IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE NASHVILLE DIVISION
DEBORAH MANEY, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) No. 3:25-cv-01195 v. ) ) JUDGE RICHARDSON WOMEN’S SHELTER, et al., ) MAGISTRATE JUDGE HOLMES ) Defendants. )
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER Pro se Plaintiff Deborah Maney, a resident of Nashville, Tennessee, filed this complaint against “Women’s Shelter” and Jane Doe, “AKA The one who stole my identity”, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. No. 1). I. FILING FEE Plaintiff submitted an Application for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP Application”). (Doc. No. 2). The Court may authorize a person to file a civil suit without paying the filing fee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). Section 1915 is intended to insure that indigent persons have equal access to the judicial system by allowing them to proceed without having to advance the fees and costs associated with litigation. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989); Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 342 (1948). Pauper status does not require absolute destitution. Adkins, 335 U.S. at 339; Foster v. Cuyahoga Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 21 F. App’x 239, 240 (6th Cir. 2001). Rather, the relevant question is “whether the court costs can be paid without undue hardship.” Foster, 21 F. App’x at 240. Proceeding in forma pauperis is a privilege, not a right, and “[t]he decision whether to permit a litigant to proceed [in forma pauperis] is within the Court’s discretion.” Id. According to Plaintiff’s IFP Application, her monthly income totals $967 from Supplemental Social Security payments, she has no cash, she has no money in bank accounts, and her monthly expenses total $875. (Id.) Plaintiff recently acquired housing after having been unhoused for some time. Because her IFP Application reflects that she lacks sufficient financial
resources to pay the full filing fee without undue hardship, the IFP Application (Doc. No. 2) is GRANTED. The Clerk therefore is DIRECTED to file the complaint in forma pauperis. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). II. INITIAL SCREENING STANDARD Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the federal in forma pauperis statute, seeking to “lower judicial access barriers to the indigent.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). In doing so, however, “Congress recognized that ‘a litigant whose filing fees and court costs are assumed by the public, unlike a paying litigant, lacks an economic incentive to refrain from filing frivolous, malicious, or repetitive lawsuits.’” Id. at 31 (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989)). To address this concern, Congress included subsection (e), which requires sua sponte
dismissal of an action upon certain determinations. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court must review her complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). Benson v. O’Brian, 179 F.3d 1014, 1016 (6th Cir. 1999). Under § 1915(e), the Court is required to screen in forma pauperis complaints and dismiss any complaint, or any portion thereof, if the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); see also Hill v. Lappin, 630 F. 3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010). Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that a complaint contain: (1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction, (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the plaintiff is entitled to relief, and (3) a demand for the relief sought. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Although allegations in a pro se complaint are held to “less stringent standards
than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), “liberal construction . . . has limits.” Erwin v. Edwards, 22 F. App’x 579, 580 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing Franklin v. Rose, 765 F.2d 82, 85 (6th Cir. 1985). A pro se complaint must still “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Barnett v. Luttrell, 414 F. App’x 784, 786 (6th Cir. 2011). District courts “have no obligation to act as counsel or paralegal” to pro se litigants. Pliler v. Ford, 542 U.S. 225, 231 (2004). Nor are they “required to create” a pro se litigant’s claim for him or her. Payne v. Secretary of Treasury, 73 F. App’x 836, 837 (6th Cir. 2003).And pro se litigants are not exempt from the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Brown v. Matauszak, 415 F. App’x 608, 613 (6th Cir. 2011). III. ALLEGED FACTS As best the Court can discern,1 in December of 2023 while Plaintiff was staying in the
Women’s Shelter, an unidentified woman stole Plaintiff’s phones and “image.” (Doc. No. 1 at 4). This woman “is living off trillions, billions” that belong to Plaintiff. (Id.) Further, unidentified individuals, referred to by Plaintiff as “they”, “actually killed [Plaintiff].” (Id.) “Jade his son brought [Plaintiff] back to life.” (Id.) However, Plaintiff now is “being squeezed in [her] abdomen stomach areas.” (Id.) People are trying to kill Plaintiff again, and that is why she “need[s] the troops.” (Id. at 5). She asks the Court to “stop the killings.” (Id.)
1 It is difficult to distill Plaintiff’s handwritten statements into coherent narratives and causes of action. IV. SCREENING OF THE IN FORMA PAUPERIS COMPLAINT After conducting the initial screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court finds that Plaintiff’s complaint cannot survive screening under Section 1915(e)(2). Plaintiff’s allegations strain credulity. Thus, Plaintiff’s claims are subject to dismissal as
frivolous or delusional. However, even if Plaintiff had stated claims upon which relief could be granted under Section 1983,2 those claims would be barred by the governing statute of limitations, which is the one-year limitations provisions found in Tennessee Code Annotated § 28-3-104(a). Porter v. Brown, 289 F. App’x 114, 116 (6th Cir. 2008). See Eidson v. Tenn.
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE NASHVILLE DIVISION
DEBORAH MANEY, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) No. 3:25-cv-01195 v. ) ) JUDGE RICHARDSON WOMEN’S SHELTER, et al., ) MAGISTRATE JUDGE HOLMES ) Defendants. )
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER Pro se Plaintiff Deborah Maney, a resident of Nashville, Tennessee, filed this complaint against “Women’s Shelter” and Jane Doe, “AKA The one who stole my identity”, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. No. 1). I. FILING FEE Plaintiff submitted an Application for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP Application”). (Doc. No. 2). The Court may authorize a person to file a civil suit without paying the filing fee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). Section 1915 is intended to insure that indigent persons have equal access to the judicial system by allowing them to proceed without having to advance the fees and costs associated with litigation. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989); Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 342 (1948). Pauper status does not require absolute destitution. Adkins, 335 U.S. at 339; Foster v. Cuyahoga Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 21 F. App’x 239, 240 (6th Cir. 2001). Rather, the relevant question is “whether the court costs can be paid without undue hardship.” Foster, 21 F. App’x at 240. Proceeding in forma pauperis is a privilege, not a right, and “[t]he decision whether to permit a litigant to proceed [in forma pauperis] is within the Court’s discretion.” Id. According to Plaintiff’s IFP Application, her monthly income totals $967 from Supplemental Social Security payments, she has no cash, she has no money in bank accounts, and her monthly expenses total $875. (Id.) Plaintiff recently acquired housing after having been unhoused for some time. Because her IFP Application reflects that she lacks sufficient financial
resources to pay the full filing fee without undue hardship, the IFP Application (Doc. No. 2) is GRANTED. The Clerk therefore is DIRECTED to file the complaint in forma pauperis. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). II. INITIAL SCREENING STANDARD Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the federal in forma pauperis statute, seeking to “lower judicial access barriers to the indigent.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). In doing so, however, “Congress recognized that ‘a litigant whose filing fees and court costs are assumed by the public, unlike a paying litigant, lacks an economic incentive to refrain from filing frivolous, malicious, or repetitive lawsuits.’” Id. at 31 (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989)). To address this concern, Congress included subsection (e), which requires sua sponte
dismissal of an action upon certain determinations. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court must review her complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). Benson v. O’Brian, 179 F.3d 1014, 1016 (6th Cir. 1999). Under § 1915(e), the Court is required to screen in forma pauperis complaints and dismiss any complaint, or any portion thereof, if the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); see also Hill v. Lappin, 630 F. 3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010). Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that a complaint contain: (1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction, (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the plaintiff is entitled to relief, and (3) a demand for the relief sought. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Although allegations in a pro se complaint are held to “less stringent standards
than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), “liberal construction . . . has limits.” Erwin v. Edwards, 22 F. App’x 579, 580 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing Franklin v. Rose, 765 F.2d 82, 85 (6th Cir. 1985). A pro se complaint must still “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Barnett v. Luttrell, 414 F. App’x 784, 786 (6th Cir. 2011). District courts “have no obligation to act as counsel or paralegal” to pro se litigants. Pliler v. Ford, 542 U.S. 225, 231 (2004). Nor are they “required to create” a pro se litigant’s claim for him or her. Payne v. Secretary of Treasury, 73 F. App’x 836, 837 (6th Cir. 2003).And pro se litigants are not exempt from the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Brown v. Matauszak, 415 F. App’x 608, 613 (6th Cir. 2011). III. ALLEGED FACTS As best the Court can discern,1 in December of 2023 while Plaintiff was staying in the
Women’s Shelter, an unidentified woman stole Plaintiff’s phones and “image.” (Doc. No. 1 at 4). This woman “is living off trillions, billions” that belong to Plaintiff. (Id.) Further, unidentified individuals, referred to by Plaintiff as “they”, “actually killed [Plaintiff].” (Id.) “Jade his son brought [Plaintiff] back to life.” (Id.) However, Plaintiff now is “being squeezed in [her] abdomen stomach areas.” (Id.) People are trying to kill Plaintiff again, and that is why she “need[s] the troops.” (Id. at 5). She asks the Court to “stop the killings.” (Id.)
1 It is difficult to distill Plaintiff’s handwritten statements into coherent narratives and causes of action. IV. SCREENING OF THE IN FORMA PAUPERIS COMPLAINT After conducting the initial screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court finds that Plaintiff’s complaint cannot survive screening under Section 1915(e)(2). Plaintiff’s allegations strain credulity. Thus, Plaintiff’s claims are subject to dismissal as
frivolous or delusional. However, even if Plaintiff had stated claims upon which relief could be granted under Section 1983,2 those claims would be barred by the governing statute of limitations, which is the one-year limitations provisions found in Tennessee Code Annotated § 28-3-104(a). Porter v. Brown, 289 F. App’x 114, 116 (6th Cir. 2008). See Eidson v. Tenn. Dep’t of Children’s Servs., 510 F.3d 631, 634 (6th Cir. 2007) (the statute of limitations for a Section 1983 action is the “state statute of limitations applicable to personal injury actions under the law of the state in which the § 1983 claims arise.”). The allegations of the complaint describe events that occurred in 2023, more than one year before Plaintiff filed this action. V. CONCLUSION As explained above, Plaintiff’s in forma pauperis complaint is subject to dismissal under
28 U.S.C. 1915(e). Accordingly, this action is hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Because an appeal would not be taken in good faith, Plaintiff is not certified to pursue an appeal from this judgment in forma pauperis. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). This is the final Order denying all relief in this case. The Clerk SHALL enter judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(b).
2 With respect to Defendant “Women’s Shelter”, the shelter is a building, not a person who can be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Cf. Fuller v. Cocran, No. 1:05-CV-76, 2005 WL 1802415, at *3 (E.D. Tenn. July 27, 2005) (dismissing § 1983 claims against the Bradley County Justice Center on the same basis); Seals v. Grainger County Jail, No. 3:04CV606, 2005 WL 1076326, at *1 (E.D. Tenn. May 6, 2005) (“The Grainger County Jail, however, is not a suable entity within the meaning of § 1983.”). It is so ORDERED.
ELI RICHARDSON UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE