Deborah Lacy v. Vanderbilt University Medical Center

CourtCourt of Appeals of Tennessee
DecidedApril 1, 2019
DocketM2018-00832-COA-R3-CV
StatusPublished

This text of Deborah Lacy v. Vanderbilt University Medical Center (Deborah Lacy v. Vanderbilt University Medical Center) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Tennessee primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Deborah Lacy v. Vanderbilt University Medical Center, (Tenn. Ct. App. 2019).

Opinion

04/01/2019 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT NASHVILLE March 5, 2019 Session

DEBORAH LACY v VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY MEDICAL CENTER ET AL.

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Davidson County No. 15C-3855 Thomas W. Brothers, Judge ___________________________________

No. M2018-00832-COA-R3-CV ___________________________________

The trial court held that Appellant failed to meet her burden to prove her claims of assault and battery. Appellant appealed. Due to the deficiencies in Appellant’s appellate brief, we do not reach Appellant’s substantive issues and dismiss the appeal.

Tenn. R. App. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court is Dismissed.

KENNY ARMSTRONG, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which J. STEVEN STAFFORD, P.J., W.S., and ARNOLD B. GOLDIN, J., joined.

Deborah Lacy, Madison, Tennessee, appellant, Pro Se.

Sara F. Reynolds and Ashley B. Tipton, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellees, Vanderbilt University Medical Center, Bethany Bowman, Gerimiha Emerson.

OPINION

I. Background

This is the second appeal of this case. As set out in our previous opinion, Lacy v. Vanderbilt Univ. Med. Ctr., No. M2016-02014-COA-R3-CV, 2017 WL 6273316, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 4, 2017) (“Lacy I”), Deborah Lacy (“Appellant”) filed suit against Vanderbilt University Medical Center (“VUMC”), Bethany Bowman, and Geremiha Emerson, M.D. (together the “Appellees”). Appellant’s complaint filed on October 21, 2015 averred that Appellees beat her during the course of her admission to the emergency room at VUMC on October 22, 2014. Appellant also alleged that she had been misdiagnosed. Appellees filed a motion to dismiss on grounds that Appellant failed to satisfy the pre-suit notice and certificate of good faith requirements for healthcare liability actions. In Lacy I, we affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of Appellant’s health care liability claims, but reversed the trial court’s dismissal of her non-health care liability claims, i.e., assault and battery claims. Id. at *8.

Following remand from this Court, Ms. Lacy propounded discovery on Appellees. As is relevant to this appeal, Ms. Lacy asked Appellees for the names of “Chelsea the care giver” and the “transport person,” who allegedly transported Lacy from the emergency room to the radiology department on October 22, 2014. Appellees notified Ms. Lacy that Chelsea Lampley was the care giver. However, Appellees were unable to procure the name of the transport person. Nonetheless, Ms. Lacy filed a motion to compel the identity of the transport person. The trial court denied the motion to compel after determining that Appellees had taken adequate steps to identify the person.

VUMC filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that it could not be held liable for the alleged beatings by its employees as such action would be outside the scope of their employment, and, therefore, respondeat superior did not apply. The trial court granted the motion. At the hearing on VUMC’s summary judgment motion, the parties discussed that Appellees Bowman and Emerson were the only remaining defendants because they were the only defendants who had been named in the complaint and served with process. Ms. Lacy then moved to amend her complaint to add Chelsea Lampley and Steven Seaman. Appellees opposed the motion to amend. The trial court ultimately denied Ms. Lacy’s motion finding that amendment would be futile because all claims against Lampley and Seaman were time-barred.

The case proceeded to hearing on May 21, 2018. Ms. Lacy was the only witness to testify during her case in chief. During her testimony, Ms. Lacy offered a packet of documents into evidence. The documents included medical records from her Vanderbilt admission on October 22, 2014; medical records and photographs relating to alleged assaults by other health care providers; a December 2014 letter from Vanderbilt’s Office of Patient Relations; written discovery responses; and other medical records. Appellees opposed admission of these items on grounds of relevance and hearsay. The trial court sustained Appellees’ objections. On May 31, 2018, following the hearing, the trial court entered its order. The trial court held that Ms. Lacy failed to meet her burden to prove her claims of assault and battery. Ms. Lacy appeals.

II. Discussion

Ms. Lacy raises several issues for review. However, her statement of the issues is rambling and largely incoherent. Because Ms. Lacy’s brief fails to comport with the requirements of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, we do not reach her substantive issues.

-2- We are cognizant that Ms. Lacy is proceeding pro se in this appeal. Courts should take into account that many pro se litigants have no legal training and little familiarity with the judicial system. Garrard v. Tenn. Dep’t of Corr., No. M2013-01525-COA-R3- CV, 2014 WL 1887298, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 8, 2014)(internal citations omitted). Therefore, the courts give pro se litigants who are untrained in the law a certain amount of leeway in drafting their pleadings and briefs. Whitaker v. Whirlpool Corp., 32 S.W.3d 222, 227 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000); Paehler v. Union Planters Nat’l Bank, Inc., 971 S.W.2d 393, 397 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997). “Pro se litigants who invoke the complex and technical procedures of the courts assume a very heavy burden.” Irvin v. City of Clarksville, 767 S.W.2d 649, 652 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989). While a party who chooses to represent himself or herself is entitled to the fair and equal treatment of the courts, Hodges v. Tenn. Att’y Gen., 43 S.W.3d 918, 920 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000), “[p]ro se litigants are not . . . entitled to shift the burden of litigating their case to the courts.” Whitaker, 32 S.W.3d at 227. Instead, pro se litigants are held to the same procedural and substantive standards to which lawyers must adhere. Diggs v. Lasalle Nat. Bank Assoc., et al., 387 S.W. 3d 559, 563 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2012); Brown v. Christian Bros. University, No. W2012-01336-COA-R3-CV, 2013 WL 3982137, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 5, 2013), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Jan. 15, 2014).

Here, Appellees argue that Ms. Lacy waived the issues raised in her appeal by failing to comply with the requirements of Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 27 and Tennessee Court of Appeals Rule 6. According to Appellees, Appellant’s brief is incoherent and “the only discernable portion of [Appellant’s] brief is the complete lack of citations to the record or relevant legal authority.” The contents of appellate briefs are governed by Rule 27 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. According to the rule, the Appellant’s brief shall contain:

(7) An argument, which may be preceded by a summary of argument, setting forth: (A) the contentions of the appellant with respect to the issues presented, and the reasons therefor, including the reasons why the contentions require appellate relief, with citations to the authorities and appropriate references to the record (which may be quoted verbatim) relied on; and (B) for each issue, a concise statement of the applicable standard of review (which may appear in the discussion of the issue or under a separate heading placed before the discussion of the issues);

Tenn. R. App. P. 27(a).

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Related

Kim Brown v. Christian Brothers University
428 S.W.3d 38 (Court of Appeals of Tennessee, 2013)
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387 S.W.3d 559 (Court of Appeals of Tennessee, 2012)
Charlotte Scott Forbess v. Michael E. Forbess
370 S.W.3d 347 (Court of Appeals of Tennessee, 2011)
Sneed v. Board of Professional Responsibility
301 S.W.3d 603 (Tennessee Supreme Court, 2010)
Bean v. Bean
40 S.W.3d 52 (Court of Appeals of Tennessee, 2000)
Whitaker v. Whirlpool Corp.
32 S.W.3d 222 (Court of Appeals of Tennessee, 2000)
Branum v. Akins
978 S.W.2d 554 (Court of Appeals of Tennessee, 1998)
Hodges v. Tennessee Attorney General
43 S.W.3d 918 (Court of Appeals of Tennessee, 2000)
Paehler v. Union Planters National Bank, Inc.
971 S.W.2d 393 (Court of Appeals of Tennessee, 1997)
Irvin v. City of Clarksville
767 S.W.2d 649 (Court of Appeals of Tennessee, 1988)
Crowe v. Birmingham & Northwestern Railway Co.
1 S.W.2d 781 (Tennessee Supreme Court, 1928)

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Bluebook (online)
Deborah Lacy v. Vanderbilt University Medical Center, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/deborah-lacy-v-vanderbilt-university-medical-center-tennctapp-2019.