Deandre Maurice Adams v. Commonwealth of Kentucky

• Court: Court of Appeals of Kentucky
• Decided: October 3, 2025
• Docket: 2024-CA-1008
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

RENDERED: OCTOBER 3, 2025; 10:00 A.M. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Commonwealth of Kentucky Court of Appeals NO. 2024-CA-1008-MR

DEANDRE MAURICE ADAMS APPELLANT

APPEAL FROM KENTON CIRCUIT COURT v. HONORABLE KATHLEEN LAPE, JUDGE ACTION NO. 22-CR-00899

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE

OPINION AFFIRMING

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BEFORE: CALDWELL, COMBS, AND EASTON, JUDGES.

COMBS, JUDGE: In this criminal appeal, Deandre Maurice Adams challenges the

judgment of the Kenton Circuit Court sentencing him to serve ten-years’

imprisonment. A jury convicted him of possession of a handgun by a convicted

felon in violation of Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 527.040 and of being a

persistent felony offender pursuant to the provisions of KRS 532.080. Adams

argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence and by failing to grant his motion for directed verdict. He also contends -- for the first

time -- that the provisions of KRS 527.040 (criminalizing possession of a firearm

by a convicted felon) are unconstitutional as applied. After our review, we affirm.

In the early morning hours of August 2, 2022, Officer Sean Dooley of

the Villa Hills Police Department spotted a vehicle swerving out of its lane of

travel along I-75 in Kenton County. A complaint had been lodged earlier that

indicated that this vehicle was being driven erratically. Officer Dooley initiated a

traffic stop. He immediately detected the odor of marijuana emanating from the

vehicle. He also saw a “commercial style marijuana product” in a jar on the dash.

Deandre Adams of Douglasville, Georgia, was driving the vehicle.

Adams indicated that the vehicle was his delivery van and that he was traveling

through Northern Kentucky from Baltimore to St. Matthews with a stopover in

Cincinnati to visit with his son. Officer Dooley explained to Adams that

possession of marijuana was illegal in Kentucky and that because he smelled it and

saw it in plain view, he had probable cause to search the vehicle.

When Officer Dooley asked about the possession of weapons, Adams

assured him that there were no weapons in the vehicle. However, inside a bag that

he took from between the driver and passenger seats, Officer Dooley found a 9mm

handgun with a hollow point round in the chamber and 15 rounds in the magazine;

another jar of marijuana; a pair of men’s slippers; and miscellaneous toiletries,

-2- including a bottle of men’s cologne. Despite its contents, Adams explained that

the bag belonged to his girlfriend and that the handgun was hers. Adams admitted

that he was a convicted felon, and he was arrested.

Adams was indicted, and in December 2022, he filed a motion to

suppress the incriminating evidence. Adams argued that the evidence had been

discovered by Officer Dooley as a result of an illegal search that violated his rights

as guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

Specifically, Adams contended that the search of the entirety of his vehicle

exceeded the scope of a warrantless search permitted incident to his arrest. But he

did not contend that Officer Dooley lacked probable cause to conduct the search

pursuant to the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. The trial court

denied the motion.

Some months later, the trial began. Adams stipulated that he was a

convicted felon. After a jury was seated and opening statements were concluded,

Officer Dooley took the stand. He testified about the events of the early morning

hours of August 2 as summarized above and his body-worn camera footage was

shown to the jury. An expert witness was called to discuss the nature of the

handgun.

When the Commonwealth announced that its case-in-chief was

complete, Adams moved for a directed verdict. Counsel declined to announce the

-3- basis of that motion. Instead, he “explain[ed] that he would ‘submit’ the motion

and argue grounds at the close of evidence.” The trial court declined to grant the

motion, and Adams began to present his defense.

Treva Whitfield, Adams’s girlfriend, testified that she owned the gun

and the bag. She produced a receipt for the handgun. Whitfield indicated that she

used the bag to carry her things to the gym on the morning of July 31, 2022 -- the

day that Adams left Georgia; that she decided to use the bag to pack some of

Adams’s things for his trip; and that she forgot to remove the handgun before he

left. Adams took the stand and confirmed Whitfield’s testimony. After the

defense closed its case, Adams moved again for a directed verdict. He argued that

the Commonwealth failed to present evidence to show that Adams knowingly

possessed Whitfield’s handgun. The court denied the motion.

The trial court instructed the jury, closing arguments were made, and

the jury began deliberating. The jury convicted Adams of possession of a handgun

by a convicted felon and of being a persistent felony offender in the second degree.

Based upon the jury’s recommendation, Adams was sentenced by the court to five-

years’ imprisonment -- enhanced by his status as a persistent felony offender to ten

years. This appeal followed.

First, Adams contends that the trial court erred by declining to grant

his motion to suppress the incriminating evidence. He acknowledges that defense

-4- counsel did not address the automobile exception to the warrant requirement in his

motion to suppress the evidence. Nevertheless, Adams argues that the issue is

preserved for our review on appeal. Alternatively, he argues that we should review

the trial court’s decision for palpable error.

Where the issue is adequately preserved for our review, we analyze a

trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress by assessing its findings of fact for clear

error and its conclusions of law under a de novo standard of review. Jackson v.

Commonwealth, 187 S.W.3d 300, 305 (Ky. 2006) (citing Welch v. Commonwealth,

149 S.W.3d 407, 409 (Ky. 2004)). Where an argument is not addressed in a

suppression motion, it is not ordinarily considered upon appellate review.

Commonwealth v. Smith, 542 S.W.3d 276, 285 (Ky. 2018). But, as Adams

correctly observes, even where an issue is inadequately preserved, we may review

the trial court’s decision for palpable error. Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure

(RCr) 10.26. However, we may grant relief only where we determine that manifest

injustice has resulted from the unpreserved error. Id.

As explained by the Supreme Court of Kentucky, an error is palpable

where it is “easily perceptible, plain, obvious and readily noticeable.” Brewer v.

Commonwealth, 206 S.W.3d 343, 349 (Ky. 2006) (citations omitted). The rule's

requirement of manifest injustice requires “showing [a] probability of a different

result or error so fundamental as to threaten a defendant’s entitlement to due

-5- process of law.” Martin v. Commonwealth, 207 S.W.3d 1, 3 (Ky. 2006).

“Manifest injustice is found if the error seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or

public reputation of the proceeding.” McGuire v. Commonwealth, 368 S.W.3d

100, 112 (Ky. 2012) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

“[A]ll searches without a warrant are unreasonable unless it can be

shown that they come within one of the exceptions to the rule that a search must be

made pursuant to a valid warrant.” Cook v. Commonwealth, 826 S.W.2d 329, 331

(Ky. 1992) (citation omitted). Under the automobile exception, police officers are

permitted “to search a legitimately stopped automobile where probable cause exists

that contraband or evidence of a crime is in the vehicle.” Dunn v. Commonwealth,

199 S.W.3d 775, 776 (Ky. App. 2006) (citing United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798,

800-01, 102 S. Ct. 2157, 2159-61, 72 L. Ed. 2d 572, 578 (1982)).

In this case, Officer Dooley stopped Adams’s van because of a traffic

violation. He was met with the strong odor of marijuana coming from the vehicle.

Officer Dooley also noticed marijuana in a container on the dash. This interaction

gave Officer Dooley probable cause to believe that evidence of a crime might

likely be found in the vehicle. Officer Dooley was authorized by probable cause to

conduct a warrantless search of Adams’s person, his vehicle, and its contents. The

handgun and the magazine were discovered as a result of the search. Officer

-6- Dooley’s search of the vehicle was justified under these facts, and his actions were

reasonable under the circumstances.

We summarily reject Adams’s untimely contention that “in light of

the changing legal landscape” where “[m]arijuana is no longer per se illegal[,]”

Officer Dooley’s immediate detection of an odor of marijuana could not alone

establish probable cause to search the vehicle. As Adams readily concedes,

possession of marijuana was plainly illegal on the date the search was undertaken.

And, as we have observed, probable cause was clearly established as a result of the

odor emanating from the vehicle. No subsequent change in the law could have

affected the trial court’s probable-cause analysis. Consequently, there was no

error. We affirm the trial court’s denial of the motion to suppress.

Next, Adams contends that the trial court erred by failing to direct a

verdict. He argues that there was no proof that he knowingly possessed the

handgun found in the vehicle.

When presented with a motion for directed verdict, the trial court must

draw all fair and reasonable inferences from the evidence in favor of the

Commonwealth. Commonwealth v. Benham, 816 S.W.2d 186, 187 (Ky. 1991). If

the evidence is sufficient to induce a reasonable juror to believe beyond a

reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty, a directed verdict will not be granted.

-7- Id. The trial court must assume that Commonwealth’s evidence is true, reserving

to the jury questions as to the credibility and weight to be given to the testimony.

Hall v. Commonwealth, 645 S.W.3d 383, 392 (Ky. 2022) (quoting Benham, 816

S.W.2d at 187). In order to defeat a directed verdict motion, the Commonwealth

must produce “‘more than a mere scintilla of evidence.’” Lackey v.

Commonwealth, 468 S.W.3d 348, 352 (Ky. 2015) (quoting Benham, 816 S.W.2d at

187).

To convict Adams, the Commonwealth had the burden of proving that

he possessed, manufactured, or transported a handgun and that he had previously

been convicted of a felony. See KRS 527.040. Adams stipulated to the fact that he

was a convicted felon. Possession of a handgun may be proven through either

actual possession or constructive possession. Deboy v. Commonwealth, 214

S.W.3d 926, 930 (Ky. App. 2007) (citation omitted). The Commonwealth

prosecuted Adams for possession of the handgun under a theory of constructive

possession.

To prove constructive possession, the Commonwealth had to present

evidence to establish that the contraband was subject to the defendant’s dominion

and control. Hargrave v. Commonwealth, 724 S.W.2d 202, 203 (Ky. 1986), cert.

denied Hargrave v. Kentucky, 484 U.S. 821, 108 S. Ct. 81, 98 L. Ed. 2d 43 (1987).

The Supreme Court of Kentucky has held that a person “who owns or exercises

-8- dominion or control over a motor vehicle in which contraband is concealed, is

deemed to possess the contraband.” Leavell v. Commonwealth, 737 S.W.2d 695,

697 (Ky. 1987) (citing United States v. Vergara, 687 F.2d 57 (5th Cir. 1982)). As

noted in Dixon v. Commonwealth, 149 S.W.3d 426 (Ky. 2004), this reasoning is in

accordance with the general rule that “[t]he contents of an automobile are

presumed to be those of one who operates it and is in charge of it, and this applies

particularly where the operator is also the owner[.]” Id. at 429 (quoting Chambers

v. State, 293 S.E.2d 20, 21 (Ga. App. 1982)). We have previously applied the

principles of Leavell to analyze constructive possession of a firearm in a vehicle by

a convicted felon. Deboy, 214 S.W.3d at 930.

In the case before us, the Commonwealth presented evidence that

Adams exercised dominion and control over the vehicle. Indeed, there was no

evidence to the contrary. Adams was authorized to use the vehicle; he was

operating it at the time; and there were no passengers. Because the

Commonwealth produced “more than a mere scintilla of evidence” to support the

charge, the trial court did not err by denying the motion for directed verdict.

Lackey, 468 S.W.3d at 352 (quoting Benham, 816 S.W.2d at 187).

Finally, Adams presents a challenge to the constitutionality of KRS

527.040 as applied to this prosecution. While Adams did not question the

constitutionality of the statute below, he did not abide by the provisions of KRS

-9- 418.075(1), which requires a defendant who wishes to challenge the

constitutionality of a statute to notify the Attorney General of his claim “before

judgment is entered.” “[S]trict compliance with the notification provisions of KRS

418.075 is mandatory[.]” Benet v. Commonwealth, 253 S.W.3d 528, 532 (Ky.

2008). The notification requirement applies even in criminal cases where the

Attorney General represents the Commonwealth -- regardless of whether a statute

is challenged on its face or as applied. Id.

In Couch v. Commonwealth, 686 S.W.3d 172, 179 (Ky. 2024) (citing

Benet, 253 S.W.3d at 532), the Supreme Court of Kentucky recently observed that

“[o]ur courts refuse to address arguments that a statute is unconstitutional unless

these notice provisions [of KRS 418.075] are fully satisfied.” The Court explained

as follows:

[G]ood reason exists for [KRS 418.075]. Kentucky does not have a unified prosecutorial system, and although there is a relationship between the Attorney General and local prosecuting officials, Commonwealth’s Attorneys do not answer to the Attorney General. See generally KRS 15.220 and 15.725. The Attorney General, who is elected statewide by the Commonwealth’s voters and not just by local citizens, “is in a unique position to defend the constitutionality of an act of the General Assembly. The Attorney General must be given this opportunity at the trial level because a declaration regarding the constitutionality of a statute affects all the citizens of the Commonwealth[.]” Benet, 253 S.W.3d at 532 n.13; see Brashars v. Commonwealth, 25 S.W.3d 58, 65-66 (Ky. 2000) (rejecting argument that notice to the Attorney General regarding constitutionality of a statute was not

-10- required because the Commonwealth was already a party to the criminal action); Jacobs v. Commonwealth, 947 S.W.2d 416, 419 (Ky. App. 1997) (stating “[w]e recognize that in criminal cases such as this the Commonwealth is represented at the trial level by local prosecuting officials. . . . For that reason, we conclude that the notice requirements of [KRS 418.075] must be met in criminal, as well as civil, actions[ ]”).

Couch, 686 S.W.3d at 179-80.

Adams acknowledges in his appellate brief that his constitutional

challenge to KRS 527.040 is unpreserved. Nevertheless, he urges us to review his

contention under the provisions of RCr 10.26. In light of the unequivocal

declarations of the Kentucky Supreme Court in Couch, we must decline to

undertake such a review with respect to this issue.

The order of the Kenton Circuit Court is affirmed.

ALL CONCUR.

BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT: BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Erin Hoffman Yang Russell Coleman Assistant Public Advocate Attorney General of Kentucky Frankfort, Kentucky Melissa A. Pile Assistant Attorney General Frankfort, Kentucky

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