Deborah Elizabeth Gouch-Onassis (Formerly Foster) v. Charles Ray Foster, Sr.

Opinion

Cite as 2026 Ark. App. 361 ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION II

No. CV-25-434

DEBORAH ELIZABETH GOUCH- Opinion Delivered August 19, 2026

ONASSIS (FORMERLY FOSTER)

APPEAL FROM THE SEBASTIAN APPELLANT

COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, FORT SMITH DISTRICT

V. [NO. 66FDR-02-51]

CHARLES RAY FOSTER, SR. HONORABLE SHANNON L. BLATT, APPELLEE JUDGE

AFFIRMED

ROBERT J. GLADWIN, Judge

Appellant Deborah Elizabeth Foster (Gouch-Onassis) appeals from an order of the Sebastian County Circuit Court granting the motion of appellee Charles Ray Foster, Sr., to dismiss her request to reopen their 2002 divorce case. This is Deborah’s second appeal to this court on related issues. See Foster v. Foster, 96 Ark. App. 109, 239 S.W.3d 1 (2006). We affirm.

I. Background Facts

The parties were divorced September 6, 2002, by a decree granting an absolute divorce, dividing the property and debts, and granting temporary custody to appellee. No visitation or child support was awarded at that time. As stated in the decree, the circuit court retained jurisdiction “of this matter and the parties to make further orders in the future as may be proper in law and equity.” Id. at 110, 239 S.W.3d at 2. In 2005, Deborah sought a portion of Charles’s military retirement to which he became entitled after the decree was filed. She also sought

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alimony from Charles. On August 9, 2005, the circuit court entered an order stating that Deborah’s motion was barred by res judicata; thus, she was not entitled to a portion of Charles’s military retirement. Deborah appealed, and this court affirmed the circuit court’s order holding that res judicata barred review. See Foster, supra.

On January 27, 2025, Deborah filed a motion to reopen the divorce proceedings requesting that certain portions of the divorce decree regarding property division be modified, including, but not limited to, her entitlement to half of Charles’s military retirement. In response, Charles filed a motion to dismiss arguing that Deborah’s request should be denied and motion dismissed on the basis of res judicata, collateral estoppel, and the statute of limitations. The circuit court entered its order on May 15, 2025, dismissing the action with prejudice. Deborah timely appealed the order of dismissal; this appeal followed.

II. Standard of Review

When the issues on appeal do not involve factual questions but rather the application of the legal doctrine of res judicata, this court simply determines whether the appellee was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Daily v. Langham, 2017 Ark. App. 310, 522 S.W.3d 177. When a complaint is dismissed on a question of law, this court conducts a de novo review; the circuit court’s ruling is given no deference on appeal. Duggar v. City of Springdale, 2020 Ark. App. 220, 599 S.W.3d 672.

III. Discussion

Here, after the court held a hearing on Charles’s request to dismiss on the basis of res judicata, the circuit court granted his request and dismissed the case with prejudice. No factual findings were made.

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Res judicata means that “a thing or matter has been definitely and finally settled and determined on its merits by the decision of a court of competent jurisdiction.” Baptist Health v. Murphy, 2010 Ark. 358, at 7, 373 S.W.3d 267, 278. The claim-preclusion aspect of res judicata bars relitigation of a subsequent suit when (1) the first suit resulted in a final judgment on the merits; (2) the first suit was based on proper jurisdiction; (3) the first suit was fully contested in good faith; (4) both suits involve the same claim or cause of action; and (5) both suits involve the same parties or their privies. Id. Res judicata bars relitigation of not only claims that were actually litigated in the first suit but also those that could have been litigated. Id. When a case is based on the same events as the subject matter of a previous lawsuit, res judicata will apply even if the subsequent lawsuit raises new legal issues and seeks additional remedies. Id.

On appeal, Deborah raises a litany of issues regarding her entitlement to years’ worth of alimony and Charles’s military retirement benefits. As discussed above, this court has already held that the divorce decree herein was a final judgment and that res judicata prevents the relitigation of any issues that Deborah raised in 2002 or that she could have raised. See Foster, supra. Therefore, we decline to further address this matter. Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court’s order of dismissal with prejudice.

Affirmed.

TUCKER and BARRETT, JJ., agree.

Deborah Elizabeth Gouch-Onassis, pro se appellant.

Gean, Gean & Gean, by: David Charles Gean, for appellee.