Debra Coules v. Schedule A Defendants

District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania·Decided August 27, 2026·No. 2:26-cv-00049·Unknown

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

DEBRA COULES,

Plaintiff, Civil Action No. 26-cv-49

v. Chief Judge Bissoon

SCHEDULE A DEFENDANTS.

PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION ORDER WHEREAS, Plaintiff filed an Ex Parte Application for the following: 1) a temporary restraining order; 2) an order restraining assets and Merchant Storefronts (as defined infra); 3) an order to show cause why a preliminary injunction should not issue; and 4) an order authorizing expedited discovery against the Defendants identified on Schedule “A” to the Complaint and attached hereto (collectively, the “Defendants”). The Court has considered the Application, the evidence in the record, and the applicable law. WHEREAS, Plaintiff filed an Ex Parte Motion for An Order Authorizing Alternative Service on Defendants Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(f)(3); WHEREAS, on July 29, 2026, the Court entered the following Orders: (A) (1) a temporary restraining order; (2) an order restraining assets and Merchant Storefronts, (3) an order to show cause why a preliminary injunction should not issue; and (4) an order authorizing expedited discovery against all of the Defendants identified on the attached Schedule “A”, and the Third-Party Service Providers and Financial Institutions, in light of Defendants’ intentional and willful offerings for sale and/or sales of Infringing Products (“Application”); and (B) Order Authorizing Alternative Service on Defendants Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(f)(3) (“the Alternative Service Order”);

WHEREAS, pursuant to the terms of the Alternative Service Order, all the Defendants have been served with notice of this Show Cause Hearing; and WHEREAS, on August 26, 2026, Plaintiff, appeared for the Order to Show Cause Hearing. None of the Defendants filed responses or contested the preliminary injunction order. Further, none of the Third-Party Service Provider(s) or Financial Institution(s) appeared.

FACTUAL FINDINGS & CONCLUSION OF LAW 1. Plaintiff’s Works1 have unique designs that are inherently distinct features, including, color, size, and shape selections, that all function as a source identifier for the Plaintiff’s works. The combined distinct features of the Plaintiff’s Works all support the copyright registrations issued by the U.S. Copyright Office. Photos of Plaintiff’s copyrighted works along with copyright registration numbers are in Exhibit 1 to the Complaint.

2. The combined unique features—ornamental and decorative—of Plaintiff’s Works comprise Plaintiff’s valuable intellectual property (“IP”) and all have become distinct in consumer’s minds such that consumers associate this IP with Plaintiff’s art. 3. Defendants, by operating on internet-based e-commerce stores and fully interactive, commercial internet websites operating under Defendants’ respective seller identities set forth on Schedule “A” hereto (the “Seller IDs”), have advertised, promoted, sold, and offered for sale goods featuring, displaying, and/or using the constituent elements of Plaintiff’s original

1 Plaintiff has obtained the following copyright registrations on her original artwork used to market and advertise her art and products: VA 2-431-409 ("La Vie En Rose"), VA 2-431-760 ("My Angel"), and VA 2-431-513 ("Life Is Beautiful"; Live, Love, Laugh); (collectively the “Plaintiff’s Works”). copyrighted works. Defendants’ infringing works are virtually indistinguishable from Plaintiff’s original works.2

4. Plaintiff is likely to prevail on her copyright claims at trial. Specifically, Plaintiff has presented evidence clearly demonstrating that Defendants are using, without authorization, Plaintiff’s copyrighted images while promoting, selling, offering for sale and distributing knock-offs of Plaintiff’s products in a willful attempt to pass off their knock-off products as genuine versions of Plaintiff’s products within this district and throughout the United States by operating e-commerce stores on at least one of the Internet marketplace websites Amazon.com, Temu, and Walmart.com under their store names and seller names identified on Schedule “A” of the Complaint (the “Seller IDs”). 5. Plaintiff has a strong probability of proving at trial that consumers are likely to be confused by Defendants’ advertisement, promotion, sale, offer for sale, or distribution of

products with unauthorized and unlicensed uses of the constituent elements of Plaintiff’s copyrighted works. 6. Plaintiff and consumers are likely to suffer immediate and irreparable losses, damages, and injuries. Defendants’ sale of the infringing products deprives Plaintiff of visibility online, raising costs of marketing her copyrighted works as well as costs to educate consumers about the original works. The market prices of Plaintiff’s original copyrighted works are being diluted due to the low selling price of Defendants’ infringing works, vastly reducing Plaintiff’s

profits and endangering the sustainability of her business. Defendants are additionally causing a steep degradation of the goodwill that Plaintiff has built up over years with customers.

2 See Complaint ¶ 1 for side-by-side comparison of Plaintiff’s original copyrighted works and Defendants’ infringing works. Defendants are also depriving Plaintiff of the ability to control the creative content and quality of her works as well as the ability to license the valuable copyrights.

7. There is good cause to believe that the unauthorized and unlicensed use of Plaintiff’s works will continue in the marketplace; that consumers are likely to be misled, confused, and disappointed by the quality of the products advertised and sold by the Defendants; and that Plaintiff may suffer loss of sales for her genuine works and an unnatural erosion of the legitimate marketplace in which she operates. 8. The potential harm to Defendants of being prevented from continuing to profit from their illegal and infringing activities if a preliminary injunction is issued is far outweighed by the potential harm to Plaintiff, her reputation, and her goodwill as an artist, if such relief is not

issued. Courts have repeatedly held that an infringing party acts at its own peril and issuing a preliminary injunction is simply requiring the infringing party to cease doing what it had no right to do initially.3 9. The public interest favors issuance of the preliminary injunction in order to protect Plaintiff’s interests and protect the public from being injured, deceived, and defrauded by the passing off of Defendants substandard infringing goods as Plaintiff’s genuine art and prints.

10. Under Pennsylvania law and Rule 64 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, this Court may issue a prejudgment asset restraint where Plaintiff’s complaint asserts a claim for money damages. This Court also has the inherent authority to issue a prejudgment asset restraint

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Debra Coules v. Schedule A Defendants, (W.D. Pa. 2026).

Debra Coules v. Schedule A Defendants (Debra Coules v. Schedule A Defendants) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related

Warner Bros. Entertainment Inc. v. WTV Systems, Inc.
824 F. Supp. 2d 1003 (C.D. California, 2011)
New York City Triathlon, LLC v. Nyc Triathlon Club, Inc.
704 F. Supp. 2d 305 (S.D. New York, 2010)
Helene Curtis Industries, Inc. v. Church & Dwight Co.
560 F.2d 1325 (Seventh Circuit, 1977)