Dease v. Daniels

CourtDistrict Court, D. Nevada
DecidedFebruary 1, 2021
Docket3:21-cv-00009
StatusUnknown

This text of Dease v. Daniels (Dease v. Daniels) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Nevada primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Dease v. Daniels, (D. Nev. 2021).

Opinion

3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

4 DISTRICT OF NEVADA

5 * * *

6 WESLEY FRANK DEASE, Case No. 3:21-cv-00009-MMD-CLB

7 Petitioner, ORDER v. 8 CHARLES DANIELS, et al., 9 Respondents. 10 11 I. SUMMARY 12 This is a habeas corpus action under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner Wesley Dease 13 has submitted an application to proceed in forma pauperis, a petition for a writ of habeas 14 corpus, and a motion for appointment of counsel. (ECF Nos. 1; 1-1; 1-1 at 50-53.) The 15 Court grants the application to proceed in forma pauperis because Petitioner is unable to 16 pay the filing fee. The Court has reviewed the petition under Rule 4 of the Rules 17 Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts. Petitioner will need 18 to show cause as to why the Court should not dismiss his petition for failure to exhaust 19 state-court remedies. Additionally, the Court denies Petitioner’s motion for appointment 20 of counsel. 21 II. BACKGROUND 22 On November 8, 1985, Petitioner was convicted of four counts of sexual assault 23 and two counts of sexual assault on a victim 65 years of age or older. (ECF No. 1-1 at 24 16.) The state district court imposed eight consecutive sentences of life imprisonment 25 with eligibility for parole beginning after a minimum of five years. (Id.) Six of those 26 sentences were for the counts of sexual assault under the version of NRS § 200.366 in 27 effect at the time, and two of those sentences were enhancements for the age of the 28 victim under the version of NRS § 193.167 in effect at the time. 2 1 at 36.) In 2017, Petitioner was paroled institutionally from his second sentence. (Id.) On 3 August 29, 2018, Petitioner elected to have his sentences aggregated under NRS § 4 213.1212(3) (2014). That section stated, in relevant part: 5 [A] prisoner who is serving consecutive sentences which have not been aggregated may, by submitting a written request to the Director of the 6 Department of Corrections, make an irrevocable election to have the sentences aggregated. If the prisoner makes such an irrevocable election 7 to have the sentences aggregated and . . .

8 (b) the prisoner has been considered for parole on one or more of the sentences, the Department of Corrections shall aggregate only the 9 sentences for which parole has not been considered. The Board [of Parole Commissioners] is not required to consider the prisoner for parole on the 10 aggregated sentences until the prisoner has served the minimum aggregate term of imprisonment. 11 12 NRS § 213.1212(3) (2014). Because Petitioner had been considered for parole on two of 13 his sentences, the Department of Corrections aggregated six sentences. Because 14 Petitioner's sentences had maximum terms of life imprisonment, his five-year minimum 15 eligibilities for parole were aggregated into a 30-year minimum eligibility for parole. 16 Petitioner’s maximum term of life imprisonment remained the same. See NRS 17 § 176.035(2)(b) (2014). 18 Petitioner commenced a civil rights action in the Seventh Judicial District Court of 19 the State of Nevada. That court converted Petitioner’s complaint to a post-conviction 20 habeas corpus petition that challenged the computation of time. (ECF No. 1-1 at 28.) The 21 state district court concluded that although Petitioner pleaded guilty to six separate 22 counts, two of those counts carried automatic enhancements that were equal and 23 consecutive to the primary sentences. Therefore, the six counts resulted in eight 24 sentences. (ECF No. 1-1 at 37.) Second, the state district court concluded that under 25 NRS § 213.1212(5)1 only the sentences for which Petitioner had not been considered for 26 parole may be aggregated; the aggregated minimum term does not retroactively apply to 27 sentences for which parole has been considered or granted. Thus, the correct aggregated 28 1An amendment in 2019 renumbered § 213.1212(3) to § 213.1212(5). 2 37.) Petitioner did not appeal. 3 III. LEGAL STANDARD 4 Before a federal court may consider a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the 5 petitioner must exhaust the remedies available in state court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b). 6 To exhaust a ground for relief, a petitioner must fairly present that ground to the state’s 7 highest court, describing the operative facts and legal theory, and give that court the 8 opportunity to address and resolve the ground. See Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 9 (1995) (per curiam); Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982). 10 IV. DISCUSSION 11 Petitioner admits that he did not appeal the state district court's decision on any of 12 these grounds. (ECF No. 1-1 at 1, 4, 6, 8.) He states that he miscalculated the deadline 13 to file an appeal. While that explains why Petitioner has failed to exhaust his state-court 14 remedies, it does not cure the failure to exhaust those remedies. Petitioner must show 15 cause as to why this Court should not dismiss this action for his failure to exhaust state- 16 court remedies. 17 Petitioner has also filed a motion for appointment of counsel. Whenever the Court 18 determines that the interests of justice so require, counsel may be appointed to any 19 financially eligible person who is seeking habeas corpus relief. See 18 U.S.C. § 20 3006A(a)(2)(B). "[T]he district court must evaluate the likelihood of success on the merits 21 as well as the ability of the petitioner to articulate his claims pro se in light of the complexity 22 of the legal issues involved." Weygandt v. Look, 718 F.2d 952 (9th Cir. 1983). There is 23 no constitutional right to counsel in federal habeas proceedings. See McCleskey v. Zant, 24 499 U.S. 467, 495 (1991). The factors to consider are not separate from the underlying 25 claims, but are intrinsically enmeshed with them. See Weygandt, 718 F.2d at 954. Having 26 reviewed the petition, the Court concludes that appointment of counsel is not warranted. 27 /// 28 /// |) V. CONCLUSION 2 It is therefore ordered that Petitioner's application to proceed in forma pauperis 3 || (ECF No. 1) is granted. Petitioner need not pay the $5.00 filing fee. 4 The Clerk of Court is directed to file the petition for a writ of habeas corpus (ECF 5 || No. 1-1). 6 The Clerk of Court is further directed to file Petitioner's motion for appointment of 7 || counsel (ECF No. 1-1 at 50-53). 8 It is further ordered that Petitioner's motion for appointment of counsel (ECF No. 9 || 1-1 at 50-53) is denied. 10 It is further ordered that Petitioner will have 30 days from the date of entry of this 11 || order to show cause as to why the Court should not dismiss this action for Petitioner's 12 || failure to exhaust his available remedies in the state courts. Failure to comply with this 13 || order will result in the dismissal of this action.

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Related

Anderson v. Harless
459 U.S. 4 (Supreme Court, 1982)
McCleskey v. Zant
499 U.S. 467 (Supreme Court, 1991)
Duncan v. Henry
513 U.S. 364 (Supreme Court, 1995)

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Dease v. Daniels, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/dease-v-daniels-nvd-2021.