Debra Miller and Ed Geaslin v. Pnk, D/B/A L'Auberge Du Lac Casino and Hotel

CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedOctober 5, 2011
DocketCA-0011-0216
StatusUnknown

This text of Debra Miller and Ed Geaslin v. Pnk, D/B/A L'Auberge Du Lac Casino and Hotel (Debra Miller and Ed Geaslin v. Pnk, D/B/A L'Auberge Du Lac Casino and Hotel) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Debra Miller and Ed Geaslin v. Pnk, D/B/A L'Auberge Du Lac Casino and Hotel, (La. Ct. App. 2011).

Opinion

STATE OF LOUISIANA COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

11-216

DEBRA MILLER AND ED GEASLIN

VERSUS

PNK, D/B/A L'AUBERGE DU LAC CASINO AND HOTEL

**********

APPEAL FROM THE FOURTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT PARISH OF CALCASIEU, NO. 2007-5591 HONORABLE G. MICHAEL CANADAY, DISTRICT JUDGE

SHANNON J. GREMILLION JUDGE

Court composed of Elizabeth A. Pickett, Billy Howard Ezell, and Shannon J. Gremillion, Judges.

AFFIRMED.

David John Calogero Philip Andre Fontenot Lindsay Deblois Davidson, Meaux, Sonnier, McElligot, Fontenot, Gideon & Edwards, L.L.P. P. O. Drawer 2908 Lafayette, LA 70502 (337) 237-1660 Counsel for Defendant/Appellee: PNK (Lake Charles), LLC d/b/a L'Auberge Du Lac Casino and Hotel James B. Doyle, Sr. Heath J. Dorsey Law Offices of James Doyle, APLC One Lakeshore Dr., Suite 1805 Lake Charles, LA 70629 (337) 433-5999 Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant: Ed Geaslin GREMILLION, Judge.

The plaintiff, Ed Geaslin, appeals the jury‟s verdict in favor of the

defendant, PNK, d/b/a L‟Auberge Du Lac Hotel and Casino. For the following

reasons, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In March 2007, Geaslin and his companion at the time (who later became his

wife), Debra Miller, were gambling at a poker table at L‟Auberge. A L‟Auberge

employee approached Miller, pulled her aside, and informed her that she needed to

discontinue drinking alcoholic beverages for a period of eight hours. She was

further instructed to gather her chips so that she could redeem them and, thereafter,

leave the casino. After cashing out, Miller and Geaslin began arguing with

L‟Auberge personnel. Geaslin claims that when he attempted to intervene between

a security guard who was trying to remove Miller‟s cell phone, he was attacked

and “tackled . . . to the floor with brute force.” Geaslin claimed in his petition that

the security guards “began placing their knees in the back of his leg and punching

him in the face. A security guard was jumping up and down with his knee on the

back of [his] leg.” Geaslin filed suit against L‟Auberge in September 2007 for

personal injuries.

Following a four-day trial, the jury rendered a verdict finding that L‟Auberge

was not at fault in any of the causes of action alleged by Geaslin. Geaslin filed a

motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict (JNOV), which was denied by

the trial court. Geaslin now appeals and assigns as error:

1. The jury legally erred by ignoring the instruction of law by the trial court and ruling in favor of the Defendants and against Plaintiff and,

2. The trial court erred by refusing to grant his motion for JNOV. DISCUSSION

A court of appeal may not set aside a jury's finding of fact in the absence of

manifest error or unless it is clearly wrong. Rosell v. Esco, 549 So.2d 840

(La.1989).

The appellate review of fact is not completed by reading only so much of the record as will reveal a reasonable factual basis for the finding in the trial court, but if the trial court or jury findings are reasonable in light of the record reviewed in its entirety, the court of appeal may not reverse even though convinced that had it been sitting as the trier of fact, it would have weighed the evidence differently.

Id. at 844.

Though an appellate court may feel its own evaluations and inferences are

more reasonable than the factfinder‟s, reasonable inferences of fact should not be

disturbed upon review where conflict exists in the testimony. Id. “[W]here two

permissible views of the evidence exist, the factfinder‟s choice between them

cannot be manifestly erroneous or clearly wrong.” Stobart v. State Through

DOTD, 617 So.2d 880, 883 (La.1993). “[T]he issue to be resolved by a reviewing

court is not whether the trier of fact was right or wrong, but whether the

factfinder‟s conclusion was a reasonable one.” Id. At 882.

Geaslin reviews the manifest error standard in this assignment of error but

argues that the “legal error of the jury was in failing to follow the clear

instructions of the court.” Therefore, he argues, we should discard the manifest

error standard and conduct a de novo review. Geaslin never states which

instructions the jury failed to follow or provides any other argument in this regard

other than the quoted claim above. This argument lacks merit and we, therefore,

limit ourselves to a manifest error review of the jury‟s finding.

The jury was called upon to decide if L‟Auberge exercised reasonable care

in removing Geaslin from the casino and if the force used was excessive. In

2 Saucier v. Players Lake Charles, LLC, 99-1196, p.7-8 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/22/99),

751 So.3d 312, 317, we stated:

A determination of excessive or unnecessary force is a finding of fact which may not be disturbed unless: (1) the record evidence does furnish a sufficient basis for the finding; or (2) that finding is clearly wrong. See Arceneaux v. Domingue, 365 So.2d 1330 (La.1978). . . .

In Kyle v. City of New Orleans, 353 So.2d 969 (La.1977), the supreme court sets forth several factors to consider in making a determination of whether the force used was reasonable under the circumstances. The factors include: (1) the known character of the arrestee; (2) the risks and dangers faced by the officer; (3) the nature of the offense or behavior involved; (4) the chance of escape if the particular means are not employed; (5) the existence of alternative methods of arrest or subduing the arrestee; (6) the physical size, strength and weaponry of the officers as compared to that of the arrestee; and (7) the exigencies of the moment. See Picou v. Terrebonne Parish Sheriff’s Office, 343 So.2d 306 (La.App. 1 Cir.), writ denied, 345 So.2d 506 (La.1977).

Having reviewed the evidence, we find that reasonable people could

conclude that L‟Auberge exercised reasonable care and did not use excessive force

in removing Geaslin from the casino. The following testimony was elicited at trial.

Debra Miller testified that she was fifty-four years old at the time of the

incident. She testified that she had been to the L‟Auberge many time before. She

said that she and Geaslin gambled at L‟Auberge starting the night before the

incident. She admitted that she and Geaslin brought two large insulated “Big

Gulp” beverage containers with them to gamble the night before the incident. She

said that no one asked them to remove them until the night of the incident. Miller

testified that she was not drunk, but had had three, four, or five alcoholic drinks.

However, on cross-examination she recalled stating that she had at least five

alcoholic beverages that night.

Miller reviewed the videotape, noting that a lady approached her while she

was seated at a table in the casino playing “three card poker” and asked if she

3 could speak to her. Miller said that the lady informed her that she could not drink

any more alcohol for eight hours. Miller said that she was informed that she was

unable to gamble if she was not drinking so she had to leave. Miller said she told

Geaslin that she needed to leave, collected her chips that remained on the table,

and proceeded to the “cashier‟s cage” to cash in her chips. Miller was

accompanied by Geaslin. Miller stated that she was confused as to why she was

being asked to leave and requested to see a manager to clarify to her satisfaction

why she was being asked to leave. Miller then said that she requested a

wheelchair because her back was hurting.

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Related

Stobart v. State Through DOTD
617 So. 2d 880 (Supreme Court of Louisiana, 1993)
McBride v. H. BROWN MACH. SHOP
732 So. 2d 650 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 1999)
Webb v. Goodley
512 So. 2d 527 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 1987)
Kyle v. City of New Orleans
353 So. 2d 969 (Supreme Court of Louisiana, 1977)
Peterson v. Gibraltar Sav. and Loan
733 So. 2d 1198 (Supreme Court of Louisiana, 1999)
Anderson v. New Orleans Public Service, Inc.
583 So. 2d 829 (Supreme Court of Louisiana, 1991)
Arceneaux v. Domingue
365 So. 2d 1330 (Supreme Court of Louisiana, 1978)
Love v. Lewis
771 So. 2d 220 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 2000)
Picou v. Terrebonne Parish Sheriff's Office
343 So. 2d 306 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 1977)
Rosell v. Esco
549 So. 2d 840 (Supreme Court of Louisiana, 1989)
Joseph v. Broussard Rice Mill, Inc.
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Lastrapes v. Progressive Security Insurance Co.
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Debra Miller and Ed Geaslin v. Pnk, D/B/A L'Auberge Du Lac Casino and Hotel, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/debra-miller-and-ed-geaslin-v-pnk-dba-lauberge-du-lac-casino-and-hotel-lactapp-2011.