Dean v. Medical Review Institute of America

CourtDistrict Court, D. Utah
DecidedJuly 22, 2022
Docket2:22-cv-00226
StatusUnknown

This text of Dean v. Medical Review Institute of America (Dean v. Medical Review Institute of America) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Utah primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Dean v. Medical Review Institute of America, (D. Utah 2022).

Opinion

THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF UTAH

SHANE WHITE, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, ORDER REGARDING MOTION TO CONSOLIDATE AND COMPETING Plaintiff, MOTIONS TO APPOINT INTERIM CO- LEAD CLASS COUNSEL AND INTERIM v. LIAISON COUNSEL

MEDICAL REVIEW INSTITUTE OF AMERICA, LLC, Consolidated Case No. 2:22cv00082-DAK-DAO Judge Dale A. Kimball Defendant. Magistrate Judge Daphne A. Oberg

KAREN PURVIS, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,

Plaintiff, Case No. 2:22cv0099

v.

MEDICAL REVIEW INSTITUTE OF AMERICA, LLC,

Defendant.

AHMED AMER, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,

Plaintiff, Case No. 2:22cv0132

Defendant. JOEL THORNTON, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,

Plaintiff, Case No. 2:22cv0181

PATRICIA A. DEAN, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Case No. 2:22cv0226 Plaintiff,

Defendant. This matter is before the court on (1) a Motion to Consolidate Cases and Motion to Appoint Interim Co-Lead Counsel filed by Plaintiffs Karen Purvis and Patricia A. Dean (the “Purvis Plaintiffs”) (ECF No. 10), and (2) Motion to Appoint Interim Co-Lead Class Counsel and Liaison Counsel Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g)(3) filed by Plaintiffs Shane White, Ahmed Amer, and Joel Thornton (the “White Plaintiffs”) (ECF No. 20). The court has carefully reviewed the written memoranda submitted by the parties, and pursuant to local rule 7-1(g), the court has concluded that oral argument would not be helpful or

necessary, and thus the court will determine the motion on the basis of the written memoranda. See DUCivR 7-1(g). I. MOTION TO CONSOLIDATE CASES The Purvis Plaintiffs and White Plaintiffs agree that the five related actions identified in the caption above (“Related Actions”) should be consolidated into the first-filed action, White v. Medical Review Institute of America, LLC, 2:22cv00082 DAK-DAO. The court finds that the parties have established good cause for the consolidation of the related cases pending in this district. These cases arise from the same nucleus of common facts, are brought against a common

defendant—Medical Review Institute of America (MRIOA)—and raise many of the same questions of law. Consolidation will provide for complete resolution in one proceeding and avoid unnecessary duplication of work and the risk of inconsistent adjudications, thereby promoting the interests of judicial economy and convenience with no prejudice to the parties and the putative class. Accordingly, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(a) and Local Rule DUCivR 42-1(a), the Motion to Consolidate is granted, and the following cases are hereby consolidated into the

3 instant case: Karen Purvis v. Medical Review Institute of America, LLC, 2:22cv00009 Ahmed Amer v. v. Medical Review Institute of America, LLC, 2:22cv00132

Joel Thornton v. Medical Review Institute of America, LLC, 2:22cv00181 Patricia A. Dean v. Medical Review Institute of America, LLC, 2:22cv00226 All filings made in the Related Action are deemed to have been made in this case without needing to refile the documents. All future papers filed in the Consolidated Action shall be filed under Case No. 2:22cv00082 DAK-DAO and shall bear the following caption:

IN RE MEDICAL REVIEW INSTITUTE OF AMERICA, LLC, DATA BREACH LITIGATION Lead Case No. 2:22cv0082-DAK-DAO Judge Dale A. Kimball Magistrate Judge Daphne A. Oberg This Document Relates to: _______

4 II. COMPETING MOTIONS TO APPOINT INTERIM CO-LEAD CLASS COUNSEL AND LIAISON COUNSEL

The White Plaintiffs request that this court appoint (i) Gary M. Klinger of Milberg Coleman Bryson Phillips Grossman, PLLC; and (ii) William B. Federman of Federman & Sherwood as Interim Co-Lead Counsel; along with (iii) Charles H. Thronson of Parsons Behle & Latimer as Interim Liaison Counsel (collectively, the “White Attorneys”). On the other hand, the Purvis Plaintiffs seek appointment of (i) Ben Barnow of Barnow and Associates, P.C.; (ii) Timothy G. Blood of Blood Hurst & O’Reardon, LLP; and (iii) Gary E. Mason of Mason LLP as Interim Co-Lead Counsel; along with (iv) Jennifer Fraser Parrish of Magleby Cataxinos & Greenwood, PC as Interim Liaison Counsel (collectively, the “Purvis Attorneys”). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(g)(3) permits the appointment of interim lead counsel “to act on behalf of putative class members before determining whether to certify the action as a class action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g)(3). “[D]esignation of interim counsel clarifies responsibility for protecting the interests of the class during precertification activities, such as making and responding to motions, conducting any necessary discovery, moving for class certification, and negotiating settlement.” Manual for Complex Litigation (4th) § 21.11 (2004). Interim lead class counsel must represent the interests of the class. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g)(2). In selecting interim lead class counsel, this court must consider: (1) the work counsel has done in identifying or investigating potential claims in the action; (2) counsel’s

experience in handling class actions, other complex litigation, and the types of claims asserted in the action; (3) counsel’s knowledge of the applicable law; and (4) the resources

5 counsel will commit to representing the class. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g)(1)(A); see also Adedipe v. U.S. Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 2014 WL 835174, at *3 (D. Minn. Mar. 4, 2014). The court may also consider “any other matter pertinent to counsel’s ability to fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g)(1)(B). The purpose of this court’s review is to ensure that counsel appointed to leading roles are “qualified and responsible, that they will fairly and adequately represent all parties on their side, and that their charges will be reasonable.” Manual for Complex Litig. § 10.22. The ultimate goal is “achieving efficiency and economy without jeopardizing fairness

to parties.” Id. § 10.221; see also Cappello v. Franciscan All., Inc., No. 3:16-CV-290-TLS-MGG, 2017 WL 781609, at *3 (N.D. Ind. Feb. 28, 2017). Ultimately, no single factor is determinative; instead, a court should appoint counsel after evaluating all relevant considerations and comparing the relative strengths of counsel. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g)(1)(A)-(B); 7B Charles Alan Wright et al., Fed. Prac. & Proc. § 1802.3 (3d ed. 2005). Based on the briefing of these motions, along with the attached exhibits, it appears that both sets of proposed interim co-lead counsel and liaison counsel satisfy the four factors that the court must consider. “Where consideration of other relevant factors does not tilt heavily in either direction, and there is a need for an objective tie-breaker, courts may also consider which party was first to file a complaint.” In re Frontier Airlines Litig., 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 253280, at *6-7

(internal quotation and citation omitted); see also In re Mun. Derivatives Antitrust Litig., 252 F.R.D. 184, 186 (S.D.N.Y.

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