Dean v. the Boeing Co.

195 F. Supp. 2d 1280, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5646, 2002 WL 485344
CourtDistrict Court, D. Kansas
DecidedMarch 29, 2002
Docket00-1256-JTM
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 195 F. Supp. 2d 1280 (Dean v. the Boeing Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Kansas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Dean v. the Boeing Co., 195 F. Supp. 2d 1280, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5646, 2002 WL 485344 (D. Kan. 2002).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM ORDER

MARTEN, District Judge.

In the present case, plaintiff Jimmie Dean advances claims of wrongful retaliation under Title VII and the Kansas Act Against Discrimination (KAAD) and breach of contract against his employer, The Boeing Company. Among other things, Dean alleges that Boeing retaliated against him for the participation of his wife in a separate lawsuit against the company when it suspended him for three days for sexually harassing another Boeing worker. Boeing has moved for summary judgment. For the reasons stated here, defendant’s motion will be granted.

Summary judgment is proper where the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). In considering a motion for summary judgment, the court must examine all evidence in a light most favorable to the opposing party. McKenzie v. Mercy Hospital, 854 F.2d 365, 367 (10th Cir.1988). The party moving for summary judgment must demonstrate its entitlement to summary judgment beyond a reasonable doubt. Ellis v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 754 F.2d 884, 885 (10th Cir.1985). The moving party need not disprove plaintiffs claim; it need only establish that the factual allegations have no legal significance. Dayton Hudson Corp. v. Macerich Real Estate Co., 812 F.2d 1319, 1323 (10th Cir.1987).

In resisting a motion for summary judgment, the opposing party may not rely *1282 upon mere allegations or denials contained in its pleadings or briefs. Rather, the nonmoving party must come forward with specific facts showing the presence of a genuine issue of material fact for trial and significant probative evidence supporting the allegation. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Once the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), the party opposing summary judgment must do more than simply show there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. “In the language of the Rule, the nonmoving party must come forward with ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. ’ ” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) (quoting Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(e))(emphasis in Matsushita). One of the principal purposes of the summary judgment rule is to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims or defenses, and the rule should be interpreted in a way that allows it to accomplish this purpose. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).

Findings of Fact 1

Dean is an hourly employee. He has worked for Boeing since April 3, 1997. At the time relevant to this lawsuit, Dean worked second shift in the Material organization. The terms and conditions of his employment are governed by a Collective Bargaining Agreement.

Other than a three-day suspension Dean received for harassing a co-worker, he has not missed any work as a result of the allegations contained in his complaint and he continues to work at Boeing.

Dean’s wife, Mary Dean, is also an hourly worker in the Material organization at Boeing. She generally works first shift, although she was temporarily assigned to second shift for two periods in 1999: from January 25 to February 5, and from February 15 to February 19. These assignments were made pursuant to Mary Dean’s request to reduce the number of contacts she would receive during the Williams lawsuit, as discussed further below. .

During 1999 and 2000, Vernell Jackson served as the director over the Material organization, and had served in that capacity since 1996. The Material organization includes approximately 400 hourly and salaried employees. Jackson had four second-level managers who reported directly to him during this time period, including Ricky Lee, who served as a second-level manager over both Dean and his wife.

As a manager, Lee was responsible for supervising several first-level managers, including Henry Bittle, Mary Stewart, Jo-nelle Yunk, and Kim Clift. The first-level managers under Lee rotated between shifts and work groups, so that there was a change in first-level managers approximately three to four times per year.

Jania Kistler has been a Personnel Representative supporting Material since August 1994. As a personnel representative, Kistler works with managers in Material regarding various personnel issues as well as answering questions for employees or referring employees to the appropriate Boeing organization.

On June 4, 1998, a race discrimination class action suit, Williams et al. v. The Boeing Company, Case No. C-98-761-C, was filed in the United States District *1283 Court for the Western District of Washington. Mary Dean was the only plaintiff from Wichita, Kansas.

On November 4, 1998, a First Amended Complaint was filed in the Williams class action in Seattle. In this Amended Complaint, there were six additional named plaintiffs from Wichita. Jimmie Dean was not one of the additional plaintiffs.

On January 22, 1999, Boeing and the Williams plaintiffs announced that they had reached a settlement. The same day, the court provisionally approved a Consent Decree settling the case, along with setting deadlines for members of the class to object.

The settlement received coverage in the Wichita newspaper, as well as in various television and radio outlets. None of the individuals accused of wrongful retaliation in this case — Lee, Millie Stewart, Henry Bittle, and Jania Kistler — were involved in the negotiation of the Williams settlement.

Boeing paid for Mary Dean to travel to Seattle for the settlement announcement. Mary Dean asked that her husband accompany her. During this trip, Phil Condit, Chairman of the Boeing Board of Directors, also met with the Deans at Mary Dean’s request because she had concerns that there would be retaliation arising out of the settlement. Mary Dean expressed her concerns to Condit about the treatment of black workers at Boeing Wichita. Condit told her that Boeing would not tolerate any retaliation.

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Bluebook (online)
195 F. Supp. 2d 1280, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5646, 2002 WL 485344, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/dean-v-the-boeing-co-ksd-2002.