Debbie Fryman

CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, E.D. Kentucky
DecidedJuly 24, 2019
Docket18-20660
StatusUnknown

This text of Debbie Fryman (Debbie Fryman) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, E.D. Kentucky primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Debbie Fryman, (Ky. 2019).

Opinion

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY COVINGTON DIVISION

IN RE

DEBBIE FRYMAN CASE NO. 18-20660

DEBTOR AMENDED MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER SUSTAINING TRUSTEE’S CLAIM OBJECTION AND DENYING CREDITOR’S MOTION TO EXTEND TIME TO FILE CLAIM

An unscheduled creditor seeks an extension of time to file a proof of claim pursuant to Rule 3002(c)(6)(A).1 Debtor omitted the creditor not only from her schedules, but also from her mailing list required by Rule 1007(a). The plain text of these Rules compels a conclusion that the requested extension must be denied. I. BACKGROUND. The facts in this matter are not disputed. Debtor filed this voluntary chapter 13 bankruptcy case on May 15, 2018. She filed her schedules and a list of creditors with the petition. She did not include Kentucky Tax Lien Fund, LLC (“Creditor”) on her schedules or her list of creditors. The deadline for filing proofs of claim was July 25, 2018. Creditor did not receive notice of the bankruptcy case prior to this deadline. Debtor’s plan was confirmed August 14, 2018, and does not provide for Creditor’s claim. Creditor filed its untimely proof of claim on January 14, 2019, asserting a claim in the amount of $2,599.19, secured by a tax lien on Debtor’s real property. The Chapter 13 Trustee objected to the claim [ECF No. 39], arguing that it must be disallowed as untimely pursuant to

1 References to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure appear as “Rule _.” Unless otherwise indicated, all chapter and section references are to the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1532. § 502(b)(9). In response, Creditor moved for an extension of time to file its claim pursuant to Rule 3002(c)(6)(A). [ECF No. 42.] Creditor argues this Rule provides grounds for an extension because Debtor failed to timely file a complete list of her creditors. The Trustee responds [ECF No. 53] that Rule 3002(c)(6)(A) does not permit a court to extend the filing deadline when a debtor timely files a list of creditors that merely omits a creditor. Creditor

filed a reply. [ECF No. 54.] The Court held a hearing on March 13, 2019. The matter is fully briefed and ripe for a decision. II. ANALYSIS. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b), and venue is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1409(a). This is a core proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(B) and the Court has authority to enter a final order. There is no dispute if Creditor’s Motion is not granted, Creditor’s untimely claim must be disallowed. 11 U.S.C. §502(b)(9).

Rule 9006(b)(3) governs a request for an enlargement of time within which to file certain documents. A court may extend the time within which to file proofs of claim “only to the extent and under the conditions stated in [Rule 3002(c)].” FED. R. BANKR. P. 9006(b)(3). Rule 3002(c)(6)(A) provides: (6) On motion filed by a creditor before or after the expiration of the time to file a proof of claim, the court may extend the time by not more than 60 days from the date of the order granting the motion. The motion may be granted if the court finds that: (A) the notice was insufficient under the circumstances to give the creditor a reasonable time to file a proof of claim because the debtor failed to timely file the list of creditors’ names and addresses required by Rule 1007(a)….

FED. R. BANKR. P. 3002(c)(6)(A). At issue here is the interpretation of the clause “because the debtor failed to timely file the list of creditors’ names and addresses required by Rule 1007(a).” Id. Rule 1007(a) requires that a debtor in a voluntary case file “a list containing the name and address of each entity included or to be included on Schedules D, E/F, G and H as prescribed by the Official Forms.” FED. R. BANKR. P. 1007(a)(1). Hereinafter, this list is referred to as the “Mailing List.”

Creditor argues that the Mailing List is not timely filed as required by Rule 1007(a) if it omits the creditor requesting an extension. Trustee argues that the omission of a single creditor from the Mailing List does not entitle that creditor to an extension, claiming there are other remedies when a debtor omits a creditor from her schedules. The parties rely on two out-of- circuit decisions that seemingly reach opposite conclusions. Creditor cites to In re Mazik, 592 B.R. 812 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2018). In Mazik, the debtor scheduled Chicago Title Insurance Company (“Chicago Title”) on Schedule E/F and timely filed a Mailing List that omitted Chicago Title. Granting Chicago Title’s request for an extension to file its claim, the court reasoned that “the omission of the creditor from the filed list constitutes a

failure to comply with the requirement in Rule 1007(a) that the list include the name and address ‘of each entity included or to be included on Schedules D, E/F, G and H.’” Id. at 818 (quoting FED. R. BANKR. P. 1007(a)(1). In response, Trustee relies on In re Wulff, 598 B.R. 459 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2019). In Wulff, the debtor timely filed schedules and a Mailing List, both of which included creditors CNH Capital America LLC and CNH Industrial Capital America LLC. However, both the schedules and the Mailing List used the wrong address for these creditors. Id. at 462. Although recognizing that the CNH creditors did not receive adequate notice, the court relied on the plain text of Rule 3002(c)(6)(A) and held that an extension of time was improper because the debtor timely filed the Mailing List. Id. at 465. The parties rely on the disposition of these cases to support their contrasting positions. But the disposition in both cases is consistent with the plain text of Rule 3002(c)(6)(A), which supports only one interpretation in this case. A. The Plain Text of the Bankruptcy Rules Supports Trustee’s Objection.

When analyzing a law, courts generally start with the “plain meaning rule,” which requires enforcing the plain meaning of the text. See Lamie v. U.S. Tr., 540 U.S. 526, 534 (2004) (explaining that courts must follow the “plain meaning” of a statute). The “plain meaning rule” applies when interpreting procedural rules, such as the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. See Rogers v. Laurain (In re Laurain), 113 F.3d 595, 597 (6th Cir. 1997) (interpreting Rule 4003 and holding that courts interpreting a rule of procedure must start with the “plain meaning” of the language). The text of Rule 3002(c)(6)(A) references Rule 1007(a), which requires that a debtor file a list “containing the name and address of each entity included or to be included on Schedules D,

E/F, G and H as prescribed by the Official Forms.” FED. R. BANKR. P. 1007(a)(1). Under a plain reading, Rule 1007(a) requires all scheduled creditors to be on the Mailing List, but it does not require unscheduled creditors to be on the Mailing List.2 The Mailing List is driven by the debtor’s schedules. Therefore, the failure to include an unscheduled creditor in the Mailing List does not expressly or implicitly violate Rule 1007(a).

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Lamie v. United States Trustee
540 U.S. 526 (Supreme Court, 2004)
Carter v. Welles-Bowen Realty, Inc.
553 F.3d 979 (Sixth Circuit, 2009)
In re Mazik
592 B.R. 812 (E.D. Pennsylvania, 2018)
In re Wulff
598 B.R. 459 (E.D. Wisconsin, 2019)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Debbie Fryman, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/debbie-fryman-kyeb-2019.