U.S. FDILISETDR IINC TT HCEO URT 1 EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
Sep 30, 2025 2
3 SEAN F. MCAVOY, CLERK
5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 7 CARROLL D., No. 4:24-CV-5120-JAG 8 Plaintiff, 9 v. ORDER AFFIRMING DECISION OF THE ALJ 10 FRANK BISIGNANO, 11 Commissioner of Social Security,
12 Defendant. 13 14 BEFORE THE COURT is Plaintiff’s Opening Brief and the 15 Commissioner’s Brief in response. ECF Nos. 7, 10. Attorney Maren A. Bam 16 represents Plaintiff; Special Assistant United States Attorney Thomas E. Chandler 17 represents the Commissioner of Social Security (Defendant). The parties have 18 consented to proceed before the undersigned by operation of Local Magistrate 19 20 Judge Rule (LMJR) 2(b)(2), as no party returned a Declination of Consent Form to 21 the Clerk’s Office by the established deadline. ECF No. 2. After reviewing the 22 administrative record and briefs filed by the parties, the Court AFFIRMS the 23 ALJ’s decision. 24 I. JURISDICTION 25 Plaintiff filed applications for Disability Insurance Benefits and 26 Supplemental Security Income on October 21, 2021, alleging disability since 27 August 15, 2020 due to MDD, hypothyroidism, bipolar disorder, hips, right eye, 28 and hearing. Tr. 59. Plaintiff’s claim was denied initially and on reconsideration, and she requested a hearing before an administrative law judge (ALJ). Tr. 78-79. 1 2 A hearing was held on December 18, 2023, at which vocational expert Patricia 3 Ayerza, and Plaintiff, who was represented by Andrew Scott Youngman, a non- 4 attorney representative, and Peter Natale, a non-attorney representative, testified. 5 Tr. 17. ALJ Caroline Siderius presided. Tr. 16. The ALJ denied benefits on 6 January 12, 2024, and issued a written decision on January 19, 2024. Tr. 14, 17- 7 28. The Appeals Council denied review. Tr. 1. The ALJ’s decision became the 8 final decision of the Commissioner, which is appealable to the district court 9 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Plaintiff filed this action for judicial review on 10 September 24, 2024. ECF No. 1. 11 II. STATEMENT OF FACTS 12 The facts of the case are set forth in detail in the transcript of proceedings 13 and the ALJ’s decision and are only briefly summarized here. Plaintiff was born in 14 1965 and was nearly 55 years old on the alleged onset date. Tr. 59. Plaintiff 15 previously worked as a delivery driver, a school bus driver, and a dispatcher. 16 Tr. 26. 17 III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 18 The ALJ is responsible for determining credibility, resolving conflicts in 19 medical testimony, and resolving ambiguities. Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 20 1039 (9th Cir. 1995). The ALJ’s determinations of law are reviewed de novo, with 21 deference to a reasonable interpretation of the applicable statutes. McNatt v. Apfel, 22 23 201 F.3d 1084, 1087 (9th Cir. 2000). The decision of the ALJ may be reversed 24 only if it is not supported by substantial evidence or if it is based on legal error. 25 Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir. 1999). Substantial evidence is 26 defined as being more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance. Id. at 27 1098. Put another way, substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a 28 reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). If the evidence is susceptible to more than one 1 2 rational interpretation, the Court may not substitute its judgment for that of the 3 ALJ. Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1097; Morgan v. Commissioner of Social Sec. Admin., 4 169 F.3d 595, 599 (9th Cir. 1999). If substantial evidence supports the 5 administrative findings, or if conflicting evidence supports a finding of either 6 disability or non-disability, the ALJ’s determination is conclusive. Sprague v. 7 Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 1229-1230 (9th Cir. 1987). Nevertheless, a decision 8 supported by substantial evidence will be set aside if the proper legal standards 9 were not applied in weighing the evidence and making the decision. Brawner v. 10 Secretary of Health and Human Services, 839 F.2d 432, 433 (9th Cir. 1988). 11 IV. SEQUENTIAL EVALUATION PROCESS 12 The Commissioner follows a five-step sequential evaluation process for 13 determining whether a person is disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a), 416.920(a); 14 see Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140-42 (1987). In steps one through four, the 15 burden of proof rests upon the claimant to establish a prima facie case of 16 entitlement to disability benefits. Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1098-99. This burden is 17 met once a claimant establishes that a physical or mental impairment prevents him 18 from engaging in past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4). 19 If a claimant cannot do their past relevant work, the ALJ proceeds to step five, and 20 the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show that: (1) the claimant can make an 21 adjustment to other work; and (2) the claimant can perform specific jobs that exist 22 23 in the national economy. Batson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 24 1193-94 (9th Cir. 2004). If a claimant cannot make an adjustment to other work in 25 the national economy, the claimant will be found disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 26 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 416.920(a)(4)(v). 27 28 1 V. ADMINISTRATIVE FINDINGS 2 On January 19, 2024, the ALJ issued a decision finding Plaintiff was not 3 disabled as defined in the Social Security Act. Tr. 28. 4 At step one, ALJ Siderius found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial 5 gainful activity since August 15, 2020. Tr. 19. 6 At step two, the ALJ found Plaintiff had the severe impairments of bipolar 7 disorder and anxiety. Tr. 19. 8 At step three, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff does not have an impairment 9 or combination of impairments that meets or medically equal one of the listed 10 impairments in 20 C.F.R., Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 11 404.1525, 404.1526, 416.920(d), 416.925 and 416.926). Tr. 20. 12 The ALJ also found that Plaintiff has the residual functional capacity 13 (“RFC”) to perform medium work, with the following limitations: 14 claimant should not walk on uneven surfaces or be exposed to 15 unprotected heights, occasionally climb ladders, ropes, and scaffolds, 16 frequently climb ramps and stairs, frequently stoop, kneel, crouch and crawl, should not be exposed to more than ordinary office level noises; 17 limited to simple, routine and repetitive tasks; occasional contact with 18 coworkers, and superficial and brief contact with the general public. 19 Tr 22.
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U.S. FDILISETDR IINC TT HCEO URT 1 EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
Sep 30, 2025 2
3 SEAN F. MCAVOY, CLERK
5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 7 CARROLL D., No. 4:24-CV-5120-JAG 8 Plaintiff, 9 v. ORDER AFFIRMING DECISION OF THE ALJ 10 FRANK BISIGNANO, 11 Commissioner of Social Security,
12 Defendant. 13 14 BEFORE THE COURT is Plaintiff’s Opening Brief and the 15 Commissioner’s Brief in response. ECF Nos. 7, 10. Attorney Maren A. Bam 16 represents Plaintiff; Special Assistant United States Attorney Thomas E. Chandler 17 represents the Commissioner of Social Security (Defendant). The parties have 18 consented to proceed before the undersigned by operation of Local Magistrate 19 20 Judge Rule (LMJR) 2(b)(2), as no party returned a Declination of Consent Form to 21 the Clerk’s Office by the established deadline. ECF No. 2. After reviewing the 22 administrative record and briefs filed by the parties, the Court AFFIRMS the 23 ALJ’s decision. 24 I. JURISDICTION 25 Plaintiff filed applications for Disability Insurance Benefits and 26 Supplemental Security Income on October 21, 2021, alleging disability since 27 August 15, 2020 due to MDD, hypothyroidism, bipolar disorder, hips, right eye, 28 and hearing. Tr. 59. Plaintiff’s claim was denied initially and on reconsideration, and she requested a hearing before an administrative law judge (ALJ). Tr. 78-79. 1 2 A hearing was held on December 18, 2023, at which vocational expert Patricia 3 Ayerza, and Plaintiff, who was represented by Andrew Scott Youngman, a non- 4 attorney representative, and Peter Natale, a non-attorney representative, testified. 5 Tr. 17. ALJ Caroline Siderius presided. Tr. 16. The ALJ denied benefits on 6 January 12, 2024, and issued a written decision on January 19, 2024. Tr. 14, 17- 7 28. The Appeals Council denied review. Tr. 1. The ALJ’s decision became the 8 final decision of the Commissioner, which is appealable to the district court 9 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Plaintiff filed this action for judicial review on 10 September 24, 2024. ECF No. 1. 11 II. STATEMENT OF FACTS 12 The facts of the case are set forth in detail in the transcript of proceedings 13 and the ALJ’s decision and are only briefly summarized here. Plaintiff was born in 14 1965 and was nearly 55 years old on the alleged onset date. Tr. 59. Plaintiff 15 previously worked as a delivery driver, a school bus driver, and a dispatcher. 16 Tr. 26. 17 III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 18 The ALJ is responsible for determining credibility, resolving conflicts in 19 medical testimony, and resolving ambiguities. Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 20 1039 (9th Cir. 1995). The ALJ’s determinations of law are reviewed de novo, with 21 deference to a reasonable interpretation of the applicable statutes. McNatt v. Apfel, 22 23 201 F.3d 1084, 1087 (9th Cir. 2000). The decision of the ALJ may be reversed 24 only if it is not supported by substantial evidence or if it is based on legal error. 25 Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir. 1999). Substantial evidence is 26 defined as being more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance. Id. at 27 1098. Put another way, substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a 28 reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). If the evidence is susceptible to more than one 1 2 rational interpretation, the Court may not substitute its judgment for that of the 3 ALJ. Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1097; Morgan v. Commissioner of Social Sec. Admin., 4 169 F.3d 595, 599 (9th Cir. 1999). If substantial evidence supports the 5 administrative findings, or if conflicting evidence supports a finding of either 6 disability or non-disability, the ALJ’s determination is conclusive. Sprague v. 7 Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 1229-1230 (9th Cir. 1987). Nevertheless, a decision 8 supported by substantial evidence will be set aside if the proper legal standards 9 were not applied in weighing the evidence and making the decision. Brawner v. 10 Secretary of Health and Human Services, 839 F.2d 432, 433 (9th Cir. 1988). 11 IV. SEQUENTIAL EVALUATION PROCESS 12 The Commissioner follows a five-step sequential evaluation process for 13 determining whether a person is disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a), 416.920(a); 14 see Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140-42 (1987). In steps one through four, the 15 burden of proof rests upon the claimant to establish a prima facie case of 16 entitlement to disability benefits. Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1098-99. This burden is 17 met once a claimant establishes that a physical or mental impairment prevents him 18 from engaging in past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4). 19 If a claimant cannot do their past relevant work, the ALJ proceeds to step five, and 20 the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show that: (1) the claimant can make an 21 adjustment to other work; and (2) the claimant can perform specific jobs that exist 22 23 in the national economy. Batson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 24 1193-94 (9th Cir. 2004). If a claimant cannot make an adjustment to other work in 25 the national economy, the claimant will be found disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 26 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 416.920(a)(4)(v). 27 28 1 V. ADMINISTRATIVE FINDINGS 2 On January 19, 2024, the ALJ issued a decision finding Plaintiff was not 3 disabled as defined in the Social Security Act. Tr. 28. 4 At step one, ALJ Siderius found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial 5 gainful activity since August 15, 2020. Tr. 19. 6 At step two, the ALJ found Plaintiff had the severe impairments of bipolar 7 disorder and anxiety. Tr. 19. 8 At step three, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff does not have an impairment 9 or combination of impairments that meets or medically equal one of the listed 10 impairments in 20 C.F.R., Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 11 404.1525, 404.1526, 416.920(d), 416.925 and 416.926). Tr. 20. 12 The ALJ also found that Plaintiff has the residual functional capacity 13 (“RFC”) to perform medium work, with the following limitations: 14 claimant should not walk on uneven surfaces or be exposed to 15 unprotected heights, occasionally climb ladders, ropes, and scaffolds, 16 frequently climb ramps and stairs, frequently stoop, kneel, crouch and crawl, should not be exposed to more than ordinary office level noises; 17 limited to simple, routine and repetitive tasks; occasional contact with 18 coworkers, and superficial and brief contact with the general public. 19 Tr 22. 20 At step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff could not perform past relevant 21 work as a delivery driver, school bus driver, and dispatcher. Tr. 26. 22 At step five, the ALJ found that, based on the testimony of the vocational 23 expert, and considering Plaintiff’s age, education, work experience, and RFC, 24 Plaintiff was capable of performing jobs that existed in significant numbers in the 25 national economy, including the jobs of cleaner, sexton, and routing clerk. Tr. 27. 26 The ALJ thus concluded Plaintiff was not under a disability within the meaning of 27 28 the Social Security Act at any time from the alleged onset date through the date of 1 2 the decision. Tr. 28. 3 VI. ISSUES 4 The question presented is whether substantial evidence exists to support the 5 ALJ's decision denying benefits and, if so, whether that decision is based on proper 6 legal standards. Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred by failing to designate 7 Plaintiff’s hearing loss in one ear and his ankle pain as “severe” at step two. ECF 8 No. 7 at 13-18. 9 VII. DISCUSSION 10 “At step two, the ALJ assesses whether the claimant has a medically severe 11 impairment or combination of impairments that significantly limits his ability to do 12 basic work activities.” Webb v. Barnhart, 433 F.3d 683, 686 (9th Cir. 2005). “An 13 impairment or combination of impairments is not severe if it does not significantly 14 limit your physical or mental ability to do basic work activities. 20 C.F.R. 15 § 404.1522(a) (West 2025). Basic work activities means “the abilities and 16 aptitudes necessary to do most jobs,” including “walking, standing” and 17 “[c]apacities for seeing, hearing, and speaking.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1522(b)(1) and 18 (2) (West 2025). An impairment or combination of impairments can be found “not 19 severe” only if the evidence establishes a slight abnormality that has “no more than 20 a minimal effect on an individuals ability to work.” Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 21 1273, 1290 (9th Cir. 1996). “[T]he ALJ must consider the combined effect of all 22 23 of the claimant's impairments on her ability to function, without regard to whether 24 each alone was sufficiently severe.” Id. 25 At step two, the ALJ examined all the medically determinable conditions 26 alleged by Plaintiff and found only Plaintiff’s bipolar disorder and anxiety as 27 “severe” impairments after also considering Plaintiff’s vision and hearing issues 28 and hip and ankle issues. Tr. 19-20. The ALJ found Plaintiff’s vision and hearing loss were correctable with the use of glasses and hearing aids and opined that 1 2 neither Plaintiff’s vision nor hearing issues were severe impairments. Tr. 20. As 3 for the ankle (and hip) pain, the ALJ examined the medical record prior to 4 discounting ankle pain as a severe impairment. Tr. 20. Nonetheless, despite 5 finding that neither Plaintiff’s hearing loss nor Plaintiff’s ankle pain were severe 6 impairments, the ALJ still included limitations in the Residual Functional Capacity 7 findings that accounted for the impairments of ankle pain and hearing loss. Tr. 23- 8 24. 9 The ALJ’s failure to designate hearing loss and hip/ankle pain as severe 10 constitutes error, however, the error was harmless due to inclusion of limitations in 11 the RFC that addressed those medical impairments. The ALJ failed to consider 12 hearing loss in one ear and Plaintiff’s ankle/hip pain in conjunction with all 13 medically determinable conditions but instead examined each condition separately. 14 When considered along with other conditions, the ALJ should have found 15 Plaintiff’s ankle/hip pain to be severe at step two because the pain limited his 16 ability to walk and stand. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1522(b)(1). Similarly, the ALJ 17 should have considered hearing loss in one ear as medically severe when 18 considered in conjunction with other impairments because hearing loss impaired 19 Plaintiff’s capacity for hearing, 20 C.F.R. § 404.1522(b)(2), although the ALJ 20 noted that much of that loss could be remedied through use of hearing aids. Tr. 20. 21 Despite this failure, the ALJ recognized that the hearing loss as well as the 22 23 ankle/hip pain impaired Plaintiff’s ability to do basic work activities so included 24 limitations in the RFC that addressed these medical impairments. Consequently, 25 although the ALJ technically erred, the ALJ’s decision of nondisability did not rely 26 upon the error. ALJ errors in social security cases are harmless, if they are 27 “inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability determination” and the reviewing 28 court can “confidently conclude that no reasonable ALJ, when fully crediting the 1 || testimony [at issue], could have reached a different disability determination.” 9|| Marsh v. Colvin, 792 F.3d 1170, 1173 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Stout v. 3|| Commissioner of Social Sec. Admin., 454 F.3d 1050, 1055-56 (9th Cir. 2006). 4|| Accordingly, any error by the ALJ in assessing these impairments as “not severe” 5|| at step two rather than considering the combined effect of all of Plaintiff's 6|| impairments was functionally remedied by including limitations in the Residual 7|| Functional Capacity findings that still accounted for the non-severe impairments of ankle pain and hearing loss. In other words, including limitations for these 9 impairments at Step Five had the same functional result as making the initial 10 finding that the impairments, in combination, were severe, when making the disability determination. Since the error of finding ankle pain and hearing loss 12 were not severe at step two was inconsequential to the ultimate finding of non- I3 disability, the error was harmless. VU. CONCLUSION '° Having reviewed the record and the ALJ's findings, the Court concludes the : ALJ's decision is supported by substantial evidence and is not based on harmful
12 error. Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED: 19 1. Defendant’s request to affirm the ALJ’s decision, ECF No. 10, is 0 GRANTED. 1 2. Plaintiff's request to remand, ECF No. 7 is DENIED. 72 The District Court Executive is directed to file this Order and provide a copy 73 || to counsel. Judgment shall be entered for Defendant and the file shall be 24|| CLOSED. 25 DATED September 30, 2025.
Aas ae JAMES A. GOEKE 28 Quy UNI STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE