaintiff cannot be awarded for losses
based on religious discrimination, a claim she did not prevail upon, and it was
improper for the trial court to rely upon such allegations "insofar as they relate
to the causation of [p]laintiff's psychiatric . . . issues" as such error is "clearly
A-0138-23 26 capable of producing an unjust result" in plaintiff's awarded damages. R. 2:10-
2.
We vacate the order of judgment awarding plaintiff damages, reverse the
order denying defendants' motion for a new trial, and remand for a new trial to
consider the economic, emotional, and punitive damages, if any, exclusively
within the context of plaintiff's claims of hostile work environment based on
disability discrimination and retaliation for hiring an attorney, a protected act
pursuant to the LAD. If the jury awards punitive damages against the Township
after the new trial, we instruct the trial court to review the punitive-damages
award pursuant to the necessary heightened standard. Pritchett, 248 N.J. at 111
("[W]e instruct the trial court on remand, and all trial courts reviewing a punitive
damages award issued by a jury against a public entity defendant, to review the
award under the heightened scrutiny required in Lockley and explicated in
Green.").
To the extent we have not addressed any of defendants' remaining
arguments, we are satisfied they lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion. R.
2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
In sum, the order denying a motion for a new trial is reversed and the order
of judgment setting forth the liability and damages awards are vacated except
A-0138-23 27 with respect to the jury's findings regarding plaintiff's failure to prove religious
discrimination against any defendant, failure to prove retaliation based on
complaints of religious discrimination against any defendant, and any liability
against defendant McFadden. The matter is remanded for proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
Reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. We do not retain
jurisdiction.
A-0138-23 28