Debra Neil Blount v. Edward Victor Blount

• Court: Court of Appeals of Georgia
• Decided: October 10, 2024
• Docket: A24A0779
• Status: Published

Opinion

SECOND DIVISION MILLER, P. J., MARKLE and LAND, JJ.

NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be physically received in our clerk’s office within ten days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed. https://www.gaappeals.us/rules

October 10, 2024

In the Court of Appeals of Georgia A24A0779. BLOUNT v. BLOUNT.

LAND, Judge.

In this divorce action, we granted Debra Neil Blount (“Wife”)’s application for

discretionary review of the trial court’s final divorce decree from her husband Edward

Victor Blount (“Husband”). Wife argues that the trial court erred by ordering her to

pay a lump sum to Husband, by not requiring Husband to refinance the marital home

in his name, by granting Husband’s motion to compel, and by ordering her to pay

attorney fees to Husband under OCGA § 9-11-37 . For the following reasons, we

affirm in part, but we reverse portions of the trial court’s order granting Husband’s

motion to compel and vacate the award of attorney fees to Husband. We therefore

remand to the trial court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. The record shows that Husband and Wife were married in December 2007,

separated in August 2021, and had no minor children. When the parties married, Wife

was working part-time and had recently purchased a home in Texas that she had

financed on her own. Husband was about to retire from AT&T and had accumulated

several hundred thousand dollars in retirement assets, a home, and rental properties.

They purchased a marital home in 2010, utilizing Husband’s retirement assets to

purchase and renovate the home, and titled the home in both of their names. Wife

then took out a mortgage against the property to pay the tax liability associated with

cashing out Husband’s retirement accounts.

In 2014, the parties started a business called Consumer Focus Insurance

(“CFI”). Wife also operated a second business, Mr Favorite Boy Matthew, LLC

(“MFBM”), during the course of the marriage. At the time of the parties’ divorce,

Husband was 68 years old and receiving social security benefits, and Wife was 55 years

old and operating both businesses.

After a bench trial, the trial court determined that the marital home and

businesses were marital assets subject to equitable division, as were the parties’ cash

accounts, retirement accounts, life insurance, debts, and personal property.

2 At issue in this appeal are the trial court’s division of the marital residence, the

two businesses, and a lump sum awarded to Husband. The final divorce decree held,

in pertinent part, that the marital residence had a fair market value of somewhere

between $540,000 to $725,000. The trial court found that there were two debts on the

marital residence: a home equity line of credit with a balance of $12,000, and a

mortgage with a balance of $92,000. The trial court awarded the marital residence to

Husband and held that Husband shall “timely pay the mortgage owed to Ally Bank (in

[Wife’s] individual name) with an approximate balance of $92,000.” The trial court’s

order did not require Husband to refinance the mortgage in his name, instead ordering

that Husband pay the mortgage pursuant to its terms and hold Wife harmless and

indemnify her from any failure to do so. The trial court also ordered that Wife should

“not take any action to alter the mortgage terms, interest rate, and/or the balance

owed to Ally Bank,” and required Wife to grant Husband access to her online account

with the mortgage servicer. The trial court also ordered Wife to pay the balance of the

HELOC account. The final divorce decree awarded the couple’s two businesses, CFI

and MFBM, and their assets to Wife and ordered Wife to pay a lump sum of $125,000

to Husband.

3 Under Georgia law, where a bench trial is held, whether a particular item of

property constitutes a marital asset may be a question for the trial court to determine

from the evidence as the trier of fact. Dasher v. Dasher, 283 Ga.436, 436-437 (1) (658

SE2d 571) (2008). In an equitable division of marital property, each spouse is entitled

to “an allocation of the marital property based upon his or her respective equitable

interest therein[.]” Wood v. Wood, 283 Ga. 8, 10 (3) (655 SE2d 611) (2008). See also

Mallard v. Maller, 297 Ga. 274 (773 SE2d 274) (2015) (“an equitable division of

property does not necessarily mean an equal division, but rather a fair one”). The trial

court enjoys broad discretion in making such a ruling. Id. Finally,

in the appellate review of a bench trial, we will not set aside the trial court’s factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous, and this Court properly gives due deference to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses. But when a question of law is at issue, we review the trial court’s decision de novo.

(Citation and footnote omitted.) Spruell v. Spruell, 356 Ga. App. 722, 724 (848 SE2d

896) (2020). Keeping these principles in mind, we turn to Wife’s enumerations of

error.

4 1. Wife argues that the trial court failed to divide the marital estate equitably

because it did not make an explicit finding of fact as to the valuation of the CFI

business that it awarded solely to her but instead only made a finding as to the “excess

cash” found in the business. Wife’s argument is unavailing because there is no

requirement for the trial court to have made such a finding, and we see no error in the

trial court’s award of the business. In a divorce case, although

each spouse is entitled to an allocation of marital property based upon his or her equitable interest therein, an award is not erroneous simply because one party receives a seemingly greater share of the marital property. [And,] [t]he trial court’s division of marital property will be upheld so long as it falls within the court’s broad discretion.

(Citations omitted.) Driver v. Driver, 292 Ga. App. 800, 801-802 (2) (741 SE2d 631)

(2013). Here, we see no “error in the trial court’s failure to make a precise finding of

the total value of the [CFI business] before determining an equitable division” of the

business and its excess cash. Id. at 801 (2). Our “review of the record reveals the

matters about which Wife complains were the subject of conflicting evidence,” and

“[b]ecause the record does not show that the trial court’s conclusions reflected in its

5 distribution of marital property were clearly erroneous, we will not disturb them.”

(Citation omitted.) Frazier v. Frazier, 280 GA. 687, 690 (4) (631 SE2d 666) (2006).

2. Wife argues that the trial court erred when it ordered her to pay Husband a

$125,000 lump sum. We find no error.

In the divorce decree—under the subheading titled “Equitable Division: Lump

Sum Payment”—the trial court ordered Wife to pay a “lump sum” of $125,000 to

Husband before June 21, 2023. The order does not specify which of Wife’s accounts

these funds are to be awarded from and, despite Wife’s contentions to the contrary,

does not require that this payment come from the proceeds of CFI’s Small Business

Administration (“SBA”) loan. Although the trial court commented at the hearing on

the excess cash in the CFI account, the written divorce decree makes no mention of

those funds when awarding the lump sum to husband.1 Further, we cannot view the

trial court’s comment in isolation, ignoring the division of the remaining assets. Here,

the trial court’s written ruling painstakingly divides the parties’ assets and orders a

1 See Mondy v. Magnolia Advanced Materials, Inc., 303 Ga. 764, 772 (4) (b) (815 SE2d 70) (2018) (“[U]ntil an oral pronouncement is memorialized, the trial judge has broad discretion to amend, alter, or completely change his decision, and any discrepancy between the oral pronouncement and the written ruling will be resolved in favor of the written ruling”). 6 lump sum payment to Husband as part of this division. That ruling makes no reference

as to where Wife was to obtain the funds to pay the lump sum, and there is certainly

no mention of any obligation to obtain those funds from the proceeds of a prior SBA

loan. The trial court’s lump sum award was within its broad discretion as the trier of

fact, and we find no abuse of that discretion in this case. See Zekser v. Zekser, 293 Ga.

366, 368 (1) (744 SE2d 698) (2013).

3. Wife argues that the trial court erred in awarding the marital residence to

Husband without requiring him to refinance the mortgage under his own name. Wife

maintains that this creates an impermissible indefinite obligation that harms her credit.

We find no abuse of discretion.

Although a trial court can order that certain events happen after the finalization

of a divorce decree as part of its order, it may not indefinitely extend a party’s

obligation relating to the equitable division of property. See Arthur v. Arthur, 293 Ga.

63 (743 SE2d 420) (2013).2 In Arthur, supra, for example, the wife was awarded the

marital home and was ordered to pay the husband $20,000 as his share of the marital

2 See also Dupree v. Dupree, 287 Ga. 319, 322 (4) (695 SE2d 628) (2010) (“A divorce decree must finalize the process by which marital property will be equitably divided, but that process need not and often cannot feasibly be completed until after the decree is entered”). 7 assets but only upon refinancing or selling the home, and the decree provided no

specific time within which she was required to sell or refinance. Arthur v. Arthur, 293

Ga. 63, 63 (743 SE2d 420) (2013). Our Supreme Court held that the absence of a

timeframe for the payment rendered the obligation indefinite and that “[a]n obligation

of a party relating to the equitable division of property may not be extended for an

indefinite period of time.” Id. at 67 (2)(b). It accordingly reversed that portion of the

judgment “provid[ing] an indefinite period of time for the Wife to pay Husband

$20,000.” Id.

Here, the trial court awarded the marital residence to Husband but did not

require him to refinance the mortgage under his own name despite the mortgage

maturity date in 2042 (nineteen years after the final decree). Whether or not extending

this obligation for nineteen years was the best idea under all of the circumstances is

not the question before us. The sole question before us is not whether we would have

reached the same decision as the trial judge had we been sitting in his seat but rather

whether the trial judge abused his discretion by imposing an allegedly indefinite

obligation with respect to the mortgage. We find no indefinite obligation here and no

abuse of discretion. Unlike the situation in Arthur, supra, keeping this mortgage in

8 Wife’s name and requiring Husband to pay it pursuant to its terms does not impose

an indefinite obligation on either Husband or Wife but instead imposes an obligation

that carries with it a clear directive with a finite (albeit lengthy) duration. It was for the

trial court, as the factfinder, to make this decision based on all of the circumstances

presented to it, and we find no abuse of discretion. See e.g., Mathis, 281 Ga. 865, 866

(642 SE2d 832) (2007).

4. Wife argues that the trial court erred when it granted Husband’s motion to

compel her to produce a variety of documents and ordering her to pay Husband

$9,000 in attorney fees pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-37. “[A] trial court has broad

discretion to control discovery, including the imposition of sanctions, and this Court

will not reverse a trial court’s decision on discovery matters absent a clear abuse of

discretion.”(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Anglin v. Smith, 346 Ga. App. 456,

462 (2) (816 SE2d 426) (2018).

Wife correctly argues that the trial court’s order erroneously required her to

produce discovery that had not been requested by Husband’s original discovery

requests and other discovery that was not sought in his motion to compel. While the

trial court has broad discretion to control discovery, this discretion does not extend

9 to ordering the production of documents that have not been properly requested. In

this regard, the trial court’s order required Wife to produce documents not sought in

Husband’s original discovery requests, including documents showing use of funds for

debts secured by 1816 Gateway Drive, all documents regarding non-recurring or

extraordinary expenses found in financial statements, certain accounts receivable, and

exhibits to agreements for the books of business purchases dated 2016, 2018 and 2019.

Further, the trial court’s order granting the motion to compel obligates Wife to

produce discovery that Husband did not identify in his motion to compel, including

bank statements from certain Chase bank accounts, documents regarding a second

mortgage on the marital residence, documents regarding money owed to Wife related

to purchase of her nephew’s car, and a complete copy of Wife’s expert’s file and all

information relied upon by the expert in conducting his valuation. Accordingly, we

reverse the trial court’s order granting the motion to compel to the extent that it

compels Wife to produce documents that were not previously sought by Husband’s

motion to compel and to the extent it compels Wife to produce documents that were

not requested by Husband’s discovery requests. See City of Griffin v. Jackson, 239 Ga.

App. 374, 378 (1) (520 SE2d 510) (1999).

10 In light of this finding, we vacate the trial court’s award of attorney fees

pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-37 and remand the case to the trial court for further

consideration of the amount to be awarded, if any. See Citibank (New York State) N.

A. v. Hill, 161 Ga. App. 186, 188 (1) (288 SE2d 258) (1982) (award of attorney fees for

parties’ failure to answer interrogatories was an abuse of discretion when evidence

produced at the hearing showed that those interrogatories had already been answered

except for those that required additional research).

Judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part, vacated in part and case remanded.

Miller, P. J., and Markle, J., concur.