Deborah Maney v. Unknown Assailants, et al.

CourtDistrict Court, M.D. Tennessee
DecidedOctober 30, 2025
Docket3:25-cv-01194
StatusUnknown

This text of Deborah Maney v. Unknown Assailants, et al. (Deborah Maney v. Unknown Assailants, et al.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, M.D. Tennessee primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Deborah Maney v. Unknown Assailants, et al., (M.D. Tenn. 2025).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE NASHVILLE DIVISION

DEBORAH MANEY, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) No. 3:25-cv-01194 v. ) ) JUDGE RICHARDSON UNKNOWN ASSAILANTS, et al., ) MAGISTRATE JUDGE FRENSLEY ) Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER Pro se Plaintiff Deborah Maney, a resident of Nashville, Tennessee, filed this complaint against Unknown Assailant, “Latin Man”, and “White Woman girlfriend.” (Doc. No. 1). I. FILING FEE Plaintiff submitted an Application for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP Application”). (Doc. No. 2). The Court may authorize a person to file a civil suit without paying the filing fee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). Section 1915 is intended to insure that indigent persons have equal access to the judicial system by allowing them to proceed without having to advance the fees and costs associated with litigation. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989); Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 342 (1948). Pauper status does not require absolute destitution. Adkins, 335 U.S. at 339; Foster v. Cuyahoga Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 21 F. App’x 239, 240 (6th Cir. 2001). Rather, the relevant question is “whether the court costs can be paid without undue hardship.” Foster, 21 F. App’x at 240. Proceeding in forma pauperis is a privilege, not a right, and “[t]he decision whether to permit a litigant to proceed [in forma pauperis] is within the Court’s discretion.” Id. According to Plaintiff’s IFP Application, her monthly income totals $967 from Supplemental Social Security payments, she has no cash, she has no money in bank accounts, and her monthly expenses total $875. (Id.) Plaintiff represents that she is homeless and will pick up Court papers at the intake counter. Because her IFP Application reflects that she lacks sufficient

financial resources to pay the full filing fee without undue hardship, the IFP Application (Doc. No. 2) is GRANTED. The Clerk therefore is DIRECTED to file the complaint in forma pauperis. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). II. INITIAL SCREENING STANDARD Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the federal in forma pauperis statute, seeking to “lower judicial access barriers to the indigent.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). In doing so, however, “Congress recognized that ‘a litigant whose filing fees and court costs are assumed by the public, unlike a paying litigant, lacks an economic incentive to refrain from filing frivolous, malicious, or repetitive lawsuits.’” Id. at 31 (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989)). To address this concern, Congress included subsection (e), which requires sua sponte

dismissal of an action upon certain determinations. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court must review her complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). Benson v. O’Brian, 179 F.3d 1014, 1016 (6th Cir. 1999). Under § 1915(e), the Court is required to screen in forma pauperis complaints and dismiss any complaint, or any portion thereof, if the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); see also Hill v. Lappin, 630 F. 3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010). Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that a complaint contain: (1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction, (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the plaintiff is entitled to relief, and (3) a demand for the relief sought. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Although allegations in a pro se complaint are held to “less stringent standards

than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), “liberal construction . . . has limits.” Erwin v. Edwards, 22 F. App’x 579, 580 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing Franklin v. Rose, 765 F.2d 82, 85 (6th Cir. 1985). A pro se complaint must still “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Barnett v. Luttrell, 414 F. App’x 784, 786 (6th Cir. 2011). District courts “have no obligation to act as counsel or paralegal” to pro se litigants. Pliler v. Ford, 542 U.S. 225, 231 (2004). Nor are they “required to create” a pro se litigant’s claim for him or her. Payne v. Secretary of Treasury, 73 F. App’x 836, 837 (6th Cir. 2003).And pro se litigants are not exempt from the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Brown v. Matauszak, 415 F. App’x 608, 613 (6th Cir. 2011). III. ALLEGED FACTS

The complaint alleges that Plaintiff was the victim in a “Brothers” case. (Doc. No. 1 at 4). The “Latin man” and his friends “terrorized” Plaintiff, claiming to be “the brother using Brother’s body image until [Plaintiff] made him confess[;] he killed the Brother unlawfully [and] used his body [for] unlawful embediment [sic].” (Id.) The complaint further alleges that two “Brothers” were “run over from/by a white man in white truck. The white woman in this lawsuit set the brother up not to [sic] long after the white brother motorcycle got hit. She paid [and] sent a group of Black motorcycle men to take out the brother.” (Id.) According to the complaint, “the Latin man male female has a victim’s vagina – saying he’s male and female. The white woman is copying me making fun of the killing of the two white motorcycle brothers.” (Id. at 5). The complaint seeks money damages “for the Brothers wrongful death case,” punitive damages, and an injunction. (Id.)

IV. SCREENING OF THE IN FORMA PAUPERIS COMPLAINT After conducting the initial screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court finds that Plaintiff’s complaint cannot survive screening under Section 1915(e)(2). First, Plaintiff’s claims are barred by res judicata. Res judicata or “claim preclusion prevents parties from raising issues that could have been raised and decided in a prior action— even if they were not actually litigated.” Lucky Brand Dungarees, Inc. v. Marcel Fashions Grp., 590 U.S. 405, 412 (2020). See Brownback v.

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Related

Adkins v. E. I. DuPont De Nemours & Co.
335 U.S. 331 (Supreme Court, 1948)
Haines v. Kerner
404 U.S. 519 (Supreme Court, 1972)
Neitzke v. Williams
490 U.S. 319 (Supreme Court, 1989)
Denton v. Hernandez
504 U.S. 25 (Supreme Court, 1992)
Pliler v. Ford
542 U.S. 225 (Supreme Court, 2004)
Hill v. Lappin
630 F.3d 468 (Sixth Circuit, 2010)
Roy Brown v. Linda Matauszak
415 F. App'x 608 (Sixth Circuit, 2011)
Geoffrey Benson v. Greg O'Brian
179 F.3d 1014 (Sixth Circuit, 1999)
Robert Barnett v. Mark Luttrell, Jr.
414 F. App'x 784 (Sixth Circuit, 2011)
Brownback v. King
592 U.S. 209 (Supreme Court, 2021)
Erwin v. Edwards
22 F. App'x 579 (Sixth Circuit, 2001)
Payne v. Secretary of the Treasury
73 F. App'x 836 (Sixth Circuit, 2003)

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Deborah Maney v. Unknown Assailants, et al., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/deborah-maney-v-unknown-assailants-et-al-tnmd-2025.