Debra Cohen Tudor v. State Farm General Insurance Company, et al.
Opinion
DEBRA COHEN TUDOR, Case No. 22-cv-01113-RFL (PHK)
Plaintiff, ORDER RESOLVING DISPUTE RE PROTECTIVE ORDER v. Re: Dkts. 55, 60, 61 COMPANY, et al. Defendants. This case has been referred to the undersigned for all discovery purposes. See Dkt. 56. Now pending before the Court is a joint letter brief and follow-up briefing regarding a dispute between the Plaintiff Debra Tudor (“Plaintiff”) and Defendant State Farm General Insurance Co. (“State Farm”) as to certain proposed provisions of the Protective Order governing confidential information and documents produced in discovery in this case. [Dkt. 55; Dkt. 60; Dkt. 61]. Both Parties agree that a Protective Order should be entered for this case, but have raised specific disputes regarding certain terms to be included in the Protective Order. After reviewing the Parties’ initial discovery letter brief [Dkt. 55], the Court directed the Parties to fully comply with the undersigned’s Discovery Standing Order and to meet and confer pursuant to the provisions therein. [Dkt. 57]. The Parties filed a joint status report indicating that, after further meet and confer, the Parties were incapable of narrowing this dispute. [Dkt. 58]. The Court thereafter ordered the Parties to submit copies of their competing versions of the Protective Order, along with a statement identifying those edits proposed by the opposing side to which each Party did not object. [Dkt. 59]. The Parties filed their respective competing versions of the Protective Order for which that Party had no objection. See Dkts. 60-63. In light of the number of changes for which both sides no longer had objections, the Court ordered the Parties to submit a redline version of the Protective Order which incorporated all non-objectionable edits from both sides and identified those remaining proposed changes from each side (color coded for clarity) for which objections and thus disputes remain. [Dkt. 64]. On October 10, 2025, the Parties submitted the redline version of the Protective Order by email to the Court, but did not file that redline version on the docket. The Court attaches that redline version of the proposed Protective Order as an Appendix to this Order. The Court finds the dispute suitable for resolution without oral argument. See Civil L.R. 7-1(b). The Court is issuing the final Protective Order for this case as a separate docket entry, which reflects the resolution of the disputes as analyzed herein. The generally applicable legal standards for discovery are well-known. The Court has broad discretion and authority to manage discovery. U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Lee Inv. LLC, 641 F.3d 1126, 1136 n.10 (9th Cir. 2011) (“District courts have wide latitude in controlling discovery, and their rulings will not be overturned in the absence of a clear abuse of discretion.”); Laub v. U.S. Dep’t of Int., 342 F.3d 1080, 1093 (9th Cir. 2003). The Court’s discretion extends to crafting discovery orders that may expand, limit, or differ from the relief requested. See Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 598 (1998) (holding trial courts have “broad discretion to tailor discovery narrowly and to dictate the sequence of discovery”). “It is well-established that the fruits of pretrial discovery are, in the absence of a court order to the contrary, presumptively public.” San Jose Mercury News, Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Court, 187 F.3d 1096, 1103 (9th Cir. 1999). However, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c) provides that “[t]he court may, for good cause, issue an order to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense, including one or more of the following . . . requiring that a trade secret or other confidential research, development, or commercial “While courts generally make a finding of good cause before issuing a protective order, a court need not do so where (as here) the parties stipulate to such an order.” In re Roman Cath. Archbishop of Portland in Or., 661 F.3d 417, 424 (9th Cir. 2011). The Ninth Circuit has recognized that district courts have “broad latitude to grant protective orders to prevent disclosure of materials for many types of information, including, but not limited to, trade secrets or other confidential research, development, or commercial information.” Phillips ex rel. Ests. of Byrd v. Gen. Motors Corp., 307 F.3d 1206, 1211 (9th Cir. 2002). Courts have recognized that, absent the entry of a protective order, the public disclosure of information such as financial information, customer names, employee lists, business proposals, and business pitches may result in competitive harm. See Bayside Sols., Inc. v. Avila, No. 21-cv-08738-PJH, 2022 WL 3215010, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 2022) (citing In re Elec. Arts, 298 F. App’x 568, 569 (9th Cir. 2008); In re Google Location History Litig., 514 F. Supp. 3d 1147, 1162 (N.D. Cal. 2021)). The scope of a district court’s discretion in discovery matters includes the “decision to grant, lift or modify a protective order[.]” Roman Cath. Archbishop, 661 F.3d at 423. The proposed Protective Order presented to the Court here is largely based on the Northern District of California’s Model Stipulated Protective Order (for standard litigation) (available at https://cand.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/documents/CAND_StandardProtOrd.Feb2022_0.pdf) (hereafter “Model PO”). From the final redline submitted by the Parties, it appears that virtually all changes proposed by Plaintiff have been resolved (with the sole exception discussed below), and the bulk of the disputes concern edits proposed by State Farm to that Model PO. Plaintiff objects to State Farm’s proposed changes. Some of State Farm’s proposed changes to the Model PO (as well as some of the arguments in favor of those proposed edits) appear to be adapted from or conceptually derived from provisions of the Northern District’s Model Protective Order for Litigation Involving Patents, Highly Sensitive Confidential Information and/or Trade Secrets (available at https://cand.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ND_Cal_Patent_Highly_Sensitive_Model_ “The Northern District's model protective order is presumptively reasonable.” Hernandez v. Syncrasy, No. 21-cv-09212-CRB (LJC), 2023 WL 2600452, at * 2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 21, 2023) (quoting In re Lithium Ion Batteries Antitrust Litig., No. 13-MD-02420-YGR-DMR, 2017 WL 930317, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 2017)). “A party seeking to deviate from the [Northern District’s] model protective order bears the burden of showing the specific harm and prejudice that will result if its request is not granted.” Id. (quoting ESC-Toy Ltd. v. Sony Interactive Ent. LLC, No. 21-CV-00778-EMC-DMR, 2022 WL 1714627, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 27, 2022)). Dispute re: Consulting Attorneys Based on the Parties’ briefing, the primary dispute here relates to the various provisions of the Model PO which allow for disclosure of confidential information to experts and consultants. The specific dispute here centers on Plaintiff’s consultants who are attorneys but are not counsel of record in this case, so-called “consulting attorneys.” In particular, State Farm raises concerns about Plaintiff’s engagement of one or more consulting attorneys, without State Farm knowing who such consulting attorneys are (since they are not counsel of record) and without any provisions in the Model PO to allow State Farm to consider whether there is a basis to object to disclosure of State Farm confidential information to such consulting attorneys. In particular, State Farm appears concerned that any consulting attorneys are or may be engaged in current or future litigation against State Farm involving disputes similar to the causes of action in this case relating to water loss claims. State Farm argues that it “recently learned that other plaintiffs’ counsel in California have shared State Farm’s confidential information
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DEBRA COHEN TUDOR, Case No. 22-cv-01113-RFL (PHK)
Plaintiff, ORDER RESOLVING DISPUTE RE PROTECTIVE ORDER v. Re: Dkts. 55, 60, 61 COMPANY, et al. Defendants. This case has been referred to the undersigned for all discovery purposes. See Dkt. 56. Now pending before the Court is a joint letter brief and follow-up briefing regarding a dispute between the Plaintiff Debra Tudor (“Plaintiff”) and Defendant State Farm General Insurance Co. (“State Farm”) as to certain proposed provisions of the Protective Order governing confidential information and documents produced in discovery in this case. [Dkt. 55; Dkt. 60; Dkt. 61]. Both Parties agree that a Protective Order should be entered for this case, but have raised specific disputes regarding certain terms to be included in the Protective Order. After reviewing the Parties’ initial discovery letter brief [Dkt. 55], the Court directed the Parties to fully comply with the undersigned’s Discovery Standing Order and to meet and confer pursuant to the provisions therein. [Dkt. 57]. The Parties filed a joint status report indicating that, after further meet and confer, the Parties were incapable of narrowing this dispute. [Dkt. 58]. The Court thereafter ordered the Parties to submit copies of their competing versions of the Protective Order, along with a statement identifying those edits proposed by the opposing side to which each Party did not object. [Dkt. 59]. The Parties filed their respective competing versions of the Protective Order for which that Party had no objection. See Dkts. 60-63. In light of the number of changes for which both sides no longer had objections, the Court ordered the Parties to submit a redline version of the Protective Order which incorporated all non-objectionable edits from both sides and identified those remaining proposed changes from each side (color coded for clarity) for which objections and thus disputes remain. [Dkt. 64]. On October 10, 2025, the Parties submitted the redline version of the Protective Order by email to the Court, but did not file that redline version on the docket. The Court attaches that redline version of the proposed Protective Order as an Appendix to this Order. The Court finds the dispute suitable for resolution without oral argument. See Civil L.R. 7-1(b). The Court is issuing the final Protective Order for this case as a separate docket entry, which reflects the resolution of the disputes as analyzed herein. The generally applicable legal standards for discovery are well-known. The Court has broad discretion and authority to manage discovery. U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Lee Inv. LLC, 641 F.3d 1126, 1136 n.10 (9th Cir. 2011) (“District courts have wide latitude in controlling discovery, and their rulings will not be overturned in the absence of a clear abuse of discretion.”); Laub v. U.S. Dep’t of Int., 342 F.3d 1080, 1093 (9th Cir. 2003). The Court’s discretion extends to crafting discovery orders that may expand, limit, or differ from the relief requested. See Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 598 (1998) (holding trial courts have “broad discretion to tailor discovery narrowly and to dictate the sequence of discovery”). “It is well-established that the fruits of pretrial discovery are, in the absence of a court order to the contrary, presumptively public.” San Jose Mercury News, Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Court, 187 F.3d 1096, 1103 (9th Cir. 1999). However, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c) provides that “[t]he court may, for good cause, issue an order to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense, including one or more of the following . . . requiring that a trade secret or other confidential research, development, or commercial “While courts generally make a finding of good cause before issuing a protective order, a court need not do so where (as here) the parties stipulate to such an order.” In re Roman Cath. Archbishop of Portland in Or., 661 F.3d 417, 424 (9th Cir. 2011). The Ninth Circuit has recognized that district courts have “broad latitude to grant protective orders to prevent disclosure of materials for many types of information, including, but not limited to, trade secrets or other confidential research, development, or commercial information.” Phillips ex rel. Ests. of Byrd v. Gen. Motors Corp., 307 F.3d 1206, 1211 (9th Cir. 2002). Courts have recognized that, absent the entry of a protective order, the public disclosure of information such as financial information, customer names, employee lists, business proposals, and business pitches may result in competitive harm. See Bayside Sols., Inc. v. Avila, No. 21-cv-08738-PJH, 2022 WL 3215010, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 2022) (citing In re Elec. Arts, 298 F. App’x 568, 569 (9th Cir. 2008); In re Google Location History Litig., 514 F. Supp. 3d 1147, 1162 (N.D. Cal. 2021)). The scope of a district court’s discretion in discovery matters includes the “decision to grant, lift or modify a protective order[.]” Roman Cath. Archbishop, 661 F.3d at 423. The proposed Protective Order presented to the Court here is largely based on the Northern District of California’s Model Stipulated Protective Order (for standard litigation) (available at https://cand.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/documents/CAND_StandardProtOrd.Feb2022_0.pdf) (hereafter “Model PO”). From the final redline submitted by the Parties, it appears that virtually all changes proposed by Plaintiff have been resolved (with the sole exception discussed below), and the bulk of the disputes concern edits proposed by State Farm to that Model PO. Plaintiff objects to State Farm’s proposed changes. Some of State Farm’s proposed changes to the Model PO (as well as some of the arguments in favor of those proposed edits) appear to be adapted from or conceptually derived from provisions of the Northern District’s Model Protective Order for Litigation Involving Patents, Highly Sensitive Confidential Information and/or Trade Secrets (available at https://cand.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ND_Cal_Patent_Highly_Sensitive_Model_ “The Northern District's model protective order is presumptively reasonable.” Hernandez v. Syncrasy, No. 21-cv-09212-CRB (LJC), 2023 WL 2600452, at * 2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 21, 2023) (quoting In re Lithium Ion Batteries Antitrust Litig., No. 13-MD-02420-YGR-DMR, 2017 WL 930317, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 2017)). “A party seeking to deviate from the [Northern District’s] model protective order bears the burden of showing the specific harm and prejudice that will result if its request is not granted.” Id. (quoting ESC-Toy Ltd. v. Sony Interactive Ent. LLC, No. 21-CV-00778-EMC-DMR, 2022 WL 1714627, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 27, 2022)). Dispute re: Consulting Attorneys Based on the Parties’ briefing, the primary dispute here relates to the various provisions of the Model PO which allow for disclosure of confidential information to experts and consultants. The specific dispute here centers on Plaintiff’s consultants who are attorneys but are not counsel of record in this case, so-called “consulting attorneys.” In particular, State Farm raises concerns about Plaintiff’s engagement of one or more consulting attorneys, without State Farm knowing who such consulting attorneys are (since they are not counsel of record) and without any provisions in the Model PO to allow State Farm to consider whether there is a basis to object to disclosure of State Farm confidential information to such consulting attorneys. In particular, State Farm appears concerned that any consulting attorneys are or may be engaged in current or future litigation against State Farm involving disputes similar to the causes of action in this case relating to water loss claims. State Farm argues that it “recently learned that other plaintiffs’ counsel in California have shared State Farm’s confidential information in violation of the terms of protective orders, including under the guise of an undisclosed ‘consulting attorney’ role, and that such improper and undisclosed sharing of State Farm’s confidential may now be commonplace.” [Dkt. 55 at 4]. Based on these issues which arose in other cases (and admittedly not involving Plaintiff’s attorney here), State Farm has proposed edits to the Model PO which exclude “consulting attorneys” from the definition of “Experts” to whom “Confidential Information” may be disclosed (even if they execute the undertaking to be bound by the Protective Order), effectively barring any “consulting State Farm has also proposed a requirement that, prior to any disclosure of any confidential information to any person authorized to receive such information, the Party designating material as confidential must receive seven days’ notice prior to any such planned disclosure, including a copy of that person’s undertaking to be bound by the Protective Order (which would identify the receiving person including non-testifying consultants). Id. at 9. State Farm argues that these additional limitations on disclosure of its confidential information are necessary because of concerns about improper public disclosure of State Farm’s confidential documents and information by other lawyers in other cases, including in particular an attorney named Schaffer. [Dkt. 55 at 5]. Mr. Schaffer has litigated against State Farm recently, he is or was apparently a “consulting attorney” (but not counsel of record) for the plaintiff in a different lawsuit against State Farm, and he allegedly consults with “many other lawyers in California on State Farm matters.” Id. at 5-6. In a Central District of California action involving Mr. Schaffer (representing a different plaintiff than Plaintiff here) against State Farm, the court there entered a modified protective order which incorporated edits requested by State Farm due to findings that Mr. Schaffer was slow to comply with protective orders in other cases involving State Farm and because he apparently attempted to subpoena confidential State Farm documents from a “friendly” plaintiff’s law firm in an apparent attempt to bypass the protective order covering those documents. See Tong v. State Farm Gen. Ins. Co., No. 2:24-cv-02219-DSF-MAR, 2024 WL 5472414, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 20, 2024) (“The Court finds it necessary to include Defendant's additional protections given Plaintiffs' counsel's belated compliance with protective orders in other cases against Defendant and their efforts to subpoena Attorney Dawson in the Mojica matter to obtain Defendant's confidential information outside the limitations of a protective order.”) (emphasis in original). In Tong, State Farm also submitted a declaration indicating that a list of State Farm’s “confidential training material and claims guidelines” identical to a list compiled by Mr. Schaffer in another case “appeared as a blog post on the website of another plaintiffs’ [law] firm who also frequently handled cases against [State Farm].” Id. State Farm argues that Plaintiff’s counsel in public by that blog post, which allegedly is based on Mr. Schaffer’s compilation of confidential State Farm documents “made by mining the contents of confidential documents produced by State Farm pursuant to protective order in another matter.” [Dkt. 55 at 5]. State Farm proposes its edits to the Model PO based on the concerns that it lacks the opportunity to object to disclosure of its confidential information to any consulting attorneys because, based on what has happened in these other cases, such disclosure risks further “erosion” of the protections of protective orders in this and other cases. Id. at 6 (“If State Farm does not know who has access to its information, it cannot take necessary steps to protect it.”). In opposition, Plaintiff argues that State Farm’s proposed edits to the Model PO are unnecessary. Plaintiff argues, first, that any alleged “improper disclosure” of State Farm’s confidential information “in other cases—cases handled by other attorneys” are “totally irrelevant to this case.” Id. at 2. Plaintiff stresses that “State Farm does not contend that plaintiff’s counsel Bruce Cohen has participated in these wrongful disclosures.” Id. Plaintiff argues that State Farm’s proposed edits to the Model PO’s paragraph 7.4 “would force [Plaintiff] to disclose to State Farm the identity of the consultants with whom she has shared covered materials, which would violate her attorney client, attorney work product, and attorney consultant privileges.” Id. at 3. Plaintiff argues that “State Farm has made no secret of the fact that its desire in obtaining this information is to be able to object to [Plaintiff]’s selection of consultants/experts; multiple previous PO versions offered by State Farm gave it the right to not only review, but in fact veto, [Plaintiff]’s selection of consultants/experts.” Id. Contrary to State Farm, Plaintiff proposes editing the Model PO to clarify that “Consultants” (who sign an undertaking to abide by the Protective Order) are expressly authorized to receive an opposing party’s designated confidential information. Id. at 2. Plaintiff concedes that the definitions of “Party” and “Receiving Party” in the Model PO already include consultants, but argues that this proposed edit is necessary “to avoid any possible protest by State Farm.” Id. Under the Model PO, the term “Expert” is defined to include both an “expert witness” and a “consultant.” Model PO at ¶ 2.6. Accordingly, under the Model PO, a non-testifying consultant protective order. Id. at ¶ 7.2(c). There is no requirement in the Model PO itself to pre-identify consultants to whom disclosure of confidential information is contemplated. There are of course separate requirements for identifying testifying experts (and the facts/data they considered) under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(2). By contrast, the Court’s Model Highly Confidential PO has two levels of confidentiality designations for documents/information (“Confidential” and “Highly Confidential”) and thus contains a procedure for approving or objecting to disclosure of highly confidential information to both certain in-house counsel and to experts. See Model Highly Confidential PO at ¶ 7.4. It is apparent that State Farm’s proposed edits to the Model PO conceptually attempt to graft onto the Model PO a procedure for pre-identification (and thus a chance to object prior to disclosure) of anyone receiving confidential information without incorporating the provisions of the Model Highly Confidential PO. More importantly, as noted, the effect of State Farm’s proposed edit to the definition of “Experts” would remove “consulting attorneys” from being able to receive any confidential information at all. Conversely, Plaintiff’s proposed edit to the Model PO would confirm that any consultant can receive confidential information (where Plaintiff treats attorneys who are not counsel of record as “consultants”). One potential approach for resolving this dispute is to require any attorney to enter appearance on the docket, if that attorney is advising a Party about this litigation and if there is a desire to disclose the opposing Party’s confidential information to that consulting attorney. See, e.g., Future Link Sys. LLC v. Realtek Semiconductor Corp., 154 F.4th 1370, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2025) (affirming district court’s denial of request to modify protective order which “requires counsel to file a notice of appearance to have access to confidential materials. . . . [T]his is a ‘standard provision in Texas’[.]”). Requiring consulting attorneys to enter appearance would result in identifying them. However, that blanket approach is not “standard” in this District as reflected in both model protective orders. Further, just because a consultant is a member of the bar does not necessarily mean that every such consulting attorney is acting in their capacity as litigation counsel—attorneys may have skills. See, e.g., C.R. Bard, Inc. v. Med. Components, Inc., No. 2:17-cv-00754-HCN-DAO, 2020 WL 5107632, at *2-4 & n.3 (D. Utah Aug. 31, 2020) (denying motion for protective order to bar disclosure of confidential information to two technical advisors who are lawyers: “[Moving party] Bard also argues that if MedComp wants [consultants] Judge Rader and Mr. Kunin to see its Confidential/AEO information, they should enter appearances as counsel, since they are both attorneys. Bard has not cited any case law or authority prohibiting attorneys from acting as technical advisors.”) (internal citation omitted)). As noted, the Court’s discretion in discovery matters extends to crafting discovery orders that may expand, limit, or differ from the relief requested. Crawford-El, 523 U.S. at 598. “To be sure, Rule 26(c) confers broad discretion on the trial court to decide when a protective order is appropriate and what degree of protection is required.” Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 36 (1984). The Court finds that neither Party’s proposed edits to the Model PO are adequate to address both the concerns about access to confidential information by unknown attorneys and the concerns about one side’s interfering with the other side’s selection of consultants to assist in pre- trial and trial case preparation. Given the prevalence of patent lawsuits and other commercial litigation involving highly confidential information in the Northern District of California, it is no surprise that this dispute has arisen previously in this Court. In Apple v. Samsung, the litigants proposed competing protective orders which treated consultants (and whether they were to be identified) differently: The main difference between the parties‘ proposals lies with the confidentiality designation(s), for which Apple proposes a single-tier (“Highly Confidential– Attorneys' Eyes Only (“AEO”)”) and Samsung proposes two tiers (“Confidential” and “Highly Confidential–AEO”). Apple's single-tier would allow disclosure of marked material to expert witnesses, including non-testifying experts and consultants, only after the party seeking to disclose has provided notice and an opportunity to the other side to object and intercede. Apple argues that its PO is consistent with the parties' practice thus far in this litigation and in concurrent litigation before the International Trade Commission (“ITC”), and thus averts the risk of increased motion practice based on shifting to a two-tier structure. Samsung argues that rather than simply maintaining the status quo, the final PO should balance the protections sought by both parties with the well-established practice of retaining undisclosed, non-testifying experts and consultants[.] Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elec. Co., No. C 11-1846 LHK (PSG), 2012 WL 1511901, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 2012). The Apple opinion resolved that dispute by recognizing the difference between a non- testifying consultant’s access to merely “Confidential Information” versus “Highly Confidential Information” in the two-tier type of protective order. “In general, parties should be able to share documents with their experts that, while confidential, do not qualify for ‘highly confidential’ designation. In a two-tier system, this may be done without a party having to disclose the non- testifying expert or consultant, secure the other side's approval, and run the risk of facing and litigating objections.” Id. at *2. The Apple opinion reasoned that a two-tier approach to the protective order “best addresses each side's legitimate concerns regarding confidentiality and respects the role of non-testifying experts and consultants.” Id. The Apple opinion concluded that “[s]o long as the material disclosed is merely ‘confidential’ and the nontestifying consultant agrees to be bound by the provisions of the PO, the role of non-testifying experts and consultants may remain unfettered by a requirement to seek permission for every confidentiality disclosure.” Id. This approach respects the role that non-testifying consultants may play in supporting a litigant, while balancing a designating party’s concerns about the disclosure of its highly confidential documents and information. If a party desires to work with a consultant (or consulting attorney) without identifying such person and without risking ancillary litigation over objections to disclosure, under a two-tier protective order that party may disclose first level “Confidential” materials to the consultant (as well as any public or non-confidential materials of course) and thus have the flexibility to engage with that consultant anonymously. However, if a party desires to disclose “Highly Confidential” materials to that non-testifying consultant, then the Model Highly Confidential PO’s provisions for identification and objections (if any) from the designating party prior to disclosure would apply. The choice of whether or not to disclose the identity of the non-testifying consultant thus rests with the party working with their consultant. Accordingly, the Court modifies the proposed Protective Order, first, by rejecting the edits proposed by both Parties directed to this dispute over consulting attorneys (e.g., edits to the Model Highly Confidential PO relevant to creating two tiers of confidentiality (“Confidential” and “Highly Confidential”) and providing that disclosure of “Confidential” information to consultants (which includes consulting attorneys) is allowed without identifying them, whereas disclosure of “Highly Confidential” information to consultants (including consulting attorneys) is subject to and may only be done after the identification and objection procedures in the Model Highly Confidential PO. As noted above, the Court is separately issuing the final Protective Order in this case, which reflects the Court’s resolution of these disputes as discussed herein. The Court is cognizant that the Parties have already engaged in discovery and may have designated materials as “Confidential” because both Parties’ proposed Protective Orders contemplated a single-tier Protective Order. Accordingly, the Court ORDERS that all materials already produced in discovery which were previously designated as “Confidential” SHALL be treated as “Highly Confidential” under the final Protective Order issued separately by the Court unless such material is de-designated entirely or re-designated as merely “Confidential.” As the Apple opinion recognized, “[t]he court does not view the entry of a two-tiered confidentiality structure to require wholesale review of designations already made in the course of the litigation. Rather, the party wishing to disclose the material to an expert or consultant must initiate a request for de-designation or to lower the designation. The burden of establishing the propriety of any confidentiality designation remains, however, with the party making the designation.” 2012 WL 1511901, at *2 n.2. Secondary Disputes State Farm has proposed several other changes to the Model PO which are unrelated to the issue of consultants, for which Plaintiff has raised specific objections. Timing of Confidentiality Designation of Deposition Testimony/Transcript State Farm has proposed editing Paragraph 5.2(b) of the Model PO which requires a designating party to identify on the record “before the close of the deposition, hearing, or other proceeding” all testimony which is to be treated as confidential under the protective order. [Dkt. 61 at 5]. State Farm’s proposed edits would provide a thirty-day period after the receipt of the as protected under the protective order, and also would allow a party to pre-designate an entire deposition, hearing, or other proceeding’s transcript as protected under the protective order prior to that deposition or hearing taking place. Id. Plaintiff objects that these edits “demolish[]” the intent of the Model PO by extending the deadline for designation far beyond the date of the deposition or hearing. [Dkt. 55 at 3]. Plaintiff also objects that the proposal to pre-designate a transcript prior to the deposition or hearing even taking place would allow proceedings to be treated as protected even where the content of the transcript would not, in fact, meet the applicable standards for a confidentiality designation. Id. A “party seeking to protect documents from the public must demonstrate good cause exists.” Bayside Sols., 2022 WL 3215010, at *1 (citing Foltz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 331 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2003)). “For good cause to exist, the party seeking protection bears the burden of showing specific prejudice or harm will result if no protective order is granted.” Phillips, 307 F.3d at 1210–11. It follows, therefore, that “[a] party seeking to deviate from the [Northern District’s] model protective order bears the burden of showing the specific harm and prejudice that will result if its request is not granted.” Hernandez, 2023 WL 2600452, at * 2. State Farm’s letter brief does not seek to justify these proposed edits. Rather, as noted above, State Farm devotes the vast bulk of its briefing to the “consulting attorney” issue and a highly granular discussion of Mr. Schaffer and proceedings in other, unrelated litigation matters which do not involve Plaintiff or her counsel. None of that briefing explains why State Farm seeks to deviate from the timing and procedural provisions in the Model PO for designating transcripts as containing protected materials. By its lack of briefing on this issue, State Farm has failed to demonstrate any harm or prejudice that would result if these proposed edits to the Model PO are not granted, much less any specific harm or prejudice. Accordingly, the Court DENIES State Farm’s requests to edit these portions of the Model PO. The Court’s resolution of this issue is reflected in the final Protective Order issued separately on the docket. Existence of Protected Materials State Farm has proposed an additional paragraph to Section 7.1 of the Model PO which and in particular includes language stating that merely “making reference to the existence . . . of documents produced subject to this Protective Order” would constitute a “use” of such confidential information (and thus would be limited to only such “use” in this litigation). [Dkt. 61 at 7]. Plaintiff contends that this proposed edit would amount to a “gag order.” [Dkt. 55 at 3]. She argues that prohibiting her from acknowledging even the mere existence (as opposed to the contents) of protected materials is unprecedented. Id. As with the proposed edits above regarding deposition transcripts, State Farm’s briefing does not even address these proposed edits specifically. The Model PO already requires that “[a] Receiving Party may use Protected Material that is disclosed or produced by another Party or by a Non-Party in connection with this case only for prosecuting, defending, or attempting to settle this litigation.” Model PO at ¶ 7.1. State Farm has failed to demonstrate any specific harm or prejudice that would result if these proposed edits to the Model PO are not granted. State Farm’s extensive arguments about third parties who may have used State Farm confidential information (either by compiling lists of State Farm confidential documents or posting such compilation publicly on a blog) are unrelated to the Parties and lawyers here. Certainly, State Farm has the ability to file appropriate motions for relief or take other appropriate action if a recipient of protected materials in this action violates the basic principles of the Model PO and uses any protected material in a manner that is not for prosecuting, defending, or attempting to settle this litigation. Accordingly, the Court DENIES State Farm’s requests to edit this section of the Model PO. The Court’s resolution of this issue is reflected in the final Protective Order issued separately on the docket. Persons Who Previously Possessed or Knew Confidential Information State Farm has proposed an edit to Section 7.3(g) of the Model PO which adds the term “lawfully” to this provision, such that confidential information under the protective order may be disclosed to “the author or recipient of a document containing the information or a custodian or other person who otherwise lawfully possessed or knew the information[.]” [Dkt. 61 at 9 only “lawfully” possessed or knew the information prior to such disclosure, as opposed to persons who merely possessed or knew the information prior to disclosure in this case. Plaintiff objects that State Farm’s proposed edit would require her “to perform the impossible task of determining whether ‘the author or recipient of a document containing the information’ not only possessed or knew the information, but ‘lawfully possessed or knew it.’” [Dkt. 55 at 3]. Plaintiff argues that State Farm effectively wants her “to act as its police force as to this issue.” Id. She argues that she “has neither the duty nor the ability to determine how information possessed or known by such individuals may have been obtained, and she should not be burdened with undertaking that investigation.” Id. As with the proposed edits above regarding deposition transcripts, State Farm’s briefing does not even address this proposed edit specifically. As noted, the Model PO provides for disclosure of protected materials to a person who possessed or knew the information previously, presumably for the common sense reason that someone who previously possessed or knew the information already has or had knowledge of it and thus further disclosure to such person does nothing to disseminate the confidential information beyond the scope of its prior disclosure. Model PO at ¶ 7.2(g). As with the proposed edits discussed above, State Farm has failed to demonstrate any specific harm or prejudice that would result if these proposed edits to the Model PO are not granted. State Farm’s extensive arguments about third parties who may or may not have complied with protective orders in other cases are unrelated to the Parties and lawyers here. As Plaintiff notes, “[i]f State Farm has evidence that anyone has unlawfully obtained its confidential information, it has the ability to pursue appropriate remedies against them.” [Dkt. 55 at 3]. Tong, discussed above, indicates that State Farm knows how to take actions against third-party attorneys such as Mr. Schaffer, for example. To be sure, nothing in this Order (or the final Protective Order) prevents State Farm from filing appropriate motions for relief or from taking other appropriate action if a person has unlawfully possessed or come to know State Farm’s confidential information. Accordingly, the Court DENIES State Farm’s requests to edit this section of the separately on the docket. Miscellaneous Issues Finally, State Farm has proposed a handful of other edits to the Model PO for which the Parties devote no substantive briefing. For example, State Farm has inserted the word “reasonable” in Paragraph 6.2 to modify the “opportunity” a designating party has to review material for which a confidentiality designation is challenged. Id. at 6. Further, State Farm has (without explanation) inserted a proposed new Section 7.2 which expands the definition of permissible “uses” of confidential information by State Farm. [Dkt. 61 at 8]. Similarly, State Farm has proposed an edit to introductory language to Section 7.3 referencing the persons authorized to receive confidential information without any explanation as to why these edits are necessary or make any substantive difference. Id. Additionally, State Farm has proposed adding a paragraph to the end of the Model PO which refers to the Court’s continuing jurisdiction over disputes regarding disclosure, return, or destruction of protected material after final disposition of this case, again without any briefing to explain why this edit is necessary or what the specific harm would be if rejected. Id. at 13. In the redline comments to the jointly submitted proposed Protective Order, Plaintiff has indicated her objection to all or portions of each of these miscellaneous proposed edits. As noted, “[a] party seeking to deviate from the [Northern District’s] model protective order bears the burden of showing the specific harm and prejudice that will result if its request is not granted.” Hernandez, 2023 WL 2600452, at * 2. Here, these miscellaneous edits proposed by State Farm are not supported by any discussion of specific harms or prejudice which requires their adoption. None of these appear to be related to the “consulting attorney” or other issues discussed above. Because Plaintiff objects to these proposed changes, State Farm bears the burden to identify the specific harm and specific prejudice absent the adoption of these proposed edits, and plainly, State Farm’s silence on these edits constitutes a failure to meet that burden here. Accordingly, the Court DENIES these miscellaneous edits to the Model PO proposed by State Farm. The Court’s resolution of this issue is reflected in the final Protective Order issued separately on the docket. Parties specifically identify in their redline comments as agreeable to both sides. See, e.g., Dkt. 61 at 1, 3. Based on those express agreements, the Court adopts those edits in the final Protective Order being issued separately. The Court also notes that there are a handful of edits proposed by State Farm which, unlike the redline edits discussed above, have no express indication in the redline comments as to whether Plaintiff objects or agrees to their inclusion. For example, State Farm has proposed an edit to Paragraphs 5.2(a) and 5.2(c) which would alter the specific language to be affixed to a document to designate that document as confidential without explanation as to why this proposed edit makes a substantive difference. Id. at 4-5. Similarly, State Farm has inserted the phrase “or unintentional” in Paragraph 5.3 of the Model PO without any explanation and without any indication as to Plaintiff’s objection or agreement to this insertion. Id. at 5. Additionally, State Farm has added categories of persons to whom confidential information may be disclosed to include “law enforcement officers,” jurors, and any other persons required by law or authorized specifically by the Parties. Id. at 9. The Court notes that the Order which instructed the Parties to jointly submit the redlined proposed Protective Order (see attached Appendix) required the Parties to “submit a joint proposed protective order (including a Word version) which (1) incorporates all edits to the Model Protective Order from both sides for which there are no objections from the other side, and (2) for those remaining proposed edits from each side for which there are objections remaining, sets forth each side's competing proposed language clearly identifying the Party proposing each such competing proposal (and, if a Party contends that an edit should not be added, a statement to that effect without argument) in the appropriate locations of the joint proposed order.” [Dkt. 64]. For these handful of edits, there is no “statement” as to whether “a Party contends that an edit should not be added.” Unlike the expressly objected to or expressly agreed upon edits, there are simply no comments or statements in either the redline or the briefing as to these handful of edits. Accordingly, the Court construes these uncommented edits as proposals “for which there are no objections from the other side.” The Court thus GRANTS the unopposed insertion of these ] the final Protective Order issued separately on the docket. 2 Unripe Issues 3 The Parties devote substantial portions of their briefing on several issues unrelated to the 4 Protective Order, which are neither germane to the disputes here nor ripe for adjudication. For 5 example, the issue of whether Plaintiff timely produced a video in discovery is unrelated to the 6 specific disputes under the Protective Order. Further, because the Parties admit that Plaintiff 7 produced that video, there appears to be no live discovery dispute as to that issue. To the extent 8 that these and other irrelevant issues were mentioned in the briefing, the Court DENIES any 9 requested relief as to such issues as premature. 11 Accordingly, for all the reasons discussed herein, the Court GRANTS-IN-PART and 12 DENIES-IN-PART the Parties’ motion requesting modifications to the Model PO. Accordingly, 13 the Court hereby ORDERS that the final version of the Protective Order reflecting the resolution 14 of the disputes as discussed herein SHALL be entered on the docket as a standalone Order. 15 This RESOLVES Dkts. 55, 60, and 61. 16
17 ITIS SO ORDERED. Z 18 Dated: December 15, 2025 19 □ 20 United States Manistrate Judge 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA DEBRA COHEN TUDOR, CASE NO. 5:22-cv-01113-RFL Plaintiff, [PROPOSED] PROTECTIVE ORDER 7 8 S C D T O O A M E T S P E A 1 v F s N th . A Y r R o , u M a g n h G I 5 l E l 0 D i N n , e o i E f n i e R s c n l c A d u o a s L r i n p v I t o e s N r . , a S t U io R n A ; a N n C d E ( P B r a o s t e ed ct i o v n e t O he r d N e o r r s) t h ern District’s Model
1. PURPOSES AND LIMITATIONS
Disclosure and discovery activity in this action are likely to involve production of
confidential, proprietary, or private information for which special protection from public disclosure
and from use for any purpose other than prosecuting this litigation may be warranted. Accordingly,
the following protective order is warranted. This Order does not confer blanket protections on all
disclosures or responses to discovery and that the protection it affords from public disclosure and
use extends only to the limited information or items that are entitled to confidential treatment under
the applicable legal principles. As set forth in Section 12.3, below, this Protective Order does not
entitle the parties to file confidential information under seal; Civil Local Rule 79-5 sets forth the
procedures that must be followed and the standards that will be applied when a party seeks permission from the court to file material under seal. C be o e m n r m ev e is n e t d e t d o r [ e J f R le 1 ct ] m : F in o o r r e , a n s o e n o -s f u r b e s fe ta r n en ti c v e e , r t e h v is i s p io a n ra s g , r t a o p w h h h i a c s h the parties agree. 2. DEFINITIONS
2.1 Challenging Party: a Party or Non-Party that challenges the designation of
information or items under this Order.
2.2 “CONFIDENTIAL” Information or Items: information (regardless of how it is
generated, stored or maintained) or tangible things that qualify for protection under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 26(c).
2.3 Counsel (without qualifier): Outside Counsel of Record and House Counsel (as well
2145596 - 1 - [PROPOSED] PROTECTIVE ORDER - CASE NO. 5:22-cv-01113-RFL as their support staff).
2.4 Designating Party: a Party or Non-Party that designates information or items that it
produces in disclosures or in responses to discovery as “CONFIDENTIAL.”
2.5 Disclosure or Discovery Material: all items or information, regardless of the
medium or manner in which it is generated, stored, or maintained (including, among other things,
testimony, transcripts, and tangible things), that are produced or generated in disclosures or
responses to discovery in this matter.
2.6 Expert: a person with specialized knowledge or experience in a matter pertinent to
the litigation who has been retained by a Party or its counsel to serve as an expert witness or as a
consultant in this action. The term “Expert” does not include consulting attorneys who are not attorneys of record in this action. C Pl o a m int m iff e o n p t p e o d se s [ J th R i 2 s a ]: d d S i t t a io te n . F arm proposes this addition.
2.7 House Counsel: attorneys who are employees of a party to this action. House
Counsel does not include Outside Counsel of Record or any other outside counsel.
2.8 Non-Party: any natural person, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal
entity not named as a Party to this action.
2.9 Outside Counsel of Record: attorneys who are not employees of a party to this
action but are retained to represent or advise a party to this action and have appeared in this action on behalf of that party or are affiliated with a law firm which has appeared on behalf of that party. C Pl o a m int m iff e o n p t p e o d se s [ J th R i 3 s d ]: e l S e t t a io te n . F arm proposes this deletion.
2.10 Party: any party to this action, including all of its officers, directors, employees, consultants (but not consulting attorneys), retained experts, and Outside Counsel of Record (and C Pl o a m int m iff e o n p t p e o d se s [ J th R i 4 s a ]: d d S i t t a io te n . F arm proposes this addition.
their support staffs).
2.11 Producing Party: a Party or Non-Party that produces Disclosure or Discovery
Material in this action.
2.12 Professional Vendors: persons or entities that provide litigation support services
(e.g., photocopying, videotaping, translating, preparing exhibits or demonstrations, and organizing,
storing, or retrieving data in any form or medium, etc.) and their employees and subcontractors.
2.13 Protected Material: any Disclosure or Discovery Material that is designated as
“CONFIDENTIAL.”
2145596 - 2 - [PROPOSED] PROTECTIVE ORDER - CASE NO. 5:22-cv-01113-RFL 2.14 Receiving Party: a Party that receives Disclosure or Discovery Material from a
Producing Party.
3. SCOPE The protections conferred by this Stipulation and Order cover not only Protected Material C to o “ m sti m pu e la n ti t o e n d ” h [J a R ve 5 b ] e : e F n o r r e e m a o se v e o d f p re u f r e s r u e a n n c t e t , o a t l h l e fu p r a th rt e i r e s re ’ ferences agreement. (as defined above), but also (1) any information copied or extracted from Protected Material; (2) all
copies, excerpts, summaries, or compilations of Protected Material; and (3) any testimony,
conversations, or presentations by Parties or their Counsel that might reveal Protected Material.
However, the protections conferred by this Order do not cover the following information: (a) any
information that is in the public domain at the time of disclosure to a Receiving Party or becomes
part of the public domain after its disclosure to a Receiving Party as a result of publication not
involving a violation of this Order, including becoming part of the public record through trial or
otherwise; and (b) any information known to the Receiving Party prior to the disclosure or obtained
by the Receiving Party after the disclosure from a source who obtained the information lawfully
and under no obligation of confidentiality to the Designating Party. Any use of Protected Material
at trial shall be governed by a separate agreement or order.
4. DURATION
Even after final disposition of this litigation, the confidentiality obligations imposed by this
Order shall remain in effect until a Designating Party agrees otherwise in writing or a court order
otherwise directs. Final disposition shall be deemed to be the later of (1) dismissal of all claims and
defenses in this action, with or without prejudice; and (2) final judgment herein after the completion
and exhaustion of all appeals, rehearings, remands, trials, or reviews of this action, including the
time limits for filing any motions or applications for extension of time pursuant to applicable law.
5. DESIGNATING PROTECTED MATERIAL
5.1 Exercise of Restraint and Care in Designating Material for Protection. Each Party or
Non-Party that designates information or items for protection under this Order must take care to
limit any such designation to specific material that qualifies under the appropriate standards. The
Designating Party must designate for protection only those parts of material, documents, items, or
oral or written communications that qualify – so that other portions of the material, documents,
2145596 - 3 - [PROPOSED] PROTECTIVE ORDER - CASE NO. 5:22-cv-01113-RFL items, or communications for which protection is not warranted are not swept unjustifiably within
the ambit of this Order.
Mass, indiscriminate, or routinized designations are prohibited. Designations that are shown
to be clearly unjustified or that have been made for an improper purpose (e.g., to unnecessarily
encumber or retard the case development process or to impose unnecessary expenses and burdens
on other parties) expose the Designating Party to sanctions.
If it comes to a Designating Party’s attention that information or items that it designated for
protection do not qualify for protection, that Designating Party must promptly notify all other
Parties that it is withdrawing the mistaken designation.
5.2 Manner and Timing of Designations. Except as otherwise provided in this Order
(see, e.g., second paragraph of section 5.2(a) below), or as otherwise stipulated or ordered,
Disclosure or Discovery Material that qualifies for protection under this Order must be clearly so
designated before the material is disclosed or produced.
Designation in conformity with this Order requires:
(a) for information in documentary form (e.g., paper or electronic documents, but
excluding transcripts of depositions or other pretrial or trial proceedings), that the Producing Party
affix the legend “CONFIDENTIAL Pursuant to Protective Order” to each page that contains
protected material. If only a portion or portions of the material on a page qualifies for protection,
the Producing Party also must clearly identify the protected portion(s) (e.g., by making appropriate
markings in the margins).
A Party or Non-Party that makes original documents or materials available for inspection
need not designate them for protection until after the inspecting Party has indicated which material
it would like copied and produced. During the inspection and before the designation, all of the
material made available for inspection shall be deemed “CONFIDENTIAL.” After the inspecting
Party has identified the documents it wants copied and produced, the Producing Party must
determine which documents, or portions thereof, qualify for protection under this Order. Then,
before producing the specified documents, the Producing Party must affix the “CONFIDENTIAL”
legend to each page that contains Protected Material. If only a portion or portions of the material on
2145596 - 4 - [PROPOSED] PROTECTIVE ORDER - CASE NO. 5:22-cv-01113-RFL a page qualifies for protection, the Producing Party also must clearly identify the protected
portion(s) (e.g., by making appropriate markings in the margins).
(b) for testimony given in deposition or in other pretrial or trial proceedings, that the
Designating Party identify on the record, before the close of the deposition, hearing, or other
proceeding, all protected testimony or by written notice of counsel no later than thirty (30) days
after receipt of the transcript of said deposition, hearing or other proceeding, all protected
testimony. All testimony, regardless of whether designated as “CONFIDENTIAL” on the record,
shall be treated as “CONFIDENTIAL” until thirty (30) days after receipt of the transcript of said
deposition, hearing or other proceeding by all parties. Certain depositions, hearings or other
proceedings may, in their entirety, be designated “CONFIDENTIAL” prior to being taken because
of the anticipated testimony. Furthermore, any document designated as “CONFIDENTIAL” shall
maintain that designation and the protections afforded thereto if introduced or discussed during a deposition, hearing or other proceeding. C Pl o a m int m iff e o n p t p e o d se s [ J th R i 6 s a ]: d d S i t t a io te n . F arm proposes this addition.
(c) for information produced in some form other than documentary and for any
other tangible items, that the Producing Party affix in a prominent place on the exterior of the
container or containers in which the information or item is stored the legend “CONFIDENTIAL
Produced Pursuant to Protective Order” or Confidential Trade Secret Produced Pursuant to
Protective Order” and/or alter the file name of the native ESI to include “CONFIDENTIAL” and
shall inform all recipients in writing of the designation at the time that the ESI is produced. If only a
portion or portions of the information or item warrant protection, the Producing Party, to the extent
practicable, shall identify the protected portion(s).
5.3 Inadvertent Failures to Designate. If timely corrected, an inadvertent or
unintentional failure to designate qualified information or items does not, standing alone, waive the
Designating Party’s right to secure protection under this Order for such material. Upon timely
correction of a designation, the Receiving Party must make reasonable efforts to assure that the
material is treated in accordance with the provisions of this Order.
6. CHALLENGING CONFIDENTIALITY DESIGNATIONS
2145596 - 5 - [PROPOSED] PROTECTIVE ORDER - CASE NO. 5:22-cv-01113-RFL 6.1 Timing of Challenges. Any Party or Non-Party may challenge a designation of
confidentiality at any time. Unless a prompt challenge to a Designating Party’s confidentiality
designation is necessary to avoid foreseeable, substantial unfairness, unnecessary economic
burdens, or a significant disruption or delay of the litigation, a Party does not waive its right to
challenge a confidentiality designation by electing not to mount a challenge promptly after the
original designation is disclosed.
6.2 Meet and Confer. The Challenging Party shall initiate the dispute resolution process
by providing written notice of each designation it is challenging and describing the basis for each
challenge. To avoid ambiguity as to whether a challenge has been made, the written notice must
recite that the challenge to confidentiality is being made in accordance with this specific paragraph
of the Protective Order. The parties shall attempt to resolve each challenge in good faith and must
begin the process by conferring directly (in voice to voice dialogue; other forms of communication
are not sufficient) within 14 days of the date of service of notice. In conferring, the Challenging
Party must explain the basis for its belief that the confidentiality designation was not proper and must give the Designating Party a reasonable opportunity to review the designated material, to C Pl o a m int m iff e o n p t p e o d se s [ J th R i 7 s a ]: d d S i t t a io te n . F arm proposes this addition.
reconsider the circumstances, and, if no change in designation is offered, to explain the basis for the
chosen designation. A Challenging Party may proceed to the next stage of the challenge process
only if it has engaged in this meet and confer process first or establishes that the Designating Party
is unwilling to participate in the meet and confer process in a timely manner.
6.3 Judicial Intervention. If the Parties cannot resolve a challenge without court
intervention, the Designating Party shall file and serve a motion to retain confidentiality under Civil
Local Rule 7 (and in compliance with Civil Local Rule 79-5, if applicable) within 21 days of the
initial notice of challenge or within 14 days of the parties agreeing that the meet and confer process
will not resolve their dispute, whichever is earlier. Each such motion must be accompanied by a
competent declaration affirming that the movant has complied with the meet and confer
requirements imposed in the preceding paragraph. Failure by the Designating Party to make such a
motion including the required declaration within 21 days (or 14 days, if applicable) shall
automatically waive the confidentiality designation for each challenged designation. In addition, the
2145596 - 6 - [PROPOSED] PROTECTIVE ORDER - CASE NO. 5:22-cv-01113-RFL Challenging Party may file a motion challenging a confidentiality designation at any time if there is
good cause for doing so, including a challenge to the designation of a deposition transcript or any
portions thereof. Any motion brought pursuant to this provision must be accompanied by a
competent declaration affirming that the movant has complied with the meet and confer
requirements imposed by the preceding paragraph.
The burden of persuasion in any such challenge proceeding shall be on the Designating
Party. Frivolous challenges, and those made for an improper purpose (e.g., to harass or impose
unnecessary expenses and burdens on other parties) may expose the Challenging Party to sanctions.
Unless the Designating Party has waived the confidentiality designation by failing to file a motion
to retain confidentiality as described above, all parties shall continue to afford the material in
question the level of protection to which it is entitled under the Producing Party’s designation until
the court rules on the challenge.
7. ACCESS TO AND USE OF PROTECTED MATERIAL
7.1 Basic Principles. A Receiving Party may use Protected Material that is disclosed or
produced by another Party or by a Non-Party in connection with this case only for prosecuting,
defending, or attempting to settle this litigation. Such Protected Material may be disclosed only to
the categories of persons and under the conditions described in this Order. When the litigation has
been terminated, a Receiving Party must comply with the provisions of section 13 below (FINAL
Protected Material must be stored and maintained by a Receiving Party at a location and in a
secure manner that ensures that access is limited to the persons authorized under this Order.
Use of Confidential Information and/or Trade Secret Information subject to this Protective
Order includes reviewing, analyzing, relying on, or making reference to the existence or contents of
documents produced subject to this Protective Order, including the titles of documents produced
pursuant to this Protective Order, or Bates ranges of documents produced pursuant to this Protective
Order. Use also includes the scanning, storing and searching of Confidential Information and/or
Trade Secret Information. Any and all such uses of Confidential Information and/or Trade Secret Information subject to this Protective Order shall be limited to this litigation only. C Pl o a m int m iff e o n p t p e o d se s [ J th R i 8 s a ]: d d S i t t a io te n . F arm proposes this addition.
2145596 - 7 - [PROPOSED] PROTECTIVE ORDER - CASE NO. 5:22-cv-01113-RFL 7.2 Use by State Farm. Nothing in this Protective Order disallows State Farm from:
(a) complying with any state or federal law or regulation, including reporting of
information to a regulator or government entity as permitted and/or required by applicable state and
federal law;
(b) adding information discovered that is relevant to a claim to the relevant
electronic record in its electronic claim system;
(c) disclosing evidence of a crime or fraud; retaining information necessary to meet
mandated retention requirements; or,
(d) retaining copies of Protected Information that may exist on back-up media or
other computer or archive storage not regularly accessed by business users in the ordinary course
Provided that should a copy of the Confidential Information be accessed it will not be used for a purpose inconsistent with this Order. C Pl o a m int m iff e o n p t p e o d se s [ J th R i 9 s a ]: d d S i t t a io te n . F arm proposes this addition.
7.3 Disclosure of “CONFIDENTIAL” Information or Items. Unless otherwise ordered
by the court or permitted in writing by the Designating Party, a Receiving Party may disclose any
information or item designated “CONFIDENTIAL” only to the following persons listed in subparagraphs a-k below. The only authorized persons are: C Pl o a m int m iff e o n p t p e o d se s [ J th R i 1 s a 0 d ] d : it S io ta n t . e Farm proposes this addition.
(a) the Receiving Party’s Outside Counsel of Record in this action, as well as
employees of said Outside Counsel of Record to whom it is reasonably necessary to disclose the
information for this litigation and who have signed the “Acknowledgment and Agreement to Be
Bound” that is attached hereto as Exhibit A;
(b) the officers, directors, and employees (including House Counsel) of the
Receiving Party to whom disclosure is reasonably necessary for this litigation and who have signed
the “Acknowledgment and Agreement to Be Bound” (Exhibit A);
(c) Consultants/Experts (as defined in this Order, of the Receiving Party to whom
disclosure is reasonably necessary for this litigation and who have signed the “Acknowledgment
and Agreement to Be Bound” (Exhibit A);
(d) the court and its personnel;
(e) court reporters and their staff, professional jury or trial consultants, mock jurors,
2145596 - 8 - [PROPOSED] PROTECTIVE ORDER - CASE NO. 5:22-cv-01113-RFL and Professional Vendors to whom disclosure is reasonably necessary for this litigation and who
have signed the “Acknowledgment and Agreement to Be Bound” (Exhibit A);
(f) during their depositions, witnesses in the action to whom disclosure is reasonably
necessary and who have signed the “Acknowledgment and Agreement to Be Bound” (Exhibit A),
unless otherwise agreed by the Designating Party or ordered by the court. Pages of transcribed
deposition testimony or exhibits to depositions that reveal Protected Material must be separately
bound by the court reporter and may not be disclosed to anyone except as permitted under this
Protective Order.
(g) the author or recipient of a document containing the information or a custodian or other person who otherwise lawfully possessed or knew the information. C Pl o a m int m iff e o n p t p e o d se s [ J th R i 1 s a 1 d ] d : it S io ta n t . e Farm proposes this addition.
(h) law enforcement officers, and/or other government agencies, as permitted or
required by applicable state and federal law.
(i) a jury involved in litigation concerning the claims and any defenses to any claims
in this lawsuit.
(j) anyone as otherwise required by law.
(k) as authorized by the Parties’ specifically.
7.4 The Parties Agree and Understand that the Designating Party is entitled to know with whom information or items designated as “CONFIDENTIAL” have been shared. As such, within 7 days after any individual sigs “Exhibit A” to this Protective Order, and at least 7 days before any Confidential Information is disclosed to that individual, notice of the planned disclosure and a copy of that Exhibit shall be provided to the Designating Party. C Pl o a m int m iff e o n p t p e o d se s [ J th R i 1 s a 2 d ] d : it S io ta n t . e Farm proposes this addition. 8. PROTECTED MATERIAL SUBPOENAED OR ORDERED PRODUCED IN OTHER
If a Party is served with a subpoena or a court order issued in other litigation that compels
disclosure of any information or items designated in this action as “CONFIDENTIAL,” that Party
must:
(a) promptly notify in writing the Designating Party. Such notification shall include
a copy of the subpoena or court order;
2145596 - 9 - [PROPOSED] PROTECTIVE ORDER - CASE NO. 5:22-cv-01113-RFL (b) promptly notify in writing the party who caused the subpoena or order to issue in
the other litigation that some or all of the material covered by the subpoena or order is subject to
this Protective Order. Such notification shall include a copy of this Protective Order; and
(c) cooperate with respect to all reasonable procedures sought to be pursued by the
Designating Party whose Protected Material may be affected.
If the Designating Party timely seeks a protective order, the Party served with the subpoena
or court order shall not produce any information designated in this action as “CONFIDENTIAL”
before a determination by the court from which the subpoena or order issued, unless the Party has
obtained the Designating Party’s permission. The Designating Party shall bear the burden and
expense of seeking protection in that court of its confidential material – and nothing in these
provisions should be construed as authorizing or encouraging a Receiving Party in this action to
disobey a lawful directive from another court.
9. A NON-PARTY’S PROTECTED MATERIAL SOUGHT TO BE PRODUCED IN THIS LITIGATION (a) The terms of this Order are applicable to information produced by a Non-Party in this action and designated as “CONFIDENTIAL.” Such information produced by Non-Parties in connection with this litigation is protected by the remedies and relief provided by this Order. Nothing in these provisions should be construed as prohibiting a Non-Party from seeking additional protections. (b) In the event that a Party is required, by a valid discovery request, to produce a Non- Party’s confidential information in its possession, and the Party is subject to an agreement with the Non-Party not to produce the Non-Party’s confidential information, then the Party shall: (1) promptly notify in writing the Requesting Party and the Non-Party that some or all of the information requested is subject to a confidentiality agreement with a Non-Party; (2) promptly provide the Non-Party with a copy of the Protective Order in this litigation, the relevant discovery request(s), and a reasonably specific description of the information requested; and (3) make the information requested available for inspection by the Non-Party.
2145596 - 10 - [PROPOSED] PROTECTIVE ORDER - CASE NO. 5:22-cv-01113-RFL (c) If the Non-Party fails to object or seek a protective order from this court within 14 days
of receiving the notice and accompanying information, the Receiving Party may produce the Non-
Party’s confidential information responsive to the discovery request. If the Non-Party timely seeks a
protective order, the Receiving Party shall not produce any information in its possession or control
that is subject to the confidentiality agreement with the Non-Party before a determination by the
court. Absent a court order to the contrary, the Non-Party shall bear the burden and expense of
seeking protection in this court of its Protected Material.
10. UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE OF PROTECTED MATERIAL
If a Receiving Party learns that, by inadvertence or otherwise, it has disclosed Protected
Material to any person or in any circumstance not authorized under this Protective Order, the
Receiving Party must immediately (a) notify in writing the Designating Party of the unauthorized
disclosures, (b) use its best efforts to retrieve all unauthorized copies of the Protected Material, (c)
inform the person or persons to whom unauthorized disclosures were made of all the terms of this
Order, and (d) request such person or persons to execute the “Acknowledgment and Agreement to
Be Bound” that is attached hereto as Exhibit A.
11. INADVERTENT PRODUCTION OF PRIVILEGED OR OTHERWISE PROTECTED MATERIAL When a Producing Party gives notice to Receiving Parties that certain inadvertently produced material is subject to a claim of privilege or other protection, the obligations of the Receiving Parties are those set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(5)(B). This provision is not intended to modify whatever procedure may be established in an e-discovery order that provides for production without prior privilege review. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 502(d) and (e), insofar as the parties reach an agreement on the effect of disclosure of a communication or information covered by the attorney-client privilege or work product protection, the parties may incorporate their agreement in a stipulated protective order submitted to the court. 12. MISCELLANEOUS 12.1 Right to Further Relief. Nothing in this Order abridges the right of any person to seek its modification by the court in the future.
2145596 - 11 - [PROPOSED] PROTECTIVE ORDER - CASE NO. 5:22-cv-01113-RFL 12.2 Right to Assert Other Objections. No Party waives any right it otherwise would have
to object to disclosing or producing any information or item on any ground not addressed in this
Protective Order. Similarly, no Party waives any right to object on any ground to use in evidence of
any of the material covered by this Protective Order.
12.3 Filing Protected Material. Without written permission from the Designating Party or
a court order secured after appropriate notice to all interested persons, a Party may not file in the
public record in this action any Protected Material. A Party that seeks to file under seal any
Protected Material must comply with Civil Local Rule 79-5. Protected Material may only be filed
under seal pursuant to a court order authorizing the sealing of the specific Protected Material at
issue. Pursuant to Civil Local Rule 79-5, a sealing order will issue only upon a request establishing
that the Protected Material at issue is privileged, protectable as a trade secret, or otherwise entitled
to protection under the law. If a Receiving Party's request to file Protected Material under seal
pursuant to Civil Local Rule 79-5 is denied by the court, then the Receiving Party may file the
information in the public record pursuant to Civil Local Rule 79-5 unless otherwise instructed by
the court.
13. FINAL DISPOSITION
Within 60 days after the final disposition of this action, as defined in paragraph 4, each
Receiving Party must return all Protected Material to the Producing Party or destroy such material.
As used in this subdivision, “all Protected Material” includes all copies, abstracts, compilations,
summaries, and any other format reproducing or capturing any of the Protected Material. Whether
the Protected Material is returned or destroyed, the Receiving Party must submit a written
certification to the Producing Party (and, if not the same person or entity, to the Designating Party)
by the 60 day deadline that (1) identifies (by category, where appropriate) all the Protected Material
that was returned or destroyed and (2) affirms that the Receiving Party has not retained any copies,
abstracts, compilations, summaries or any other format reproducing or capturing any of the
Protected Material. Notwithstanding this provision, Counsel are entitled to retain an archival copy
of all pleadings, motion papers, trial, deposition, and hearing transcripts, legal memoranda,
correspondence, deposition and trial exhibits, expert reports, attorney work product, and consultant
2145596 - 12 - [PROPOSED] PROTECTIVE ORDER - CASE NO. 5:22-cv-01113-RFL and expert work product, even if such materials contain Protected Material. Any such archival
copies that contain or constitute Protected Material remain subject to this Protective Order as set
forth in Section 4 (DURATION).
In the event a dispute arises regarding the disclosure, return, or destruction of Protected
Material, this Court shall have jurisdiction over such dispute, even after final disposition of this litigation as set forth in Section 4 (DURATION). C Pl o a m int m iff e o n p t p e o d se s [ J th R i 1 s a 3 d ] d : it S io ta n t . e Farm proposes this addition.
Dated: October 10, 2025 BMCA LAW GROUP, A P.C.
By JULIA MACHAI COHEN Attorneys for Plaintiff DEBRA COHEN TUDOR
Dated: October 10, 2025 HAYES SCOTT BONINO
By /S/ Stephen P. Ellingson STEPHEN P. ELLINGSON Attorneys for Defendant COMPANY
DATED: ______________, 2025 _____________________________________ HONORABLE RITA F. LIN United States District Judge
2145596 - 13 - [PROPOSED] PROTECTIVE ORDER - CASE NO. 5:22-cv-01113-RFL
I, _____________________________ [print or type full name], of _________________
[print or type full address], declare under penalty of perjury that I have read in its entirety and
understand the Protective Order that was issued by the United States District Court for the Northern
District of California on [date] in the case of ___________ [insert formal name of the case and the
number and initials assigned to it by the court]. I agree to comply with and to be bound by all the
terms of this Protective Order and I understand and acknowledge that failure to so comply could
expose me to sanctions and punishment in the nature of contempt. I solemnly promise that I will not
disclose in any manner any information or item that is subject to this Protective Order to any person
or entity except in strict compliance with the provisions of this Order.
I further agree to submit to the jurisdiction of the United States District Court for the
Northern District of California for the purpose of enforcing the terms of this Protective Order, even
if such enforcement proceedings occur after termination of this action.
I hereby appoint __________________________ [print or type full name] of
_______________________________________ [print or type full address and telephone number]
as my California agent for service of process in connection with this action or any proceedings
related to enforcement of this Protective Order.
Date: ______________________________________
City and State where sworn and signed: _________________________________
Printed name: _______________________________
Signature: __________________________________
2145596 - 14 - [PROPOSED] PROTECTIVE ORDER - CASE NO. 5:22-cv-01113-RFL
Debra Cohen Tudor v. State Farm General Insurance Company, et al. (Debra Cohen Tudor v. State Farm General Insurance Company, et al.) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.