Deborah Bray v. Radwan R. Khuri, M.D.

523 S.W.3d 619, 2017 WL 2856697, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 396
CourtTennessee Supreme Court
DecidedJuly 5, 2017
DocketW2015-00397-SC-R11-CV
StatusPublished
Cited by18 cases

This text of 523 S.W.3d 619 (Deborah Bray v. Radwan R. Khuri, M.D.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Tennessee Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Deborah Bray v. Radwan R. Khuri, M.D., 523 S.W.3d 619, 2017 WL 2856697, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 396 (Tenn. 2017).

Opinion

OPINION

Sharon G. Lee, J.,

delivered the opinion of the Court,

in which Jeffrey S. Bivins, C.J., Cornelia A. Clark, Holly Kirby, and Roger A. Page, JJ., joined.

Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26~121(a)(2)(E)requires a person who asserts a potential claim for healthcare liability to include with pre-suit notice a HI-PAA-compliant 1 medical authorization permitting the healthcare provider who receives the notice to obtain complete medical records “from each other provider being sent the notice.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121(a)(2)(E). Here, the plaintiff sent pre-suit notice of her claim to a single healthcare provider and included a medical authorization. After the plaintiff filed suit, the defendant healthcare provider moved to dismiss, asserting the plaintiff had failed to provide a HIPAA-compliant medical authorization. The trial court granted the motion, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. We hold that a prospective plaintiff who provides pre-suit notice to one potential defendant is not required under Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121(a)(2)(E) to provide the single potential defendant with a HIPAA-compliant medical authorization. We reverse the judgments of the trial court and the Court of Appeals and remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings.

I.

Between the evening of March 25 and the morning of March 26, 2003, Nigel Bray committed suicide at Saint Francis Hospital in Memphis. Dr. Radwan Khuri provided psychiatric care to Mr. Bray from the time of his hospital admission on March 20 until his death less than a week later.

In March 2004, Deborah Bray, Mr. Bray’s surviving spouse, filed a healthcare liability case against Dr. Khuri alleging negligence in the care and treatment of Mr. Bray. In May 2010, after the parties had engaged in pretrial discovery, Mrs. Bray voluntarily dismissed the suit.

In May 2011, Mrs. Bray sent Dr. Khuri pre-suit notice of her healthcare liability claim as required by section 29-26-121(a)(1). The pre-suit notice letter advised Dr. Khuri of a potential claim by Mrs. Bray for the wrongful death of her husband arising out of the medical and psychiatric treatment Dr. Khuri provided to Mr. Bray at Saint Francis Hospital. The notice, which included a medical authorization signed by Mrs. Bray, stated that Dr. Khuri was the only healthcare provider receiving the notice.

In September 2011, Mrs. Bray filed a healthcare liability suit against Dr. Khuri. Dr. Khuri moved to dismiss the case, asserting that Mrs. Bray had failed to provide a HIPAA-compliant medical authorization under section 29-26-121(a)(2)(E). Dr. Khuri argued that because the authorization was incomplete and not HIPAA-com- *621 pliant, 2 he could not discuss Mr. Bray’s medical records with counsel to prepare a defense to the potential claim. Mrs. Bray responded, in part, that no authorization was required under section 29-26-121(a)(2)(E) because Dr. Khuri was the only healthcare provider to whom she sent pre-suit notice.

The trial court granted Dr. Khuri’s motion and dismissed the complaint, finding that the authorization provided by Mrs. Bray did not comply with HIPAA and did not substantially comply with the requirements of Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121(a)(2)(E). Further, the trial court ruled that Dr. Khuri was prejudiced by Mrs. Bray’s deficient authorization because he could not use Mr. Bray’s records to prepare a. defense. The trial court concluded that it was not determinative that Dr. Khuri was the only defendant and may have had the records.

The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Mrs. Bray was required to furnish a HIPAA-compliant authorization with the pre-suit notice even though Dr. Khuri was the only healthcare provider notified of the claim. Bray v. Khuri, No. W2015-00397-COA-R3-CV, 2015 WL 7775316, at *3, *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 3, 2015). The Court of Appeals reasoned that the goal of section 29-26-121(a)(2)(E) is to allow a defendant to gain early access to a plaintiff’s medical records to evaluate the substantive merits of the claim. Id. at *3 (quoting Stevens ex rel. Stevens v. Hickman Cmty. Health Care Servs., Inc., 418 S.W.3d 547, 555 (Tenn. 2013)). The Court of Appeals concluded that even though Dr. Khuri may have physically possessed the decedent’s records, he could not review them with counsel to evaluate the merits of-the claim absent a HIPAA-compliant authorization. Id. The Court of Appeals'further held that the authorization failed to substantially comply with HIPAA requirements. Id. at *3-4.

We granted Mrs. Bray’s application for permission to appeal.

II.

This case involves an interpretation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121(a)(2)(E), which is a question of law we review de novo. See Stevens, 418 S.W.3d at 553 (citing Pratcher v. Methodist Healthcare Memphis Hosps., 407 S.W.3d 727, 734 (Tenn. 2013)). “[0]ur role is to ascertain and effectuate the legislature’s intent.” Id. (citing Sullivan ex rel. Hightower v. Edwards Oil Co., 141 S.W.3d 544, 547 (Tenn. 2004)). We do not broaden or restrict a statute’s intended meaning, and we presume that the legislature' intended to give each word of the statute its full effect. Id. (citing Garrison v. Bickford, 377 S.W.3d 659, 663 (Tenn. 2012); In re Estate of Trigg, 368 S.W.3d 483, 490 *622 (Tenn. 2012)). When statutory language is clear and unambiguous, we accord the language its plain meaning, understood in its. ordinary and accepted usage, without a forced interpretation. Foster v. Chiles, 467 S.W.3d 911, 914 (Tenn. 2015) (citing Baker v. State, 417 S.W.3d 428, 433 (Tenn. 2013)); Stevens, 418 S.W.3d at 553 (citing Glassman, Edwards, Wyatt, Tuttle & Cox, P.C. v. Wade, 404 S.W.3d 464, 467 (Tenn. 2013)).

Tennessee Code Annotated section -29-26421(a)(1) provides that a person “asserting a potential claim for health care liability shall give written notice of the potential claim to each health care provider that will be a named defendant at least sixty (60) days before the filing of a complaint....” Tenn. Code Ann.

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Bluebook (online)
523 S.W.3d 619, 2017 WL 2856697, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 396, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/deborah-bray-v-radwan-r-khuri-md-tenn-2017.