Debra C. Gunn, MD, Obstetrical and Gynecological Associates, P.A. and Obstetrical and Gynecological Associates, PLLC v. Andre McCoy, as Permanent Guardian of Shannon Miles McCoy, an Incapacitated Person

Court of Appeals of Texas·Decided March 5, 2015·No. 14-14-00112-CV·Published

Opinion

THE KLEIN LAW FIRM

ALEXANDER B. KLEIN III 2000 THE LYRIC CENTRE MYRIAM K. LEGGE BOARD CERTIFIED 440 LOUISIANA STREET OF COUNSEL PERSONAL INJURY TRIAL LAW TEXAS BOARD OF LEGAL HOUSTON, TEXAS 77002 SPECIALIZATION (713) 650-1111

ALSO LICENSED IN COLORADO FACSIMILE (713) 227-1121

03/04/15

March 4, 2015

Mr. Christopher A. Prine Via eFiling Clerk, 14th Court of Appeals 301 Fannin Street, Suite 245 Houston, Texas 77002

Re: Appellate Cause No. 14-14-00112-CV; Debra C. Gunn, M.D., Obstetrical and Gynecological Associates, P.A., and Obstetrical and Gynecological Associates, P.L.L.C. vs. Andre McCoy, as Permanent Guardian of Shannon Miles McCoy, an Incapacitated Person; In the Fourteenth Court of Appeals, Houston, Texas

Dear Mr. Prine:

I am writing to provide the McCoy family’s response to the post-submission letter brief submitted by Debra C. Gunn, M.D.

I. Dr. Brewer’s causation testimony is legally sufficient.

The position taken by Dr. Gunn in her letter brief is curious given the fact that she told the jury that she had “no opinions” about the topic of proximate cause1, or the accuracy of Dr. Brewer’s blood loss calculations2. Dr. Gunn testified at trial that she not only lacked the “expertise” to testify about the cause of Shannon’s code and brain damage,3 she also told the jury that, if someone wanted to calculate Shannon’s blood loss on the 14th, they needed to ask Dr. Brewer:

1

RR. Vol. 10, 28:4-15.

2

RR. Vol. 10, 151:7-152:4.

3

RR. Vol. 10, 123:9-16.

Mr. Christopher A. Prine, Clerk March 4, 2015 Page 2

Q: Did you do these calculations?

A: I didn't do those exact calculations. No, sir, I did not.

Q: I see. So if we back up to around 7:27 in the morning where Dr. Brewer had said about 25 percent of the blood volume was lost when her hemoglobin was 5.5. Do you agree or disagree with that number?

A: You would have to ask Dr. Brewer.

RR. Vol. 9, 277:4-11 (emphasis added).

Despite these concessions, Dr. Gunn’s recent correspondence reads more like a pre-trial report from a defense expert explaining her rebuttal points on causation rather than a letter brief on legal sufficiency. Although Dr. Gunn has admitted that she is unqualified to address the issue, her letter brief explores the factual minutiae of Dr. Brewer’s testimony in attempt to convince this Court that Dr. Brewer and the jury got it wrong on causation, but her experts got it right. And, as a result, this Court should find that Dr. Brewer’s causation testimony amounts to no evidence at all.

Dr. Gunn’s argument ignores the fundamental tenet of reviewing a no evidence point on appeal–when causation evidence (e.g., evidence about a disputed fact) falls within the zone of reasonable disagreement, the reviewing appellate court is prohibited from invading the fact finding role of the jury to sustain a no-evidence challenge. City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 822 (Tex. 2005); Morrell v. Finke, 184 S.W.3d 257, 272 (Tex.App.–Fort Worth 2005, pet. denied). Dr. Brewer provided legally sufficient evidence on the issue of proximate cause, and Appellants lost the “battle of the experts” at trial. While Dr. Gunn invites this Court to sit as the thirteenth juror and re-try this case on causation, the invitation to substitute a different decision for the one reached by the jury in this case should be declined.

In a battle of competing experts, the jury has the sole responsibility to determine the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony. Morrell v. Finke, 184 S.W.3d 257, 272 (Tex.App.–Fort Worth 2005, pet. denied). The jury alone gets to decide which expert’s testimony on causation should be accepted or rejected in reaching its verdict. Morrell, 184 S.W.3d at 272; Wilson,

Mr. Christopher A. Prine, Clerk March 4, 2015 Page 3

168 S.W.3d at 822. On appeal, when the losing party complains that the expert testimony the jury relied on to reach its verdict is legally insufficient, the reviewing court is not free to re-weigh the evidence, re-try the case, and set aside the jury’s verdict. Morrell, 184 S.W.3d at 272. This is true even if the reviewing court feels that a different result based on the same evidence is more reasonable. Morrell, 184 S.W.3d at 272.

If Texas law really means what it says, e.g., that all evidence in support of the jury’s finding on proximate cause must be considered in the light most favorable to the verdict; and, all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence concerning proximate cause, including Dr. Brewer’s testimony, must be made in favor of supporting the jury’s verdict, the legal sufficiency challenge to Dr. Brewer’s testimony should be overruled. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d at 821. Nearly twenty-five years ago, this Court made the following observation that provides an enduring backdrop against which Dr. Gunn’s legal sufficiency challenge should be viewed:

Even if we as the reviewing court might view the circumstances of this tragic case contrary to the way the jury did, we cannot become a thirteenth juror and substitute our judgment for theirs. In a battle of competing evidence, it is the sole obligation of the jury to determine the credibility of the witnesses and to weigh their testimony. ... And it is our obligation to see that the process was fair and carried out according to the rules. We cannot under any circumstances re-try the case.

Warner v. Hurt, 834 S.W.2d 404, 408–09 (Tex.App.–Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, no writ); see also Morrell, 184 S.W.3d at 272. Here, the jury was free to believe Dr. Brewer’s causation testimony over the opinions expressed by the defense experts. The jury was free to accept the McCoy’s theory of the case, and to reject Appellants’ theory of the case. In cases like this one, where reasonable jurors could resolve conflicting causation evidence either way, a reviewing court must presume they did so in favor of the prevailing party. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d at 822. Turning now to the specific points argued by Dr. Gunn, the briefing below shows that her no evidence challenge to Dr. Brewer’s testimony should be overruled.

Mr. Christopher A. Prine, Clerk March 4, 2015 Page 4

II. Dr. Gunn’s attempt to establish the incorrectness of Dr. Brewer’s blood loss calculations for the jury misses the mark on proximate cause.

Contrary to Dr. Gunn’s contention, the answer to Justice Boyce’s question is “yes;” there was evidence presented to the jury showing a mechanism of injury independent of Shannon’s blood loss. That mechanism was twofold: (1) Dr. Gunn’s negligent failure to order and administer fresh frozen plasma (“FFP”) to Shannon on the 14th , and (2) the negligent ordering and administration of Lasix–a diuretic drug that caused Shannon to experience fluid volume loss independent of the blood loss she was experiencing from the DIC. Each of these causation mechanisms is discussed below.

A. If Shannon had been administered FFP on the 14th, as required by the standard of care, her blood would have been able to effectively coagulate or clot, stopping the blood loss from the DIC.

Several undisputed facts are relevant to this aspect of Dr. Brewer’s causation testimony. They are as follows:

1. Shannon was suffering from DIC and actively bleeding at the time Dr.

Gunn was caring for her on September 14, 2004.

2. DIC is a blood clotting disorder that compromises the human body’s coagulation mechanism that naturally occurs as a defensive response to bleeding by destroying the clotting factors in the blood.4

3. Shannon’s blood was not coagulating on the 14th because the DIC had depleted or destroyed her clotting factors as evidenced by the abnormal

4 RR. Vol. 8, 160:8-16, 162:7-13, 163:4-15, 164:1-7 (Dr. Brewer’s testimony about how DIC causes the body to consume, not produce, blood clotting factors); RR. Vol. 13, 219:7-10 (Dr. Alexander, Appellants’ maternal fetal medicine expert, testified that DIC causes the destruction of coagulation factors in the blood).

Mr. Christopher A. Prine, Clerk March 4, 2015 Page 5

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Debra C. Gunn, MD, Obstetrical and Gynecological Associates, P.A. and Obstetrical and Gynecological Associates, PLLC v. Andre McCoy, as Permanent Guardian of Shannon Miles McCoy, an Incapacitated Person, (Tex. Ct. App. 2015).

Debra C. Gunn, MD, Obstetrical and Gynecological Associates, P.A. and Obstetrical and Gynecological Associates, PLLC v. Andre McCoy, as Permanent Guardian of Shannon Miles McCoy, an Incapacitated Person (Debra C. Gunn, MD, Obstetrical and Gynecological Associates, P.A. and Obstetrical and Gynecological Associates, PLLC v. Andre McCoy, as Permanent Guardian of Shannon Miles McCoy, an Incapacitated Person) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related

Morrell v. Finke
184 S.W.3d 257 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 2005)
Warner v. Hurt
834 S.W.2d 404 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1992)
City of Keller v. Wilson
168 S.W.3d 802 (Texas Supreme Court, 2005)