Debra Foster v. Social Security Administration

CourtMerit Systems Protection Board
DecidedJanuary 17, 2023
DocketCH-1221-16-0563-W-1
StatusUnpublished

This text of Debra Foster v. Social Security Administration (Debra Foster v. Social Security Administration) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Merit Systems Protection Board primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Debra Foster v. Social Security Administration, (Miss. 2023).

Opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

DEBRA A. FOSTER, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, CH-1221-16-0563-W-1

v.

SOCIAL SECURITY DATE: January 17, 2023 ADMINISTRATION, Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Debra A. Foster, Chicago, Illinois, pro se.

Amy Baines, Esquire, and James Hail, Esquire, Chicago, Illinois, for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman Raymond A. Limon, Member Tristan L. Leavitt, Member

FINAL ORDER

¶1 The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which dismissed for lack of jurisdiction her individual right of action (IRA) appeal. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the following

1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c). 2

circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review and AFFIRM the initial decision, which is now the Board’s final decision. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113(b). ¶2 The agency took a performance-based removal action against the appellant, a GS-0105-11 Social Insurance Specialist Claims Authorizer, effectiv e January 8, 2016. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 1 at 14. It appears that the Office of Personnel Management approved her application for disability retirement at some point after her removal. IAF, Tab 13 at 79. The appellant filed a complaint with the Office of Special Counsel (OSC) and, after receiving a closure letter, filed an IRA appeal in which she alleged that the agency took a number of personnel actions against her in reprisal for her alleged protected disclosures. IAF, Tab 1 at 10-12, Tab 9 at 11-26. ¶3 The administrative judge issued proper notice affording the appellant accurate and complete notice of her burden of establishing jurisdiction over her IRA appeal. IAF, Tab 3. After considering the parties’ responses, the administrative judge issued an initial decision that dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction upon finding that the appellant failed to make a nonfrivolous allegation that any of her disclosures were protected. The appellant petitions for review of the initial decision. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tabs 1, 5. The 3

agency responds in opposition to the petition for review, and the appellant replies to the agency’s response. PFR File, Tabs 6-7. ¶4 The Board has jurisdiction over an IRA appeal if the appellant exhausts her administrative remedies before OSC and makes nonfrivolous allegations that (1) she made a disclosure that was protected under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or engaged in protected activity described in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D), and (2) the disclosure or protected activity was a contributing factor in the agency’s decision to take or fail to take a personnel action as defined by 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(A). Linder v. Department of Justice, 122 M.S.P.R. 14, ¶ 6 (2014). Here, the appellant did not clearly explain which issues she raised to OSC. She submitted a partial copy of her original OSC complaint on Form 11 (“Complaint of Possible Prohibited Personnel Practice or Other Prohibited Activity”) and copies of correspondence from OSC concerning her complaint. IAF, Tab 1 at 7-13, Tab 9 at 11-26. The initial decision accurately characterizes those disclosures (described in more detail below) that the appellant exhausted before OSC. IAF, Tab 16, Initial Decision (ID) at 4-5. The appellant appears to contend on review that the administrative judge incorrectly excluded other disclosures and incorrectly refused to consider disclosures raised only in the appellant’s OSC Form 12 (“Disclosure of Information”). PFR File, Tab 1 at 6, 8. However, the appellant has identified nothing in the record below to show she raised any disclosures to OSC that the administrative judge neglected to consider. Moreover, the Board has found that making disclosures to OSC’s D isclosure Unit via Form 12 does not satisfy the exhaustion requirement under 5 U.S.C. § 1214(a)(3). Mason v. Department of Homeland Security, 116 M.S.P.R. 135, ¶ 16 (2011) (finding that, unlike OSC’s Complaints Examining Unit, which investigates complaints filed on OSC Form 11, the Disclosure Unit does not review allegations of prohibited personnel practices). ¶5 Having satisfied the exhaustion requirement as to some of her alleged protected disclosures, the next step in the appellant’s jurisdictional burden is to 4

make a nonfrivolous allegation that she made a disclosure that was protected under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or engaged in protected activity described in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D). Prior to the enactment of the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2012 (WPEA), 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9) made it a prohibited personnel practice to retaliate against an employee or applicant for employment because of the exercise of any appeal, complaint, or grievance right granted by any law, rule, or regulation. Reprisal in violation of 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9) was seen as reprisal based on exercising a right to complain. Linder, 122 M.S.P.R. 14, ¶ 7. After the enactment of the WPEA, the Board has jurisdiction to hear appeals of violations of 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), i.e., allegations of reprisal for exercising a right to complain, when the substance of that complaint seeks redress for a violation of 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8). Mudd v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 120 M.S.P.R. 365, ¶ 7 (2013).

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Debra Foster v. Social Security Administration, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/debra-foster-v-social-security-administration-mspb-2023.