Deborah Cooney v. Molly Dwyer

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: July 2, 2025
• Docket: 23-15236
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUL 2 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

DEBORAH COONEY, No. 23-15236

Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 4:21-cv-01721-YGR

v. MEMORANDUM* MOLLY C. DWYER, Clerk of Court, United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Individually and in Her Official Capacity; et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted June 18, 2025**

Before: WALLACE, O’SCANNLAIN, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges

Deborah Cooney (“Cooney”) appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Accordingly, Cooney’s motion for oral argument is denied. See Dkt. No. 68. dismissing her action against more than 140 defendants, including Molly Dwyer,

Susan Soong, former governors, cities and counties, law firms and attorneys, state-

court judges and court staff, public utilities, corporations and executives, banks,

insurance companies, churches, unions, landlords, and others.

In 2012, Cooney filed a previous action, Cooney v. California Public Utilities

Commission, et al., Case No. 4:12-cv-06466-CWS (hereinafter, “Cooney I”), in the

U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. There, Cooney asserted

the State of California, the California Public Utilities Commission (“CPUC”),

former California Attorney General Kamala Harris, former CPUC President Michael

Peevey, and Itron, Inc. installed “harmful radiation devices” known as “Smart

Meters” on her home and in her community, causing her serious harm. The district

court dismissed these claims, and we dismissed Cooney’s subsequent appeal as

frivolous.

In 2018, Cooney filed a second action, Cooney v. City of San Diego, et al.,

Case No. 18-cv-01860-JSW (hereinafter, “Cooney II”), in the Northern District of

California, alleging “fraud on the court” related to the district court judgments

against her in Cooney I, and that defendants conspired to deprive her of numerous

rights. In that action, Cooney named nearly 90 defendants, including the defendants

from Cooney I, governors, judges, cities and counties, law firms and attorneys,

public utilities, corporations and executives, and churches. The district court granted

2 Cooney leave to amend but ultimately dismissed the action with prejudice for failure

to meet federal pleading standards. Cooney appealed, and we dismissed the appeal

as frivolous.

Cooney filed this action on March 11, 2021, alleging fraud regarding the

judgments against her in Cooney I, Cooney II, and various state-court actions, among

other allegations of conspiracies to deprive her of numerous rights. In her First

Amended Complaint, Cooney named more than 140 defendants, including Molly

Dwyer, Clerk of the Court for the Ninth Circuit, and Susan Soong, former Clerk of

the Court for the Northern District of California; former governors; cities and

counties; law firms and attorneys; state-court judges and court staff; public utilities;

unions; corporations and executives; banks; insurance companies; churches;

landlords; and others. The district court dismissed Cooney’s claims and denied in

part her motion for costs of service. Cooney appeals.1

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo the district

court’s dismissal for failure to state a claim, res judicata, and personal immunity.

See, e.g., Steinle v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 919 F.3d 1154, 1160 (9th Cir.

1 The parties have filed several requests for this court to take judicial notice of court records from prior proceedings and information contained on government websites. See Dkt. Nos. 94, 145, 149, 152. Insofar as these requests pertain to relevant court records and government websites, we grant judicial notice of the existence of such documents. See Fed. R. Evid. 201(d); see also United States v. Howard, 381 F.3d 873, 876 n.1 (9th Cir. 2004); Ariz. Libertarian Party v. Reagan, 798 F.3d 723, 727 n.3 (9th Cir. 2015).

3 2019) (failure to state a claim); Maldonado v. Harris, 370 F.3d 945, 949 (9th Cir.

2004) (res judicata); Acres Bonusing, Inc. v. Marston, 17 F.4th 901, 907 (9th Cir.

2021) (personal immunity).

We review for an abuse of discretion the district court’s denial of leave to

amend. Walker v. Beard, 789 F.3d 1125, 1139 (9th Cir. 2015). We also review for

abuse of discretion denial of motion for costs of service. Estate of Darulis v. Garate,

401 F.3d 1060, 1063 (9th Cir. 2005).

We affirm.

1. Dismissal of Claims Against Dwyer and Soong. The district court did not

err in dismissing Cooney’s claims against Dwyer and Soong because they are

entitled to quasi-judicial immunity since Dwyer’s and Soong’s purported

misconduct relates to tasks “inexorably connected” with a judicial function and are

therefore “within the realm of activities protected by quasi-judicial immunity.” Fort

v. Washington, 41 F.4th 1141, 1146 (9th Cir. 2022) (citation and internal quotation

marks omitted); see also Acres Bonusing, Inc v. Marston, 17 F.4th 901, 916 (9th Cir.

2021), quoting Mullis v. U.S. Bankr. Ct. for Dist. of Nevada, 828 F.2d 1385, 1390

(9th Cir. 1987) (“Court clerks have absolute quasi-judicial immunity from damages

for civil rights violations when they perform tasks that are an integral part of the

judicial process.”); In re Castillo, 297 F.3d 940, 952–53 (9th Cir. 2002) (explaining

that controlling and managing the docket, scheduling, and noticing proceedings are

4 part of the judicial function).

2. Dismissal for Failure to State a Claim and Based on Res Judicata. The

district court did not err in dismissing Cooney’s remaining claims because they are

all either insufficiently pled or barred by res judicata. Cooney’s various claims are

difficult to follow and are unsupported by facts. Cooney’s conclusory allegations

do not meet federal pleading standards and were properly dismissed, as Cooney

failed to establish any plausible connection between the defendants and the events,

and included no facts indicating when any event happened, which defendant caused

it, or how any defendant caused her alleged injury. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.

662, 678 (2009), citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007).

In any event, Cooney’s claims are also barred by res judicata as she previously

raised the same allegations against nearly all the same defendants in her prior

actions, each of which resulted in a final judgment on the merits. See Owens v.

Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc., 244 F.3d 708, 713 (9th Cir. 2001), quoting W.

Radio Servs. Co. v. Glickman, 123 F.3d 1189, 1192 (9th Cir. 1997) (“‘Res judicata,

also known as claim preclusion, bars litigation in a subsequent action of any claims

that were raised or could have been raised in the prior action.’ The doctrine is

applicable whenever there is ‘(1) an identity of claims, (2) a final judgment on the

merits, and (3) identity or privity between the parties.’”). As such, the district court

correctly dismissed her claims.

5 3. Denial of Leave to Amend. The district court did not abuse its discretion

in denying Cooney leave to amend her claims because amendment would be futile.

See, e.g., Walker v. Beard, 789 F.3d 1125, 1139 (9th Cir. 2015) (explaining that a

district court does not abuse its discretion in denying leave amend where no

amendment would cure the deficiency). Indeed, there are no facts that Cooney could

plead to cure her claims as they are all barred by either quasi-judicial immunity or

res judicata.

4. Denial In Part of Cooney’s Motion for Costs of Service. The district court

did not abuse its discretion in denying in part Cooney’s motion for costs of service

because Cooney failed to meet her burden of showing that she properly served

defendants with a request for waiver. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(1) (setting forth

requirements to serve a request for waiver of a service of a summons); Brockmeyer

v. May, 383 F.3d 798, 801 (9th Cir. 2004) (explaining that the plaintiff bears the

burden of showing that service was proper); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(1) (stating

that a plaintiff may follow state law for serving a summons); Cal. Civ. Proc. Code

§ 415.30 (setting forth requirements for service of a summons under California law).

5. Cooney’s Remaining Arguments. Cooney’s remaining arguments that

(a) her request for a preliminary injunction is not moot, (b) the district court erred in

dismissing 52 defendants who had not yet appeared and in failing to enter default

against these defendants, and (c) the judgment is “void” for various reasons,

6 including lack of personal and subject matter jurisdiction, are meritless. First, the

district court properly dismissed as moot Cooney’s request for a preliminary

injunction given that the court had dismissed all of Cooney’s claims. See Bayer v.

Neiman Marcus Grp., Inc., 861 F.3d 853, 864 (9th Cir. 2017) (“‘A request for

injunctive relief remains live only so long as there is some present harm left to

enjoin.’” (citation omitted)). Second, the district court did not err in dismissing

various defendants and not entering judgment against them because Cooney failed

to serve most, if not all, of these defendants and she was therefore not entitled to

default against them. Finally, Cooney’s argument that the judgment is “void” for

various reasons is completely unsupported by facts and legal authority.

Consequently, we reject her remaining arguments.

AFFIRMED.