Deborah Hopkins v. USA

• Court: District Court, D. New Hampshire
• Decided: November 12, 2000
• Docket: CV-00-418-B
• Status: Published

Opinion

Deborah Hopkins v. USA CV-00-418-B 11/12/00

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Deborah Curtis Hopkins

v. Civil No. 00-418-B Opinion No. 2000DNH241 United States of America

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Deborah Curtis Hopkins pro se moves, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 2255, to vacate or set aside the sentence imposed on her by the

court. She argues that the court lacked the authority to

sentence her to an additional term of supervised release

following her reimprisonment for violating the conditions of her

initial term. Because Hopkins’ argument is premised on a flawed

reading of Johnson v . United States, 120 S.Ct. 1795 (2000), I

dismiss her motion.

I. BACKGROUND

In August 1994, Hopkins pled guilty to the federal crime of

conspiracy to possess, with the intent to distribute, cocaine and cocaine base. On June 2 3 , 1995, this court sentenced her to

thirty-six months imprisonment followed by a four-year period of

supervised release.

Hopkins filed a motion to vacate her sentence, pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 2255, on December 4 , 1995, alleging that her guilty

plea was tainted. The court denied her motion.

On February 2 5 , 1998, Hopkins was released from prison and

began serving her period of supervised release. After a hearing

on February 1 4 , 2000, the court found that Hopkins had violated

the terms of her supervised release. The court subsequently

sentenced Hopkins to six months imprisonment to be followed by a

two-year period of supervised release. She did not appeal this

decision. Hopkins filed the instant motion on September 1 , 2000.

II. DISCUSSION

28 U.S.C. § 2255 provides, in relevant part, that:

“[a] prisoner in custody under sentence of a [federal] court . . . claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution

-2- or laws of the United States . . . may move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside, or correct the sentence.”

Hopkins satisfies the threshold requirements of § 2255. See

United States v . Barrett, 178 F.3d 3 4 , 42 (1st Cir. 1999).

The government opposes Hopkins’ motion on procedural and

substantive grounds. I assume for purposes of analysis that:

(1) the instant motion is Hopkins’ first § 2255 motion and

therefore is not subject to the certification requirements of §

2255; and (2) Hopkins had cause for not raising her present

argument on direct appeal. Notwithstanding these assumptions, I

conclude that this case must be dismissed because Hopkins’

argument is based on an incomplete reading of Johnson.

Hopkins argues that the court lacked the authority to impose

an additional term of supervised release after she violated her

initial term. She bases her entire argument on the following

language from Johnson: Ҥ 3583(h) [which authorizes courts to

impose an additional term of supervised release following the

reimprisonment of those who violate the conditions of an initial

-3- term] applies only to cases in which that initial offense

occurred after . . . September 1 3 , 1994," the date of enactment.

120 S.Ct. at 1802. She goes on to say that since her initial

offense occurred prior to September 1 3 , 1994, § 3583(h) does not

apply to her. Therefore, she argues, the court lacked the

authority to reimpose supervised release. Moreover, she contends

that to the extent that the court applied § 3583(h) to her

retroactively, such action was in violation of the Ex Post Facto

Clause of the Constitution. See U.S. Const. Art. I , § 9, c l . 3 .

Hopkins’ argument fails because she neglects to put the

above-quoted language from Johnson in the context of the entire

opinion. In Johnson, the Supreme Court faced an Ex Post Facto

Clause challenge to the retroactive application of 18 U.S.C. §

3583(h). 120 S.Ct. at 1798. The Supreme Court found no need to

resolve the Ex Post Facto Clause issue, however, because it

concluded that Congress did not intend for § 3583(h) to apply

retroactively. Id. at 1801-02.

-4- The Court was then left with the question of whether federal

law prior to the enactment of § 3583(h), specifically 18 U.S.C. §

3583(e)(3), authorized district courts to impose an additional

term of supervised release following reimprisonment for violating

the conditions of an initial term. See id. at 1802. The Circuit

Courts of Appeal had split on the issue, with the majority of

Circuits concluding that § 3583(e)(3) did not grant courts that

power. See id. at 1799 n.2.

The Court ultimately sided with the minority position and

concluded that district courts had the authority under §

3583(e)(3) to order terms of supervised release following

reimprisonment. Id. at 1807. Thus, Johnson does not support

Hopkins’ motion, rather it forecloses her entire line of

argument. Based on Johnson, the court had the authority under §

3583(e)(3) to sentence Hopkins to her current term of supervised

release. See United States v . Bermudez-Plaza, 221 F.3d 231, 233-

34 (1st Cir. 2000). Accordingly, I dismiss Hopkins’ motion.

-5- CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, I dismiss Hopkins’ motion (Doc.

N o . 1 ) with prejudice.

SO ORDERED.

Paul Barbadoro Chief Judge

November 1 2 , 2000

cc: Deborah Curtis Hopkins, pro se Peter E . Papps, Esq.

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